From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>,
kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
sthemmin@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
martin.petersen@oracle.com, arnd@arndb.de, hch@infradead.org,
m.szyprowski@samsung.com, robin.murphy@arm.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com,
michael.h.kelley@microsoft.com
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, parri.andrea@gmail.com,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, vkuznets@redhat.com,
hch@lst.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 10:40:49 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c25ff1e8-4d1e-cf1c-a9f6-c189307f92fd@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3243ff22-f6c8-b7cd-26b7-6e917e274a7c@gmail.com>
On 12/13/21 8:36 PM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
> On 12/14/2021 12:45 AM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 12/12/21 11:14 PM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
>>> In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via
>>> extra address space which is above shared_gpa_boundary (E.G 39 bit
>>> address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUID ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access
>>> physical address will be original physical address +
>>> shared_gpa_boundary.
>>> The shared_gpa_boundary in the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of
>>> memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as
>>> private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.
>>
>> This seems to be independently reintroducing some of the SEV
>> infrastructure. Is it really OK that this doesn't interact at all with
>> any existing SEV code?
>>
>> For instance, do we need a new 'swiotlb_unencrypted_base', or should
>> this just be using sme_me_mask somehow?
>
> Thanks for your review. Hyper-V provides a para-virtualized
> confidential computing solution based on the AMD SEV function and not
> expose sev&sme capabilities to guest. So sme_me_mask is unset in the
> Hyper-V Isolation VM. swiotlb_unencrypted_base is more general solution
> to handle such case of different address space for encrypted and
> decrypted memory and other platform also may reuse it.
I don't really understand how this can be more general any *not* get
utilized by the existing SEV support.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-14 19:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-13 7:14 [PATCH V7 0/5] x86/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V Isolation VM support(Second part) Tianyu Lan
2021-12-13 7:14 ` [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM Tianyu Lan
2021-12-13 16:45 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-14 4:36 ` Tianyu Lan
2021-12-14 18:40 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2021-12-14 22:23 ` Tom Lendacky via iommu
2021-12-14 22:40 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-15 5:00 ` Tianyu Lan
2021-12-16 11:05 ` Wei Liu
2021-12-13 7:14 ` [PATCH V7 2/5] x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in the cc_platform_has() Tianyu Lan
2021-12-14 15:33 ` Wei Liu
2021-12-14 16:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-14 16:10 ` Wei Liu
2021-12-13 7:14 ` [PATCH V7 3/5] hyper-v: Enable swiotlb bounce buffer for Isolation VM Tianyu Lan
2021-12-13 7:14 ` [PATCH V7 4/5] scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver Tianyu Lan
2021-12-15 19:19 ` Long Li via iommu
2022-02-03 23:53 ` Jakub Kicinski
2022-02-04 2:55 ` Jakub Kicinski
2021-12-13 7:14 ` [PATCH V7 5/5] net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driver Tianyu Lan
2021-12-13 16:56 ` Haiyang Zhang via iommu
2021-12-14 18:35 ` [PATCH V7 0/5] x86/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V Isolation VM support(Second part) Michael Kelley (LINUX) via iommu
2021-12-17 18:02 ` Wei Liu
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