From: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com, alxmtvv@gmail.com,
linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, yamada.masahiro@socionext.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/21] x86: Make exception handler functions visible
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 13:34:09 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171127213423.27218-8-andi@firstfloor.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171127213423.27218-1-andi@firstfloor.org>
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Make the C exception handler functions that are directly called through
exception tables visible. LTO needs to know they are accessed from assembler.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 3321b446b66c..abe60607e8b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ex_fixup_handler(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
return (ex_handler_t)((unsigned long)&x->handler + x->handler);
}
-bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+__visible bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_default);
-bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+__visible bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault);
* Handler for UD0 exception following a failed test against the
* result of a refcount inc/dec/add/sub.
*/
-bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+__visible bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
/* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_refcount);
* of vulnerability by restoring from the initial state (essentially, zeroing
* out all the FPU registers) if we can't restore from the task's FPU state.
*/
+__visible
bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fprestore);
-bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+__visible bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
/* Special hack for uaccess_err */
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_ext);
-bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pF)\n",
@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe);
-bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pF)\n",
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe);
-bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+__visible bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG))
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_clear_fs);
-bool ex_has_fault_handler(unsigned long ip)
+__visible bool ex_has_fault_handler(unsigned long ip)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
ex_handler_t handler;
--
2.13.6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-27 21:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-27 21:34 Link time optimization for LTO/x86 Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 01/21] x86/xen: Mark pv stub assembler symbol visible Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 02/21] afs: Fix const confusion in AFS Andi Kleen
2017-11-28 16:04 ` David Howells
2017-11-28 16:50 ` Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 03/21] x86/timer: Don't inline __const_udelay Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 04/21] locking/spinlocks: Mark spinlocks noinline when inline spinlocks are disabled Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 05/21] x86/kvm: Make steal_time visible Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 06/21] x86/syscalls: Make x86 syscalls use real prototypes Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 08/21] x86/idt: Make const __initconst Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 09/21] lto: Use C version for SYSCALL_ALIAS Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 10/21] Fix read buffer overflow in delta-ipc Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 11/21] trace: Use -mcount-record for dynamic ftrace Andi Kleen
2017-12-01 0:22 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-05-01 18:42 ` Steven Rostedt
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 12/21] ftrace: Mark function tracer test functions noinline/noclone Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 13/21] ftrace: Disable LTO for ftrace self tests Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 14/21] lto, fs: Avoid static variable in linux/fs.h Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 15/21] lto, x86, mm: Disable vmalloc BUILD_BUG_ON for LTO Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 16/21] lto: Add __noreorder and mark initcalls __noreorder Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 17/21] lto, workaround: Disable LTO for BPF Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 18/21] lto, crypto: Disable LTO for camelia glue Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 19/21] lto, x86: Disable LTO for realmode / vDSO / head64 Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 20/21] Kbuild, lto: Add Link Time Optimization support Andi Kleen
2018-01-27 0:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-01-27 0:55 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-27 14:26 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-01-28 18:33 ` Andi Kleen
2017-11-27 21:34 ` [PATCH 21/21] x86: Enable Link Time Optimization Andi Kleen
2017-11-29 23:09 ` Link time optimization for LTO/x86 Sami Tolvanen
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