From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>,
mingo@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, dvhart@infradead.org,
dave@stgolabs.net, andrealmeid@igalia.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jann@thejh.net, keescook@chromium.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linux.dev,
Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race
Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2025 10:19:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <871ppqgoz0.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250804115533.14186-1-pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
On Mon, Aug 04 2025 at 17:25, Pranav Tyagi wrote:
> Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking
> ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
> This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the
> check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
> credentials.
>
> changed in v2:
> - improved changelog
> - helper function for common part of the compat and native syscalls
Please put version log below the --- line. That's not part of the change log.
> Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/1477863998-3298-5-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net/
> Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/119
> ---
> kernel/futex/syscalls.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
> 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/futex/syscalls.c b/kernel/futex/syscalls.c
> index 4b6da9116aa6..3278d91d95ce 100644
> --- a/kernel/futex/syscalls.c
> +++ b/kernel/futex/syscalls.c
> @@ -39,46 +39,81 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * sys_get_robust_list() - Get the robust-futex list head of a task
> - * @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task]
> - * @head_ptr: pointer to a list-head pointer, the kernel fills it in
> - * @len_ptr: pointer to a length field, the kernel fills in the header size
> - */
> -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
> - struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr,
> - size_t __user *, len_ptr)
> +static void __user *get_robust_list_common(int pid,
> + bool compat)
What is this random line break for?
> {
> - struct robust_list_head __user *head;
> + void __user *head;
> unsigned long ret;
> - struct task_struct *p;
>
Stray new line and please use reverse fir tree ordering of variables:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/maintainer-tip.html#variable-declarations
> - rcu_read_lock();
> + struct task_struct *p;
>
> - ret = -ESRCH;
> - if (!pid)
> + if (!pid) {
> p = current;
> - else {
> + get_task_struct(p);
> + } else {
> + rcu_read_lock();
> p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
> + /*
> + * pin the task to permit dropping the RCU read lock before
> + * acquiring the semaphore
> + */
> + if (p)
> + get_task_struct(p);
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> if (!p)
> - goto err_unlock;
> + return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
scoped_guard(rcu) {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
return (void __user *)ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
get_task_struct(p);
}
No need for a comment about pinning the task. This is obvious and a
common pattern all over the place. And note the type case on the error
return.
But you can simplify this whole thing even further:
struct task_struct *p = current;
scoped_guard(rcu) {
if (pid) {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
return (void __user *)ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
}
get_task_struct(p);
}
Yes, RCU is not required for the !pid case, but this is not a hot path.
>
> + /*
> + * Hold exec_update_lock to serialize with concurrent exec()
> + * so ptrace_may_access() is checked against stable credentials
> + */
> +
Stray newline.
> + ret = down_read_killable(&p->signal->exec_update_lock);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_put;
> +
> ret = -EPERM;
> if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> goto err_unlock;
>
> - head = p->robust_list;
> - rcu_read_unlock();
> + if (compat)
> + head = p->compat_robust_list;
> + else
> + head = p->robust_list;
Brain compiler complains about a build fail with CONFIG_COMPAT=n
static inline void __user *task_robust_list(struct task_struct *p, bool compat)
{
#ifdef COMPAT
if (compat)
return p->compat_robust_list;
#endif
return p->robust_list;
}
So you don't have the #ifdef ugly in this function..
> - if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
> - return -EFAULT;
> - return put_user(head, head_ptr);
> + up_read(&p->signal->exec_update_lock);
> + put_task_struct(p);
> +
> + return head;
>
> err_unlock:
> - rcu_read_unlock();
> + up_read(&p->signal->exec_update_lock);
> +err_put:
> + put_task_struct(p);
> + return ERR_PTR(ret);
> +}
>
> - return ret;
> +
> +/**
> + * sys_get_robust_list() - Get the robust-futex list head of a task
> + * @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task]
> + * @head_ptr: pointer to a list-head pointer, the kernel fills it in
> + * @len_ptr: pointer to a length field, the kernel fills in the header size
> + */
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
> + struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr,
> + size_t __user *, len_ptr)
> +{
> + struct robust_list_head __user *head =
> + get_robust_list_common(pid, false);
No line break required.
> + if (IS_ERR(head))
> + return PTR_ERR(head);
> +
> + if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + return put_user(head, head_ptr);
> }
>
> long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
> @@ -455,36 +490,15 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
> compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr,
> compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr)
> {
> - struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head;
> - unsigned long ret;
> - struct task_struct *p;
> + struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head =
> + get_robust_list_common(pid, true);
Ditto
Thanks,
tglx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-05 8:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-04 11:55 [PATCH v2] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race Pranav Tyagi
2025-08-04 15:12 ` Kees Cook
2025-08-05 8:19 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2025-08-05 13:57 ` Pranav Tyagi
2025-08-05 9:01 ` kernel test robot
2025-08-05 18:27 ` kernel test robot
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