From: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com>
To: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Philip Paeps <philip@trouble.is>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>,
Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>,
Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>,
Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>,
Ivan Delalande <colona@arista.com>,
Caowangbao <caowangbao@huawei.com>,
Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@google.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 25/26] tcp: authopt: If no keys are valid for send report an error
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:59 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1ebffe1a92b0d36488168aa273ac87fa3866d9ca.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com>
If this is not treated specially then when all keys are removed or
expired then TCP will start sending unsigned packets which is
undesirable. Instead try to report an error on key selection and
propagate it to userspace.
The error is assigned to sk_err and propagate it as soon as possible.
In theory we could try to make the error "soft" and even let the
connection continue if userspace adds a new key but the advantages are
unclear.
Since userspace is responsible for managing keys it can also avoid
sending unsigned packets by always closing the socket before removing
the active last key.
The specific error reported is ENOKEY.
This requires changes inside TCP option write code to support aborting
the actual packet send, until this point this did not happen in any
scenario.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 9 +++++++--
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
index bbdc5f68ab56..933a4bbddb70 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
@@ -448,10 +448,11 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk,
u8 *rnextkeyid,
bool locked)
{
struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key = NULL;
struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk);
+ bool anykey = false;
/* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try
* to keep using the same key.
* The rnextkeyid is stored in tcp_request_sock
*/
@@ -470,11 +471,13 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk,
else
send_id = rsk->recv_rnextkeyid;
key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_id, NULL);
/* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */
if (!key)
- key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, NULL);
+ key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, &anykey);
+ if (!key && anykey)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
if (key)
*rnextkeyid = key->recv_id;
return key;
}
@@ -506,11 +509,13 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk,
info->recv_rnextkeyid,
NULL);
}
/* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */
if (!key && !new_key)
- new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, NULL);
+ new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, &anykey);
+ if (!new_key && anykey)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
/* Update current key only if we hold the socket lock. */
if (new_key && key != new_key) {
if (locked) {
if (kref_get_unless_zero(&new_key->ref)) {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 74c3ef86f0bc..a1c2d4d2c426 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -411,10 +411,11 @@ static inline bool tcp_urg_mode(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
#define OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE BIT(0)
#define OPTION_TS BIT(1)
#define OPTION_MD5 BIT(2)
#define OPTION_WSCALE BIT(3)
#define OPTION_AUTHOPT BIT(4)
+#define OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL BIT(5)
#define OPTION_FAST_OPEN_COOKIE BIT(8)
#define OPTION_SMC BIT(9)
#define OPTION_MPTCP BIT(10)
static void smc_options_write(__be32 *ptr, u16 *options)
@@ -783,10 +784,14 @@ static int tcp_authopt_init_options(const struct sock *sk,
{
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key;
key = tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, addr_sk, &opts->authopt_info, &opts->authopt_rnextkeyid);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ opts->options |= OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL;
+ return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT;
+ }
if (key) {
opts->options |= OPTION_AUTHOPT;
opts->authopt_key = key;
return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT;
}
@@ -1342,10 +1347,18 @@ static int __tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* release the following packet.
*/
if (tcp_skb_pcount(skb) > 1)
tcb->tcp_flags |= TCPHDR_PSH;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+ if (opts.options & OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ sk->sk_err = ENOKEY;
+ sk_error_report(sk);
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+#endif
tcp_header_size = tcp_options_size + sizeof(struct tcphdr);
/* if no packet is in qdisc/device queue, then allow XPS to select
* another queue. We can be called from tcp_tsq_handler()
* which holds one reference to sk.
@@ -3652,10 +3665,17 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
/* bpf program will be interested in the tcp_flags */
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_ACK;
tcp_header_size = tcp_synack_options(sk, req, mss, skb, &opts, md5,
foc, synack_type,
syn_skb) + sizeof(*th);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+ if (opts.options & OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#endif
skb_push(skb, tcp_header_size);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
th = (struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-18 20:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-18 19:59 [PATCH v7 00/26] tcp: Initial support for RFC5925 auth option Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] docs: Add user documentation for tcp_authopt Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] tcp: Refactor tcp_sig_hash_skb_data for AO Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] tcp: Refactor tcp_inbound_md5_hash into tcp_inbound_sig_hash Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] tcp: authopt: Hook into tcp core Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] tcp: authopt: Implement Sequence Number Extension Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] tcp: ipv6: Add AO signing for tcp_v6_send_response Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for " Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] tcp: authopt: Add v4mapped ipv6 address support Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] selftests: nettest: Rename md5_prefix to key_addr_prefix Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] selftests: nettest: Initial tcp_authopt support Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] selftests: net/fcnal: " Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] tcp: authopt: Try to respect rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] tcp: authopt: tcp_authopt_lookup_send: Add anykey output param Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] tcp: authopt: Initial support for TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE Leonard Crestez
2022-08-18 19:59 ` Leonard Crestez [this message]
2022-08-18 20:00 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] tcp: authopt: Initial implementation of TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT Leonard Crestez
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