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Tue, 6 Jan 2026 05:06:34 GMT Received: from smtpav02.dal12v.mail.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F6C65805C; Tue, 6 Jan 2026 05:06:34 +0000 (GMT) Received: from smtpav02.dal12v.mail.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C73F58051; Tue, 6 Jan 2026 05:06:30 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [9.124.214.6] (unknown [9.124.214.6]) by smtpav02.dal12v.mail.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 6 Jan 2026 05:06:29 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2026 10:36:28 +0530 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] pseries/plpks: add HCALLs for PowerVM Key Wrapping Module To: Mimi Zohar , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: maddy@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, npiggin@gmail.com, christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, jarkko@kernel.org, nayna@linux.ibm.com, rnsastry@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org References: <20251217172505.112398-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> <20251217172505.112398-5-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Srish Srinivasan In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=QbNrf8bv c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=695c985e cx=c_pps a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:117 a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:17 a=IkcTkHD0fZMA:10 a=vUbySO9Y5rIA:10 a=VkNPw1HP01LnGYTKEx00:22 a=VnNF1IyMAAAA:8 a=koB8e8PFGBGOZsEmAvoA:9 a=ViHw82dsJJ-CUmMY:21 a=3ZKOabzyN94A:10 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: 4H0r5OgvqDD_WaDdIg-sgSbdXug1bEpT X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details-Enc: AW1haW4tMjYwMTA2MDAzOCBTYWx0ZWRfX6D+4oCq7Nixr NCeTnv4boSAGmqTWRphfCkd05iWEZImeMnyGc7uevp5EqYbUBJ4duDKze3+hYpMbSMerHrY/afK l5KC06TLaC6C67irWlzQhIRW+1DGRELFMx61cX+0wVBDAs3Vr0/J6jdgmx7UtYLWCvzJeAoddZs E6gcWgK10/9PZLUd8y17UWP6tI/a7UdFkG/BrwEHS35m/t1kASfeh/ESo8gdIkIfoXD+beEaHvI W9CxKoCr0+2M28GVELfPlTlXtMVGpvHM2Bd0B80j+GtS15FaYoEBnVBAq77PZNIGaeZ7fZ8CqBo Rw6FY/M+VJU7hkdd7TuNpmOi84cpllgrm5QrOeQmg3dZjTEDamMErIEYdRGDkzRCkeybx8sK2+C b4TkbjU/VqG9Lx768jcb/jDSODrulji4afw8USpAWJhfQfgwqsFFsiGNMd1PjXOeVJMVqUnNwwf NDP7V8IhLXSr+zBL+TQ== X-Proofpoint-GUID: lK8WcFAvQJ1BPz8SfxhJtFQ1ImzG2GyR X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1121,Hydra:6.1.9,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2026-01-05_02,2026-01-05_01,2025-10-01_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 bulkscore=0 suspectscore=0 priorityscore=1501 adultscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 phishscore=0 malwarescore=0 classifier=typeunknown authscore=0 authtc= authcc= route=outbound adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.19.0-2512120000 definitions=main-2601060038 Hi Mimi, thanks for taking  a look. On 1/2/26 10:55 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > Hi Srish, > > On Wed, 2025-12-17 at 22:55 +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote: >> The hypervisor generated wrapping key is an AES-GCM-256 symmetric key which >> is stored in a non-volatile, secure, and encrypted storage called the Power >> LPAR Platform KeyStore. It has policy based protections that prevent it >> from being read out or exposed to the user. >> >> Implement H_PKS_GEN_KEY, H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT, and H_PKS_UNWRAP_OBJECT HCALLs >> to enable using the PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a new trust >> source for trusted keys. Disallow H_PKS_READ_OBJECT, H_PKS_SIGNED_UPDATE, >> and H_PKS_WRITE_OBJECT for objects with the 'wrapping key' policy set. >> Capture the availability status for the H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT interface. >> >> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan > scripts/checkpatch.pl --codespell caught a couple of typos. Please fix the > typos here in in this patch and the one in v2 5/6. Sure, I will fix them and send out v3. Thanks for pointing these out. >> --- >> Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst | 43 +++ >> arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h | 10 + >> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c | 345 ++++++++++++++++++++- >> 3 files changed, 396 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst >> index 805e1cb9bab9..14e39f095a1c 100644 >> --- a/Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst >> +++ b/Documentation/arch/powerpc/papr_hcalls.rst >> @@ -300,6 +300,49 @@ H_HTM supports setup, configuration, control and dumping of Hardware Trace >> Macro (HTM) function and its data. HTM buffer stores tracing data for functions >> like core instruction, core LLAT and nest. >> >> +**H_PKS_GEN_KEY** >> + >> +| Input: authorization, objectlabel, objectlabellen, policy, out, outlen >> +| Out: *Hypervisor Generated Key, or None when the wrapping key policy is set* >> +| Return Value: *H_SUCCESS, H_Function, H_State, H_R_State, H_Parameter, H_P2, >> + H_P3, H_P4, H_P5, H_P6, H_Authority, H_Nomem, H_Busy, H_Resource, >> + H_Aborted* >> + >> +H_PKS_GEN_KEY is used to have the hypervisor generate a new random key. >> +This key is stored as an object in the Power LPAR Platform KeyStore with >> +the provided object label. With the wrapping key policy set the key is only >> +visible to the hypervisor, while the key's label would still be visible to >> +the user. Generation of wrapping keys is supported only for a key size of >> +32 bytes. >> + >> +**H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT** >> + >> +| Input: authorization, wrapkeylabel, wrapkeylabellen, objectwrapflags, in, >> +| inlen, out, outlen, continue-token >> +| Out: *continue-token, byte size of wrapped object, wrapped object* >> +| Return Value: *H_SUCCESS, H_Function, H_State, H_R_State, H_Parameter, H_P2, >> + H_P3, H_P4, H_P5, H_P6, H_P7, H_P8, H_P9, H_Authority, H_Invalid_Key, >> + H_NOT_FOUND, H_Busy, H_LongBusy, H_Aborted* >> + >> +H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT is used to wrap an object using a wrapping key stored in the >> +Power LPAR Platform KeyStore and return the wrapped object to the caller. The >> +caller provides a label to a wrapping key with the 'wrapping key' policy set, >> +which must have been previously created with H_PKS_GEN_KEY. The provided object >> +is then encrypted with the wrapping key and additional metadata and the result >> +is returned to the caller. >> + >> + >> +**H_PKS_UNWRAP_OBJECT** >> + >> +| Input: authorization, objectwrapflags, in, inlen, out, outlen, continue-token >> +| Out: *continue-token, byte size of unwrapped object, unwrapped object* >> +| Return Value: *H_SUCCESS, H_Function, H_State, H_R_State, H_Parameter, H_P2, >> + H_P3, H_P4, H_P5, H_P6, H_P7, H_Authority, H_Unsupported, H_Bad_Data, >> + H_NOT_FOUND, H_Invalid_Key, H_Busy, H_LongBusy, H_Aborted* >> + >> +H_PKS_UNWRAP_OBJECT is used to unwrap an object that was previously warapped with >> +H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT. >> + >> References >> ========== >> .. [1] "Power Architecture Platform Reference" >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h >> index 8f034588fdf7..e87f90e40d4e 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpks.h >> @@ -113,6 +113,16 @@ void plpks_early_init_devtree(void); >> int plpks_populate_fdt(void *fdt); >> >> int plpks_config_create_softlink(struct kobject *from); >> + >> +bool plpks_wrapping_is_supported(void); >> + >> +int plpks_gen_wrapping_key(void); >> + >> +int plpks_wrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len, u16 wrap_flags, >> + u8 **output_buf, u32 *output_len); >> + >> +int plpks_unwrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len, >> + u8 **output_buf, u32 *output_len); >> #else // CONFIG_PSERIES_PLPKS >> static inline bool plpks_is_available(void) { return false; } >> static inline u16 plpks_get_passwordlen(void) { BUILD_BUG(); } >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c >> index 4a08f51537c8..2ec04908b057 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c >> @@ -9,6 +9,32 @@ >> >> #define pr_fmt(fmt) "plpks: " fmt >> >> +#define PLPKS_WRAPKEY_COMPONENT "PLPKSWR" >> +#define PLPKS_WRAPKEY_NAME "default-wrapping-key" >> + >> +/* >> + * To 4K align the {input, output} buffers to the {UN}WRAP H_CALLs >> + */ >> +#define PLPKS_WRAPPING_BUF_ALIGN 4096 >> + >> +/* >> + * To ensure the output buffer's length is at least 1024 bytes greater >> + * than the input buffer's length during the WRAP H_CALL >> + */ >> +#define PLPKS_WRAPPING_BUF_DIFF 1024 >> + >> +#define PLPKS_WRAP_INTERFACE_BIT 3 >> +#define PLPKS_WRAPPING_KEY_LENGTH 32 >> + >> +#define WRAPFLAG_BE_BIT_SET(be_bit) \ >> + BIT_ULL(63 - (be_bit)) >> + >> +#define WRAPFLAG_BE_GENMASK(be_bit_hi, be_bit_lo) \ >> + GENMASK_ULL(63 - (be_bit_hi), 63 - (be_bit_lo)) >> + >> +#define WRAPFLAG_BE_FIELD_PREP(be_bit_hi, be_bit_lo, val) \ >> + FIELD_PREP(WRAPFLAG_BE_GENMASK(be_bit_hi, be_bit_lo), (val)) >> + >> #include >> #include >> #include >> @@ -39,6 +65,7 @@ static u32 supportedpolicies; >> static u32 maxlargeobjectsize; >> static u64 signedupdatealgorithms; >> static u64 wrappingfeatures; >> +static bool wrapsupport; >> >> struct plpks_auth { >> u8 version; >> @@ -283,6 +310,7 @@ static int _plpks_get_config(void) >> maxlargeobjectsize = be32_to_cpu(config->maxlargeobjectsize); >> signedupdatealgorithms = be64_to_cpu(config->signedupdatealgorithms); >> wrappingfeatures = be64_to_cpu(config->wrappingfeatures); >> + wrapsupport = config->flags & PPC_BIT8(PLPKS_WRAP_INTERFACE_BIT); >> >> // Validate that the numbers we get back match the requirements of the spec >> if (maxpwsize < 32) { >> @@ -614,6 +642,9 @@ int plpks_signed_update_var(struct plpks_var *var, u64 flags) >> if (!(var->policy & PLPKS_SIGNEDUPDATE)) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> + if (var->policy & PLPKS_WRAPPINGKEY) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> // Signed updates need the component to be NULL. >> if (var->component) >> return -EINVAL; >> @@ -696,6 +727,9 @@ int plpks_write_var(struct plpks_var var) >> if (var.policy & PLPKS_SIGNEDUPDATE) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> + if (var.policy & PLPKS_WRAPPINGKEY) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> auth = construct_auth(PLPKS_OS_OWNER); >> if (IS_ERR(auth)) >> return PTR_ERR(auth); >> @@ -790,6 +824,9 @@ static int plpks_read_var(u8 consumer, struct plpks_var *var) >> if (var->namelen > PLPKS_MAX_NAME_SIZE) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> + if (var->policy & PLPKS_WRAPPINGKEY) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> auth = construct_auth(consumer); >> if (IS_ERR(auth)) >> return PTR_ERR(auth); >> @@ -845,8 +882,312 @@ static int plpks_read_var(u8 consumer, struct plpks_var *var) >> } >> >> /** >> - * plpks_read_os_var() - Fetch the data for the specified variable that is >> - * owned by the OS consumer. >> + * plpks_wrapping_is_supported() - Get the H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT interface >> + * availability status for the LPAR. >> + * >> + * Successful execution of the H_PKS_GET_CONFIG HCALL during initialization >> + * sets bit 3 of the flags variable in the PLPKS config structure if the >> + * H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT interface is supported. >> + * >> + * Returns: true if the H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT interface is supported, false if not. >> + */ >> +bool plpks_wrapping_is_supported(void) >> +{ >> + return wrapsupport; >> +} >> + >> +/** >> + * plpks_gen_wrapping_key() - Generate a new random key with the 'wrapping key' >> + * policy set. >> + * >> + * The H_PKS_GEN_KEY HCALL makes the hypervisor generate a new random key and >> + * store the key in a PLPKS object with the provided object label. With the >> + * 'wrapping key' policy set, only the label to the newly generated random key >> + * would be visible to the user. >> + * >> + * Possible reasons for the returned errno values: >> + * >> + * -ENXIO if PLPKS is not supported >> + * -EIO if PLPKS access is blocked due to the LPAR's state >> + * if PLPKS modification is blocked due to the LPAR's state >> + * if an error occurred while processing the request >> + * -EINVAL if invalid authorization parameter >> + * if invalid object label parameter >> + * if invalid object label len parameter >> + * if invalid or unsupported policy declaration >> + * if invalid output buffer parameter >> + * if invalid output buffer length parameter >> + * -EPERM if access is denied >> + * -ENOMEM if there is inadequate memory to perform this operation >> + * -EBUSY if unable to handle the request >> + * -EEXIST if the object label already exists >> + * >> + * Returns: On success 0 is returned, a negative errno if not. >> + */ >> +int plpks_gen_wrapping_key(void) >> +{ >> + unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE] = { 0 }; >> + struct plpks_auth *auth; >> + struct label *label; >> + int rc = 0, pseries_status = 0; >> + struct plpks_var var = { >> + .name = PLPKS_WRAPKEY_NAME, >> + .namelen = strlen(var.name), >> + .policy = PLPKS_WRAPPINGKEY, >> + .os = PLPKS_VAR_LINUX, >> + .component = PLPKS_WRAPKEY_COMPONENT >> + }; >> + >> + auth = construct_auth(PLPKS_OS_OWNER); >> + if (IS_ERR(auth)) >> + return PTR_ERR(auth); >> + >> + label = construct_label(var.component, var.os, var.name, var.namelen); >> + if (IS_ERR(label)) { >> + rc = PTR_ERR(label); >> + goto out; >> + } >> + >> + rc = plpar_hcall(H_PKS_GEN_KEY, retbuf, >> + virt_to_phys(auth), virt_to_phys(label), >> + label->size, var.policy, >> + NULL, PLPKS_WRAPPING_KEY_LENGTH); >> + >> + if (!rc) >> + rc = plpks_confirm_object_flushed(label, auth); >> + >> + pseries_status = rc; >> + rc = pseries_status_to_err(rc); >> + >> + if (rc && rc != -EEXIST) { >> + pr_err("H_PKS_GEN_KEY failed."); >> + pr_err("pseries_status = %d, error code = %d", pseries_status, >> + rc); >> + } else { >> + rc = 0; >> + } >> + >> + kfree(label); >> +out: >> + kfree(auth); >> + return rc; >> +} >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(plpks_gen_wrapping_key); >> + >> +/** >> + * plpks_wrap_object() - Wrap an object using the default wrapping key stored in >> + * the PLPKS. >> + * @input_buf: buffer containing the data to be wrapped >> + * @input_len: length of the input buffer >> + * @wrap_flags: object wrapping flags >> + * @output_buf: buffer to store the wrapped data >> + * @output_len: length of the output buffer >> + * >> + * The H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT HCALL wraps an object using a wrapping key stored in >> + * the PLPKS and returns the wrapped object to the caller. The caller provides a >> + * label to the wrapping key with the 'wrapping key' policy set that must have >> + * been previously created with the H_PKS_GEN_KEY HCALL. The provided object is >> + * then encrypted with the wrapping key and additional metadata and the result >> + * is returned to the user. The metadata includes the wrapping algorithm and the >> + * wrapping key name so those parameters are not required during unwrap. >> + * >> + * Possible reasons for the returned errno values: >> + * >> + * -ENXIO if PLPKS is not supported >> + * -EIO if PLPKS access is blocked due to the LPAR's state >> + * if PLPKS modification is blocked due to the LPAR's state >> + * if an error occurred while processing the request >> + * -EINVAL if invalid authorization parameter >> + * if invalid wraping key label parameter > -> wrapping Noted. Will fix this. > >> + * if invalid wrapping key label length parameter >> + * if invalid or unsupported object wrapping flags >> + * if invalid inut buffer parameter > -> input Noted. Will fix this. >> + * if invalid input buffer length parameter >> + * if invalid output buffer parameter >> + * if invalid output buffer length parameter >> + * if invalid continue token parameter >> + * if the wrapping key is not compatible with the wrapping >> + * algorithm >> + * -EPERM if access is denied >> + * -ENOENT if the requested wrapping key was not found >> + * -EBUSY if unable to handle the request or long running operation >> + * initiated, retry later. >> + * >> + * Returns: On success 0 is returned, a negative errno if not. >> + */ >> +int plpks_wrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len, u16 wrap_flags, >> + u8 **output_buf, u32 *output_len) >> +{ >> + unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE] = { 0 }; >> + struct plpks_auth *auth; >> + struct label *label; >> + u64 continuetoken = 0; >> + u64 objwrapflags = 0; >> + int rc = 0, pseries_status = 0; >> + bool sb_audit_or_enforce_bit = wrap_flags & BIT(0); >> + bool sb_enforce_bit = wrap_flags & BIT(1); >> + struct plpks_var var = { >> + .name = PLPKS_WRAPKEY_NAME, >> + .namelen = strlen(var.name), >> + .os = PLPKS_VAR_LINUX, >> + .component = PLPKS_WRAPKEY_COMPONENT >> + }; >> + >> + auth = construct_auth(PLPKS_OS_OWNER); >> + if (IS_ERR(auth)) >> + return PTR_ERR(auth); >> + >> + label = construct_label(var.component, var.os, var.name, var.namelen); >> + if (IS_ERR(label)) { >> + rc = PTR_ERR(label); >> + goto out; >> + } >> + >> + /* Set the consumer password requirement bit. A must have. */ >> + objwrapflags |= WRAPFLAG_BE_BIT_SET(3); >> + >> + /* Set the wrapping algorithm bit. Just one algorithm option for now */ >> + objwrapflags |= WRAPFLAG_BE_FIELD_PREP(60, 63, 0x1); >> + >> + if (sb_audit_or_enforce_bit & sb_enforce_bit) { >> + pr_err("Cannot set both audit/enforce and enforce bits."); >> + rc = -EINVAL; >> + goto out_free_label; >> + } else if (sb_audit_or_enforce_bit) { >> + objwrapflags |= WRAPFLAG_BE_BIT_SET(1); >> + } else if (sb_enforce_bit) { >> + objwrapflags |= WRAPFLAG_BE_BIT_SET(2); >> + } >> + >> + *output_len = input_len + PLPKS_WRAPPING_BUF_DIFF; >> + >> + *output_buf = kzalloc(ALIGN(*output_len, PLPKS_WRAPPING_BUF_ALIGN), >> + GFP_KERNEL); >> + if (!(*output_buf)) { >> + pr_err("Output buffer allocation failed. Returning -ENOMEM."); >> + rc = -ENOMEM; >> + goto out_free_label; >> + } >> + >> + do { >> + rc = plpar_hcall9(H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT, retbuf, >> + virt_to_phys(auth), virt_to_phys(label), >> + label->size, objwrapflags, >> + virt_to_phys(*input_buf), input_len, >> + virt_to_phys(*output_buf), *output_len, >> + continuetoken); >> + >> + continuetoken = retbuf[0]; >> + pseries_status = rc; >> + rc = pseries_status_to_err(rc); >> + } while (rc == -EBUSY); >> + >> + if (rc) { >> + pr_err("H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT failed."); >> + pr_err("pseries_status = %d, return code = %d", pseries_status, >> + rc); >> + kfree(*output_buf); >> + *output_buf = NULL; >> + } else { >> + *output_len = retbuf[1]; >> + } >> + >> +out_free_label: >> + kfree(label); >> +out: >> + kfree(auth); >> + return rc; >> +} >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(plpks_wrap_object); >> + >> +/** >> + * plpks_unwrap_object() - Unwrap an object using the default wrapping key >> + * stored in the PLPKS. >> + * @input_buf: buffer containing the data to be unwrapped >> + * @input_len: length of the input buffer >> + * @output_buf: buffer to store the unwrapped data >> + * @output_len: length of the output buffer >> + * >> + * The H_PKS_UNWRAP_OBJECT HCALL unwraps an object that was previously wrapped >> + * using the H_PKS_WRAP_OBJECT HCALL. >> + * >> + * Possible reasons for the returned errno values: >> + * >> + * -ENXIO if PLPKS is not supported >> + * -EIO if PLPKS access is blocked due to the LPAR's state >> + * if PLPKS modification is blocked due to the LPAR's state >> + * if an error occurred while processing the request >> + * -EINVAL if invalid authorization parameter >> + * if invalid or unsupported object unwrapping flags >> + * if invalid inut buffer parameter > -> input Noted. Will fix this. > >> + * if invalid input buffer length parameter >> + * if invalid output buffer parameter >> + * if invalid output buffer length parameter >> + * if invalid continue token parameter >> + * if the wrapping key is not compatible with the wrapping >> + * algorithm >> + * if the wrapped object's format is not supported >> + * if the wrapped object is invalid >> + * -EPERM if access is denied >> + * -ENOENT if the wrapping key for the provided object was not found >> + * -EBUSY if unable to handle the request or long running operation >> + * initiated, retry later. >> + * >> + * Returns: On success 0 is returned, a negative errno if not. >> + */ >> +int plpks_unwrap_object(u8 **input_buf, u32 input_len, u8 **output_buf, >> + u32 *output_len) >> +{ >> + unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE] = { 0 }; >> + struct plpks_auth *auth; >> + u64 continuetoken = 0; >> + u64 objwrapflags = 0; >> + int rc = 0, pseries_status = 0; >> + >> + auth = construct_auth(PLPKS_OS_OWNER); >> + if (IS_ERR(auth)) >> + return PTR_ERR(auth); >> + >> + *output_len = input_len - PLPKS_WRAPPING_BUF_DIFF; >> + *output_buf = kzalloc(ALIGN(*output_len, PLPKS_WRAPPING_BUF_ALIGN), >> + GFP_KERNEL); >> + if (!(*output_buf)) { >> + pr_err("Output buffer allocation failed. Returning -ENOMEM."); >> + rc = -ENOMEM; >> + goto out; >> + } >> + >> + do { >> + rc = plpar_hcall9(H_PKS_UNWRAP_OBJECT, retbuf, >> + virt_to_phys(auth), objwrapflags, >> + virt_to_phys(*input_buf), input_len, >> + virt_to_phys(*output_buf), *output_len, >> + continuetoken); >> + >> + continuetoken = retbuf[0]; >> + pseries_status = rc; >> + rc = pseries_status_to_err(rc); >> + } while (rc == -EBUSY); >> + >> + if (rc) { >> + pr_err("H_PKS_UNWRAP_OBJECT failed."); >> + pr_err("pseries_status = %d, return code = %d", pseries_status, >> + rc); >> + kfree(*output_buf); >> + *output_buf = NULL; >> + } else { >> + *output_len = retbuf[1]; >> + } >> + >> +out: >> + kfree(auth); >> + return rc; >> +} >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(plpks_unwrap_object); >> + >> +/** >> + * plpks_read_os_var() - Fetch the data for the specified variable that is owned >> + * by the OS consumer. >> * @var: variable to be read from the PLPKS >> * >> * The consumer or the owner of the object is the os kernel. The Thanks, Srish.