* [PATCH v3 1/7] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-10 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar,
open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list
In-Reply-To: <20251210143940.264191-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
TPM2_Unseal requires TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, and tpm2_unseal_cmd() always does
set up either password or HMAC session.
Remove the branch in tpm2_unseal_cmd() conditionally setting
TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. It is faulty but luckily it is never exercised at
run-time, and thus does not cause regressions.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +---------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 9074ae1a5896..27424e1a4a63 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -450,9 +450,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 blob_handle)
{
- struct tpm_header *head;
u16 data_len;
- int offset;
u8 *data;
int rc;
@@ -488,14 +486,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, options->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append(buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+ if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip))
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
- } else {
- offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
- head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
- }
}
rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 0/7] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-10 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS,
open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list
Since we cannot at this point cache names of the keys given limitations
of the ASN.1 file format, I'll start a fresh patch set. Let's fixup what
we can right now.
This patch set addresses two major issues in the feature:
1. Dynamic resolution without gain. All kernel sites have at most single
handle to authorize. Even if this changes some day this is how it is
as of today and we definitely do not want to dictate the future but
instead downscale code to the metrics that we have as of today.
2. Eliminate at least one unnnecessary tpm2_read_public() call.
Jarkko Sakkinen (7):
KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
tpm: Orchestrate TPM commands in tpm_get_random()
tpm: Send only one TPM command per hwrng request
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 ----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++--
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 -
drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 62 --------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 102 +------------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 130 +++++-----------
include/linux/tpm.h | 51 +++++--
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 8 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 134 ++++++++++-------
11 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 370 deletions(-)
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-10 1:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list, Herbert Xu,
David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <aThqCYgK1_zvk5UO@kernel.org>
On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 08:27:25PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 07:32:27PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 05:42:55PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 12:05:23PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > Since we cannot at this point cache names of the keys given limitations
> > > > of the ASN.1 file format, I'll start a fresh patch set. Let's fixup what
> > > > we can right now.
> > > >
> > > > This patch set addresses two major issues in the feature:
> > > >
> > > > 1. Dynamic resolution without gain. All kernel sites have at most single
> > > > handle to authorize. Even if this changes some day this is how it is
> > > > as of today and we definitely do not want to dictate the future but
> > > > instead downscale code to the metrics that we have as of today.
> > > > 2. Eliminate at least one unnnecessary tpm2_read_public() call.
> > > >
> > > > Jarkko Sakkinen (5):
> > > > KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
> > > > tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
> > > > KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
> > > > tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
> > > > tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
> > > >
> > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 ----
> > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 9 +-
> > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 130 ++++++---------------
> > > > include/linux/tpm.h | 49 +++++---
> > > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 134 +++++++++++++---------
> > > > 6 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > 2.52.0
> > > >
> > >
> > > For hwrng we can e.g., calculate factor by timing tpm2_get_random() with
> > > and without HMAC encryption. Then we can use this as frequency how often
> > > data is pulled.
> > >
> > > The other angle to combine this is to maintain largeish FIFO of random
> > > bytes and fill this when it goes below a treshold.
> > >
> > > Probably some combination of these will provide answer to performance
> > > and latency problem with hwrng when HMAC encryption is turned on:
> > >
> > > 1. The first amortizes the overall quota.
> > > 2. Second provides constant latency without major spikes.
> >
> > Another perhaps more unorthodox idea:
> >
> > 1. Calculate factor as said above. Let's call it N.
> > 2. Every Nth step seed a pseudo rng from TPM.
> > 3. On steps not divisible by N, pull from pseud rng.
> >
> > I'm not a cryptographer but would randomness suffer from this? Then the
> > seeds that woud come from TPM are HMAC encrypted at least without major
> > hits on performance.
> >
> > Just enumerated this. Not sure about this idea yet by any means but I do
> > like simplicy of it (and that also makes me concerned about missed
> > details).
>
> Third option would be to have simply a kthread with a rate that fills a
> pool and hwrng callbacks serves from that pool. If there is no bytes,
> there is no bytes (which is fine as far as API is concerned).
>
> This has optimal system latency properties I'd figure.
OK so the very first thing that should be done with hwrng is this: it
should be opportunistic instead of being committing (to X number of
bytes). Further optimizations should be considered only after changing
this heuristics.
That guarantees that when hwrng's thread queries bytes from TPM driver
it is guaranteed to cause always exactly one TPM2_GetRandom transaction.
How this can be done is to first re-orchestrate tpm_get_random() along
the lines (out of top of my head, did not even compile this):
int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
{
u32 num_bytes = max;
u8 *out_ptr = out;
int retries = 5;
int total = 0;
int rc;
if (!out || !max || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
return -EINVAL;
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
do {
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
rc = tpm2_get_random(chip, out_ptr, num_bytes);
else
rc = tpm1_get_random(chip, out_ptr, num_bytes);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
out_ptr += rc;
total += rc;
num_bytes -= rc;
} while (retries-- && total < max);
tpm_put_ops(chip);
return total ? total : -EIO;
err:
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
{tpm1,tpm2}_get_random() are changed to do exactly single transaction
and on success they return how many bytes were read.
hwrng code should also use {tpm1,tpm2}_get_random() and use the
requested size as a hint not as something that we commit into.
I think this will benefit kernel even without HMAC encryption because
it objectively makes things a bit more deterministic.
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v4 3/4] ima_{conditionals,measurements}.sh: Use tst_runas
From: Petr Vorel @ 2025-12-09 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Cc: Petr Vorel, Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, selinux, Cyril Hrubis,
Jan Stancek, Li Wang
In-Reply-To: <20251209185557.20598-1-pvorel@suse.cz>
Replace 'sudo' and 'sg' with 'tst_runas'.
This not only removes 'sudo' external dependency, but it s required
because new releases of many distros (e.g. Debian, openSUSE Tumbleweed,
SLES, ...) switched shell for 'nobody' user from /bin/bash (or /bin/sh)
to /usr/sbin/nologin. That effectively disables using 'sudo', 'su', 'sg':
ima_conditionals 1 TINFO: verify measuring user files when requested via uid
sudo: Account expired or PAM config lacks an "account" section for sudo, contact your system administrator
sudo: a password is required
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
---
.../integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh | 13 ++++++-------
.../integrity/ima/tests/ima_measurements.sh | 11 ++---------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh
index ba19176039..ae947db1e9 100755
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# gid and fgroup options test kernel commit 40224c41661b ("ima: add gid
# support") from v5.16.
-TST_NEEDS_CMDS="cat chgrp chown id sg sudo"
+TST_NEEDS_CMDS="cat chgrp chown"
TST_SETUP="setup"
TST_CNT=1
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ verify_measurement()
local test_file="$PWD/test.txt"
local cmd="cat $test_file > /dev/null"
- local value="$(id -u $user)"
- [ "$request" = 'gid' -o "$request" = 'fgroup' ] && value="$(id -g $user)"
+ local value="$TST_USR_UID"
+ [ "$request" = 'gid' -o "$request" = 'fgroup' ] && value="$TST_USR_GID"
# needs to be checked each run (not in setup)
require_policy_writable
@@ -41,15 +41,14 @@ verify_measurement()
case "$request" in
fgroup)
- chgrp $user $test_file
+ chgrp $TST_USR_GID $test_file
sh -c "$cmd"
;;
fowner)
- chown $user $test_file
+ chown $TST_USR_UID $test_file
sh -c "$cmd"
;;
- gid) sg $user "sh -c '$cmd'";;
- uid) sudo -n -u $user sh -c "$cmd";;
+ gid|uid) tst_runas sh -c "$cmd";;
*) tst_brk TBROK "Invalid res type '$1'";;
esac
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_measurements.sh b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_measurements.sh
index 60350f3926..cf35e131ed 100755
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_measurements.sh
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_measurements.sh
@@ -68,30 +68,23 @@ test2()
test3()
{
- local user="nobody"
local dir="$PWD/user"
local file="$dir/test.txt"
local cmd="grep $file $ASCII_MEASUREMENTS"
# Default policy does not measure user files
tst_res TINFO "verify not measuring user files"
- tst_check_cmds sudo || return
if [ "$IMA_MISSING_POLICY_CONTENT" = 1 ]; then
tst_res TCONF "test requires specific policy, try load it with LTP_IMA_LOAD_POLICY=1"
return
fi
- if ! id $user >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
- tst_res TCONF "missing system user $user (wrong installation)"
- return
- fi
-
[ -d "$dir" ] || mkdir -m 0700 $dir
- chown $user $dir
+ chown $TST_USR_UID $dir
cd $dir
# need to read file to get updated $ASCII_MEASUREMENTS
- sudo -n -u $user sh -c "echo $(cat /proc/uptime) user file > $file; cat $file > /dev/null"
+ tst_runas sh -c "echo $(cat /proc/uptime) user file > $file; cat $file > /dev/null"
cd ..
if ! tst_rod "$cmd" 2> /dev/null; then
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 0/4] tst_runas.c, ima_{conditionals, measurements}.sh enhancements
From: Petr Vorel @ 2025-12-09 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Cc: Petr Vorel, Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, selinux, Cyril Hrubis,
Jan Stancek, Li Wang
v3->v4:
Rename tst_sudo.c => tst_runas.c (Li, Cyril)
Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20251127082638.224110-1-pvorel@suse.cz/T/#t
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/list/?series=483681&state=*
Kind regards,
Petr
Petr Vorel (4):
shell: Add tst_runas.c helper
tst_test.sh: Add TST_USR_{G,U}ID variables
ima_{conditionals,measurements}.sh: Use tst_runas
ima_conditionals.sh: Split test by request
doc/users/setup_tests.rst | 4 +
runtest/ima | 5 +-
.../integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh | 78 +++++++++++--------
.../integrity/ima/tests/ima_measurements.sh | 11 +--
testcases/lib/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
testcases/lib/tst_runas.c | 51 ++++++++++++
testcases/lib/tst_test.sh | 6 +-
8 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v4 4/4] ima_conditionals.sh: Split test by request
From: Petr Vorel @ 2025-12-09 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Cc: Petr Vorel, Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, selinux, Cyril Hrubis,
Jan Stancek, Li Wang
In-Reply-To: <20251209185557.20598-1-pvorel@suse.cz>
This helps to run all testcases on systems without CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=y
(disabled by default in mainline, therefore disabled for some distros,
e.g. openSUSE Tumbleweed), if SUT reboots.
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
---
runtest/ima | 5 +-
.../integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh | 67 ++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/runtest/ima b/runtest/ima
index 01942eefa3..c8d0c6801e 100644
--- a/runtest/ima
+++ b/runtest/ima
@@ -6,5 +6,8 @@ ima_violations ima_violations.sh
ima_keys ima_keys.sh
ima_kexec ima_kexec.sh
ima_selinux ima_selinux.sh
-ima_conditionals ima_conditionals.sh
+ima_conditionals_uid ima_conditionals.sh -r uid
+ima_conditionals_fowner ima_conditionals.sh -r fowner
+ima_conditionals_gid ima_conditionals.sh -r gid
+ima_conditionals_fgroup ima_conditionals.sh -r fgroup
evm_overlay evm_overlay.sh
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh
index ae947db1e9..7dd37373cd 100755
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh
@@ -11,35 +11,66 @@
TST_NEEDS_CMDS="cat chgrp chown"
TST_SETUP="setup"
-TST_CNT=1
+TST_OPTS="r:"
+TST_USAGE="usage"
+TST_PARSE_ARGS="parse_args"
+REQUEST="uid"
+
+parse_args()
+{
+ REQUEST="$2"
+}
+
+usage()
+{
+ cat << EOF
+usage: $0 [-r <uid|fowner|gid|fgroup>]
+
+OPTIONS
+-r Specify the request to be measured. One of:
+ uid, fowner, gid, fgroup
+ Default: uid
+EOF
+}
setup()
{
+ case "$REQUEST" in
+ fgroup|fowner|gid|uid)
+ tst_res TINFO "request '$REQUEST'"
+ ;;
+ *) tst_brk TBROK "Invalid -r '$REQUEST', use: -r <uid|fowner|gid|fgroup>";;
+ esac
+
if check_need_signed_policy; then
tst_brk TCONF "policy have to be signed"
fi
}
-verify_measurement()
+test()
{
+ # needs to be checked each run (not in setup)
+ require_policy_writable
+
local request="$1"
- local user="nobody"
local test_file="$PWD/test.txt"
local cmd="cat $test_file > /dev/null"
-
local value="$TST_USR_UID"
- [ "$request" = 'gid' -o "$request" = 'fgroup' ] && value="$TST_USR_GID"
- # needs to be checked each run (not in setup)
- require_policy_writable
+ if [ "$REQUEST" = 'gid' -o "$REQUEST" = 'fgroup' ]; then
+ if tst_kvcmp -lt 5.16; then
+ tst_brk TCONF "gid and fgroup options require kernel 5.16 or newer"
+ fi
+ value="$TST_USR_GID"
+ fi
ROD rm -f $test_file
- tst_res TINFO "verify measuring user files when requested via $request"
- ROD echo "measure $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY
- ROD echo "$(cat /proc/uptime) $request test" \> $test_file
+ tst_res TINFO "verify measuring user files when requested via $REQUEST"
+ ROD echo "measure $REQUEST=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY
+ ROD echo "$(cat /proc/uptime) $REQUEST test" \> $test_file
- case "$request" in
+ case "$REQUEST" in
fgroup)
chgrp $TST_USR_GID $test_file
sh -c "$cmd"
@@ -49,24 +80,10 @@ verify_measurement()
sh -c "$cmd"
;;
gid|uid) tst_runas sh -c "$cmd";;
- *) tst_brk TBROK "Invalid res type '$1'";;
esac
ima_check $test_file
}
-test1()
-{
- verify_measurement uid
- verify_measurement fowner
-
- if tst_kvcmp -lt 5.16; then
- tst_brk TCONF "gid and fgroup options require kernel 5.16 or newer"
- fi
-
- verify_measurement gid
- verify_measurement fgroup
-}
-
. ima_setup.sh
tst_run
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 2/4] tst_test.sh: Add TST_USR_{G,U}ID variables
From: Petr Vorel @ 2025-12-09 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Cc: Petr Vorel, Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, selinux, Cyril Hrubis,
Jan Stancek, Li Wang
In-Reply-To: <20251209185557.20598-1-pvorel@suse.cz>
Add TST_USR_{G,U}ID variables with the default values from tst_runas.c.
These can be used as a default values for tests which use tst_runas and
need to know UID/GID for other commands.
It will be used in LTP IMA tests.
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
---
testcases/lib/tst_runas.c | 1 +
testcases/lib/tst_test.sh | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/testcases/lib/tst_runas.c b/testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
index e8d5d8dd9d..e937828273 100644
--- a/testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
+++ b/testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
* Copyright (c) 2025 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
*/
+/* update also tst_test.sh */
#define LTP_USR_UID 65534
#define LTP_USR_GID 65534
diff --git a/testcases/lib/tst_test.sh b/testcases/lib/tst_test.sh
index 4be10a4f94..26e6a86dcb 100644
--- a/testcases/lib/tst_test.sh
+++ b/testcases/lib/tst_test.sh
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ export TST_ITERATIONS=1
export TST_TMPDIR_RHOST=0
export TST_LIB_LOADED=1
+# see testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
+export TST_USR_UID="${LTP_USR_UID:-65534}"
+export TST_USR_GID="${LTP_USR_GID:-65534}"
+
. tst_ansi_color.sh
. tst_security.sh
@@ -689,7 +693,7 @@ tst_run()
CHECKPOINT_WAKE2|CHECKPOINT_WAKE_AND_WAIT);;
DEV_EXTRA_OPTS|DEV_FS_OPTS|FORMAT_DEVICE|MOUNT_DEVICE);;
SKIP_FILESYSTEMS|SKIP_IN_LOCKDOWN|SKIP_IN_SECUREBOOT);;
- DEVICE_SIZE);;
+ DEVICE_SIZE|USR_UID|USR_GID);;
*) tst_res TWARN "Reserved variable TST_$_tst_i used!";;
esac
done
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 1/4] shell: Add tst_runas.c helper
From: Petr Vorel @ 2025-12-09 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Cc: Petr Vorel, Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, selinux, Cyril Hrubis,
Jan Stancek, Li Wang
In-Reply-To: <20251209185557.20598-1-pvorel@suse.cz>
It will be used in LTP IMA tests. Not only it removes external
dependency, but also fixes problem when 'nobody' user is not possible to
use due using /usr/sbin/nologin shell.
Suggested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
---
doc/users/setup_tests.rst | 4 ++++
testcases/lib/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
testcases/lib/tst_runas.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
diff --git a/doc/users/setup_tests.rst b/doc/users/setup_tests.rst
index 38976f3b0a..e3608127e4 100644
--- a/doc/users/setup_tests.rst
+++ b/doc/users/setup_tests.rst
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ users.
* - LTP_IMA_LOAD_POLICY
- Load IMA example policy, see :master:`testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md`.
+ * - LTP_USR_UID, LTP_USR_GID
+ - Set UID and GID of ``nobody`` user for :doc:`../developers/api_shell_tests`,
+ see :master:`testcases/lib/tst_runas.c`.
+
* - LTP_VIRT_OVERRIDE
- Overrides virtual machine detection in the test library. Setting it to
empty string, tells the library that system is not a virtual machine.
diff --git a/testcases/lib/.gitignore b/testcases/lib/.gitignore
index 19d7c67bbe..c379cd5ac4 100644
--- a/testcases/lib/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/lib/.gitignore
@@ -26,3 +26,4 @@
/tst_res_
/tst_run_shell
/tst_remaining_runtime
+/tst_runas
diff --git a/testcases/lib/Makefile b/testcases/lib/Makefile
index 2309a42a3d..e2461924a7 100644
--- a/testcases/lib/Makefile
+++ b/testcases/lib/Makefile
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ MAKE_TARGETS := tst_sleep tst_random tst_checkpoint tst_rod tst_kvcmp\
tst_get_median tst_hexdump tst_get_free_pids tst_timeout_kill\
tst_check_kconfigs tst_cgctl tst_fsfreeze tst_ns_create tst_ns_exec\
tst_ns_ifmove tst_lockdown_enabled tst_secureboot_enabled tst_res_\
- tst_run_shell tst_remaining_runtime
+ tst_run_shell tst_remaining_runtime tst_runas
include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_trunk_target.mk
diff --git a/testcases/lib/tst_runas.c b/testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8d5d8dd9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/lib/tst_runas.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2025 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
+ */
+
+#define LTP_USR_UID 65534
+#define LTP_USR_GID 65534
+
+#define TST_NO_DEFAULT_MAIN
+#include "tst_test.h"
+
+static void print_help(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s cmd [args] ...\n", __FILE__);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s cmd [-h] print help\n\n", __FILE__);
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "Environment Variables\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "LTP_USR_UID: UID of 'nobody' user, defaults %d\n",
+ LTP_USR_UID);
+ fprintf(stderr, "LTP_USR_GID: GID of 'nobody' user, defaults %d\n",
+ LTP_USR_GID);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ if (argc < 2 || !strcmp(argv[1], "-h")) {
+ print_help();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ unsigned uid = LTP_USR_UID, gid = LTP_USR_GID;
+
+ char *uid_env = getenv(TST_TO_STR_(LTP_USR_UID));
+ char *gid_env = getenv(TST_TO_STR_(LTP_USR_GID));
+
+ if (uid_env)
+ uid = SAFE_STRTOL(uid_env, 1, INT_MAX);
+
+ if (gid_env)
+ gid = SAFE_STRTOL(gid_env, 1, INT_MAX);
+
+ tst_res(TINFO, "UID: %d, GID: %d", uid, gid);
+ SAFE_SETGROUPS(0, NULL);
+ SAFE_SETRESGID(gid, gid, gid);
+ SAFE_SETRESUID(uid, uid, uid);
+
+ SAFE_CMD((const char * const *)&argv[1], NULL, NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] shell: Add tst_sudo.c helper
From: Petr Vorel @ 2025-12-09 18:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Cyril Hrubis
Cc: Li Wang, ltp, Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, selinux, Jan Stancek
In-Reply-To: <aTgh9CIRfVWniUZD@yuki.lan>
> Hi!
> > > I feel that the filename tst_sudo.c is a bit misleading. The helper
> > > doesn’t
> > > replicate sudo behavior (authentication, privilege escalation), it simply
> > > drops from root to a fixed UID/GID before executing a command.
> > > So readers may expect a “sudo-like” elevation wrapper when, however
> > > it’s a privilege-dropping trampoline.
> > > What about renaming it to:
> > > tst_runas.c,
> > > tst_runas_nobody.c, or
> > > tst_drop_privs.c?
> > Personally, I prefer the tst_runas_nody.c because it reflects the
> > default privilege,
> > but due it supports the more env so contains "su" maybe better:
> > tst_su_switch.c, tst_su_cmd.c
> Maybe just tst_runas.c I think that 'runas' in the name is probably the
> best description.
LGTM. I'll send v4.
Kind regards,
Petr
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 18:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
In-Reply-To: <aThdJwpDWD_-hhy6@kernel.org>
On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 07:32:27PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 05:42:55PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 12:05:23PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Since we cannot at this point cache names of the keys given limitations
> > > of the ASN.1 file format, I'll start a fresh patch set. Let's fixup what
> > > we can right now.
> > >
> > > This patch set addresses two major issues in the feature:
> > >
> > > 1. Dynamic resolution without gain. All kernel sites have at most single
> > > handle to authorize. Even if this changes some day this is how it is
> > > as of today and we definitely do not want to dictate the future but
> > > instead downscale code to the metrics that we have as of today.
> > > 2. Eliminate at least one unnnecessary tpm2_read_public() call.
> > >
> > > Jarkko Sakkinen (5):
> > > KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
> > > tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
> > > KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
> > > tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
> > > tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
> > >
> > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 ----
> > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 9 +-
> > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 130 ++++++---------------
> > > include/linux/tpm.h | 49 +++++---
> > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 134 +++++++++++++---------
> > > 6 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.52.0
> > >
> >
> > For hwrng we can e.g., calculate factor by timing tpm2_get_random() with
> > and without HMAC encryption. Then we can use this as frequency how often
> > data is pulled.
> >
> > The other angle to combine this is to maintain largeish FIFO of random
> > bytes and fill this when it goes below a treshold.
> >
> > Probably some combination of these will provide answer to performance
> > and latency problem with hwrng when HMAC encryption is turned on:
> >
> > 1. The first amortizes the overall quota.
> > 2. Second provides constant latency without major spikes.
>
> Another perhaps more unorthodox idea:
>
> 1. Calculate factor as said above. Let's call it N.
> 2. Every Nth step seed a pseudo rng from TPM.
> 3. On steps not divisible by N, pull from pseud rng.
>
> I'm not a cryptographer but would randomness suffer from this? Then the
> seeds that woud come from TPM are HMAC encrypted at least without major
> hits on performance.
>
> Just enumerated this. Not sure about this idea yet by any means but I do
> like simplicy of it (and that also makes me concerned about missed
> details).
Third option would be to have simply a kthread with a rate that fills a
pool and hwrng callbacks serves from that pool. If there is no bytes,
there is no bytes (which is fine as far as API is concerned).
This has optimal system latency properties I'd figure.
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
In-Reply-To: <aThDeSWFhbI6GRgh@kernel.org>
On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 05:42:55PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 12:05:23PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Since we cannot at this point cache names of the keys given limitations
> > of the ASN.1 file format, I'll start a fresh patch set. Let's fixup what
> > we can right now.
> >
> > This patch set addresses two major issues in the feature:
> >
> > 1. Dynamic resolution without gain. All kernel sites have at most single
> > handle to authorize. Even if this changes some day this is how it is
> > as of today and we definitely do not want to dictate the future but
> > instead downscale code to the metrics that we have as of today.
> > 2. Eliminate at least one unnnecessary tpm2_read_public() call.
> >
> > Jarkko Sakkinen (5):
> > KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
> > tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
> > KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
> > tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
> > tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
> >
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 ----
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 9 +-
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 130 ++++++---------------
> > include/linux/tpm.h | 49 +++++---
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 134 +++++++++++++---------
> > 6 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-)
> >
> > --
> > 2.52.0
> >
>
> For hwrng we can e.g., calculate factor by timing tpm2_get_random() with
> and without HMAC encryption. Then we can use this as frequency how often
> data is pulled.
>
> The other angle to combine this is to maintain largeish FIFO of random
> bytes and fill this when it goes below a treshold.
>
> Probably some combination of these will provide answer to performance
> and latency problem with hwrng when HMAC encryption is turned on:
>
> 1. The first amortizes the overall quota.
> 2. Second provides constant latency without major spikes.
Another perhaps more unorthodox idea:
1. Calculate factor as said above. Let's call it N.
2. Every Nth step seed a pseudo rng from TPM.
3. On steps not divisible by N, pull from pseud rng.
I'm not a cryptographer but would randomness suffer from this? Then the
seeds that woud come from TPM are HMAC encrypted at least without major
hits on performance.
Just enumerated this. Not sure about this idea yet by any means but I do
like simplicy of it (and that also makes me concerned about missed
details).
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 15:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 12:05:23PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Since we cannot at this point cache names of the keys given limitations
> of the ASN.1 file format, I'll start a fresh patch set. Let's fixup what
> we can right now.
>
> This patch set addresses two major issues in the feature:
>
> 1. Dynamic resolution without gain. All kernel sites have at most single
> handle to authorize. Even if this changes some day this is how it is
> as of today and we definitely do not want to dictate the future but
> instead downscale code to the metrics that we have as of today.
> 2. Eliminate at least one unnnecessary tpm2_read_public() call.
>
> Jarkko Sakkinen (5):
> KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
> tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
> KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
> tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
> tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
>
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 ----
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 9 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 130 ++++++---------------
> include/linux/tpm.h | 49 +++++---
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 134 +++++++++++++---------
> 6 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.52.0
>
For hwrng we can e.g., calculate factor by timing tpm2_get_random() with
and without HMAC encryption. Then we can use this as frequency how often
data is pulled.
The other angle to combine this is to maintain largeish FIFO of random
bytes and fill this when it goes below a treshold.
Probably some combination of these will provide answer to performance
and latency problem with hwrng when HMAC encryption is turned on:
1. The first amortizes the overall quota.
2. Second provides constant latency without major spikes.
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] shell: Add tst_sudo.c helper
From: Cyril Hrubis @ 2025-12-09 13:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Li Wang; +Cc: Petr Vorel, ltp, Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, selinux,
Jan Stancek
In-Reply-To: <CAEemH2e6ivP0rzfTBp5LnZ8n-oe7moqfHszgs2QyYVMUTUQ_wQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hi!
> > I feel that the filename tst_sudo.c is a bit misleading. The helper
> > doesn’t
> > replicate sudo behavior (authentication, privilege escalation), it simply
> > drops from root to a fixed UID/GID before executing a command.
> >
> > So readers may expect a “sudo-like” elevation wrapper when, however
> > it’s a privilege-dropping trampoline.
> >
> > What about renaming it to:
> > tst_runas.c,
> > tst_runas_nobody.c, or
> > tst_drop_privs.c?
> >
>
>
> Personally, I prefer the tst_runas_nody.c because it reflects the
> default privilege,
> but due it supports the more env so contains "su" maybe better:
> tst_su_switch.c, tst_su_cmd.c
Maybe just tst_runas.c I think that 'runas' in the name is probably the
best description.
--
Cyril Hrubis
chrubis@suse.cz
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Are setuid shell scripts safe? (Implied by security_bprm_creds_for_exec)
From: Jan Kara @ 2025-12-09 12:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bernd Edlinger
Cc: Al Viro, Eric W. Biederman, Roberto Sassu, Alexey Dobriyan,
Oleg Nesterov, Kees Cook, Andy Lutomirski, Will Drewry,
Christian Brauner, Andrew Morton, Michal Hocko, Serge Hallyn,
James Morris, Randy Dunlap, Suren Baghdasaryan, Yafang Shao,
Helge Deller, Adrian Reber, Thomas Gleixner, Jens Axboe,
Alexei Starovoitov, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest, linux-mm,
linux-security-module, tiozhang, Luis Chamberlain,
Paulo Alcantara (SUSE), Sergey Senozhatsky, Frederic Weisbecker,
YueHaibing, Paul Moore, Aleksa Sarai, Stefan Roesch, Chao Yu,
xu xin, Jeff Layton, Jan Kara, David Hildenbrand, Dave Chinner,
Shuah Khan, Elena Reshetova, David Windsor, Mateusz Guzik,
Ard Biesheuvel, Joel Fernandes (Google), Matthew Wilcox (Oracle),
Hans Liljestrand, Penglei Jiang, Lorenzo Stoakes, Adrian Ratiu,
Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra (Intel), Cyrill Gorcunov,
Eric Dumazet, zohar, linux-integrity, Ryan Lee, apparmor
In-Reply-To: <GV2PPF74270EBEE0AAAE2EB22B668EE21A7E4A6A@GV2PPF74270EBEE.EURP195.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
On Thu 04-12-25 14:03:27, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
> On 12/4/25 06:49, Al Viro wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 03, 2025 at 02:16:29PM +0100, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
> >
> >> Hmm, yes, that looks like an issue.
> >>
> >> I would have expected the security engine to look at bprm->filenanme
> >> especially in the case, when bprm->interp != bprm->filename,
> >> and check that it is not a sym-link with write-access for the
> >> current user and of course also that the bprm->file is not a regular file
> >> which is writable by the current user, if that is the case I would have expected
> >> the secuity engine to enforce non-new-privs on a SUID executable somehow.
> >
> > Check that _what_ is not a symlink? And while we are at it, what do write
> > permissions to any symlinks have to do with anything whatsoever?
>
> When we execve a normal executable, we do open the binary file with
> deny_write_access so this might allow the security engine to inspaect the
> binary, before it is used.
That would be seriously flawed IMO because there are lot of cases where
code is executed without deny_write_access() - like shared libraries, code
loaded by interpreter, and probably more.
> However this behavior has changed recently,
> now it has some exceptions, where even this behavior is no longer
> guaranteed for binary executables, due to commit
> 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51, but why? I have no idea...
Because for hierarchical storage implementation you may need to fill in the
executable data from remote storage on demand and the deny_write_access
logic was making this impossible. We even tried to completely remove the
deny_write_access logic exactly because it has very limited use and
complicates things (commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount
during exec")) but that had to be reverted because some userspace depends
on the ETXTBUSY behavior.
Honza
--
Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
^ permalink raw reply
* [RFC][PATCH] ima: Add support for staging measurements for deletion
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2025-12-09 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: corbet, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg, paul, jmorris,
serge
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, linux-integrity, linux-security-module,
gregorylumen, chenste, nramas, Roberto Sassu
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Introduce the ability of staging the entire of the IMA measurement list, or
a portion, for deletion. Staging means moving the current content of the
measurement list to a separate location, and allowing users to read and
delete it. This causes the measurement list to be atomically truncated
before new measurements can be added. Staging can be done only once at a
time.
User space is responsible to concatenate the staged IMA measurements list
portions following the temporal order in which the operations were done,
together with the current measurement list. Then, it can send the collected
data to the remote verifiers.
The benefit of this solution is the ability to free precious kernel memory,
in exchange of delegating user space to reconstruct the full measurement
list from the chunks. No trust needs to be given to user space, since the
integrity of the measurement list is protected by the TPM.
By default, staging the measurements list for deletion does not alter the
hash table. When staging is done, IMA is still able to detect collisions on
the staged and later deleted measurement entries, by keeping the entry
digests (only template data are freed).
However, since during the measurements list serialization only the SHA1
digest is passed, and since there are no template data to recalculate the
other digests from, the hash table is currently not populated with digests
from staged/deleted entries after kexec().
Introduce the new kernel option ima_flush_htable to decide whether or not
the digests of staged measurement entries are flushed from the hash table.
Then, introduce ascii_runtime_measurements_staged_<algo> and
binary_runtime_measurement_staged_<algo> interfaces to stage/delete the
measurements. Use 'echo A > <IMA interface>' and 'echo D > <IMA interface>'
to respectively stage and delete the entire measurements list. Use
'echo N > <IMA interface>', with N between 1 and ULONG_MAX, to stage the
selected portion of the measurements list.
The ima_measure_users counter (protected by the ima_measure_lock mutex) has
been introduced to protect access to the measurement list and the staged
part. The open method of all the measurement interfaces has been extended
to allow only one writer at a time or, in alternative, multiple readers.
The write permission is used to stage/delete the measurements, the read
permission to read them. Write requires also the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.
Finally, introduce the _notrim version of the run-time measurements count
and the binary measurements list size, to display them in the kexec-related
critical data records.
Note: This code derives from the Alt-IMA Huawei project, and is being
released under the dual license model (GPL-2.0 OR MIT).
Link: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 222 +++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 13 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 111 ++++++++-
5 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 6c42061ca20e..355d8930e3ac 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2215,6 +2215,10 @@
Use the canonical format for the binary runtime
measurements, instead of host native format.
+ ima_flush_htable [IMA]
+ Flush the measurement list hash table when staging all
+ or a part of it for deletion.
+
ima_hash= [IMA]
Format: { md5 | sha1 | rmd160 | sha256 | sha384
| sha512 | ... }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e3d71d8d56e3..d7aa4a0f79b1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
};
extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
+extern struct list_head ima_measurements_staged; /* list of staged meas. */
+extern bool ima_measurements_staged_exist; /* If there are staged meas. */
/* Some details preceding the binary serialized measurement list */
struct ima_kexec_hdr {
@@ -281,10 +283,12 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_buf(void);
struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template);
+int ima_queue_stage(unsigned long req_value);
+int ima_queue_delete_staged(void);
int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
-unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void);
+unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(bool notrim);
int ima_init_template(void);
void ima_init_template_list(void);
int __init ima_init_digests(void);
@@ -298,11 +302,13 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock;
struct ima_h_table {
- atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */
+ atomic_long_t len; /* current num of stored meas. in the list */
+ atomic_long_t len_notrim; /* total num of stored meas. in the list */
atomic_long_t violations;
struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
};
extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
+extern struct mutex ima_extend_list_mutex;
static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 87045b09f120..321c98ae0e55 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@
#include "ima.h"
+/* Requests: ('A', [1, ULONG_MAX])\n (stage all/N) or D\n (delete staged) */
+#define STAGED_REQ_LENGTH 21
+
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_lock);
+static long ima_measure_users;
bool ima_canonical_fmt;
static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
@@ -74,14 +79,15 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
};
/* returns pointer to hlist_node */
-static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+static void *_ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos,
+ struct list_head *head)
{
loff_t l = *pos;
struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
/* we need a lock since pos could point beyond last element */
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, head, later) {
if (!l--) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return qe;
@@ -91,7 +97,18 @@ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
return NULL;
}
-static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return _ima_measurements_start(m, pos, &ima_measurements);
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_staged_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return _ima_measurements_start(m, pos, &ima_measurements_staged);
+}
+
+static void *_ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos,
+ struct list_head *head)
{
struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
@@ -103,7 +120,18 @@ static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
rcu_read_unlock();
(*pos)++;
- return (&qe->later == &ima_measurements) ? NULL : qe;
+ return (&qe->later == head) ? NULL : qe;
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return _ima_measurements_next(m, v, pos, &ima_measurements);
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_staged_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v,
+ loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return _ima_measurements_next(m, v, pos, &ima_measurements_staged);
}
static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
@@ -202,16 +230,138 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = {
.show = ima_measurements_show
};
+static int _ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+ const struct seq_operations *seq_ops)
+{
+ bool write = !!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_measure_lock);
+ if ((write && ima_measure_users != 0) ||
+ (!write && ima_measure_users < 0)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ ret = seq_open(file, seq_ops);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_lock);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (write)
+ ima_measure_users--;
+ else
+ ima_measure_users++;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- return seq_open(file, &ima_measurments_seqops);
+ return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file, &ima_measurments_seqops);
+}
+
+static int ima_measurements_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ bool write = !!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_measure_lock);
+ ret = seq_release(inode, file);
+ if (!ret) {
+ if (write)
+ ima_measure_users++;
+ else
+ ima_measure_users--;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_lock);
+ return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
.open = ima_measurements_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release,
+ .release = ima_measurements_release,
+};
+
+static const struct seq_operations ima_measurments_staged_seqops = {
+ .start = ima_measurements_staged_start,
+ .next = ima_measurements_staged_next,
+ .stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+ .show = ima_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_measurements_staged_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file,
+ &ima_measurments_staged_seqops);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_measurements_staged_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ if (!ima_measurements_staged_exist)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ return seq_read(file, buf, size, ppos);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_measurements_staged_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char req[STAGED_REQ_LENGTH], *req_ptr = req;
+ unsigned long req_value;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (*ppos > 0 || datalen < 2 || datalen > STAGED_REQ_LENGTH)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = copy_from_user(req, buf, datalen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (strsep(&req_ptr, "\n") == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (req[0]) {
+ case 'A':
+ if (datalen != 2 || req[1] != '\0')
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = ima_queue_stage(ULONG_MAX);
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ if (datalen != 2 || req[1] != '\0')
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = ima_queue_delete_staged();
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = kstrtoul(req, 0, &req_value);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = ima_queue_stage(req_value);
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return datalen;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_staged_ops = {
+ .open = ima_measurements_staged_open,
+ .read = ima_measurements_staged_read,
+ .write = ima_measurements_staged_write,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = ima_measurements_release,
};
void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size)
@@ -279,14 +429,37 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = {
static int ima_ascii_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- return seq_open(file, &ima_ascii_measurements_seqops);
+ return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file,
+ &ima_ascii_measurements_seqops);
}
static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
.open = ima_ascii_measurements_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release,
+ .release = ima_measurements_release,
+};
+
+static const struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_staged_seqops = {
+ .start = ima_measurements_staged_start,
+ .next = ima_measurements_staged_next,
+ .stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+ .show = ima_ascii_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_staged_open(struct inode *inode,
+ struct file *file)
+{
+ return _ima_measurements_open(inode, file,
+ &ima_ascii_measurements_staged_seqops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_staged_ops = {
+ .open = ima_ascii_measurements_staged_open,
+ .read = ima_measurements_staged_read,
+ .write = ima_measurements_staged_write,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = ima_measurements_release,
};
static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
@@ -419,6 +592,25 @@ static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists(void)
&ima_measurements_ops);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+ sprintf(file_name, "ascii_runtime_measurements_staged_%s",
+ hash_algo_name[algo]);
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP,
+ ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t)i,
+ &ima_ascii_measurements_staged_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+ sprintf(file_name, "binary_runtime_measurements_staged_%s",
+ hash_algo_name[algo]);
+ dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP |
+ S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP,
+ ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t)i,
+ &ima_measurements_staged_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
}
return 0;
@@ -528,6 +720,20 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
goto out;
}
+ dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("binary_runtime_measurements_staged",
+ ima_dir, "binary_runtime_measurements_staged_sha1", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("ascii_runtime_measurements_staged",
+ ima_dir, "ascii_runtime_measurements_staged_sha1", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
dentry = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
&ima_measurements_count_ops);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index 7362f68f2d8b..23a20300da7b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ void ima_measure_kexec_event(const char *event_name)
long len;
int n;
- buf_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size();
- len = atomic_long_read(&ima_htable.len);
+ buf_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size(true);
+ len = atomic_long_read(&ima_htable.len_notrim);
n = scnprintf(ima_kexec_event, IMA_KEXEC_EVENT_LEN,
"kexec_segment_size=%lu;ima_binary_runtime_size=%lu;"
@@ -93,8 +93,10 @@ static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
memset(&khdr, 0, sizeof(khdr));
khdr.version = 1;
- /* This is an append-only list, no need to hold the RCU read lock */
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later, true) {
+
+ /* It can race with ima_queue_stage(). */
+ mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
if (ima_kexec_file.count < ima_kexec_file.size) {
khdr.count++;
ima_measurements_show(&ima_kexec_file, qe);
@@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
break;
}
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
/*
* fill in reserved space with some buffer details
@@ -157,7 +160,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
else
extra_memory = CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC_EXTRA_MEMORY_KB * 1024;
- binary_runtime_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size() + extra_memory;
+ binary_runtime_size = ima_get_binary_runtime_size(false) + extra_memory;
if (binary_runtime_size >= ULONG_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
kexec_segment_size = ULONG_MAX;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 590637e81ad1..868f216ac343 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -22,19 +22,32 @@
#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
+bool ima_flush_htable;
+static int __init ima_flush_htable_setup(char *str)
+{
+ ima_flush_htable = true;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_flush_htable", ima_flush_htable_setup);
+
/* pre-allocated array of tpm_digest structures to extend a PCR */
static struct tpm_digest *digests;
LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements); /* list of all measurements */
+LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements_staged); /* list of staged measurements */
+bool ima_measurements_staged_exist; /* If there are staged measurements */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
static unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
+static unsigned long binary_runtime_size_notrim;
#else
static unsigned long binary_runtime_size = ULONG_MAX;
+static unsigned long binary_runtime_size_notrim = ULONG_MAX;
#endif
/* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */
struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
.len = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
+ .len_notrim = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
.violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
.queue[0 ... IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE - 1] = HLIST_HEAD_INIT
};
@@ -43,7 +56,7 @@ struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
* and extending the TPM PCR aggregate. Since tpm_extend can take
* long (and the tpm driver uses a mutex), we can't use the spinlock.
*/
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
/*
* Used internally by the kernel to suspend measurements.
@@ -114,15 +127,19 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements);
atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len);
+ atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len_notrim);
if (update_htable) {
key = ima_hash_key(entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ima_htable.queue[key]);
}
- if (binary_runtime_size != ULONG_MAX) {
+ if (binary_runtime_size_notrim != ULONG_MAX) {
int size;
size = get_binary_runtime_size(entry);
+ binary_runtime_size_notrim =
+ (binary_runtime_size_notrim < ULONG_MAX - size) ?
+ binary_runtime_size_notrim + size : ULONG_MAX;
binary_runtime_size = (binary_runtime_size < ULONG_MAX - size) ?
binary_runtime_size + size : ULONG_MAX;
}
@@ -134,12 +151,18 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
* entire binary_runtime_measurement list, including the ima_kexec_hdr
* structure.
*/
-unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void)
+unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(bool notrim)
{
- if (binary_runtime_size >= (ULONG_MAX - sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr)))
+ unsigned long *val;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ val = (notrim) ? &binary_runtime_size_notrim : &binary_runtime_size;
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+ if (*val >= (ULONG_MAX - sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr)))
return ULONG_MAX;
else
- return binary_runtime_size + sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr);
+ return *val + sizeof(struct ima_kexec_hdr);
}
static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr)
@@ -220,6 +243,84 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
return result;
}
+int ima_queue_stage(unsigned long req_value)
+{
+ unsigned long req_value_copy = req_value, to_remove = 0;
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+
+ if (ima_measurements_staged_exist)
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ if (list_empty(&ima_measurements)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ if (req_value == ULONG_MAX) {
+ list_replace(&ima_measurements, &ima_measurements_staged);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_measurements);
+ atomic_long_set(&ima_htable.len, 0);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC))
+ binary_runtime_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ list_for_each_entry(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
+ to_remove += get_binary_runtime_size(qe->entry);
+ if (--req_value_copy == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (req_value_copy > 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ __list_cut_position(&ima_measurements_staged, &ima_measurements,
+ &qe->later);
+ atomic_long_sub(req_value, &ima_htable.len);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC))
+ binary_runtime_size -= to_remove;
+ }
+
+ if (ima_flush_htable) {
+ list_for_each_entry(qe, &ima_measurements_staged, later)
+ /* It can race with ima_lookup_digest_entry(). */
+ hlist_del_rcu(&qe->hnext);
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ ima_measurements_staged_exist = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_queue_delete_staged(void)
+{
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *qe_tmp;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (!ima_measurements_staged_exist)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, qe_tmp, &ima_measurements_staged, later) {
+ for (i = 0; i < qe->entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
+ kfree(qe->entry->template_data[i].data);
+ qe->entry->template_data[i].data = NULL;
+ qe->entry->template_data[i].len = 0;
+ }
+
+ list_del(&qe->later);
+
+ if (ima_flush_htable) {
+ kfree(qe->entry->digests);
+ kfree(qe->entry);
+ kfree(qe);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ima_measurements_staged_exist = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
{
int result = 0;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 5/5] tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Since the number of handles is fixed to a single handle, eliminate all uses
of buf->handles and deduce values during compile-time.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
v2:
- Streamline the code change and remove dead code.
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 -------------------------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 6 ++----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 14 ++------------
include/linux/tpm.h | 2 --
4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
index 73be8a87b472..752c69b8a4f5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size, u16 tag, u32 ordi
buf->flags = 0;
buf->length = sizeof(*head);
buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
- buf->handles = 0;
head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag);
head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head));
head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal);
@@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size)
buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B;
buf->length = 2;
buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
- buf->handles = 0;
buf->data[0] = 0;
buf->data[1] = 0;
}
@@ -177,29 +175,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32);
-/**
- * tpm_buf_append_handle() - Add a handle
- * @buf: &tpm_buf instance
- * @handle: a TPM object handle
- *
- * Add a handle to the buffer, and increase the count tracking the number of
- * handles in the command buffer. Works only for command buffers.
- */
-void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
-{
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
- return;
-
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) {
- WARN(1, "tpm-buf: invalid type: TPM2B\n");
- buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
- return;
- }
-
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
- buf->handles++;
-}
-
/**
* tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer
* @buf: &tpm_buf instance
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 5b04e74b6377..dbcd46c5e09d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
return rc;
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
- tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, pcr_idx);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, pcr_idx);
tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, buf, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -281,10 +281,8 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
NULL, 0);
} else {
- offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
- head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+ head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
}
tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, num_bytes);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 62a200ae72d7..f2b8ca893e15 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
- tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, handle);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
return 0;
}
@@ -288,17 +288,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 *passphrase, int passphrase_len)
{
- /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
- int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
-
- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
- /* not the first session so update the existing length */
- len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
- put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
- } else {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
- }
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + passphrase_len);
/* auth handle */
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
/* nonce */
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 9f684fc7ae04..e68995df8796 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -395,7 +395,6 @@ enum tpm_buf_flags {
*/
struct tpm_buf {
u8 flags;
- u8 handles;
u16 length;
u16 capacity;
u8 data[];
@@ -441,7 +440,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value);
u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
-void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle);
/*
* Check if TPM device is in the firmware upgrade mode.
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 4/5] tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
In all of the call sites only one session is ever append. Thus, reduce
AUTH_MAX_NAMES, which leads into removing constant completely.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 31 +++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 0816a91134fc..62a200ae72d7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -72,9 +72,6 @@
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/utils.h>
-/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */
-#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES 3
-
#define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128
#define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8)
@@ -136,8 +133,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
* handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
* we must compute and remember
*/
- u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
- u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
+ u8 name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+ u16 name_size;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
@@ -254,11 +251,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public);
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
struct tpm2_auth *auth;
- int slot;
int ret;
-#endif
+
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n");
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, handle);
@@ -266,12 +266,6 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
- slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4;
- if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n");
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
auth = chip->auth;
if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed");
@@ -280,16 +274,14 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
auth->session += 4;
- memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size);
- auth->name_size_tbl[slot] = name_size;
+ memcpy(auth->name, name, name_size);
+ auth->name_size = name_size;
#endif
return 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
err:
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
return ret;
-#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
@@ -658,8 +650,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
/* ordinal is already BE */
sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal));
/* add the handle names */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++)
- sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]);
+ sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name, auth->name_size);
if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf))
sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 3/5] KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, James Bottomley,
Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, open list, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED,
open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
tpm2_load_cmd() and tpm2_unseal_cmd() use the same parent, and calls to
tpm_buf_append_name() cause the exact same TPM2_ReadPublic command to be
sent to the chip, causing unnecessary traffic.
1. Export tpm2_read_public in order to make it callable from
'trusted_tpm2'.
2. Re-orchestrate tpm2_seal_trusted() and tpm2_unseal_trusted() in order to
halve the name resolutions required:
2a. Move tpm2_read_public() calls into trusted_tpm2.
2b. Pass TPM name to tpm_buf_append_name().
2c. Rework tpm_buf_append_name() to use the pre-resolved name.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 3 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 95 +++++------------
include/linux/tpm.h | 10 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 124 ++++++++++++++--------
4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 2682f5ec09cb..5b04e74b6377 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx, (u8 *)&pcr_idx,
+ sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
return rc;
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index a0c88fb1804c..0816a91134fc 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
* handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
* we must compute and remember
*/
- u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+ u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
};
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
@@ -163,7 +163,17 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name)
}
}
-static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
+/**
+ * tpm2_read_public: Resolve TPM name for a handle
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @handle: TPM handle.
+ * @name: A buffer for returning the name blob. Must have a
+ * capacity of 'SHA512_DIGET_SIZE + 2' bytes at minimum
+ *
+ * Returns size of TPM handle name of success.
+ * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd error codes when TPM2_ReadPublic fails.
+ */
+int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
{
u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -212,14 +222,16 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], rc);
return name_size_alg;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public);
#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
/**
- * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
- * @chip: the TPM chip structure
- * @buf: The buffer to be appended
- * @handle: The handle to be appended
- * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
+ * tpm_buf_append_name() - Append a handle and store TPM name
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @buf: TPM buffer containing the TPM command in-transit.
+ * @handle: TPM handle to be appended.
+ * @name: TPM name of the handle
+ * @name_size: Size of the TPM name.
*
* In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
* objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply
@@ -236,15 +248,14 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
* will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
* kernel message.
*
- * Ends the authorization session on failure.
+ * Returns zero on success.
+ * Returns -EIO when the authorization area state is malformed.
*/
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name)
+ u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
- enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
struct tpm2_auth *auth;
- u16 name_size_alg;
int slot;
int ret;
#endif
@@ -269,36 +280,15 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
auth->session += 4;
-
- if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- if (!name) {
- ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err;
-
- name_size_alg = ret;
- }
- } else {
- if (name) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n",
- handle);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
- if (name)
- memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg);
+ memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size);
+ auth->name_size_tbl[slot] = name_size;
#endif
return 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
err:
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- return tpm_ret_to_err(ret);
+ return ret;
#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
@@ -606,22 +596,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
+ offset_s += handles * sizeof(u32);
- /*
- * just check the names, it's easy to make mistakes. This
- * would happen if someone added a handle via
- * tpm_buf_append_u32() instead of tpm_buf_append_name()
- */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
- u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
-
- if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */
val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
/* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */
offset_p = offset_s + val;
@@ -682,23 +658,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
/* ordinal is already BE */
sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal));
/* add the handle names */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++) {
- enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(auth->name_h[i]);
-
- if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- ret = name_size(auth->name[i]);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err;
-
- sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret);
- } else {
- __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]);
-
- sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&h, 4);
- }
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < handles; i++)
+ sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]);
if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf))
sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 922a43ef23b5..9f684fc7ae04 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name);
+ u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size);
void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
int passphraselen);
@@ -557,6 +557,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf);
int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
int rc);
void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name);
#else
#include <linux/unaligned.h>
@@ -580,6 +581,13 @@ static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip,
{
return rc;
}
+
+static inline int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ void *name)
+{
+ memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32));
+ return sizeof(u32);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 27424e1a4a63..63539b344ffb 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
+ u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ u16 parent_name_size;
int blob_len = 0;
int hash;
u32 flags;
@@ -220,6 +222,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, options->keyhandle, parent_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out_put;
+
+ parent_name_size = rc;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
goto out_put;
@@ -234,7 +242,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size);
if (rc)
goto out_put;
@@ -326,48 +335,38 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
- *
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
- * @options: authentication values and other options
- * @blob_handle: returned blob handle
+ * tpm2_load_cmd() - Execute TPM2_Load
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @payload: Key data in clear text.
+ * @options: Trusted key options.
+ * @parent_name: A cryptographic name, i.e. a TPMT_HA blob, of the
+ * parent key.
+ * @blob: The decoded payload for the key.
+ * @blob_handle: On success, will contain handle to the loaded keyedhash
+ * blob.
*
- * Return: 0 on success.
- * -E2BIG on wrong payload size.
- * -EPERM on tpm error status.
- * < 0 error from tpm_send.
+ * Return -E2BIG when the blob size is too small for all the data.
+ * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd() error codes when either TPM2_Load fails.
*/
static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u8 *parent_name,
+ u16 parent_name_size,
+ const u8 *blob,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
- u8 *blob, *pub;
+ const u8 *pub;
int rc;
u32 attrs;
- rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
- if (rc) {
- /* old form */
- blob = payload->blob;
- payload->old_format = 1;
- } else {
- /* Bind for cleanup: */
- blob_ref = blob;
- }
-
- /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
- if (!options->keyhandle)
- return -EINVAL;
-
/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
if (payload->blob_len < 4)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -E2BIG;
private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
@@ -406,7 +405,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -434,20 +434,23 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
+ * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - Execute TPM2_Unload
*
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
- * @options: authentication values and other options
- * @blob_handle: blob handle
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: Key data in clear text.
+ * @options: Trusted key options.
+ * @parent_name: A cryptographic name, i.e. a TPMT_HA blob, of the
+ * parent key.
+ * @blob_handle: Handle to the loaded keyedhash blob.
*
- * Return: 0 on success
- * -EPERM on tpm error status
- * < 0 error from tpm_send
+ * Return -E2BIG when the blob size is too small for all the data.
+ * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd() error codes when either TPM2_Load fails.
*/
static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u8 *parent_name,
+ u16 parent_name_size,
u32 blob_handle)
{
u16 data_len;
@@ -465,7 +468,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -526,30 +530,60 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
+ * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - Unseal a trusted key
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ * @payload: Key data in clear text.
+ * @options: Trusted key options.
*
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
- * @options: authentication values and other options
- *
- * Return: Same as with tpm_send.
+ * Return -E2BIG when the blob size is too small for all the data.
+ * Return -EINVAL when parent's key handle has not been set.
+ * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd() error codes when either TPM2_Load or TPM2_Unseal
+ * fails.
*/
int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
+ u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+ u16 parent_name_size;
u32 blob_handle;
+ u8 *blob;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Try to decode the provided blob as an ASN.1 blob. Assume that the
+ * blob is in the legacy format if decoding does not end successfully.
+ */
+ rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
+ if (rc) {
+ blob = payload->blob;
+ payload->old_format = 1;
+ } else {
+ blob_ref = blob;
+ }
+
+ if (!options->keyhandle)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ rc = tpm2_read_public(chip, options->keyhandle, parent_name);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ parent_name_size = rc;
+
+ rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size, blob, &blob_handle);
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
+ rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, parent_name,
+ parent_name_size, blob_handle);
+
tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
out:
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 2/5] tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
This is somewhat cosmetic change but it does serve a purpose on tracking
the value set for the maximum length of TPM names, and to clearly states
what components it is composed of. It also anchors the value so that when
buffers are declared for this particular purpose, the same value is used
for the capacity.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v2:
- Rename TPM2_NAME_SIZE as TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE.
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 2 +-
include/linux/tpm.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index f5dcadb1ab3c..0f321c307bc6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static ssize_t null_name_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
- int size = TPM2_NAME_SIZE;
+ int size = TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE;
bin2hex(buf, chip->null_key_name, size);
size *= 2;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 79f27a46bd7f..a0c88fb1804c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
* we must compute and remember
*/
u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
- u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
};
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 42e2a091f43d..922a43ef23b5 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -28,9 +28,33 @@
#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
#define TPM_BUFSIZE 4096
+/*
+ * SHA-512 is, as of today, the largest digest in the TCG algorithm repository.
+ */
#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * A TPM name digest i.e., TPMT_HA, is a concatenation of TPM_ALG_ID of the
+ * name algorithm and hash of TPMT_PUBLIC.
+ */
+#define TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE (TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 2)
+
+/*
+ * The maximum number of PCR banks.
+ */
#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8
+/*
+ * fixed define for the size of a name. This is actually HASHALG size
+ * plus 2, so 32 for SHA256
+ */
+#define TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE 34
+
+/*
+ * The maximum size for an object context
+ */
+#define TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE 4096
+
struct tpm_chip;
struct trusted_key_payload;
struct trusted_key_options;
@@ -140,17 +164,6 @@ struct tpm_chip_seqops {
/* fixed define for the curve we use which is NIST_P256 */
#define EC_PT_SZ 32
-/*
- * fixed define for the size of a name. This is actually HASHALG size
- * plus 2, so 32 for SHA256
- */
-#define TPM2_NAME_SIZE 34
-
-/*
- * The maximum size for an object context
- */
-#define TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE 4096
-
struct tpm_chip {
struct device dev;
struct device devs;
@@ -212,7 +225,7 @@ struct tpm_chip {
/* saved context for NULL seed */
u8 null_key_context[TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE];
/* name of NULL seed */
- u8 null_key_name[TPM2_NAME_SIZE];
+ u8 null_key_name[TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE];
u8 null_ec_key_x[EC_PT_SZ];
u8 null_ec_key_y[EC_PT_SZ];
struct tpm2_auth *auth;
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 1/5] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, James Bottomley,
Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, open list, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED,
open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
TPM2_Unseal requires TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, and tpm2_unseal_cmd() always does
set up either password or HMAC session.
Remove the branch in tpm2_unseal_cmd() conditionally setting
TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. It is faulty but luckily it is never exercised at
run-time, and thus does not cause regressions.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +---------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 9074ae1a5896..27424e1a4a63 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -450,9 +450,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 blob_handle)
{
- struct tpm_header *head;
u16 data_len;
- int offset;
u8 *data;
int rc;
@@ -488,14 +486,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, options->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append(buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+ if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip))
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
- } else {
- offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
- head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
- }
}
rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 0/5] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
Since we cannot at this point cache names of the keys given limitations
of the ASN.1 file format, I'll start a fresh patch set. Let's fixup what
we can right now.
This patch set addresses two major issues in the feature:
1. Dynamic resolution without gain. All kernel sites have at most single
handle to authorize. Even if this changes some day this is how it is
as of today and we definitely do not want to dictate the future but
instead downscale code to the metrics that we have as of today.
2. Eliminate at least one unnnecessary tpm2_read_public() call.
Jarkko Sakkinen (5):
KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 ----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 9 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 130 ++++++---------------
include/linux/tpm.h | 49 +++++---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 134 +++++++++++++---------
6 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-)
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/1] IMA event log trimming
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2025-12-09 9:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley, steven chen, linux-integrity
Cc: zohar, roberto.sassu, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg, paul,
jmorris, serge, linux-security-module, anirudhve, gregorylumen,
nramas, sushring
In-Reply-To: <d0c00469a8501483baffaf1158102c0f2c5211e8.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On Tue, 2025-12-09 at 07:17 +0900, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Mon, 2025-12-08 at 10:40 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > I have the impression that none the functionality you cited has to be
> > implemented in the kernel, because the only component one can trust
> > to verify the integrity of the IMA measurements list is the TPM.
> > Whether either the kernel or user space retain the measurements is
> > irrelevant.
>
> That's correct, I'm not advocating moving quoting into the kernel. Co-
> ordinating the trim with where the quote gets you to is phenomenally
> useful. While you could theoretically store any mismatch in userspace,
> having two locations for the log makes it more error prone.
>
> > I believe that the only role of the kernel is to get rid of the
> > measurements entries as fast as possible (the kernel would act more
> > like a buffer).
>
> I wouldn't say that, I'd say to get rid of measurements that the user
> has indicated are of no further use.
Different users could have different and conflicting requirements, and
we would spend time trying to conciliate those. We can avoid that by
doing it the same for everyone, and the additional cost of handling it
I believe it is fair.
I could accept staging N entries since I already agreed with Gregory
and Steven, and since it requires only an extra iteration in the linked
list. The other desired functionality should be implemented in user
space.
> > This was actually the intent of my original proposal in
> > https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/1 . The idea of
> > staging (was snapshotting, but Mimi thinks the term is not accurate)
> > is simply to detach the entire IMA measurement list as fast as
> > possible. Further read and delete after staging is done without
> > interfering with new measurements (sure, the detaching of the hash
> > table is not yet as efficient as I hoped).
>
> From the application point of view, offloading the log and random
> points is a bit more work because now the log collector has to be
> modified to look in multiple locations and we'd also need an agreement
> of where those locations are and how the log is sequenced in a naming
> scheme so it's the same for every distribution. If the application is
> in charge of trimming the log at a particular point, collection remains
> the same (it can simply be the existing in-kernel location), so we
> don't need a cross distro agreement, and the trim can simply be added
> as an extra function.
It could be a single location, the user space program would be
responsible to present the IMA measurement list as if it was never
trimmed.
Roberto
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 4/4] tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 7:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
open list, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
In-Reply-To: <20251209073903.767518-5-jarkko@kernel.org>
On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 09:39:02AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Since the number of handles is fixed to a single handle, eliminate all uses
> of buf->handles and deduce values during compile-time.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 -----------------------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 4 ++--
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 4 ++--
> include/linux/tpm.h | 1 -
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 2 +-
> 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> index 73be8a87b472..752c69b8a4f5 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size, u16 tag, u32 ordi
> buf->flags = 0;
> buf->length = sizeof(*head);
> buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
> - buf->handles = 0;
> head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag);
> head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head));
> head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal);
> @@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size)
> buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B;
> buf->length = 2;
> buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
> - buf->handles = 0;
> buf->data[0] = 0;
> buf->data[1] = 0;
> }
> @@ -177,29 +175,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32);
>
> -/**
> - * tpm_buf_append_handle() - Add a handle
> - * @buf: &tpm_buf instance
> - * @handle: a TPM object handle
> - *
> - * Add a handle to the buffer, and increase the count tracking the number of
> - * handles in the command buffer. Works only for command buffers.
> - */
> -void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
> -{
> - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
> - return;
> -
> - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) {
> - WARN(1, "tpm-buf: invalid type: TPM2B\n");
> - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
> - return;
> - }
> -
> - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
> - buf->handles++;
> -}
> -
> /**
> * tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer
> * @buf: &tpm_buf instance
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> index 5b04e74b6377..d14e249831c7 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> return rc;
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0);
> } else {
> - tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, pcr_idx);
> + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, pcr_idx);
> tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, buf, NULL, 0);
> }
>
> @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
> TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
> NULL, 0);
> } else {
> - offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
> head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
> if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
> head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 62a200ae72d7..dfd1abe673bc 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> }
>
> if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
> - tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, handle);
> + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> u8 *passphrase, int passphrase_len)
> {
> /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
> - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> + int offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
> u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
>
> if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index db716841973f..e20647cc0a0f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -437,7 +437,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value);
> u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
> u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
> u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
> -void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle);
>
> /*
> * Check if TPM device is in the firmware upgrade mode.
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 7756aa839d81..0a07a18da2ed 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
> } else {
> - offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
Maybe it would be sensible to define:
/*
* Offset of the authorization area of a TPM command with a single
* handle.
*/
#define TPM2_AUTH_OFFSET (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))
This would overall clarify how this code works.
> head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
> if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
> head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
> --
> 2.52.0
>
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 4/4] tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 7:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, James Bottomley,
Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, open list, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED,
open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
In-Reply-To: <20251209073903.767518-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Since the number of handles is fixed to a single handle, eliminate all uses
of buf->handles and deduce values during compile-time.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 -----------------------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 4 ++--
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/tpm.h | 1 -
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
index 73be8a87b472..752c69b8a4f5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size, u16 tag, u32 ordi
buf->flags = 0;
buf->length = sizeof(*head);
buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
- buf->handles = 0;
head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag);
head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head));
head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal);
@@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size)
buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B;
buf->length = 2;
buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
- buf->handles = 0;
buf->data[0] = 0;
buf->data[1] = 0;
}
@@ -177,29 +175,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32);
-/**
- * tpm_buf_append_handle() - Add a handle
- * @buf: &tpm_buf instance
- * @handle: a TPM object handle
- *
- * Add a handle to the buffer, and increase the count tracking the number of
- * handles in the command buffer. Works only for command buffers.
- */
-void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
-{
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
- return;
-
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) {
- WARN(1, "tpm-buf: invalid type: TPM2B\n");
- buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
- return;
- }
-
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
- buf->handles++;
-}
-
/**
* tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer
* @buf: &tpm_buf instance
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 5b04e74b6377..d14e249831c7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
return rc;
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
- tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, pcr_idx);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, pcr_idx);
tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, buf, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
NULL, 0);
} else {
- offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 62a200ae72d7..dfd1abe673bc 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
- tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, handle);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
return 0;
}
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 *passphrase, int passphrase_len)
{
/* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
- int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ int offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index db716841973f..e20647cc0a0f 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -437,7 +437,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value);
u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
-void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle);
/*
* Check if TPM device is in the firmware upgrade mode.
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 7756aa839d81..0a07a18da2ed 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
} else {
- offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
--
2.52.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 3/4] tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-12-09 7:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, open list
In-Reply-To: <20251209073903.767518-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
In all of the call sites only one session is ever append. Thus, reduce
AUTH_MAX_NAMES, which leads into removing constant completely.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 31 +++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 0816a91134fc..62a200ae72d7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -72,9 +72,6 @@
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/utils.h>
-/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */
-#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES 3
-
#define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128
#define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8)
@@ -136,8 +133,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
* handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
* we must compute and remember
*/
- u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
- u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
+ u8 name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+ u16 name_size;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
@@ -254,11 +251,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public);
int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
struct tpm2_auth *auth;
- int slot;
int ret;
-#endif
+
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n");
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, handle);
@@ -266,12 +266,6 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
- slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4;
- if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n");
- ret = -EIO;
- goto err;
- }
auth = chip->auth;
if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed");
@@ -280,16 +274,14 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
auth->session += 4;
- memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size);
- auth->name_size_tbl[slot] = name_size;
+ memcpy(auth->name, name, name_size);
+ auth->name_size = name_size;
#endif
return 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
err:
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
return ret;
-#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
@@ -658,8 +650,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
/* ordinal is already BE */
sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal));
/* add the handle names */
- for (i = 0; i < handles; i++)
- sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]);
+ sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name, auth->name_size);
if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf))
sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
--
2.52.0
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