From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: ZhaoJinming <zhaojinming@uniontech.com>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>,
Guanghui Feng <guanghuifeng@linux.alibaba.com>,
Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>,
Desnes Nunes <desnesn@redhat.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/19] iommu/vt-d: Support the new DMA_REMAP_OPT_OUT flag bit
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:43:07 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804234314.3087110-14-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804234314.3087110-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
From: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Some BIOS already provides config options to expose/hide VT-d units
as a whole to/from system software. A new demand is to allow exposing
VT-d units but requesting system software to disable DMA remapping
while sustaining interrupt remapping. This can be communicated now by
setting the new DMA_REMAP_OPT_OUT flag bit in the DMAR table, as
introduced in VT-d spec v5.2 (section 8.1, DMA Remapping Reporting
Structure).
Introduce a new off policy (DMAR_FW_OFF) for DMA_REMAP_OPT_OUT. As
the strongest off policy, it cannot be overridden by user opts or
any force_on types. If tboot is enabled in the meantime, kernel will
panic. It is user responsibility to configure BIOS properly.
One cleanup is left for future - the DMAR flag is parsed multiple
times, in detect_intel_iommu(), dmar_platform_optin() (which can be
called at run-time), etc. Caching it is a cleaner way.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h | 4 ++++
include/linux/dmar.h | 1 +
drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h
index 9805edb8c7df..656cd311ed9a 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h
@@ -1375,6 +1375,9 @@ enum dmar_force_on {
* - DMAR_USER_OFF
* turn off by user opts ("intel_iommu=off" or "iommu=off").
*
+ * - DMAR_FW_OFF
+ * turn off due to firmware opt-out (DMAR_REMAP_OPT_OUT)
+ *
* - '0' is invalid, compared to decide the on/off policy
*
*/
@@ -1382,6 +1385,7 @@ enum dmar_force_on {
#define DMAR_ON 1
#define DMAR_DEFAULT_OFF -1
#define DMAR_USER_OFF -2
+#define DMAR_FW_OFF -3
extern int dmar_policy;
static inline bool dmar_policy_on(void)
diff --git a/include/linux/dmar.h b/include/linux/dmar.h
index 692b2b445761..63e35df2cef4 100644
--- a/include/linux/dmar.h
+++ b/include/linux/dmar.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct acpi_dmar_header;
#define DMAR_INTR_REMAP 0x1
#define DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT 0x2
#define DMAR_PLATFORM_OPT_IN 0x4
+#define DMAR_REMAP_OPT_OUT 0x8
struct intel_iommu;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c
index bc2f6597eb27..33bfaeafa7c6 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c
@@ -930,7 +930,9 @@ dmar_validate_one_drhd(struct acpi_dmar_header *entry, void *arg)
*
* - DMAR_FORCEON_TBOOT: tboot strictly requires DMA remapping for secure
* boot hence supersedes any user opts ("iommu=off" or "intel_iommu=off")
- * and weaker off policies.
+ * and weaker off policies. But if firmware forces DMA remapping off (by
+ * setting DMAR_REMAP_OPT_OUT in the DMAR table), no force_on is allowed.
+ * Firmware settings must be changed to unblock tboot.
*
* - DMAR_FORCEON_PLATFORM: external-facing devices requires DMA
* remapping to prevent malicious downstream external devices from
@@ -939,6 +941,7 @@ dmar_validate_one_drhd(struct acpi_dmar_header *entry, void *arg)
*
* In a nutshell, "trusted boot environment" is considered stronger than
* "user choices", which in turn is stronger than "platform opt-in hint".
+ * But they are all meaningless when it's forced off by "firmware".
*/
bool dmar_can_force_on(enum dmar_force_on force_on)
{
@@ -976,31 +979,42 @@ static bool dmar_required(void)
void __init detect_intel_iommu(void)
{
- int ret;
struct dmar_res_callback validate_drhd_cb = {
.cb[ACPI_DMAR_TYPE_HARDWARE_UNIT] = &dmar_validate_one_drhd,
.ignore_unhandled = true,
};
+ struct acpi_table_dmar *dmar;
+ int ret;
down_write(&dmar_global_lock);
if (no_iommu)
dmar_policy = DMAR_USER_OFF;
ret = dmar_table_detect();
- if (!ret)
- ret = dmar_walk_dmar_table((struct acpi_table_dmar *)dmar_tbl,
- &validate_drhd_cb);
- if (!ret && !iommu_detected && dmar_required()) {
+ if (!ret) {
+ dmar = (struct acpi_table_dmar *)dmar_tbl;
+ ret = dmar_walk_dmar_table(dmar, &validate_drhd_cb);
+ }
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (dmar->flags & DMAR_REMAP_OPT_OUT) {
+ dmar_policy = DMAR_FW_OFF;
+ pr_info("Firmware forces DMA remapping off\n");
+ pr_info("Any user opt or tboot/platform force_on will be ignored\n");
+ }
+
+ if (!iommu_detected && dmar_required()) {
iommu_detected = 1;
/* Make sure ACS will be enabled */
pci_request_acs();
}
- if (!ret) {
- x86_init.iommu.iommu_init = intel_iommu_init;
- x86_platform.iommu_shutdown = intel_iommu_shutdown;
- }
+ x86_init.iommu.iommu_init = intel_iommu_init;
+ x86_platform.iommu_shutdown = intel_iommu_shutdown;
+out:
if (dmar_tbl) {
acpi_put_table(dmar_tbl);
dmar_tbl = NULL;
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 23:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 23:42 [PATCH v2 00/19][PULL REQUEST] Intel IOMMU updates for v7.3 Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:42 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] iommu/vt-d: Fix UCTP context table slot when copying root entries Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:42 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] iommu/vt-d: Use logical OR operator for privilege mode check Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:42 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] iommu/vt-d: Fix CACHE_TAG_NESTING_DEVTLB polluting shared variables in flush loop Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:42 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] iommu/vt-d: Use kstrtoint_from_user() in dmar_perf_latency_write() Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:42 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] iommu/vt-d: Fix no_iommu to disable platform opt-in Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] iommu/vt-d: Force requesting ACS when tboot is enabled Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] iommu/vt-d: Remove dead code when CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU is not set Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] iommu/vt-d: Consolidate dmar policy management and force_on logic Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] iommu/vt-d: Use dmar_can_force_on() for platform opt-in Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] iommu/vt-d: Call dmar_can_force_on() for tboot opt-in Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] iommu/vt-d: Remove the 'force_on' variable Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] iommu/vt-d: Remove dmar_disabled Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` Lu Baolu [this message]
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] iommu/vt-d: Cache max domain ID to avoid redundant calculation Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] iommu/vt-d: Fix copied_tables bitmap leak on error in copy_translation_tables Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down copied context entry Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] iommu/vt-d: Fix iopf_refcount leak on RID domain replacement Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] iommu/vt-d: Tear down scalable-mode context on probe failure Lu Baolu
2026-08-04 23:43 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] iommu/vt-d: Flush context cache with correct SID when tearing down aliases Lu Baolu
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