From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
robin.murphy@arm.com, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, will@kernel.org,
maz@kernel.org, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
jiri@resnulli.us
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 5/5] dma-mapping: Fix memory decryption issues
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 10:53:25 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260415135325.GH2577880@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <yq5aldeo9yxm.fsf@kernel.org>
On Wed, Apr 15, 2026 at 06:13:17PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> writes:
>
> > On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 12:49:34PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> >> > 2) Using phys_to_dma_unencrypted() is not enlighted about already
> >> > decrypted memory and will use the wrong functions for that.
> >>
> >> Can you split this into a separate patch? I’m finding it difficult to
> >> understand what the issue is here. Adding the unencrypted flag multiple
> >> times to an address is not a problem in itself. Even so, I still do not
> >> follow when we would end up doing that.
> >
> > I think my comments show how to address it right..
> >
> >> phys_to_dma_direct should depend on the device state.
> >
> > No, it depends on what state the CPU address is, which in some flows
> > would have depended on the device state, but by the time you get to
> > generating a dma_addr_t it should be based 100% on the current state
> > of the phys_addr and nothing else.
> >
> > Assuming that a T=0 device must be presented unencrypted memory is an
> > easy hack but it doesn't work when we get to T=1 devices that can
> > handle both encryped and decrypted memory. Then we need to track it
> > explicitly.
> >
> > The only places we we should check the device state for T=0 is at the
> > very top when we decide if we force it to swiotlb and inside swiotlb
> > when we decide if the allocation should be decrypted. Everything else
> > should flow from tracking the phy's state, and be tied into the new
> > DMA ATTR UNENCRYPTED.
> >
>
> For things like
>
> #define dma_map_single(d, a, s, r) dma_map_single_attrs(d, a, s, r, 0)
>
> Where do you suggest DMA_ATTR_CC_DECRYPTED be set?
dma_map_single() assumes that a is encrypted.
If the caller passes an a that it decrypted then it must pass
DMA_ATTR_CC_DECRYPTED.
It is NOT directly derived from force_dma_unencrypted().
If attr says encrypted and force_dma_unencrypted(), then we have to do
swiotlb, we get a new address and we track the decrypted state of the
new address along with it.
Lower levels always receive an address and a 'is decrypted' flag to
make their decisions.
The place we check force_dma_unencrypted() is while branching to
swiotlb.
swiotlb might re-use DMA_ATTR_CC_DECRYPTED, or it might use the
dma_page idea, but logically the address and a matching flag flow
together through the call chains.
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-15 13:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-08 19:47 [RFC PATCH v3 0/5] dma-mapping: Fixes for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-08 19:47 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/5] swiotlb: Return state of memory from swiotlb_alloc() Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-14 9:25 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-15 20:43 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-16 8:53 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-08 19:47 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/5] dma-mapping: Move encryption in __dma_direct_free_pages() Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-10 17:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-15 20:49 ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-16 0:11 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-08 19:47 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/5] dma-mapping: Decrypt memory on remap Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-14 9:31 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-14 12:22 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-14 13:13 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-14 13:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-08 19:47 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/5] dma-mapping: Encapsulate memory state during allocation Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-10 18:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-15 9:38 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-08 19:47 ` [RFC PATCH v3 5/5] dma-mapping: Fix memory decryption issues Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-13 7:19 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-13 12:42 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-15 12:43 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-15 13:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-04-14 9:37 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-10 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/5] dma-mapping: Fixes for memory encryption Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-15 20:25 ` Mostafa Saleh
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