From: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
To: iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: robin.murphy@arm.com, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, will@kernel.org,
maz@kernel.org, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
jiri@resnulli.us, jgg@ziepe.ca, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org,
Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] dma-mapping: Add doc for memory encryption
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 14:50:43 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260330145043.1586623-6-smostafa@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260330145043.1586623-1-smostafa@google.com>
Add a document for memory encryption usage with dma-direct.
Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
---
.../core-api/dma-direct-memory-encryption.rst | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 77 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/core-api/dma-direct-memory-encryption.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/dma-direct-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/core-api/dma-direct-memory-encryption.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a780279292b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/core-api/dma-direct-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+============================================
+DMA Direct and Memory Encryption Integration
+============================================
+
+Introduction
+------------
+Modern platforms introduce memory encryption features (e.g., AMD SEV, Intel TDX,
+ARM CCA, and pKVM) typically for CoCo when running protected virtual machines.
+
+These guests typically boot with their memory encrypted by default.
+
+In some cases this memory needs to be accessed by the untrusted host or the
+VMM which then requires this memory to be decrypted. One typical case is
+dealing with emulated device (e.g., virtio) which are handled by direct-dma
+code as these devices are not behind an IOMMU.
+
+That means, the memory used by these devices must be decrypted before accessed
+by the untrusted host.
+
+It must be clarified that encrypted/decrypted may not always be
+cryptographic; in a broader sense, a decrypted page means that it is
+accessible or "shared" with the untrusted host.
+
+Ownership
+---------
+The direct-dma layer deals with memory encryption in two distinct scenarios:
+
+1. **Externally Managed Decryption (e.g., Restricted DMA Pools)**
+ In some setups (like a device restricted to a specific SWIOTLB pool, i.e.,
+ `DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL`), an entire region of memory is pre-decrypted during
+ boot or pool initialization. The memory is owned by the pool, and the
+ transitions (encryption/decryption) are **not** managed by direct-dma on
+ a per-allocation basis.
+ See Documentation/core-api/swiotlb.rst
+
+2. **DMA Direct Managed Decryption (e.g., `force_dma_unencrypted()`)**
+ For standard coherent DMA allocations the direct-dma layer is explicitly
+ responsible for managing the decryption. It must decrypt the pages upon
+ allocation and re-encrypt them upon freeing.
+
+To cleanly separate these concerns, the core logic is abstracted via three
+internal helpers:
+
+* ``dma_external_decryption(dev)``: Returns true if the pages are decrypted but
+ managed externally. For example, if the device allocates from a restricted
+ DMA pool.
+* ``dma_owns_decryption(dev)``: Returns true if the pages need to be explicitly
+ decrypted and managed by the direct-dma layer (i.e., the architecture forces
+ unencrypted DMA, and it's not handled by an external pool).
+* ``is_dma_decrypted(dev)``: Returns true if the memory being used is in a
+ decrypted state, regardless of who manages it.
+
+Addressing and Page Protections
+-------------------------------
+When memory is decrypted (whether externally or by direct-dma), the layer must
+adjust physical-to-DMA address conversions and page protections:
+
+* **DMA Address Conversion:**
+ Decrypted memory often requires a specific bit to be cleared or set in the DMA
+ address (e.g., stripping the encryption bit). If ``is_dma_decrypted(dev)`` is
+ true, the conversion uses ``phys_to_dma_unencrypted()`` instead of the standard
+ ``phys_to_dma()``.
+
+* **Page Protections (Remap and Mmap):**
+ When remapping decrypted pages into the kernel virtual address space (vmalloc)
+ or mapping them to user space via ``mmap()``, the page protection attributes
+ must reflect the decrypted state. If ``is_dma_decrypted(dev)`` is true, the
+ layer applies ``pgprot_decrypted(prot)`` to ensure the CPU accesses the memory
+ with the correct encryption attributes.
+
+Notes
+-----
+In many cases when memory encryption/decryption fails the page will be leaked,
+that's was added for TDX, where ``set_memory_encrypted()`` or
+``set_memory_decrypted()``may fail while the page remains shared.
--
2.53.0.1185.g05d4b7b318-goog
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-30 14:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-30 14:50 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] dma-mapping: Fixes for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] dma-mapping: Avoid double decrypting with DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:43 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-31 11:34 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-03-31 12:50 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] dma-mapping: Use the correct phys_to_dma() for DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:47 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] dma-mapping: Decrypt memory on remap Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:49 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] dma-mapping: Refactor memory encryption usage Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` Mostafa Saleh [this message]
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