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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>, Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	brauner@kernel.org, miklos@szeredi.hu
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 9/9] ima: Record i_version of real_inode for change detection
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 18:14:00 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fa242ec4-3f7b-4ae0-9430-b1b39255e10d@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <754c1617c27660eff17bc0d7f4921c59d2471603.camel@kernel.org>



On 2/6/24 10:54, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Tue, 2024-02-06 at 17:23 +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote:
>> On Mon, Feb 5, 2024 at 8:25 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> process_measurement() will try to detect file content changes for not-yet-
>>> copied-up files on a stacked filesystem based on the i_version number of
>>> the real inode: !inode_eq_iversion(real_inode, iint->version)
>>> Therefore, take a snapshot of the i_version of the real file to be used
>>> for i_version number-based file content change detection by IMA in
>>> process_meassurements().
>>>
>>> In this case vfs_getattr_nosec() cannot be used since it will return the
>>> i_version number of the file on the overlay layer which will trigger more
>>> iint resets in process_measurements() than necessary since this i_version
>>> number represents different state than that of the real_inode (of a
>>> not-yet-copied up file).
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>>> ---
>>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------------
>>>   1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>>> index 597ea0c4d72f..530888cc481e 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>>> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
>>>   #include <linux/xattr.h>
>>>   #include <linux/evm.h>
>>>   #include <linux/fsverity.h>
>>> +#include <linux/iversion.h>
>>>
>>>   #include "ima.h"
>>>
>>> @@ -250,7 +251,6 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>>>          int result = 0;
>>>          int length;
>>>          void *tmpbuf;
>>> -       u64 i_version = 0;
>>>
>>>          /*
>>>           * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
>>> @@ -263,16 +263,6 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>>>          if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
>>>                  goto out;
>>>
>>> -       /*
>>> -        * Detecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems
>>> -        * which do not support i_version, support was originally limited
>>> -        * to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit, but was modified to
>>> -        * assume the file changed.
>>> -        */
>>> -       result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
>>> -                                  AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
>>> -       if (!result && (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE))
>>> -               i_version = stat.change_cookie;
>>>          hash.hdr.algo = algo;
>>>          hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
>>>
>>> @@ -302,10 +292,22 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>>>
>>>          iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
>>>          memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
>>> -       iint->version = i_version;
>>> -       if (real_inode != inode) {
>>> +       if (real_inode == inode) {
>>> +               /*
>>> +                * Detecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems
>>> +                * which do not support i_version, support was originally limited
>>> +                * to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit, but was modified to
>>> +                * assume the file changed.
>>> +                */
>>> +               result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
>>> +                                          STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
>>> +                                          AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
>>> +               if (!result && (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE))
>>> +                       iint->version = stat.change_cookie;
>>> +       } else {
>>>                  iint->real_ino = real_inode->i_ino;
>>>                  iint->real_dev = real_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>>> +               iint->version = inode_query_iversion(real_inode);
> 
> You only want to do this if IS_I_VERSION(inode) is true. If the
> underlying filesystem is doing its own thing wrt the i_version field,
> calling inode_query_iversion on it may corrupt it.
> 
> 
>>>          }
>>>
>>
>> The commit that removed inode_query_iversion db1d1e8b9867 ("IMA: use
>> vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version") claimed to do that because
>> inode_query_iversion() did not work in overlayfs and now this commit
>> uses inode_query_iversion() only for overlayfs.

Following this patch inode_query_version() would only be used when 
real_inode != inode, such as when a copy-up has not occurred, yet. If 
real_inode == inode then this is the case for the 'overlay' layer of 
overlayfs as well as any other non-stacked filesystem that would then 
still use vfs_getattr_nosec(). So is vfs_getattr_nosec() NOT the more 
general approach for all filesystems to use here?

>>
>> STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE does not seem to make much sense in this
>> code anymore, unless it is still needed, according to original commit to
>> "allow IMA to work properly with a broader class of filesystems in the future."
> 
> I don't have a real opinion here. When I did the original patch that
> switched this over to to use vfs_getattr_nosec, I didn't consider that
> it could end up being called from an atomic context. Reverting that

Under what conditions do we have an atomic context here? I was/am not 
aware of this.

> seems like the correct thing to do if it's still broken.
> 
> If you're fine with this only working on a subset of local filesystems,
> then doing something like this is probably fine:
> 
> 	if (IS_I_VERSION(real_inode))
> 		iint->version = inode_query_iversion(real_inode);
> 
> ...but it's not clear to me what you should do if IS_I_VERSION is false.
> I guess IMA just falls back to checking the ctime in that case?

It does not use ctime but assumes that something has changed.

      reply	other threads:[~2024-02-13 23:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-05 18:24 [PATCH v2 0/9] evm: Support signatures on stacked filesystem Stefan Berger
2024-02-05 18:24 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] ima: Rename backing_inode to real_inode Stefan Berger
2024-02-06 15:23   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-05 18:24 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] security: allow finer granularity in permitting copy-up of security xattrs Stefan Berger
2024-02-06 15:12   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-20 22:57   ` Paul Moore
2024-02-05 18:25 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] evm: Implement per signature type decision in security_inode_copy_up_xattr Stefan Berger
2024-02-05 18:25 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] ima: Reset EVM status upon detecting changes to the real file Stefan Berger
2024-02-06 12:38   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-06 15:44   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-07  5:04   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-05 18:25 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] evm: Use the inode holding the metadata to calculate metadata hash Stefan Berger
2024-02-06 15:33   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-06 18:22   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-05 18:25 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] evm: Enforce signatures on unsupported filesystem for EVM_INIT_X509 Stefan Berger
2024-02-05 18:25 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] fs: Rename SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED to SB_I_EVM_HMAC_UNSUPPORTED Stefan Berger
2024-02-06 15:11   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-05 18:25 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] evm: Rename is_unsupported_fs to is_unsupported_hmac_fs Stefan Berger
2024-02-05 18:25 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] ima: Record i_version of real_inode for change detection Stefan Berger
2024-02-06 15:23   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-06 15:54     ` Jeff Layton
2024-02-13 23:14       ` Stefan Berger [this message]

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