From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, luto@amacapital.net,
mingo@redhat.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, hpa@zytor.com,
bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 16:03:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7ee55288-209f-8f19-ef69-27e2a5448473@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6713b6b2-3c6d-8318-ee9e-e1746f02a3a5@oracle.com>
On 2021-12-03 15:47, Ross Philipson wrote:
> On 12/2/21 12:26, Robin Murphy wrote:
>> On 2021-08-27 14:28, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> [...]
>>> +IOMMU Configuration
>>> +-------------------
>>> +
>>> +When doing a Secure Launch, the IOMMU should always be enabled and
>>> the drivers
>>> +loaded. However, IOMMU passthrough mode should never be used. This
>>> leaves the
>>> +MLE completely exposed to DMA after the PMR's [2]_ are disabled.
>>> First, IOMMU
>>> +passthrough should be disabled by default in the build configuration::
>>> +
>>> + "Device Drivers" -->
>>> + "IOMMU Hardware Support" -->
>>> + "IOMMU passthrough by default [ ]"
>>> +
>>> +This unset the Kconfig value CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_PASSTHROUGH.
>>
>> Note that the config structure has now changed, and if set, passthrough
>> is deselected by choosing a different default domain type.
>
> Thanks for the heads up. We will have to modify this for how things
> exist today.
>
>>
>>> +In addition, passthrough must be disabled on the kernel command line
>>> when doing
>>> +a Secure Launch as follows::
>>> +
>>> + iommu=nopt iommu.passthrough=0
>>
>> This part is a bit silly - those options are literally aliases for the
>> exact same thing, and furthermore if the config is already set as
>> required then the sole effect either of them will have is to cause "(set
>> by kernel command line)" to be printed. There is no value in explicitly
>> overriding the default value with the default value - if anyone can
>> append an additional "iommu.passthrough=1" (or "iommu=pt") to the end of
>> the command line they'll still win.
>
> I feel like when we worked on this, it was still important to set those
> values. This could have been in an older kernel version. We will go back
> and verify what you are saying here and adjust the documentation
> accordingly.
>
> As to anyone just adding values to the command line, that is why the
> command line is part of the DRTM measurements.
Yeah, I had a vague memory that that was the case - basically if you can
trust the command line as much as the config then it's definitely
redundant to pass an option for this (see iommu_subsys_init() - it's now
all plumbed through iommu_def_domain_type), and if you can't then
passing them is futile anyway.
Cheers,
Robin.
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iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-03 16:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-27 13:28 [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:01 ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] x86/boot: Add setup_indirect support in early_memremap_is_setup_data Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:03 ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-12-02 17:26 ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 15:47 ` Ross Philipson
2021-12-03 16:03 ` Robin Murphy [this message]
2021-12-03 17:48 ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-08-30 19:45 ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-01 1:06 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Paul Moore
2021-12-02 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-06 20:56 ` Paul Moore
2022-01-21 21:39 ` Paul Moore
2022-02-15 15:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
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