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From: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
To: Alex Williamson
	<alex.williamson-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: eric.auger-qxv4g6HH51o@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Eric Auger <eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	marc.zyngier-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org,
	p.fedin-Sze3O3UU22JBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org,
	patches-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
	pranav.sawargaonkar-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
	kvmarm-FPEHb7Xf0XXUo1n7N8X6UoWGPAHP3yOg@public.gmane.org,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: ARM PCI/MSI KVM passthrough with GICv2M
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 10:48:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160208094826.GA620@cbox> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160205111700.726ac061-1yVPhWWZRC1BDLzU/O5InQ@public.gmane.org>

On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 11:17:00AM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Feb 2016 18:32:07 +0100
> Eric Auger <eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> 
> > Hi Alex,
> > 
> > I tried to sketch a proposal for guaranteeing the IRQ integrity when
> > doing ARM PCI/MSI passthrough with ARM GICv2M msi-controller. This is
> > based on extended VFIO group viability control, as detailed below.
> > 
> > As opposed to ARM GICv3 ITS, this MSI controller does *not* support IRQ
> > remapping. It can expose 1 or more 4kB MSI frame. Each frame contains a
> > single register where the msi data is written.
> > 
> > I would be grateful to you if you could tell me whether it makes any sense.
> > 
> > Thanks in advance
> > 
> > Best Regards
> > 
> > Eric
> > 
> > 
> > 1) GICv2m with a single 4kB single frame
> >    all devices having this msi-controller as msi-parent share this
> >    single MSI frame. Those devices can work on behalf of the host
> >    or work on behalf of 1 or more guests (KVM assigned devices). We
> >    must make sure either the host only or 1 single VM can access to the
> >    single frame to guarantee interrupt integrity: a device assigned
> >    to 1 VM should not be able to trigger MSI targeted to the host
> >    or another VM.
> > 
> >    I would propose to extend the VFIO notion of group viability.
> >    Currently a VFIO group is viable if:
> >    all devices belonging to the same group are bound to a VFIO driver
> >    or unbound.
> > 
> >    Let's imagine we extend the viability check as follows:
> > 
> >    0) keep the current viable check: all the devices belonging to
> >       the group must be vfio bound or unbound.
> >    1) retrieve the MSI parent of the device and list all the
> >       other devices using that MSI controller as MSI-parent (does not
> >       look straightforward):
> >    2) they must be VFIO driver bound or unbound as well (meaning
> >       they are not used by the host). If not, reject device attachment
> >    - in case they are VFIO bound (a VFIO group is set):
> >      x if all VFIO containers are the same as the one of the device's
> >        we try to attach, that's OK. This means the other devices
> >        use different IOMMU mappings, eventually will target the
> >        MSI frame but they all work for the same user space client/VM.
> >      x 1 or more devices has a different container than the device
> >        under attachment:
> >        It works on behalf of a different user space client/VM,
> >        we can't attach the new device. I think there is a case however
> >        where severals containers can be opened by a single QEMU.
> > 
> > Of course the dynamic aspects, ie a new device showing up or an unbind
> > event bring significant complexity.
> > 
> > 2) GICv2M with multiple 4kB frames
> >    Each msi-frame is enumerated as msi-controller. The device tree
> >    statically defines which device is attached to each msi frame.
> >    In case devices are assigned we cannot change this attachment
> >    anyway since there might be physical contraints behind.
> >    So devices likely to be assigned to guests should be linked to a
> >    different MSI frame than devices that are not.
> > 
> >    I think extended viability concept can be used as well.
> > 
> >    This model still is not ideal: in case we have a SR-IOV device
> >    plugged onto an host bridge attached to a single MSI parent you won't
> >    be able anyway to have 1 Virtual Function working for host and 1 VF
> >    working for a guest. Only Interrupt translation (ITS) will bring that
> >    feature.
> > 
> > 3) GICv3 ITS
> >    This one supports interrupt translation service ~ Intel
> >    IRQ remapping.
> >    This means a single frame can be used by all devices. A deviceID is
> >    used exclusively by the host or a guest. I assume the ITS driver
> >    allocates/populates deviceid interrupt translation table featuring
> >    separate LPI spaces ie by construction different ITT cannot feature
> >    same LPIs. So no need to do the extended viability test.
> > 
> >    The MSI controller should have a property telling whether
> >    it supports interrupt translation. This kind of property currently
> >    exists on IOMMU side for INTEL remapping.
> > 
> 
> Hi Eric,
> 
> Would anyone be terribly upset if we simply assume the worst case
> scenario on GICv2m/M, have the IOMMU not claim IOMMU_CAP_INTR_REMAP, and
> require the user to opt-in via the allow_unsafe_interrupts on the
> vfio_iommu_type1 module?  That would make it very compatible with what
> we already do on x86, where it really is all or nothing.  

meaning either you allow unsafe multiplexing with passthrough in every
flavor (unsafely) or you don't allow it at all?

I didn't know such on option existed, but it seems to me that this fits
the bill exactly.


> My assumption
> is that GICv2 would be phased out in favor of GICv3, so there's always
> a hardware upgrade path to having more complete isolation, but the
> return on investment for figuring out whether a given device really has
> this sort of isolation seems pretty low.  Often users already have some
> degree of trust in the VMs they use for device assignment anyway.  An
> especially prudent user can still look at the hardware specs for their
> specific system to understand whether any devices are fully isolated
> and only make use of those for device assignment.  Does that seem like
> a reasonable alternative?
> 

It sounds good to me, that would allow us to release a GICv2m-based
solution for MSI passthrough on currently available hardware like the
Seattle.

Thanks,
-Christoffer

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-02-08  9:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-26 13:12 [PATCH 00/10] KVM PCIe/MSI passthrough on ARM/ARM64 Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 01/10] iommu: Add DOMAIN_ATTR_MSI_MAPPING attribute Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 02/10] vfio: expose MSI mapping requirement through VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO Eric Auger
     [not found] ` <1453813968-2024-1-git-send-email-eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-26 13:12   ` [PATCH 03/10] vfio_iommu_type1: add reserved binding RB tree management Eric Auger
2016-01-28 21:51   ` [PATCH 00/10] KVM PCIe/MSI passthrough on ARM/ARM64 Alex Williamson
     [not found]     ` <1454017899.23148.0.camel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-29 14:35       ` Eric Auger
2016-01-29 19:33         ` Alex Williamson
     [not found]           ` <1454096004.9301.1.camel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-29 21:25             ` Eric Auger
     [not found]               ` <56ABD8E0.6080409-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-01 14:03                 ` Will Deacon
2016-02-03 12:50                   ` Christoffer Dall
2016-02-03 13:10                     ` Will Deacon
     [not found]                       ` <20160203131057.GA20217-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-03 15:36                         ` Christoffer Dall
2016-02-05 17:32                           ` ARM PCI/MSI KVM passthrough with GICv2M Eric Auger
     [not found]                             ` <56B4DC97.60904-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-05 18:17                               ` Alex Williamson
     [not found]                                 ` <20160205111700.726ac061-1yVPhWWZRC1BDLzU/O5InQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-08  9:48                                   ` Christoffer Dall [this message]
2016-02-08 13:27                                     ` Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 04/10] vfio: introduce VFIO_IOVA_RESERVED vfio_dma type Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 05/10] vfio/type1: attach a reserved iova domain to vfio_domain Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 06/10] vfio: introduce vfio_group_alloc_map_/unmap_free_reserved_iova Eric Auger
     [not found]   ` <1453813968-2024-7-git-send-email-eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-26 16:17     ` kbuild test robot
2016-01-26 16:37       ` Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 07/10] vfio: pci: cache the vfio_group in vfio_pci_device Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 08/10] vfio: introduce vfio_group_require_msi_mapping Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 09/10] vfio-pci: create an iommu mapping for msi address Eric Auger
     [not found]   ` <1453813968-2024-10-git-send-email-eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-26 14:43     ` kbuild test robot
     [not found]       ` <201601262259.1kktHLzi%fengguang.wu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-26 15:14         ` Eric Auger
2016-01-26 13:12 ` [PATCH 10/10] vfio: allow the user to register reserved iova range for MSI mapping Eric Auger
2016-01-26 16:42   ` kbuild test robot
     [not found]   ` <1453813968-2024-11-git-send-email-eric.auger-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-26 18:32     ` kbuild test robot
2016-01-26 17:25 ` [PATCH 00/10] KVM PCIe/MSI passthrough on ARM/ARM64 Pavel Fedin
2016-01-27  8:52   ` Eric Auger
2016-01-28  7:13     ` Pavel Fedin
2016-01-28  9:50       ` Eric Auger

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