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From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: robin.murphy@arm.com, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, will@kernel.org,
	maz@kernel.org, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	jiri@resnulli.us, jgg@ziepe.ca,
	Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] dma-mapping: Decrypt memory on remap
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 11:53:39 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5a8qarbcpg.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260330145043.1586623-4-smostafa@google.com>

Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com> writes:

> In case memory needs to be remapped on systems with
> force_dma_unencrypted(), where this memory is not allocated
> from a restricted-dma pool, this was currently ignored, while only
> setting the decrypted pgprot in the remapped alias.
>
> The memory still needs to be decrypted in that case.
>
> With memory decryption, don't allow highmem allocations, but that
> shouldn't be a problem on such modern systems.
>
> Reported-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Fixes: f3c962226dbe ("dma-direct: clean up the remapping checks in dma_direct_alloc")
> Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>
> ---
>  kernel/dma/direct.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.c b/kernel/dma/direct.c
> index 1a402bb956d9..a4260689bcc8 100644
> --- a/kernel/dma/direct.c
> +++ b/kernel/dma/direct.c
> @@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ static void *dma_direct_alloc_no_mapping(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>  void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>  		dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t gfp, unsigned long attrs)
>  {
> +	bool allow_highmem = !force_dma_unencrypted(dev);
>  	bool remap = false, set_uncached = false;
>  	struct page *page;
>  	void *ret;
> @@ -251,7 +252,7 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>  		return dma_direct_alloc_from_pool(dev, size, dma_handle, gfp);
>  
>  	/* we always manually zero the memory once we are done */
> -	page = __dma_direct_alloc_pages(dev, size, gfp & ~__GFP_ZERO, true);
> +	page = __dma_direct_alloc_pages(dev, size, gfp & ~__GFP_ZERO, allow_highmem);
>  	if (!page)
>  		return NULL;
>  
> @@ -265,6 +266,9 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>  		set_uncached = false;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (dma_set_decrypted(dev, page_address(page), size))
> +		goto out_leak_pages;
> +
>  	if (remap) {
>  		pgprot_t prot = dma_pgprot(dev, PAGE_KERNEL, attrs);
>  
> @@ -278,11 +282,9 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>  		ret = dma_common_contiguous_remap(page, size, prot,
>  				__builtin_return_address(0));
>  		if (!ret)
> -			goto out_free_pages;
> +			goto out_encrypt_pages;
>  	} else {
>  		ret = page_address(page);
> -		if (dma_set_decrypted(dev, ret, size))
> -			goto out_leak_pages;
>  	}
>  
>  	memset(ret, 0, size);
> @@ -300,7 +302,6 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>  out_encrypt_pages:
>  	if (dma_set_encrypted(dev, page_address(page), size))
>  		return NULL;
> -out_free_pages:
>  	__dma_direct_free_pages(dev, page, size);
>  	return NULL;
>  out_leak_pages:
> @@ -339,7 +340,12 @@ void dma_direct_free(struct device *dev, size_t size,
>  		return;
>  
>  	if (is_vmalloc_addr(cpu_addr)) {
> +		void *vaddr = page_address(dma_direct_to_page(dev, dma_addr));
> +
>  		vunmap(cpu_addr);
> +
> +		if (dma_set_encrypted(dev, vaddr, size))
> +			return;


Right now, a remap is required under two conditions:

1. HighMem — I assume we are avoiding this for devices that require memory decryption.
2. The device is not DMA-coherent.

Can we assume that condition (2) will also not be supported alongside
memory encryption/decryption? That would allow us to simplify all of
this. We would then only need to carry the patch that disables HighMem
for devices requiring unencrypted DMA buffers.

I did post a patch along similar lines some time back. There is also the
challenge of presenting a vmap address as decrypted on ARM.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260102155037.2551524-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org


>  	} else {
>  		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_CLEAR_UNCACHED))
>  			arch_dma_clear_uncached(cpu_addr, size);
> -- 
> 2.53.0.1185.g05d4b7b318-goog

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-13  6:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-30 14:50 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] dma-mapping: Fixes for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] dma-mapping: Avoid double decrypting with DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:06   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:43     ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-31 11:34       ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-03-31 12:50         ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-04-13  6:00       ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-04-13 12:35         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] dma-mapping: Use the correct phys_to_dma() for DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:09   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:47     ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:28       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13  6:08   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] dma-mapping: Decrypt memory on remap Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:19   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 20:49     ` Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 22:30       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-13  6:23   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] dma-mapping: Refactor memory encryption usage Mostafa Saleh
2026-03-30 15:27   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] dma-mapping: Add doc for memory encryption Mostafa Saleh

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