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Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Mon, 21 May 2018 15:57:35 -0600 Subject: Re: [PATCH] audit: add containerid support for IMA-audit To: Steve Grubb Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , Mimi Zohar , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List , linux-integrity , LKML , paul@paul-moore.com References: <1520257393.10396.291.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <2397631.78oLu0QVqb@x2> <21646a72-e782-e33a-9e75-5cc98b241f36@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <4015765.rtofcNpGHU@x2> From: Stefan Berger Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 17:57:29 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <4015765.rtofcNpGHU@x2> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Message-Id: Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 05/21/2018 02:30 PM, Steve Grubb wrote: > Hello Stefan, > > On Monday, May 21, 2018 1:53:04 PM EDT Stefan Berger wrote: >> On 05/21/2018 12:58 PM, Steve Grubb wrote: >>> On Thursday, May 17, 2018 10:18:13 AM EDT Stefan Berger wrote: >>>>> audit_log_container_info() then releasing the local context. This >>>>> version of the record has additional concerns covered here: >>>>> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/52 >>>> Following the discussion there and the concern with breaking user space, >>>> how can we split up the AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE that is used in >>>> ima_audit_measurement() and ima_parse_rule(), without 'breaking user >>>> space'? >>>> >>>> A message produced by ima_parse_rule() looks like this here: >>>> >>>> type=INTEGRITY_RULE msg=audit(1526566213.870:305): action="dont_measure" >>>> fsmagic="0x9fa0" res=1 >>> Why is action and fsmagic being logged as untrusted strings? Untrusted >>> strings are used when an unprivileged user can affect the contents of the >>> field such as creating a file with space or special characters in the >>> name. >>> >>> Also, subject and object information is missing. Who loaded this rule? >>> >>>> in contrast to that an INTEGRITY_PCR record type: >>>> >>>> type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1526566235.193:334): pid=1615 uid=0 auid=0 >>>> ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 >>>> op="invalid_pcr" cause="open_writers" comm="scp" >>>> name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="dm-0" ino=1962625 res=1 >>> Why is op & cause being logged as an untrusted string? This also has >>> incomplete subject information. >> It's calling audit_log_string() in both cases: >> >> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/security/integrity/integrity >> _audit.c#L48 > I see. Looking things over, I see that it seems like it should do the right > thing. But the original purpose for this function is here: > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/audit.c#L1944 > > This is where it is logging an untrusted string and has to decide to encode > it or just place it in quotes. If it has quotes, that means it's an untrusted > string but has no control characters in it. I think you want to use > audit_log_format() for any string that is trustworthy. Replacing all occurrences (in IMA) of audit_log_string() with audit_log_format(). > > > As an aside, I wonder why audit_log_string() is in the API when it is a > helper to audit_log_untrustedstring() ? Without understanding the rules of > untrusted strings, it can't be used correctly without re-inventing > audit_log_untrustedstring() by hand. > > >>>> Should some of the fields from INTEGRITY_PCR also appear in >>>> INTEGRITY_RULE? If so, which ones? >>> pid, uid, auid, tty, session, subj, comm, exe, res. <- these are >>> required to be searchable >>> >>>> We could probably refactor the current integrity_audit_message() and >>>> have ima_parse_rule() call into it to get those fields as well. I >>>> suppose adding new fields to it wouldn't be considered breaking user >>>> space? >>> The audit user space utilities pretty much expects those fields in that >>> order for any IMA originating events. You can add things like op or >>> cause before >> We will call into audit_log_task, which will put the parameters into >> correct order: >> >> auid uid gid ses subj pid comm exe > I'm telling you what the correct order is. :-) A long time ago, the IMA :-) Thanks. Was getting confused. > system had audit events with the order I'm mentioning. For example, here's > one from a log I collected back in 2013: > > type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1327409021.813:21): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 > ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op="add_template_measure" cause="hash_added" > comm="init" name="01parse-kernel.sh" dev=rootfs ino=5413 res=0 > > it was missing "tty" and "exe", but the order is as I mentioned. The > expectation is that INTEGRITY events maintain this established order across > all events. I am *appending* exe= and tty= now: type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1526939047.809:305): pid=1609 uid=0 auid=0 ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="invalid_pcr" cause="open_writers" comm="ssh" name="/var/lib/sss/mc/passwd" dev="dm-0" ino=1962679 res=1 exe="/usr/bin/ssh" tty=tty2 Stefan > > Thanks, > -Steve > > >> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/auditsc.c#L2433 >> >>> that. The reason why you can do that is those additional fields are not >>> required to be searchable by common criteria. >>> >>> -Steve > > >