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From: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
To: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: maddy@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, npiggin@gmail.com,
	christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu,
	James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, nayna@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/10] pseries/plpks: improve type consistency and parameter validation
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 11:41:48 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e98b01dc-6347-438b-9894-4f18335f2c9e@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831111738.334857-4-ssrish@linux.ibm.com>


On 31.08.2026 4:47 PM, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> Update plpks_wrap_object() and plpks_unwrap_object() to use u64 length
> parameters, matching the underlying hcall data types for consistency.
> Update the PKWM consumer, where these interfaces are used, accordingly.
>
> Add explicit casts when copying values from hcall return buffers into
> narrower data types. This makes the intended conversion clear and avoids
> implicit truncation in PLPKS hcall result handling.
>
> Also validate input pointers in plpks_signed_update_var() and
> plpks_read_var() before dereferencing them, addressing missing validation
> when reading and updating PLPKS objects.
>
> Fixes: 133aa79e211d ("pseries/plpks: add HCALLs for PowerVM Key Wrapping Module")
> Fixes: 2454a7af0f2a ("powerpc/pseries: define driver for Platform KeyStore")
> Fixes: 899d9b8fee66 ("powerpc/pseries: Implement signed update for PLPKS objects")
> Fixes: c99fcb0d735b ("keys/trusted_keys: establish PKWM as a trusted source")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>

Tested on ppc64le PowerVM LPARs on firmware with wrap/unwrap support,
with and without Secure Boot enabled.

Verified trusted key creation and the seal/unseal round-trip for key sizes
in the range [32-128] bytes. Confirmed that NULL pointer validation in
plpks_signed_update_var() and plpks_read_var() does not break normal
operation.
> ---
>   arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h          |  8 ++++----
>   arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c    | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
>   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c |  4 ++--
>   3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h
> index e87f90e40d4e..8b2ffb27db5a 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h
> @@ -118,11 +118,11 @@ bool plpks_wrapping_is_supported(void);
>   
>   int plpks_gen_wrapping_key(void);
>   
> -int plpks_wrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len, u16 wrap_flags,
> -		      u8 **output_buf, u32 *output_len);
> +int plpks_wrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u64 input_len, u16 wrap_flags,
> +		      u8 **output_buf, u64 *output_len);
>   
> -int plpks_unwrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len,
> -			u8 **output_buf, u32 *output_len);
> +int plpks_unwrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u64 input_len,
> +			u8 **output_buf, u64 *output_len);
>   #else // CONFIG_PSERIES_PLPKS
>   static inline bool plpks_is_available(void) { return false; }
>   static inline u16 plpks_get_passwordlen(void) { BUILD_BUG(); }
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c
> index 7bd5c149dd09..45278c5a45c1 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c
> @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int plpks_confirm_object_flushed(struct label *label,
>   				 virt_to_phys(auth), virt_to_phys(label),
>   				 label->size);
>   
> -		status = retbuf[0];
> +		status = (u8)retbuf[0];
>   		if (rc) {
>   			timed_out = false;
>   			if (rc == H_NOT_FOUND && status == 1)
> @@ -637,6 +637,9 @@ int plpks_signed_update_var(struct plpks_var *var, u64 flags)
>   	u64 continuetoken = 0;
>   	u64 timeout = 0;
>   
> +	if (!var)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>   	if (!var->data || var->datalen <= 0 || var->namelen > PLPKS_MAX_NAME_SIZE)
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   
> @@ -822,6 +825,9 @@ static int plpks_read_var(u8 consumer, struct plpks_var *var)
>   	u8 *output;
>   	int rc;
>   
> +	if (!var)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>   	if (var->namelen > PLPKS_MAX_NAME_SIZE)
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   
> @@ -863,14 +869,14 @@ static int plpks_read_var(u8 consumer, struct plpks_var *var)
>   		goto out_copy_policy;
>   	}
>   
> -	if (!var->data || var->datalen > retbuf[0])
> -		var->datalen = retbuf[0];
> +	if (!var->data || var->datalen > (u16)retbuf[0])
> +		var->datalen = (u16)retbuf[0];
>   
>   	if (var->data)
>   		memcpy(var->data, output, var->datalen);
>   
>   out_copy_policy:
> -	var->policy = retbuf[1];
> +	var->policy = (u32)retbuf[1];
>   out_free_output:
>   	kfree(output);
>   out_free_label:
> @@ -1015,8 +1021,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(plpks_gen_wrapping_key);
>    *
>    * Returns: On success 0 is returned, a negative errno if not.
>    */
> -int plpks_wrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len, u16 wrap_flags,
> -		      u8 **output_buf, u32 *output_len)
> +int plpks_wrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u64 input_len, u16 wrap_flags,
> +		      u8 **output_buf, u64 *output_len)
>   {
>   	unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE] = { 0 };
>   	struct plpks_auth *auth;
> @@ -1134,8 +1140,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(plpks_wrap_object);
>    *
>    * Returns: On success 0 is returned, a negative errno if not.
>    */
> -int plpks_unwrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len, u8 **output_buf,
> -			u32 *output_len)
> +int plpks_unwrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u64 input_len, u8 **output_buf,
> +			u64 *output_len)
>   {
>   	unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE] = { 0 };
>   	struct plpks_auth *auth;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
> index bf42c6679245..b6b5697426a8 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_pkwm.c
> @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int trusted_pkwm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>   	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>   	struct trusted_pkwm_options *pkwm = NULL;
>   	u8 *input_buf, *output_buf;
> -	u32 output_len, input_len;
> +	u64 output_len, input_len;
>   	int rc;
>   
>   	options = trusted_options_alloc();
> @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int trusted_pkwm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>   static int trusted_pkwm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>   {
>   	u8 *input_buf, *output_buf;
> -	u32 input_len, output_len;
> +	u64 input_len, output_len;
>   	int rc;
>   
>   	input_len = p->blob_len;

-- 
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry


  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-04  6:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-31 11:17 [PATCH v2 00/10] Extend PKWM to support user-created wrapping keys Srish Srinivasan
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] pseries/plpks: update PKS documentation and maintainer entry Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:10   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] pseries/plpks: fix error handling in plpks_read_var() Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:10   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] pseries/plpks: improve type consistency and parameter validation Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:11   ` R Nageswara Sastry [this message]
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] keys/trusted_keys: propagate wrapping key generation errors Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:12   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] pseries/plpks: rename the default wrapping key macro Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:13   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] pseries/plpks: fix self-reference in plpks_var initializer Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:14   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] pseries/plpks: hide wrapping_features when unsupported Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:16   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] pseries/plpks: add HCALLs for PKWM wrapping key life cycle management Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:16   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] keys/trusted_keys: enable PKWM wrapping key selection by label Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:17   ` R Nageswara Sastry
2026-08-31 11:17 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] pseries/plpks/wrapkey: expose PKWM wrapping key management to userspace via sysfs Srish Srinivasan
2026-09-04  6:19   ` R Nageswara Sastry

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