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From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	ashok.raj@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@intel.com, alan.cox@intel.com,
	kevin.tian@intel.com, mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com,
	pengfei.xu@intel.com
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/10] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 14:35:03 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190327063506.32564-8-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190327063506.32564-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>

This adds a helper to check whether a device needs to
use bounce buffer. It also provides a boot time option
to disable the bounce buffer. Users can use this to
prevent the iommu driver from using the bounce buffer
for performance gain.

Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@intel.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  5 +++++
 drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c                     | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2b8ee90bb644..86880eb3fc73 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1726,6 +1726,11 @@
 			Note that using this option lowers the security
 			provided by tboot because it makes the system
 			vulnerable to DMA attacks.
+		nobounce [Default off]
+			Do not use the bounce buffer for untrusted devices like
+			the Thunderbolt devices. This will treat the untrusted
+			devices as the trusted ones, hence might expose security
+			risks of DMA attacks.
 
 	intel_idle.max_cstate=	[KNL,HW,ACPI,X86]
 			0	disables intel_idle and fall back on acpi_idle.
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
index 3bfec944b0b8..b95a94f2fd5a 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_strict;
 static int intel_iommu_superpage = 1;
 static int intel_iommu_sm;
 static int iommu_identity_mapping;
+static int intel_no_bounce;
 
 #define IDENTMAP_ALL		1
 #define IDENTMAP_GFX		2
@@ -382,6 +383,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_iommu_gfx_mapped);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(device_domain_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(device_domain_list);
 
+static inline bool device_needs_bounce(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
+
+	if (intel_no_bounce)
+		return false;
+
+	if (dev_is_pci(dev))
+		pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
+
+	return pdev ? pdev->untrusted : false;
+}
+
 /*
  * Iterate over elements in device_domain_list and call the specified
  * callback @fn against each element.
@@ -464,6 +478,9 @@ static int __init intel_iommu_setup(char *str)
 			printk(KERN_INFO
 				"Intel-IOMMU: not forcing on after tboot. This could expose security risk for tboot\n");
 			intel_iommu_tboot_noforce = 1;
+		} else if (!strncmp(str, "nobounce", 8)) {
+			pr_info("Intel-IOMMU: No bounce buffer. This could expose security risks of DMA attacks\n");
+			intel_no_bounce = 1;
 		}
 
 		str += strcspn(str, ",");
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-03-27  6:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-27  6:34 [PATCH v2 00/10] iommu/vt-d: Bounce buffer for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:34 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] iommu/vt-d: Add trace events for domain map/unmap Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:34 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] iommu/vt-d: Add helpers for domain mapping/unmapping Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:34 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] iommu/vt-d: Add address walk helper Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:35 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] iommu/vt-d: Add dir_to_prot() helper Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:35 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] iommu/vt-d: Add bounce buffer API for map/unmap Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:35 ` Lu Baolu [this message]
2019-03-27  6:35 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] iommu/vt-d: Add dma sync ops for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:35 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] iommu/vt-d: Flush IOTLB for untrusted device in time Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:35 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] iommu/vt-d: Use bounce buffer for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
     [not found] ` <20190327063506.32564-1-baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2019-03-27  6:35   ` [PATCH v2 06/10] iommu/vt-d: Add bounce buffer API for dma sync Lu Baolu
2019-03-27  6:48   ` [PATCH v2 00/10] iommu/vt-d: Bounce buffer for untrusted devices Christoph Hellwig
2019-03-28  6:33     ` Lu Baolu
2019-03-28 16:11       ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-03-29  2:33         ` Lu Baolu

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