From: Yonghong Song <yhs@meta.com>
To: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxtram95@gmail.com>, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>,
Song Liu <song@kernel.org>, Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 1/2] bpf: Fix verifier tracking scalars on spill
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 18:32:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <11eb089f-9e71-856f-7f01-375176bd5edf@meta.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230606214246.403579-2-maxtram95@gmail.com>
On 6/6/23 2:42 PM, Maxim Mikityanskiy wrote:
> From: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
>
> The following scenario describes a verifier bypass in privileged mode
> (CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN):
>
> 1. Prepare a 32-bit rogue number.
> 2. Put the rogue number into the upper half of a 64-bit register, and
> roll a random (unknown to the verifier) bit in the lower half. The
> rest of the bits should be zero (although variations are possible).
> 3. Assign an ID to the register by MOVing it to another arbitrary
> register.
> 4. Perform a 32-bit spill of the register, then perform a 32-bit fill to
> another register. Due to a bug in the verifier, the ID will be
> preserved, although the new register will contain only the lower 32
> bits, i.e. all zeros except one random bit.
>
> At this point there are two registers with different values but the same
> ID, which means the integrity of the verifier state has been corrupted.
> Next steps show the actual bypass:
>
> 5. Compare the new 32-bit register with 0. In the branch where it's
> equal to 0, the verifier will believe that the original 64-bit
> register is also 0, because it has the same ID, but its actual value
> still contains the rogue number in the upper half.
> Some optimizations of the verifier prevent the actual bypass, so
> extra care is needed: the comparison must be between two registers,
> and both branches must be reachable (this is why one random bit is
> needed). Both branches are still suitable for the bypass.
> 6. Right shift the original register by 32 bits to pop the rogue number.
> 7. Use the rogue number as an offset with any pointer. The verifier will
> believe that the offset is 0, while in reality it's the given number.
>
> The fix is similar to the 32-bit BPF_MOV handling in check_alu_op for
> SCALAR_VALUE. If the spill is narrowing the actual register value, don't
> keep the ID, make sure it's reset to 0.
>
> Fixes: 354e8f1970f8 ("bpf: Support <8-byte scalar spill and refill")
> Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
LGTM with a small nit below.
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 5871aa78d01a..7be23eced561 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -3856,6 +3856,8 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
> if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) &&
> !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) {
> + bool reg_value_fits;
> +
> if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) {
> /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit
> * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of
> @@ -3867,7 +3869,12 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> +
> + reg_value_fits = fls64(reg->umax_value) <= BITS_PER_BYTE * size;
> save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
> + /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */
> + if (!reg_value_fits)
> + state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
I think the code can be simplied like below:
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4230,6 +4230,8 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
return err;
}
save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
+ if (fls64(reg->umax_value) > BITS_PER_BYTE * size)
+ state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
} else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) &&
insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) {
struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};
> } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) &&
> insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) {
> struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-07 1:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-06 21:42 [PATCH bpf v3 0/2] Fix BPF verifier bypass on scalar spill Maxim Mikityanskiy
2023-06-06 21:42 ` [PATCH bpf v3 1/2] bpf: Fix verifier tracking scalars on spill Maxim Mikityanskiy
2023-06-07 1:32 ` Yonghong Song [this message]
2023-06-07 7:36 ` Maxim Mikityanskiy
2023-06-06 21:42 ` [PATCH bpf v3 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add test cases to assert proper ID tracking " Maxim Mikityanskiy
2023-06-07 1:40 ` Yonghong Song
2023-06-07 1:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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