Re: Summary of LPC guest MSI discussion in Santa Fe

[Don Dutile <ddutile-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>]

On 11/11/2016 06:19 AM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 10:46:01AM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote:
>> In the case of x86, we know that DMA mappings overlapping the MSI
>> doorbells won't be translated correctly, it's not a valid mapping for
>> that range, and therefore the iommu driver backing the IOMMU API
>> should describe that reserved range and reject mappings to it.
>
> The drivers actually allow mappings to the MSI region via the IOMMU-API,
> and I think it should stay this way also for other reserved ranges.
> Address space management is done by the IOMMU-API user already (and has
> to be done there nowadays), be it a DMA-API implementation which just
> reserves these regions in its address space allocator or be it VFIO with
> QEMU, which don't map RAM there anyway. So there is no point of checking
> this again in the IOMMU drivers and we can keep that out of the
> mapping/unmapping fast-path.
>
>> For PCI devices userspace can examine the topology of the iommu group
>> and exclude MMIO ranges of peer devices based on the BARs, which are
>> exposed in various places, pci-sysfs as well as /proc/iomem.  For
>> non-PCI or MSI controllers... ???
>
> Right, the hardware resources can be examined. But maybe this can be
> extended to also cover RMRR ranges? Then we would be able to assign
> devices with RMRR mappings to guests.
>
eh gads no!

Assigning devices w/RMRR's is a security issue waiting to happen, if
it doesn't crash the system before the guest even gets the device --
reset the device before assignment; part of device is gathering system
environmental data; if BIOS/SMM support doesn't get env. data update,
it NMI's the system..... in fear that it may overheat ...


>
>
> 	Joerg
>