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From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] lib/crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 08:10:21 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fdd88f0f-ec72-4640-919b-3e6d3a3c9434@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260813022757.GB28329@sol>

On 13/08/2026 04.27, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 12, 2026 at 06:33:33PM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
>> It's maybe not worth the effort for hmac_sha1_ctx right now (since there
>> is only one spot that forgot to zeroize the structure in case of errors),
>> but offering a function for zeroizing the data via __cleanup might help to
>> get future code into the proper shape right from the start. Thus let's
>> introduce a hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() function now and use it in the
>> appropriate spots.
>>
>> Thomas Huth (3):
>>    crypto: Provide a wrapper for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx
> 
> Subject prefix should be "lib/crypto: sha1:"
> 
>>    security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before
>>      returning
>>    lib/crypto: sha1: Use hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() instead of
>>      memzero_explicit()
>>
>>   include/crypto/sha1.h                     | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>>   lib/crypto/sha1.c                         |  2 +-
>>   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c |  2 +-
>>   3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> As you probably know, SHA-1 is a bit outdated.  Will these be coming for
> SHA-2 as well?  It would be nice to introduce all the APIs at the same
> time so that we can make sure they're consistent.  I would actually
> prioritize that over introducing callers of them right now, as that can
> be done later and often requires acks from other maintainers (and they
> can go through other trees as well).
Yes, makes sense. I've got a patch for HMAC-SHA2 ready, too, but the patch 
that is using it on the calling site has a conflict with the smb patch that 
I already sent out, so I wanted to wait a little bit til that is merged:

  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260812130152.2861834-2-thuth@redhat.com/

... but if you're fine with a series that introduces the zeroization 
functions first, without immediately introducing callers, I'm happy to 
assemble such a patch series first!

  Thomas


      reply	other threads:[~2026-08-13  6:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-12 16:33 [PATCH 0/3] lib/crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 2/3] security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before returning Thomas Huth
2026-08-12 16:33 ` [PATCH 3/3] lib/crypto: sha1: Use hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() instead of memzero_explicit() Thomas Huth
2026-08-13  2:27 ` [PATCH 0/3] lib/crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx Eric Biggers
2026-08-13  6:10   ` Thomas Huth [this message]

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