* [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 01/24] selftests/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory linuxram
` (24 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
Memory protection keys enables an application to protect its address space from
inadvertent access by its own code.
This feature is now enabled on powerpc architecture and integrated in
4.16-rc1. The patches move the selftests to arch neutral directory
and enhance their test coverage.
Test
----
Verified for correctness on powerpc. Need help verifying on x86.
Compiles on x86.
History:
-------
version 13:
(1) Incorporated comments for Dave Hansen.
(2) Added one more test for correct pkey-0 behavior.
version 12:
(1) fixed the offset of pkey field in the siginfo structure for
x86_64 and powerpc. And tries to use the actual field
if the headers have it defined.
version 11:
(1) fixed a deadlock in the ptrace testcase.
version 10 and prior:
(1) moved the testcase to arch neutral directory
(2) split the changes into incremental patches.
Ram Pai (22):
selftests/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory
selftests/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name
selftests/vm: move generic definitions to header file
selftests/vm: typecast the pkey register
selftests/vm: generic function to handle shadow key register
selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
selftests/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear()
selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
selftests/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random
selftests/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction
selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
selftests/vm: generic cleanup
selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction
selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey
selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access
violation
selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write
violation
selftests/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key
page
selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions
selftests/vm: sub-page allocator
selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0
Thiago Jung Bauermann (2):
selftests/vm: move arch-specific definitions to arch-specific header
selftests/vm: Make gcc check arguments of sigsafe_printf()
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 214 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h | 126 ++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 184 +++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 1598 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore | 1 -
tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h | 219 ----
tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 1485 -----------------------
9 files changed, 2124 insertions(+), 1705 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 01/24] selftests/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 02/24] selftests/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name linuxram
` (23 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo at kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 219 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 1485 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore | 1 -
tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h | 219 ----
tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 1485 -------------------------
7 files changed, 1706 insertions(+), 1705 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore
index 342c7bc..0214fbf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ mlock-random-test
virtual_address_range
gup_benchmark
va_128TBswitch
+protection_keys
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile
index fdefa22..9788a58 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += transhuge-stress
TEST_GEN_FILES += userfaultfd
TEST_GEN_FILES += va_128TBswitch
TEST_GEN_FILES += virtual_address_range
+TEST_GEN_FILES += protection_keys
TEST_PROGS := run_vmtests
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..254e543
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _PKEYS_HELPER_H
+#define _PKEYS_HELPER_H
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ucontext.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+#define NR_PKEYS 16
+#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+
+#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
+#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
+#endif
+#define DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE 4096
+extern int dprint_in_signal;
+extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
+static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ if (!dprint_in_signal) {
+ va_start(ap, format);
+ vprintf(format, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ } else {
+ int ret;
+ /*
+ * No printf() functions are signal-safe.
+ * They deadlock easily. Write the format
+ * string to get some output, even if
+ * incomplete.
+ */
+ ret = write(1, format, strlen(format));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+#define dprintf_level(level, args...) do { \
+ if (level <= DEBUG_LEVEL) \
+ sigsafe_printf(args); \
+} while (0)
+#define dprintf0(args...) dprintf_level(0, args)
+#define dprintf1(args...) dprintf_level(1, args)
+#define dprintf2(args...) dprintf_level(2, args)
+#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
+#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
+
+extern unsigned int shadow_pkru;
+static inline unsigned int __rdpkru(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, edx;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int pkru;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
+ : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
+ : "c" (ecx));
+ pkru = eax;
+ return pkru;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int _rdpkru(int line)
+{
+ unsigned int pkru = __rdpkru();
+
+ dprintf4("rdpkru(line=%d) pkru: %x shadow: %x\n",
+ line, pkru, shadow_pkru);
+ assert(pkru == shadow_pkru);
+
+ return pkru;
+}
+
+#define rdpkru() _rdpkru(__LINE__)
+
+static inline void __wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+{
+ unsigned int eax = pkru;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int edx = 0;
+
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
+ : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
+ assert(pkru == __rdpkru());
+}
+
+static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+{
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ /* will do the shadow check for us: */
+ rdpkru();
+ __wrpkru(pkru);
+ shadow_pkru = pkru;
+ dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkru: %08x\n", __func__, pkru, __rdpkru());
+}
+
+/*
+ * These are technically racy. since something could
+ * change PKRU between the read and the write.
+ */
+static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
+{
+ unsigned int pkru = rdpkru();
+ int bit = pkey * 2;
+
+ if (do_allow)
+ pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ else
+ pkru |= (1<<bit);
+
+ dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
+ wrpkru(pkru);
+}
+
+static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
+{
+ long pkru = rdpkru();
+ int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
+
+ if (do_allow_write)
+ pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ else
+ pkru |= (1<<bit);
+
+ wrpkru(pkru);
+ dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
+}
+
+#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
+#define PROT_PKEY1 0x20 /* protection key value (bit 1) */
+#define PROT_PKEY2 0x40 /* protection key value (bit 2) */
+#define PROT_PKEY3 0x80 /* protection key value (bit 3) */
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define MB (1<<20)
+
+static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
+ unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
+{
+ /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
+ asm volatile(
+ "cpuid;"
+ : "=a" (*eax),
+ "=b" (*ebx),
+ "=c" (*ecx),
+ "=d" (*edx)
+ : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
+}
+
+/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
+
+static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+
+ eax = 0x7;
+ ecx = 0x0;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT (9)
+#define XSTATE_PKRU 0x200
+
+int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+ int xstate_offset;
+ int xstate_size;
+ unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
+ int leaf;
+
+ /* assume that XSTATE_PKRU is set in XCR0 */
+ leaf = XSTATE_PKRU_BIT;
+ {
+ eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
+ ecx = leaf;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (leaf == XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) {
+ xstate_offset = ebx;
+ xstate_size = eax;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (xstate_size == 0) {
+ printf("could not find size/offset of PKRU in xsave state\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return xstate_offset;
+}
+
+#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..460b4bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1485 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt)
+ *
+ * There are examples in here of:
+ * * how to set protection keys on memory
+ * * how to set/clear bits in PKRU (the rights register)
+ * * how to handle SEGV_PKRU signals and extract pkey-relevant
+ * information from the siginfo
+ *
+ * Things to add:
+ * make sure KSM and KSM COW breaking works
+ * prefault pages in at malloc, or not
+ * protect MPX bounds tables with protection keys?
+ * make sure VMA splitting/merging is working correctly
+ * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()), so make sure it is immune to pkeys
+ * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA but "freed" back to the kernel
+ * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make sure the pkey sticks
+ *
+ * Compile like this:
+ * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/futex.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ucontext.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+
+#include "pkey-helpers.h"
+
+int iteration_nr = 1;
+int test_nr;
+
+unsigned int shadow_pkru;
+
+#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
+#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
+#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
+
+#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
+
+int dprint_in_signal;
+char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
+
+extern void abort_hooks(void);
+#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
+ if (!(condition)) { \
+ dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, \
+ test_nr, iteration_nr); \
+ dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
+ abort_hooks(); \
+ exit(__LINE__); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+void cat_into_file(char *str, char *file)
+{
+ int fd = open(file, O_RDWR);
+ int ret;
+
+ dprintf2("%s(): writing '%s' to '%s'\n", __func__, str, file);
+ /*
+ * these need to be raw because they are called under
+ * pkey_assert()
+ */
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "error opening '%s'\n", str);
+ perror("error: ");
+ exit(__LINE__);
+ }
+
+ ret = write(fd, str, strlen(str));
+ if (ret != strlen(str)) {
+ perror("write to file failed");
+ fprintf(stderr, "filename: '%s' str: '%s'\n", file, str);
+ exit(__LINE__);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+}
+
+#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
+static int warned_tracing;
+int tracing_root_ok(void)
+{
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ if (!warned_tracing)
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, "
+ "can not do tracing control\n");
+ warned_tracing = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void tracing_on(void)
+{
+#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
+#define TRACEDIR "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing"
+ char pidstr[32];
+
+ if (!tracing_root_ok())
+ return;
+
+ sprintf(pidstr, "%d", getpid());
+ cat_into_file("0", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
+ cat_into_file("\n", TRACEDIR "/trace");
+ if (1) {
+ cat_into_file("function_graph", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
+ cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/options/funcgraph-proc");
+ } else {
+ cat_into_file("nop", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
+ }
+ cat_into_file(pidstr, TRACEDIR "/set_ftrace_pid");
+ cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
+ dprintf1("enabled tracing\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+void tracing_off(void)
+{
+#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
+ if (!tracing_root_ok())
+ return;
+ cat_into_file("0", "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on");
+#endif
+}
+
+void abort_hooks(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "running %s()...\n", __func__);
+ tracing_off();
+#ifdef SLEEP_ON_ABORT
+ sleep(SLEEP_ON_ABORT);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
+{
+ /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
+ asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This attempts to have roughly a page of instructions followed by a few
+ * instructions that do a write, and another page of instructions. That
+ * way, we are pretty sure that the write is in the second page of
+ * instructions and has at least a page of padding behind it.
+ *
+ * *That* lets us be sure to madvise() away the write instruction, which
+ * will then fault, which makes sure that the fault code handles
+ * execute-only memory properly.
+ */
+__attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)))
+void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
+{
+ dprintf3("running %s()\n", __func__);
+ __page_o_noops();
+ /* Assume this happens in the second page of instructions: */
+ *write_to_me = __LINE__;
+ /* pad out by another page: */
+ __page_o_noops();
+ dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Define some kernel-like types */
+#define u8 uint8_t
+#define u16 uint16_t
+#define u32 uint32_t
+#define u64 uint64_t
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
+# define SYS_pkey_free 382
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
+
+#else
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
+# define SYS_pkey_free 331
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
+
+#endif
+
+void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
+{
+ char *c = (void *)dumpme;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i += sizeof(u64)) {
+ u64 *ptr = (u64 *)(c + i);
+ dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016jx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Failed address bound checks: */
+#ifndef SEGV_BNDERR
+# define SEGV_BNDERR 3
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SEGV_PKUERR
+# define SEGV_PKUERR 4
+#endif
+
+static char *si_code_str(int si_code)
+{
+ if (si_code == SEGV_MAPERR)
+ return "SEGV_MAPERR";
+ if (si_code == SEGV_ACCERR)
+ return "SEGV_ACCERR";
+ if (si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)
+ return "SEGV_BNDERR";
+ if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
+ return "SEGV_PKUERR";
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+int pkru_faults;
+int last_si_pkey = -1;
+void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
+{
+ ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
+ int trapno;
+ unsigned long ip;
+ char *fpregs;
+ u32 *pkru_ptr;
+ u64 siginfo_pkey;
+ u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
+ int pkru_offset;
+ fpregset_t fpregset;
+
+ dprint_in_signal = 1;
+ dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
+ __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+
+ trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
+ ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
+ fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
+ fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
+
+ dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n", __func__,
+ trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code), si->si_code);
+#ifdef __i386__
+ /*
+ * 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
+ * the XSTATE header is present in addition to the "legacy" FPU
+ * state. We just assume that it is here.
+ */
+ fpregs += 0x70;
+#endif
+ pkru_offset = pkru_xstate_offset();
+ pkru_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkru_offset]);
+
+ dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
+ dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
+ /*
+ * If we got a PKRU fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
+ * here.
+ */
+ dprintf1("pkru_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkru_xstate_offset());
+ if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
+ dump_mem(pkru_ptr - 128, 256);
+ pkey_assert(*pkru_ptr);
+
+ if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
+ (si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
+ (si->si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)) {
+ printf("non-PK si_code, exiting...\n");
+ exit(4);
+ }
+
+ si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
+ dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
+ dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
+ siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
+ pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
+
+ dprintf1("signal pkru from xsave: %08x\n", *pkru_ptr);
+ /* need __rdpkru() version so we do not do shadow_pkru checking */
+ dprintf1("signal pkru from pkru: %08x\n", __rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
+ *(u64 *)pkru_ptr = 0x00000000;
+ dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
+ pkru_faults++;
+ dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
+ dprint_in_signal = 0;
+}
+
+int wait_all_children(void)
+{
+ int status;
+ return waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
+}
+
+void sig_chld(int x)
+{
+ dprint_in_signal = 1;
+ dprintf2("[%d] SIGCHLD: %d\n", getpid(), x);
+ dprint_in_signal = 0;
+}
+
+void setup_sigsegv_handler(void)
+{
+ int r, rs;
+ struct sigaction newact;
+ struct sigaction oldact;
+
+ /* #PF is mapped to sigsegv */
+ int signum = SIGSEGV;
+
+ newact.sa_handler = 0;
+ newact.sa_sigaction = signal_handler;
+
+ /*sigset_t - signals to block while in the handler */
+ /* get the old signal mask. */
+ rs = sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, 0, &newact.sa_mask);
+ pkey_assert(rs == 0);
+
+ /* call sa_sigaction, not sa_handler*/
+ newact.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+
+ newact.sa_restorer = 0; /* void(*)(), obsolete */
+ r = sigaction(signum, &newact, &oldact);
+ r = sigaction(SIGALRM, &newact, &oldact);
+ pkey_assert(r == 0);
+}
+
+void setup_handlers(void)
+{
+ signal(SIGCHLD, &sig_chld);
+ setup_sigsegv_handler();
+}
+
+pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
+{
+ pid_t forkret;
+
+ forkret = fork();
+ pkey_assert(forkret >= 0);
+ dprintf3("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n", getpid(), forkret);
+
+ if (!forkret) {
+ /* in the child */
+ while (1) {
+ dprintf1("child sleeping...\n");
+ sleep(30);
+ }
+ }
+ return forkret;
+}
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
+#endif
+
+static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+ u32 pkru = __rdpkru();
+ u32 shifted_pkru;
+ u32 masked_pkru;
+
+ dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
+ __func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
+ dprintf2("%s() raw pkru: %x\n", __func__, pkru);
+
+ shifted_pkru = (pkru >> (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkru: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkru);
+ masked_pkru = shifted_pkru & mask;
+ dprintf2("%s() masked pkru: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkru);
+ /*
+ * shift down the relevant bits to the lowest two, then
+ * mask off all the other high bits.
+ */
+ return masked_pkru;
+}
+
+static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+ u32 old_pkru = __rdpkru();
+ u32 new_pkru;
+
+ /* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
+ assert(!(rights & ~mask));
+
+ /* copy old pkru */
+ new_pkru = old_pkru;
+ /* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
+ new_pkru &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ /* OR in new bits for pkey: */
+ new_pkru |= (rights << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+
+ __wrpkru(new_pkru);
+
+ dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x pkru now: %x old_pkru: %x\n",
+ __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __rdpkru(), old_pkru);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
+{
+ unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int pkey_rights;
+ u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+
+ dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
+ pkey, flags);
+ pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
+
+ pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+ pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights |= flags;
+
+ ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
+ assert(!ret);
+ /*pkru and flags have the same format */
+ shadow_pkru |= flags << (pkey * 2);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkru);
+
+ pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ if (flags)
+ pkey_assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+ dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
+ pkey, flags);
+}
+
+void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
+{
+ unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+ u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+
+ pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+ pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights |= flags;
+
+ ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
+ /* pkru and flags have the same format */
+ shadow_pkru &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
+ pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ if (flags)
+ assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+}
+
+void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+}
+void pkey_write_deny(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+}
+void pkey_access_allow(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
+}
+void pkey_access_deny(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
+}
+
+int sys_mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ dprintf2("%s(0x%p, %zx, prot=%lx, pkey=%lx)\n", __func__,
+ ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+ if (errno) {
+ dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key sret: %d\n", sret);
+ dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key prot: 0x%lx\n", orig_prot);
+ dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key failed, errno: %d\n", errno);
+ if (DEBUG_LEVEL >= 2)
+ perror("SYS_mprotect_pkey");
+ }
+ return sret;
+}
+
+int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_alloc, flags, init_val);
+ dprintf1("%s(flags=%lx, init_val=%lx) syscall ret: %d errno: %d\n",
+ __func__, flags, init_val, ret, errno);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int alloc_pkey(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
+
+ dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n",
+ __LINE__, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
+ /*
+ * pkey_alloc() sets PKRU, so we need to reflect it in
+ * shadow_pkru:
+ */
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ if (ret) {
+ /* clear both the bits: */
+ shadow_pkru &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ /*
+ * move the new state in from init_val
+ * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkru format)
+ */
+ shadow_pkru |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
+ }
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d errno: %d\n", __LINE__, errno);
+ /* for shadow checking: */
+ rdpkru();
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
+ dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * I had a bug where pkey bits could be set by mprotect() but
+ * not cleared. This ensures we get lots of random bit sets
+ * and clears on the vma and pte pkey bits.
+ */
+int alloc_random_pkey(void)
+{
+ int max_nr_pkey_allocs;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+ int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
+ int nr_alloced = 0;
+ int random_index;
+ memset(alloced_pkeys, 0, sizeof(alloced_pkeys));
+
+ /* allocate every possible key and make a note of which ones we got */
+ max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
+ max_nr_pkey_allocs = 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
+ int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+ if (new_pkey < 0)
+ break;
+ alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
+ }
+
+ pkey_assert(nr_alloced > 0);
+ /* select a random one out of the allocated ones */
+ random_index = rand() % nr_alloced;
+ ret = alloced_pkeys[random_index];
+ /* now zero it out so we don't free it next */
+ alloced_pkeys[random_index] = 0;
+
+ /* go through the allocated ones that we did not want and free them */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
+ int free_ret;
+ if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
+ continue;
+ free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
+ pkey_assert(!free_ret);
+ }
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ int nr_iterations = random() % 100;
+ int ret;
+
+ while (0) {
+ int rpkey = alloc_random_pkey();
+ ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+ dprintf1("sys_mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
+ ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
+ if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
+ break;
+
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ }
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+ dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
+ ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct pkey_malloc_record {
+ void *ptr;
+ long size;
+ int prot;
+};
+struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_malloc_records;
+struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_last_malloc_record;
+long nr_pkey_malloc_records;
+void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot)
+{
+ long i;
+ struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
+ rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
+ /* find a free record */
+ if (rec)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!rec) {
+ /* every record is full */
+ size_t old_nr_records = nr_pkey_malloc_records;
+ size_t new_nr_records = (nr_pkey_malloc_records * 2 + 1);
+ size_t new_size = new_nr_records * sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
+ dprintf2("new_nr_records: %zd\n", new_nr_records);
+ dprintf2("new_size: %zd\n", new_size);
+ pkey_malloc_records = realloc(pkey_malloc_records, new_size);
+ pkey_assert(pkey_malloc_records != NULL);
+ rec = &pkey_malloc_records[nr_pkey_malloc_records];
+ /*
+ * realloc() does not initialize memory, so zero it from
+ * the first new record all the way to the end.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < new_nr_records - old_nr_records; i++)
+ memset(rec + i, 0, sizeof(*rec));
+ }
+ dprintf3("filling malloc record[%d/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
+ (int)(rec - pkey_malloc_records), rec, ptr, size);
+ rec->ptr = ptr;
+ rec->size = size;
+ rec->prot = prot;
+ pkey_last_malloc_record = rec;
+ nr_pkey_malloc_records++;
+}
+
+void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
+{
+ long i;
+ int ret;
+ dprintf3("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ptr);
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
+ struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
+ dprintf4("looking for ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
+ ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
+ if ((ptr < rec->ptr) ||
+ (ptr >= rec->ptr + rec->size))
+ continue;
+
+ dprintf3("found ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
+ ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
+ nr_pkey_malloc_records--;
+ ret = munmap(rec->ptr, rec->size);
+ dprintf3("munmap ret: %d\n", ret);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ dprintf3("clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
+ rec->ptr = NULL;
+ dprintf3("done clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
+ return;
+ }
+ pkey_assert(false);
+}
+
+
+void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ rdpkru();
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+ rdpkru();
+
+ dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *malloc_pkey_anon_huge(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ /*
+ * Guarantee we can fit at least one huge page in the resulting
+ * allocation by allocating space for 2:
+ */
+ size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+
+ dprintf1("unaligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
+ ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE);
+ dprintf1(" aligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
+ ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
+ dprintf1("MADV_HUGEPAGE ret: %d\n", ret);
+ ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_WILLNEED);
+ dprintf1("MADV_WILLNEED ret: %d\n", ret);
+ memset(ptr, 0, HPAGE_SIZE);
+
+ dprintf1("mmap()'d thp for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+int hugetlb_setup_ok;
+#define GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES 10
+void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
+{
+ int err;
+ int fd;
+ char buf[] = "123";
+
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES), "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
+
+ /*
+ * Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
+ * are 2M pages. Someone might have made 1G the default.
+ */
+ fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages", O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ perror("opening sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* -1 to guarantee leaving the trailing \0 */
+ err = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
+ close(fd);
+ if (err <= 0) {
+ perror("reading sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (atoi(buf) != GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got: '%s' expected %d\n",
+ buf, GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ hugetlb_setup_ok = 1;
+}
+
+void *malloc_pkey_hugetlb(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_HUGETLB;
+
+ if (!hugetlb_setup_ok)
+ return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(%ld, %x, %x)\n", __func__, size, prot, pkey);
+ size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, flags, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+
+ dprintf1("mmap()'d hugetlbfs for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *malloc_pkey_mmap_dax(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int fd;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ fd = open("/dax/foo", O_RDWR);
+ pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
+
+ ptr = mmap(0, size, prot, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+
+ dprintf1("mmap()'d for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ close(fd);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *(*pkey_malloc[])(long size, int prot, u16 pkey) = {
+
+ malloc_pkey_with_mprotect,
+ malloc_pkey_anon_huge,
+ malloc_pkey_hugetlb
+/* can not do direct with the pkey_mprotect() API:
+ malloc_pkey_mmap_direct,
+ malloc_pkey_mmap_dax,
+*/
+};
+
+void *malloc_pkey(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ret;
+ static int malloc_type;
+ int nr_malloc_types = ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_malloc);
+
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+
+ while (1) {
+ pkey_assert(malloc_type < nr_malloc_types);
+
+ ret = pkey_malloc[malloc_type](size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(ret != (void *)-1);
+
+ malloc_type++;
+ if (malloc_type >= nr_malloc_types)
+ malloc_type = (random()%nr_malloc_types);
+
+ /* try again if the malloc_type we tried is unsupported */
+ if (ret == PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP)
+ continue;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dprintf3("%s(%ld, prot=%x, pkey=%x) returning: %p\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int last_pkru_faults;
+#define UNKNOWN_PKEY -2
+void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
+{
+ dprintf2("%s(): last_pkru_faults: %d pkru_faults: %d\n",
+ __func__, last_pkru_faults, pkru_faults);
+ dprintf2("%s(%d): last_si_pkey: %d\n", __func__, pkey, last_si_pkey);
+ pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults + 1 == pkru_faults);
+
+ /*
+ * For exec-only memory, we do not know the pkey in
+ * advance, so skip this check.
+ */
+ if (pkey != UNKNOWN_PKEY)
+ pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKRU to let the
+ * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
+ */
+ if (__rdpkru() != 0)
+ pkey_assert(0);
+
+ __wrpkru(shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s() set PKRU=%x to restore state after signal nuked it\n",
+ __func__, shadow_pkru);
+ last_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+ last_si_pkey = -1;
+}
+
+#define do_not_expect_pk_fault(msg) do { \
+ if (last_pkru_faults != pkru_faults) \
+ dprintf0("unexpected PK fault: %s\n", msg); \
+ pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults == pkru_faults); \
+} while (0)
+
+int test_fds[10] = { -1 };
+int nr_test_fds;
+void __save_test_fd(int fd)
+{
+ pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
+ pkey_assert(nr_test_fds < ARRAY_SIZE(test_fds));
+ test_fds[nr_test_fds] = fd;
+ nr_test_fds++;
+}
+
+int get_test_read_fd(void)
+{
+ int test_fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ __save_test_fd(test_fd);
+ return test_fd;
+}
+
+void close_test_fds(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_test_fds; i++) {
+ if (test_fds[i] < 0)
+ continue;
+ close(test_fds[i]);
+ test_fds[i] = -1;
+ }
+ nr_test_fds = 0;
+}
+
+#define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory")
+__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr)
+{
+ /*
+ * Keep GCC from optimizing this away somehow
+ */
+ barrier();
+ return *ptr;
+}
+
+void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[1], doing read\n");
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
+ dprintf1("\n");
+}
+void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ rdpkru();
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
+
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
+ "having kernel read() to buffer\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 1);
+ dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
+ pkey_assert(ret);
+}
+void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
+
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 100);
+ dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
+ if (ret < 0 && (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0))
+ perror("verbose read result (OK for this to be bad)");
+ pkey_assert(ret);
+}
+
+void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int pipe_ret, vmsplice_ret;
+ struct iovec iov;
+ int pipe_fds[2];
+
+ pipe_ret = pipe(pipe_fds);
+
+ pkey_assert(pipe_ret == 0);
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
+ "having kernel vmsplice from buffer\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ iov.iov_base = ptr;
+ iov.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
+ vmsplice_ret = vmsplice(pipe_fds[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
+ dprintf1("vmsplice() ret: %d\n", vmsplice_ret);
+ pkey_assert(vmsplice_ret == -1);
+
+ close(pipe_fds[0]);
+ close(pipe_fds[1]);
+}
+
+void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ignored = 0xdada;
+ int futex_ret;
+ int some_int = __LINE__;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling write to PKEY[%02d], "
+ "doing futex gunk in buffer\n", pkey);
+ *ptr = some_int;
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ futex_ret = syscall(SYS_futex, ptr, FUTEX_WAIT, some_int-1, NULL,
+ &ignored, ignored);
+ if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0)
+ perror("futex");
+ dprintf1("futex() ret: %d\n", futex_ret);
+}
+
+/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
+void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int err;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
+ for (i = 1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
+ if (pkey == i)
+ continue;
+
+ dprintf1("trying get/set/free to non-allocated pkey: %2d\n", i);
+ err = sys_pkey_free(i);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+
+ err = sys_pkey_free(i);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, i);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
+void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int err;
+ int bad_pkey = NR_PKEYS+99;
+
+ /* pass a known-invalid pkey in: */
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, bad_pkey);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+}
+
+/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
+void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int err;
+ int allocated_pkeys[NR_PKEYS] = {0};
+ int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
+ int new_pkey;
+ dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
+ new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, err, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
+ if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
+ dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
+ __func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
+ break;
+ }
+ pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
+ allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
+ }
+
+ dprintf3("%s()::%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+
+ /*
+ * ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without
+ * failure:
+ */
+ pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
+
+ /*
+ * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
+ * allocated by the time we get here:
+ * 1. The default key (0)
+ * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
+ * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
+ * 'pkey' to this function.
+ * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
+ */
+ pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
+ err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * pkey 0 is special. It is allocated by default, so you do not
+ * have to call pkey_alloc() to use it first. Make sure that it
+ * is usable.
+ */
+void test_mprotect_with_pkey_0(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ long size;
+ int prot;
+
+ assert(pkey_last_malloc_record);
+ size = pkey_last_malloc_record->size;
+ /*
+ * This is a bit of a hack. But mprotect() requires
+ * huge-page-aligned sizes when operating on hugetlbfs.
+ * So, make sure that we use something that's a multiple
+ * of a huge page when we can.
+ */
+ if (size >= HPAGE_SIZE)
+ size = HPAGE_SIZE;
+ prot = pkey_last_malloc_record->prot;
+
+ /* Use pkey 0 */
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, 0);
+
+ /* Make sure that we can set it back to the original pkey. */
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+}
+
+void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ __attribute__((__unused__)) int peek_result;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ void *ignored = 0;
+ long ret;
+ int status;
+ /*
+ * This is the "control" for our little expermient. Make sure
+ * we can always access it when ptracing.
+ */
+ int *plain_ptr_unaligned = malloc(HPAGE_SIZE);
+ int *plain_ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(plain_ptr_unaligned, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Fork a child which is an exact copy of this process, of course.
+ * That means we can do all of our tests via ptrace() and then plain
+ * memory access and ensure they work differently.
+ */
+ child_pid = fork_lazy_child();
+ dprintf1("[%d] child pid: %d\n", getpid(), child_pid);
+
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, child_pid, ignored, ignored);
+ if (ret)
+ perror("attach");
+ dprintf1("[%d] attach ret: %ld %d\n", getpid(), ret, __LINE__);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ ret = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
+ if ((ret != child_pid) || !(WIFSTOPPED(status))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "weird waitpid result %ld stat %x\n",
+ ret, status);
+ pkey_assert(0);
+ }
+ dprintf2("waitpid ret: %ld\n", ret);
+ dprintf2("waitpid status: %d\n", status);
+
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+
+ /* Write access, untested for now:
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, child_pid, peek_at, data);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ dprintf1("poke at %p: %ld\n", peek_at, ret);
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Try to access the pkey-protected "ptr" via ptrace:
+ */
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, ptr, ignored);
+ /* expect it to work, without an error: */
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ /* Now access from the current task, and expect an exception: */
+ peek_result = read_ptr(ptr);
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * Try to access the NON-pkey-protected "plain_ptr" via ptrace:
+ */
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, plain_ptr, ignored);
+ /* expect it to work, without an error: */
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ /* Now access from the current task, and expect NO exception: */
+ peek_result = read_ptr(plain_ptr);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
+
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child_pid, ignored, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+
+ ret = kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+
+ wait(&status);
+
+ free(plain_ptr_unaligned);
+}
+
+void *get_pointer_to_instructions(void)
+{
+ void *p1;
+
+ p1 = ALIGN_PTR_UP(&lots_o_noops_around_write, PAGE_SIZE);
+ dprintf3("&lots_o_noops: %p\n", &lots_o_noops_around_write);
+ /* lots_o_noops_around_write should be page-aligned already */
+ assert(p1 == &lots_o_noops_around_write);
+
+ /* Point 'p1' at the *second* page of the function: */
+ p1 += PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to ensure we fault this in on next touch to ensure
+ * we get an instruction fault as opposed to a data one
+ */
+ madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
+
+ return p1;
+}
+
+void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *p1;
+ int scratch;
+ int ptr_contents;
+ int ret;
+
+ p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+
+ ret = mprotect_pkey(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC, (u64)pkey);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+
+ dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
+ */
+ madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+
+void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *p1;
+ int scratch;
+ int ptr_contents;
+ int ret;
+
+ dprintf1("%s() start\n", __func__);
+
+ p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+
+ /* Use a *normal* mprotect(), not mprotect_pkey(): */
+ ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+
+ dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+
+ /* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
+ madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+ expected_pk_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
+
+ /*
+ * Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
+ * exec-only pkey off the VMA and allow it to be readable
+ * again. Go to PROT_NONE first to check for a kernel bug
+ * that did not clear the pkey when doing PROT_NONE.
+ */
+ ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+
+ ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
+}
+
+void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ int sret;
+
+ if (cpu_has_pku()) {
+ dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, PROT_READ, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(sret < 0);
+}
+
+void (*pkey_tests[])(int *ptr, u16 pkey) = {
+ test_read_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region,
+ test_executing_on_unreadable_memory,
+ test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory,
+ test_mprotect_with_pkey_0,
+ test_ptrace_of_child,
+ test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey,
+ test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args,
+ test_pkey_alloc_exhaust,
+};
+
+void run_tests_once(void)
+{
+ int *ptr;
+ int prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
+
+ for (test_nr = 0; test_nr < ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests); test_nr++) {
+ int pkey;
+ int orig_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+
+ dprintf1("======================\n");
+ dprintf1("test %d preparing...\n", test_nr);
+
+ tracing_on();
+ pkey = alloc_random_pkey();
+ dprintf1("test %d starting with pkey: %d\n", test_nr, pkey);
+ ptr = malloc_pkey(PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
+ dprintf1("test %d starting...\n", test_nr);
+ pkey_tests[test_nr](ptr, pkey);
+ dprintf1("freeing test memory: %p\n", ptr);
+ free_pkey_malloc(ptr);
+ sys_pkey_free(pkey);
+
+ dprintf1("pkru_faults: %d\n", pkru_faults);
+ dprintf1("orig_pkru_faults: %d\n", orig_pkru_faults);
+
+ tracing_off();
+ close_test_fds();
+
+ printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n", test_nr, iteration_nr);
+ dprintf1("======================\n\n");
+ }
+ iteration_nr++;
+}
+
+void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
+{
+ shadow_pkru = __rdpkru();
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ int nr_iterations = 22;
+
+ setup_handlers();
+
+ printf("has pku: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
+
+ if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
+ int size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ int *ptr;
+
+ printf("running PKEY tests for unsupported CPU/OS\n");
+
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(ptr, 1);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ pkey_setup_shadow();
+ printf("startup pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ setup_hugetlbfs();
+
+ while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
+ run_tests_once();
+
+ printf("done (all tests OK)\n");
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore
index 7757f73..eb30ffd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore
@@ -11,5 +11,4 @@ ldt_gdt
iopl
mpx-mini-test
ioperm
-protection_keys
test_vdso
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 254e543..0000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef _PKEYS_HELPER_H
-#define _PKEYS_HELPER_H
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <ucontext.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-
-#define NR_PKEYS 16
-#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
-
-#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
-#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
-#endif
-#define DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE 4096
-extern int dprint_in_signal;
-extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
-static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
-
- if (!dprint_in_signal) {
- va_start(ap, format);
- vprintf(format, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- } else {
- int ret;
- /*
- * No printf() functions are signal-safe.
- * They deadlock easily. Write the format
- * string to get some output, even if
- * incomplete.
- */
- ret = write(1, format, strlen(format));
- if (ret < 0)
- exit(1);
- }
-}
-#define dprintf_level(level, args...) do { \
- if (level <= DEBUG_LEVEL) \
- sigsafe_printf(args); \
-} while (0)
-#define dprintf0(args...) dprintf_level(0, args)
-#define dprintf1(args...) dprintf_level(1, args)
-#define dprintf2(args...) dprintf_level(2, args)
-#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
-#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
-
-extern unsigned int shadow_pkru;
-static inline unsigned int __rdpkru(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax, edx;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkru;
-
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
- : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
- : "c" (ecx));
- pkru = eax;
- return pkru;
-}
-
-static inline unsigned int _rdpkru(int line)
-{
- unsigned int pkru = __rdpkru();
-
- dprintf4("rdpkru(line=%d) pkru: %x shadow: %x\n",
- line, pkru, shadow_pkru);
- assert(pkru == shadow_pkru);
-
- return pkru;
-}
-
-#define rdpkru() _rdpkru(__LINE__)
-
-static inline void __wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
-{
- unsigned int eax = pkru;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int edx = 0;
-
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
- : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
- assert(pkru == __rdpkru());
-}
-
-static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
-{
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
- /* will do the shadow check for us: */
- rdpkru();
- __wrpkru(pkru);
- shadow_pkru = pkru;
- dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkru: %08x\n", __func__, pkru, __rdpkru());
-}
-
-/*
- * These are technically racy. since something could
- * change PKRU between the read and the write.
- */
-static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
-{
- unsigned int pkru = rdpkru();
- int bit = pkey * 2;
-
- if (do_allow)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
- else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
-
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
- wrpkru(pkru);
-}
-
-static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
-{
- long pkru = rdpkru();
- int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
-
- if (do_allow_write)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
- else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
-
- wrpkru(pkru);
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
-}
-
-#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
-#define PROT_PKEY1 0x20 /* protection key value (bit 1) */
-#define PROT_PKEY2 0x40 /* protection key value (bit 2) */
-#define PROT_PKEY3 0x80 /* protection key value (bit 3) */
-
-#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
-#define MB (1<<20)
-
-static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
- unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
-{
- /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
- asm volatile(
- "cpuid;"
- : "=a" (*eax),
- "=b" (*ebx),
- "=c" (*ecx),
- "=d" (*edx)
- : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
-}
-
-/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
-
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
-
- eax = 0x7;
- ecx = 0x0;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT (9)
-#define XSTATE_PKRU 0x200
-
-int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
- int xstate_offset;
- int xstate_size;
- unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
- int leaf;
-
- /* assume that XSTATE_PKRU is set in XCR0 */
- leaf = XSTATE_PKRU_BIT;
- {
- eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
- ecx = leaf;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (leaf == XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) {
- xstate_offset = ebx;
- xstate_size = eax;
- }
- }
-
- if (xstate_size == 0) {
- printf("could not find size/offset of PKRU in xsave state\n");
- return 0;
- }
-
- return xstate_offset;
-}
-
-#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 460b4bd..0000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1485 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-/*
- * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt)
- *
- * There are examples in here of:
- * * how to set protection keys on memory
- * * how to set/clear bits in PKRU (the rights register)
- * * how to handle SEGV_PKRU signals and extract pkey-relevant
- * information from the siginfo
- *
- * Things to add:
- * make sure KSM and KSM COW breaking works
- * prefault pages in at malloc, or not
- * protect MPX bounds tables with protection keys?
- * make sure VMA splitting/merging is working correctly
- * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()), so make sure it is immune to pkeys
- * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA but "freed" back to the kernel
- * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make sure the pkey sticks
- *
- * Compile like this:
- * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
- * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
- */
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <linux/futex.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <ucontext.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/ptrace.h>
-#include <setjmp.h>
-
-#include "pkey-helpers.h"
-
-int iteration_nr = 1;
-int test_nr;
-
-unsigned int shadow_pkru;
-
-#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
-#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
-#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
-#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
-
-#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
-
-int dprint_in_signal;
-char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
-
-extern void abort_hooks(void);
-#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
- if (!(condition)) { \
- dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
- __FILE__, __LINE__, \
- test_nr, iteration_nr); \
- dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
- abort_hooks(); \
- exit(__LINE__); \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
-void cat_into_file(char *str, char *file)
-{
- int fd = open(file, O_RDWR);
- int ret;
-
- dprintf2("%s(): writing '%s' to '%s'\n", __func__, str, file);
- /*
- * these need to be raw because they are called under
- * pkey_assert()
- */
- if (fd < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "error opening '%s'\n", str);
- perror("error: ");
- exit(__LINE__);
- }
-
- ret = write(fd, str, strlen(str));
- if (ret != strlen(str)) {
- perror("write to file failed");
- fprintf(stderr, "filename: '%s' str: '%s'\n", file, str);
- exit(__LINE__);
- }
- close(fd);
-}
-
-#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
-static int warned_tracing;
-int tracing_root_ok(void)
-{
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- if (!warned_tracing)
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, "
- "can not do tracing control\n");
- warned_tracing = 1;
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-void tracing_on(void)
-{
-#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
-#define TRACEDIR "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing"
- char pidstr[32];
-
- if (!tracing_root_ok())
- return;
-
- sprintf(pidstr, "%d", getpid());
- cat_into_file("0", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
- cat_into_file("\n", TRACEDIR "/trace");
- if (1) {
- cat_into_file("function_graph", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
- cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/options/funcgraph-proc");
- } else {
- cat_into_file("nop", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
- }
- cat_into_file(pidstr, TRACEDIR "/set_ftrace_pid");
- cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
- dprintf1("enabled tracing\n");
-#endif
-}
-
-void tracing_off(void)
-{
-#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
- if (!tracing_root_ok())
- return;
- cat_into_file("0", "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on");
-#endif
-}
-
-void abort_hooks(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "running %s()...\n", __func__);
- tracing_off();
-#ifdef SLEEP_ON_ABORT
- sleep(SLEEP_ON_ABORT);
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
-{
- /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
- asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
-}
-
-/*
- * This attempts to have roughly a page of instructions followed by a few
- * instructions that do a write, and another page of instructions. That
- * way, we are pretty sure that the write is in the second page of
- * instructions and has at least a page of padding behind it.
- *
- * *That* lets us be sure to madvise() away the write instruction, which
- * will then fault, which makes sure that the fault code handles
- * execute-only memory properly.
- */
-__attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)))
-void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
-{
- dprintf3("running %s()\n", __func__);
- __page_o_noops();
- /* Assume this happens in the second page of instructions: */
- *write_to_me = __LINE__;
- /* pad out by another page: */
- __page_o_noops();
- dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
-}
-
-/* Define some kernel-like types */
-#define u8 uint8_t
-#define u16 uint16_t
-#define u32 uint32_t
-#define u64 uint64_t
-
-#ifdef __i386__
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
-# define SYS_pkey_free 382
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
-
-#else
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
-# define SYS_pkey_free 331
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
-
-#endif
-
-void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
-{
- char *c = (void *)dumpme;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i += sizeof(u64)) {
- u64 *ptr = (u64 *)(c + i);
- dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016jx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
- }
-}
-
-/* Failed address bound checks: */
-#ifndef SEGV_BNDERR
-# define SEGV_BNDERR 3
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SEGV_PKUERR
-# define SEGV_PKUERR 4
-#endif
-
-static char *si_code_str(int si_code)
-{
- if (si_code == SEGV_MAPERR)
- return "SEGV_MAPERR";
- if (si_code == SEGV_ACCERR)
- return "SEGV_ACCERR";
- if (si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)
- return "SEGV_BNDERR";
- if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
- return "SEGV_PKUERR";
- return "UNKNOWN";
-}
-
-int pkru_faults;
-int last_si_pkey = -1;
-void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
-{
- ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
- int trapno;
- unsigned long ip;
- char *fpregs;
- u32 *pkru_ptr;
- u64 siginfo_pkey;
- u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
- int pkru_offset;
- fpregset_t fpregset;
-
- dprint_in_signal = 1;
- dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
- __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
-
- trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
- ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
- fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
- fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
-
- dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n", __func__,
- trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code), si->si_code);
-#ifdef __i386__
- /*
- * 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
- * the XSTATE header is present in addition to the "legacy" FPU
- * state. We just assume that it is here.
- */
- fpregs += 0x70;
-#endif
- pkru_offset = pkru_xstate_offset();
- pkru_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkru_offset]);
-
- dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
- dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
- /*
- * If we got a PKRU fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
- * here.
- */
- dprintf1("pkru_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkru_xstate_offset());
- if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
- dump_mem(pkru_ptr - 128, 256);
- pkey_assert(*pkru_ptr);
-
- if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
- (si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
- (si->si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)) {
- printf("non-PK si_code, exiting...\n");
- exit(4);
- }
-
- si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
- dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
- dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
- siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
- pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
-
- dprintf1("signal pkru from xsave: %08x\n", *pkru_ptr);
- /* need __rdpkru() version so we do not do shadow_pkru checking */
- dprintf1("signal pkru from pkru: %08x\n", __rdpkru());
- dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
- *(u64 *)pkru_ptr = 0x00000000;
- dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
- pkru_faults++;
- dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
- dprint_in_signal = 0;
-}
-
-int wait_all_children(void)
-{
- int status;
- return waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
-}
-
-void sig_chld(int x)
-{
- dprint_in_signal = 1;
- dprintf2("[%d] SIGCHLD: %d\n", getpid(), x);
- dprint_in_signal = 0;
-}
-
-void setup_sigsegv_handler(void)
-{
- int r, rs;
- struct sigaction newact;
- struct sigaction oldact;
-
- /* #PF is mapped to sigsegv */
- int signum = SIGSEGV;
-
- newact.sa_handler = 0;
- newact.sa_sigaction = signal_handler;
-
- /*sigset_t - signals to block while in the handler */
- /* get the old signal mask. */
- rs = sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, 0, &newact.sa_mask);
- pkey_assert(rs == 0);
-
- /* call sa_sigaction, not sa_handler*/
- newact.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
-
- newact.sa_restorer = 0; /* void(*)(), obsolete */
- r = sigaction(signum, &newact, &oldact);
- r = sigaction(SIGALRM, &newact, &oldact);
- pkey_assert(r == 0);
-}
-
-void setup_handlers(void)
-{
- signal(SIGCHLD, &sig_chld);
- setup_sigsegv_handler();
-}
-
-pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
-{
- pid_t forkret;
-
- forkret = fork();
- pkey_assert(forkret >= 0);
- dprintf3("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n", getpid(), forkret);
-
- if (!forkret) {
- /* in the child */
- while (1) {
- dprintf1("child sleeping...\n");
- sleep(30);
- }
- }
- return forkret;
-}
-
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
-#endif
-
-static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
-{
- u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 shifted_pkru;
- u32 masked_pkru;
-
- dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
- __func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
- dprintf2("%s() raw pkru: %x\n", __func__, pkru);
-
- shifted_pkru = (pkru >> (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkru: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkru);
- masked_pkru = shifted_pkru & mask;
- dprintf2("%s() masked pkru: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkru);
- /*
- * shift down the relevant bits to the lowest two, then
- * mask off all the other high bits.
- */
- return masked_pkru;
-}
-
-static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
-{
- u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 old_pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 new_pkru;
-
- /* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
- assert(!(rights & ~mask));
-
- /* copy old pkru */
- new_pkru = old_pkru;
- /* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
- new_pkru &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- /* OR in new bits for pkey: */
- new_pkru |= (rights << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
-
- __wrpkru(new_pkru);
-
- dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x pkru now: %x old_pkru: %x\n",
- __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __rdpkru(), old_pkru);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
-{
- unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
- int ret;
- int pkey_rights;
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
-
- dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
- pkey, flags);
- pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
-
- pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights |= flags;
-
- ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
- assert(!ret);
- /*pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru |= flags << (pkey * 2);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkru);
-
- pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
- if (flags)
- pkey_assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
- dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
- pkey, flags);
-}
-
-void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
-{
- unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
- int ret;
- int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
-
- pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights |= flags;
-
- ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
- /* pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
- pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
- if (flags)
- assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
-}
-
-void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
-}
-void pkey_write_deny(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
-}
-void pkey_access_allow(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
-}
-void pkey_access_deny(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
-}
-
-int sys_mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
- unsigned long pkey)
-{
- int sret;
-
- dprintf2("%s(0x%p, %zx, prot=%lx, pkey=%lx)\n", __func__,
- ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
-
- errno = 0;
- sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
- if (errno) {
- dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key sret: %d\n", sret);
- dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key prot: 0x%lx\n", orig_prot);
- dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key failed, errno: %d\n", errno);
- if (DEBUG_LEVEL >= 2)
- perror("SYS_mprotect_pkey");
- }
- return sret;
-}
-
-int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
-{
- int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_alloc, flags, init_val);
- dprintf1("%s(flags=%lx, init_val=%lx) syscall ret: %d errno: %d\n",
- __func__, flags, init_val, ret, errno);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int alloc_pkey(void)
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
-
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n",
- __LINE__, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
- /*
- * pkey_alloc() sets PKRU, so we need to reflect it in
- * shadow_pkru:
- */
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- if (ret) {
- /* clear both the bits: */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- /*
- * move the new state in from init_val
- * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkru format)
- */
- shadow_pkru |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
- }
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d errno: %d\n", __LINE__, errno);
- /* for shadow checking: */
- rdpkru();
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
-{
- int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
- dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * I had a bug where pkey bits could be set by mprotect() but
- * not cleared. This ensures we get lots of random bit sets
- * and clears on the vma and pte pkey bits.
- */
-int alloc_random_pkey(void)
-{
- int max_nr_pkey_allocs;
- int ret;
- int i;
- int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
- int nr_alloced = 0;
- int random_index;
- memset(alloced_pkeys, 0, sizeof(alloced_pkeys));
-
- /* allocate every possible key and make a note of which ones we got */
- max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
- max_nr_pkey_allocs = 1;
- for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
- int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- if (new_pkey < 0)
- break;
- alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
- }
-
- pkey_assert(nr_alloced > 0);
- /* select a random one out of the allocated ones */
- random_index = rand() % nr_alloced;
- ret = alloced_pkeys[random_index];
- /* now zero it out so we don't free it next */
- alloced_pkeys[random_index] = 0;
-
- /* go through the allocated ones that we did not want and free them */
- for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
- int free_ret;
- if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
- continue;
- free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
- pkey_assert(!free_ret);
- }
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
- unsigned long pkey)
-{
- int nr_iterations = random() % 100;
- int ret;
-
- while (0) {
- int rpkey = alloc_random_pkey();
- ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
- dprintf1("sys_mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
- ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
- if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
- break;
-
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- }
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
-
- ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
- dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
- ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- return ret;
-}
-
-struct pkey_malloc_record {
- void *ptr;
- long size;
- int prot;
-};
-struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_malloc_records;
-struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_last_malloc_record;
-long nr_pkey_malloc_records;
-void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot)
-{
- long i;
- struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
- rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
- /* find a free record */
- if (rec)
- break;
- }
- if (!rec) {
- /* every record is full */
- size_t old_nr_records = nr_pkey_malloc_records;
- size_t new_nr_records = (nr_pkey_malloc_records * 2 + 1);
- size_t new_size = new_nr_records * sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
- dprintf2("new_nr_records: %zd\n", new_nr_records);
- dprintf2("new_size: %zd\n", new_size);
- pkey_malloc_records = realloc(pkey_malloc_records, new_size);
- pkey_assert(pkey_malloc_records != NULL);
- rec = &pkey_malloc_records[nr_pkey_malloc_records];
- /*
- * realloc() does not initialize memory, so zero it from
- * the first new record all the way to the end.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < new_nr_records - old_nr_records; i++)
- memset(rec + i, 0, sizeof(*rec));
- }
- dprintf3("filling malloc record[%d/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
- (int)(rec - pkey_malloc_records), rec, ptr, size);
- rec->ptr = ptr;
- rec->size = size;
- rec->prot = prot;
- pkey_last_malloc_record = rec;
- nr_pkey_malloc_records++;
-}
-
-void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
-{
- long i;
- int ret;
- dprintf3("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ptr);
- for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
- struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
- dprintf4("looking for ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
- ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
- if ((ptr < rec->ptr) ||
- (ptr >= rec->ptr + rec->size))
- continue;
-
- dprintf3("found ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
- ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
- nr_pkey_malloc_records--;
- ret = munmap(rec->ptr, rec->size);
- dprintf3("munmap ret: %d\n", ret);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf3("clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
- rec->ptr = NULL;
- dprintf3("done clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
- return;
- }
- pkey_assert(false);
-}
-
-
-void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ptr;
- int ret;
-
- rdpkru();
- dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
- rdpkru();
-
- dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *malloc_pkey_anon_huge(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ret;
- void *ptr;
-
- dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey);
- /*
- * Guarantee we can fit at least one huge page in the resulting
- * allocation by allocating space for 2:
- */
- size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-
- dprintf1("unaligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
- ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE);
- dprintf1(" aligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
- ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
- dprintf1("MADV_HUGEPAGE ret: %d\n", ret);
- ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_WILLNEED);
- dprintf1("MADV_WILLNEED ret: %d\n", ret);
- memset(ptr, 0, HPAGE_SIZE);
-
- dprintf1("mmap()'d thp for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-int hugetlb_setup_ok;
-#define GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES 10
-void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
-{
- int err;
- int fd;
- char buf[] = "123";
-
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
- return;
- }
-
- cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES), "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
-
- /*
- * Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
- * are 2M pages. Someone might have made 1G the default.
- */
- fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages", O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- perror("opening sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
- return;
- }
-
- /* -1 to guarantee leaving the trailing \0 */
- err = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
- close(fd);
- if (err <= 0) {
- perror("reading sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
- return;
- }
-
- if (atoi(buf) != GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES) {
- fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got: '%s' expected %d\n",
- buf, GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES);
- return;
- }
-
- hugetlb_setup_ok = 1;
-}
-
-void *malloc_pkey_hugetlb(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ptr;
- int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_HUGETLB;
-
- if (!hugetlb_setup_ok)
- return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
-
- dprintf1("doing %s(%ld, %x, %x)\n", __func__, size, prot, pkey);
- size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, flags, -1, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
-
- dprintf1("mmap()'d hugetlbfs for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *malloc_pkey_mmap_dax(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ptr;
- int fd;
-
- dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- fd = open("/dax/foo", O_RDWR);
- pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
-
- ptr = mmap(0, size, prot, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
-
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
-
- dprintf1("mmap()'d for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- close(fd);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *(*pkey_malloc[])(long size, int prot, u16 pkey) = {
-
- malloc_pkey_with_mprotect,
- malloc_pkey_anon_huge,
- malloc_pkey_hugetlb
-/* can not do direct with the pkey_mprotect() API:
- malloc_pkey_mmap_direct,
- malloc_pkey_mmap_dax,
-*/
-};
-
-void *malloc_pkey(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ret;
- static int malloc_type;
- int nr_malloc_types = ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_malloc);
-
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
-
- while (1) {
- pkey_assert(malloc_type < nr_malloc_types);
-
- ret = pkey_malloc[malloc_type](size, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(ret != (void *)-1);
-
- malloc_type++;
- if (malloc_type >= nr_malloc_types)
- malloc_type = (random()%nr_malloc_types);
-
- /* try again if the malloc_type we tried is unsupported */
- if (ret == PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP)
- continue;
-
- break;
- }
-
- dprintf3("%s(%ld, prot=%x, pkey=%x) returning: %p\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey, ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int last_pkru_faults;
-#define UNKNOWN_PKEY -2
-void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
-{
- dprintf2("%s(): last_pkru_faults: %d pkru_faults: %d\n",
- __func__, last_pkru_faults, pkru_faults);
- dprintf2("%s(%d): last_si_pkey: %d\n", __func__, pkey, last_si_pkey);
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults + 1 == pkru_faults);
-
- /*
- * For exec-only memory, we do not know the pkey in
- * advance, so skip this check.
- */
- if (pkey != UNKNOWN_PKEY)
- pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
-
- /*
- * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKRU to let the
- * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
- */
- if (__rdpkru() != 0)
- pkey_assert(0);
-
- __wrpkru(shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("%s() set PKRU=%x to restore state after signal nuked it\n",
- __func__, shadow_pkru);
- last_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
- last_si_pkey = -1;
-}
-
-#define do_not_expect_pk_fault(msg) do { \
- if (last_pkru_faults != pkru_faults) \
- dprintf0("unexpected PK fault: %s\n", msg); \
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults == pkru_faults); \
-} while (0)
-
-int test_fds[10] = { -1 };
-int nr_test_fds;
-void __save_test_fd(int fd)
-{
- pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
- pkey_assert(nr_test_fds < ARRAY_SIZE(test_fds));
- test_fds[nr_test_fds] = fd;
- nr_test_fds++;
-}
-
-int get_test_read_fd(void)
-{
- int test_fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
- __save_test_fd(test_fd);
- return test_fd;
-}
-
-void close_test_fds(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_test_fds; i++) {
- if (test_fds[i] < 0)
- continue;
- close(test_fds[i]);
- test_fds[i] = -1;
- }
- nr_test_fds = 0;
-}
-
-#define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory")
-__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr)
-{
- /*
- * Keep GCC from optimizing this away somehow
- */
- barrier();
- return *ptr;
-}
-
-void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ptr_contents;
-
- dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[1], doing read\n");
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
- dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
- dprintf1("\n");
-}
-void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ptr_contents;
-
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- rdpkru();
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
- dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- *ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- *ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ret;
- int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
-
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
- "having kernel read() to buffer\n", pkey);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 1);
- dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
- pkey_assert(ret);
-}
-void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ret;
- int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
-
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 100);
- dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
- if (ret < 0 && (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0))
- perror("verbose read result (OK for this to be bad)");
- pkey_assert(ret);
-}
-
-void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int pipe_ret, vmsplice_ret;
- struct iovec iov;
- int pipe_fds[2];
-
- pipe_ret = pipe(pipe_fds);
-
- pkey_assert(pipe_ret == 0);
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
- "having kernel vmsplice from buffer\n", pkey);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- iov.iov_base = ptr;
- iov.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
- vmsplice_ret = vmsplice(pipe_fds[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
- dprintf1("vmsplice() ret: %d\n", vmsplice_ret);
- pkey_assert(vmsplice_ret == -1);
-
- close(pipe_fds[0]);
- close(pipe_fds[1]);
-}
-
-void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ignored = 0xdada;
- int futex_ret;
- int some_int = __LINE__;
-
- dprintf1("disabling write to PKEY[%02d], "
- "doing futex gunk in buffer\n", pkey);
- *ptr = some_int;
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- futex_ret = syscall(SYS_futex, ptr, FUTEX_WAIT, some_int-1, NULL,
- &ignored, ignored);
- if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0)
- perror("futex");
- dprintf1("futex() ret: %d\n", futex_ret);
-}
-
-/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
-void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int err;
- int i;
-
- /* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
- for (i = 1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
- if (pkey == i)
- continue;
-
- dprintf1("trying get/set/free to non-allocated pkey: %2d\n", i);
- err = sys_pkey_free(i);
- pkey_assert(err);
-
- err = sys_pkey_free(i);
- pkey_assert(err);
-
- err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, i);
- pkey_assert(err);
- }
-}
-
-/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
-void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int err;
- int bad_pkey = NR_PKEYS+99;
-
- /* pass a known-invalid pkey in: */
- err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, bad_pkey);
- pkey_assert(err);
-}
-
-/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
-void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int err;
- int allocated_pkeys[NR_PKEYS] = {0};
- int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
- int new_pkey;
- dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
- new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, err, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
- dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
- if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
- dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
- __func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
- break;
- }
- pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
- allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
- }
-
- dprintf3("%s()::%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
-
- /*
- * ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without
- * failure:
- */
- pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
-
- /*
- * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
- * allocated by the time we get here:
- * 1. The default key (0)
- * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
- * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
- * 'pkey' to this function.
- * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
- */
- pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
- err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
- pkey_assert(!err);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * pkey 0 is special. It is allocated by default, so you do not
- * have to call pkey_alloc() to use it first. Make sure that it
- * is usable.
- */
-void test_mprotect_with_pkey_0(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- long size;
- int prot;
-
- assert(pkey_last_malloc_record);
- size = pkey_last_malloc_record->size;
- /*
- * This is a bit of a hack. But mprotect() requires
- * huge-page-aligned sizes when operating on hugetlbfs.
- * So, make sure that we use something that's a multiple
- * of a huge page when we can.
- */
- if (size >= HPAGE_SIZE)
- size = HPAGE_SIZE;
- prot = pkey_last_malloc_record->prot;
-
- /* Use pkey 0 */
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, 0);
-
- /* Make sure that we can set it back to the original pkey. */
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-}
-
-void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- __attribute__((__unused__)) int peek_result;
- pid_t child_pid;
- void *ignored = 0;
- long ret;
- int status;
- /*
- * This is the "control" for our little expermient. Make sure
- * we can always access it when ptracing.
- */
- int *plain_ptr_unaligned = malloc(HPAGE_SIZE);
- int *plain_ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(plain_ptr_unaligned, PAGE_SIZE);
-
- /*
- * Fork a child which is an exact copy of this process, of course.
- * That means we can do all of our tests via ptrace() and then plain
- * memory access and ensure they work differently.
- */
- child_pid = fork_lazy_child();
- dprintf1("[%d] child pid: %d\n", getpid(), child_pid);
-
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, child_pid, ignored, ignored);
- if (ret)
- perror("attach");
- dprintf1("[%d] attach ret: %ld %d\n", getpid(), ret, __LINE__);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- ret = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
- if ((ret != child_pid) || !(WIFSTOPPED(status))) {
- fprintf(stderr, "weird waitpid result %ld stat %x\n",
- ret, status);
- pkey_assert(0);
- }
- dprintf2("waitpid ret: %ld\n", ret);
- dprintf2("waitpid status: %d\n", status);
-
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
-
- /* Write access, untested for now:
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, child_pid, peek_at, data);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- dprintf1("poke at %p: %ld\n", peek_at, ret);
- */
-
- /*
- * Try to access the pkey-protected "ptr" via ptrace:
- */
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, ptr, ignored);
- /* expect it to work, without an error: */
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- /* Now access from the current task, and expect an exception: */
- peek_result = read_ptr(ptr);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-
- /*
- * Try to access the NON-pkey-protected "plain_ptr" via ptrace:
- */
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, plain_ptr, ignored);
- /* expect it to work, without an error: */
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- /* Now access from the current task, and expect NO exception: */
- peek_result = read_ptr(plain_ptr);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
-
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child_pid, ignored, 0);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
-
- ret = kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
-
- wait(&status);
-
- free(plain_ptr_unaligned);
-}
-
-void *get_pointer_to_instructions(void)
-{
- void *p1;
-
- p1 = ALIGN_PTR_UP(&lots_o_noops_around_write, PAGE_SIZE);
- dprintf3("&lots_o_noops: %p\n", &lots_o_noops_around_write);
- /* lots_o_noops_around_write should be page-aligned already */
- assert(p1 == &lots_o_noops_around_write);
-
- /* Point 'p1' at the *second* page of the function: */
- p1 += PAGE_SIZE;
-
- /*
- * Try to ensure we fault this in on next touch to ensure
- * we get an instruction fault as opposed to a data one
- */
- madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
-
- return p1;
-}
-
-void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *p1;
- int scratch;
- int ptr_contents;
- int ret;
-
- p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
-
- ret = mprotect_pkey(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC, (u64)pkey);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
-
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
-
- /*
- * Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
- */
- madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-
-void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *p1;
- int scratch;
- int ptr_contents;
- int ret;
-
- dprintf1("%s() start\n", __func__);
-
- p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
-
- /* Use a *normal* mprotect(), not mprotect_pkey(): */
- ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
-
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
-
- /* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
- madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
-
- /*
- * Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
- * exec-only pkey off the VMA and allow it to be readable
- * again. Go to PROT_NONE first to check for a kernel bug
- * that did not clear the pkey when doing PROT_NONE.
- */
- ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
-
- ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
-}
-
-void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int size = PAGE_SIZE;
- int sret;
-
- if (cpu_has_pku()) {
- dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
- return;
- }
-
- sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, PROT_READ, pkey);
- pkey_assert(sret < 0);
-}
-
-void (*pkey_tests[])(int *ptr, u16 pkey) = {
- test_read_of_write_disabled_region,
- test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
- test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region,
- test_executing_on_unreadable_memory,
- test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory,
- test_mprotect_with_pkey_0,
- test_ptrace_of_child,
- test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey,
- test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args,
- test_pkey_alloc_exhaust,
-};
-
-void run_tests_once(void)
-{
- int *ptr;
- int prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
-
- for (test_nr = 0; test_nr < ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests); test_nr++) {
- int pkey;
- int orig_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
-
- dprintf1("======================\n");
- dprintf1("test %d preparing...\n", test_nr);
-
- tracing_on();
- pkey = alloc_random_pkey();
- dprintf1("test %d starting with pkey: %d\n", test_nr, pkey);
- ptr = malloc_pkey(PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
- dprintf1("test %d starting...\n", test_nr);
- pkey_tests[test_nr](ptr, pkey);
- dprintf1("freeing test memory: %p\n", ptr);
- free_pkey_malloc(ptr);
- sys_pkey_free(pkey);
-
- dprintf1("pkru_faults: %d\n", pkru_faults);
- dprintf1("orig_pkru_faults: %d\n", orig_pkru_faults);
-
- tracing_off();
- close_test_fds();
-
- printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n", test_nr, iteration_nr);
- dprintf1("======================\n\n");
- }
- iteration_nr++;
-}
-
-void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
-{
- shadow_pkru = __rdpkru();
-}
-
-int main(void)
-{
- int nr_iterations = 22;
-
- setup_handlers();
-
- printf("has pku: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
-
- if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
- int size = PAGE_SIZE;
- int *ptr;
-
- printf("running PKEY tests for unsupported CPU/OS\n");
-
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
- assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(ptr, 1);
- exit(0);
- }
-
- pkey_setup_shadow();
- printf("startup pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
- setup_hugetlbfs();
-
- while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
- run_tests_once();
-
- printf("done (all tests OK)\n");
- return 0;
-}
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 01/24] selftests/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 01/24] selftests/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo at kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 219 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 1485 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore | 1 -
tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h | 219 ----
tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 1485 -------------------------
7 files changed, 1706 insertions(+), 1705 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore
index 342c7bc..0214fbf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ mlock-random-test
virtual_address_range
gup_benchmark
va_128TBswitch
+protection_keys
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile
index fdefa22..9788a58 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += transhuge-stress
TEST_GEN_FILES += userfaultfd
TEST_GEN_FILES += va_128TBswitch
TEST_GEN_FILES += virtual_address_range
+TEST_GEN_FILES += protection_keys
TEST_PROGS := run_vmtests
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..254e543
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _PKEYS_HELPER_H
+#define _PKEYS_HELPER_H
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ucontext.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+#define NR_PKEYS 16
+#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+
+#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
+#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
+#endif
+#define DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE 4096
+extern int dprint_in_signal;
+extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
+static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ if (!dprint_in_signal) {
+ va_start(ap, format);
+ vprintf(format, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ } else {
+ int ret;
+ /*
+ * No printf() functions are signal-safe.
+ * They deadlock easily. Write the format
+ * string to get some output, even if
+ * incomplete.
+ */
+ ret = write(1, format, strlen(format));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+#define dprintf_level(level, args...) do { \
+ if (level <= DEBUG_LEVEL) \
+ sigsafe_printf(args); \
+} while (0)
+#define dprintf0(args...) dprintf_level(0, args)
+#define dprintf1(args...) dprintf_level(1, args)
+#define dprintf2(args...) dprintf_level(2, args)
+#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
+#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
+
+extern unsigned int shadow_pkru;
+static inline unsigned int __rdpkru(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, edx;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int pkru;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
+ : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
+ : "c" (ecx));
+ pkru = eax;
+ return pkru;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int _rdpkru(int line)
+{
+ unsigned int pkru = __rdpkru();
+
+ dprintf4("rdpkru(line=%d) pkru: %x shadow: %x\n",
+ line, pkru, shadow_pkru);
+ assert(pkru == shadow_pkru);
+
+ return pkru;
+}
+
+#define rdpkru() _rdpkru(__LINE__)
+
+static inline void __wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+{
+ unsigned int eax = pkru;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int edx = 0;
+
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
+ : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
+ assert(pkru == __rdpkru());
+}
+
+static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+{
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ /* will do the shadow check for us: */
+ rdpkru();
+ __wrpkru(pkru);
+ shadow_pkru = pkru;
+ dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkru: %08x\n", __func__, pkru, __rdpkru());
+}
+
+/*
+ * These are technically racy. since something could
+ * change PKRU between the read and the write.
+ */
+static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
+{
+ unsigned int pkru = rdpkru();
+ int bit = pkey * 2;
+
+ if (do_allow)
+ pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ else
+ pkru |= (1<<bit);
+
+ dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
+ wrpkru(pkru);
+}
+
+static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
+{
+ long pkru = rdpkru();
+ int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
+
+ if (do_allow_write)
+ pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ else
+ pkru |= (1<<bit);
+
+ wrpkru(pkru);
+ dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
+}
+
+#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
+#define PROT_PKEY1 0x20 /* protection key value (bit 1) */
+#define PROT_PKEY2 0x40 /* protection key value (bit 2) */
+#define PROT_PKEY3 0x80 /* protection key value (bit 3) */
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define MB (1<<20)
+
+static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
+ unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
+{
+ /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
+ asm volatile(
+ "cpuid;"
+ : "=a" (*eax),
+ "=b" (*ebx),
+ "=c" (*ecx),
+ "=d" (*edx)
+ : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
+}
+
+/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
+
+static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+
+ eax = 0x7;
+ ecx = 0x0;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT (9)
+#define XSTATE_PKRU 0x200
+
+int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+ int xstate_offset;
+ int xstate_size;
+ unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
+ int leaf;
+
+ /* assume that XSTATE_PKRU is set in XCR0 */
+ leaf = XSTATE_PKRU_BIT;
+ {
+ eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
+ ecx = leaf;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (leaf == XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) {
+ xstate_offset = ebx;
+ xstate_size = eax;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (xstate_size == 0) {
+ printf("could not find size/offset of PKRU in xsave state\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return xstate_offset;
+}
+
+#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..460b4bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1485 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt)
+ *
+ * There are examples in here of:
+ * * how to set protection keys on memory
+ * * how to set/clear bits in PKRU (the rights register)
+ * * how to handle SEGV_PKRU signals and extract pkey-relevant
+ * information from the siginfo
+ *
+ * Things to add:
+ * make sure KSM and KSM COW breaking works
+ * prefault pages in at malloc, or not
+ * protect MPX bounds tables with protection keys?
+ * make sure VMA splitting/merging is working correctly
+ * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()), so make sure it is immune to pkeys
+ * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA but "freed" back to the kernel
+ * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make sure the pkey sticks
+ *
+ * Compile like this:
+ * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/futex.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ucontext.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+
+#include "pkey-helpers.h"
+
+int iteration_nr = 1;
+int test_nr;
+
+unsigned int shadow_pkru;
+
+#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
+#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
+#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
+
+#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
+
+int dprint_in_signal;
+char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
+
+extern void abort_hooks(void);
+#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
+ if (!(condition)) { \
+ dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, \
+ test_nr, iteration_nr); \
+ dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
+ abort_hooks(); \
+ exit(__LINE__); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+void cat_into_file(char *str, char *file)
+{
+ int fd = open(file, O_RDWR);
+ int ret;
+
+ dprintf2("%s(): writing '%s' to '%s'\n", __func__, str, file);
+ /*
+ * these need to be raw because they are called under
+ * pkey_assert()
+ */
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "error opening '%s'\n", str);
+ perror("error: ");
+ exit(__LINE__);
+ }
+
+ ret = write(fd, str, strlen(str));
+ if (ret != strlen(str)) {
+ perror("write to file failed");
+ fprintf(stderr, "filename: '%s' str: '%s'\n", file, str);
+ exit(__LINE__);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+}
+
+#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
+static int warned_tracing;
+int tracing_root_ok(void)
+{
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ if (!warned_tracing)
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, "
+ "can not do tracing control\n");
+ warned_tracing = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void tracing_on(void)
+{
+#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
+#define TRACEDIR "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing"
+ char pidstr[32];
+
+ if (!tracing_root_ok())
+ return;
+
+ sprintf(pidstr, "%d", getpid());
+ cat_into_file("0", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
+ cat_into_file("\n", TRACEDIR "/trace");
+ if (1) {
+ cat_into_file("function_graph", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
+ cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/options/funcgraph-proc");
+ } else {
+ cat_into_file("nop", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
+ }
+ cat_into_file(pidstr, TRACEDIR "/set_ftrace_pid");
+ cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
+ dprintf1("enabled tracing\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+void tracing_off(void)
+{
+#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
+ if (!tracing_root_ok())
+ return;
+ cat_into_file("0", "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on");
+#endif
+}
+
+void abort_hooks(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "running %s()...\n", __func__);
+ tracing_off();
+#ifdef SLEEP_ON_ABORT
+ sleep(SLEEP_ON_ABORT);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
+{
+ /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
+ asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This attempts to have roughly a page of instructions followed by a few
+ * instructions that do a write, and another page of instructions. That
+ * way, we are pretty sure that the write is in the second page of
+ * instructions and has at least a page of padding behind it.
+ *
+ * *That* lets us be sure to madvise() away the write instruction, which
+ * will then fault, which makes sure that the fault code handles
+ * execute-only memory properly.
+ */
+__attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)))
+void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
+{
+ dprintf3("running %s()\n", __func__);
+ __page_o_noops();
+ /* Assume this happens in the second page of instructions: */
+ *write_to_me = __LINE__;
+ /* pad out by another page: */
+ __page_o_noops();
+ dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Define some kernel-like types */
+#define u8 uint8_t
+#define u16 uint16_t
+#define u32 uint32_t
+#define u64 uint64_t
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
+# define SYS_pkey_free 382
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
+
+#else
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
+# define SYS_pkey_free 331
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
+
+#endif
+
+void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
+{
+ char *c = (void *)dumpme;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i += sizeof(u64)) {
+ u64 *ptr = (u64 *)(c + i);
+ dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016jx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Failed address bound checks: */
+#ifndef SEGV_BNDERR
+# define SEGV_BNDERR 3
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SEGV_PKUERR
+# define SEGV_PKUERR 4
+#endif
+
+static char *si_code_str(int si_code)
+{
+ if (si_code == SEGV_MAPERR)
+ return "SEGV_MAPERR";
+ if (si_code == SEGV_ACCERR)
+ return "SEGV_ACCERR";
+ if (si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)
+ return "SEGV_BNDERR";
+ if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
+ return "SEGV_PKUERR";
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+int pkru_faults;
+int last_si_pkey = -1;
+void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
+{
+ ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
+ int trapno;
+ unsigned long ip;
+ char *fpregs;
+ u32 *pkru_ptr;
+ u64 siginfo_pkey;
+ u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
+ int pkru_offset;
+ fpregset_t fpregset;
+
+ dprint_in_signal = 1;
+ dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
+ __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+
+ trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
+ ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
+ fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
+ fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
+
+ dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n", __func__,
+ trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code), si->si_code);
+#ifdef __i386__
+ /*
+ * 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
+ * the XSTATE header is present in addition to the "legacy" FPU
+ * state. We just assume that it is here.
+ */
+ fpregs += 0x70;
+#endif
+ pkru_offset = pkru_xstate_offset();
+ pkru_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkru_offset]);
+
+ dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
+ dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
+ /*
+ * If we got a PKRU fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
+ * here.
+ */
+ dprintf1("pkru_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkru_xstate_offset());
+ if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
+ dump_mem(pkru_ptr - 128, 256);
+ pkey_assert(*pkru_ptr);
+
+ if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
+ (si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
+ (si->si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)) {
+ printf("non-PK si_code, exiting...\n");
+ exit(4);
+ }
+
+ si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
+ dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
+ dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
+ siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
+ pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
+
+ dprintf1("signal pkru from xsave: %08x\n", *pkru_ptr);
+ /* need __rdpkru() version so we do not do shadow_pkru checking */
+ dprintf1("signal pkru from pkru: %08x\n", __rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
+ *(u64 *)pkru_ptr = 0x00000000;
+ dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
+ pkru_faults++;
+ dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
+ dprint_in_signal = 0;
+}
+
+int wait_all_children(void)
+{
+ int status;
+ return waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
+}
+
+void sig_chld(int x)
+{
+ dprint_in_signal = 1;
+ dprintf2("[%d] SIGCHLD: %d\n", getpid(), x);
+ dprint_in_signal = 0;
+}
+
+void setup_sigsegv_handler(void)
+{
+ int r, rs;
+ struct sigaction newact;
+ struct sigaction oldact;
+
+ /* #PF is mapped to sigsegv */
+ int signum = SIGSEGV;
+
+ newact.sa_handler = 0;
+ newact.sa_sigaction = signal_handler;
+
+ /*sigset_t - signals to block while in the handler */
+ /* get the old signal mask. */
+ rs = sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, 0, &newact.sa_mask);
+ pkey_assert(rs == 0);
+
+ /* call sa_sigaction, not sa_handler*/
+ newact.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+
+ newact.sa_restorer = 0; /* void(*)(), obsolete */
+ r = sigaction(signum, &newact, &oldact);
+ r = sigaction(SIGALRM, &newact, &oldact);
+ pkey_assert(r == 0);
+}
+
+void setup_handlers(void)
+{
+ signal(SIGCHLD, &sig_chld);
+ setup_sigsegv_handler();
+}
+
+pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
+{
+ pid_t forkret;
+
+ forkret = fork();
+ pkey_assert(forkret >= 0);
+ dprintf3("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n", getpid(), forkret);
+
+ if (!forkret) {
+ /* in the child */
+ while (1) {
+ dprintf1("child sleeping...\n");
+ sleep(30);
+ }
+ }
+ return forkret;
+}
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
+#endif
+
+static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+ u32 pkru = __rdpkru();
+ u32 shifted_pkru;
+ u32 masked_pkru;
+
+ dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
+ __func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
+ dprintf2("%s() raw pkru: %x\n", __func__, pkru);
+
+ shifted_pkru = (pkru >> (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkru: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkru);
+ masked_pkru = shifted_pkru & mask;
+ dprintf2("%s() masked pkru: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkru);
+ /*
+ * shift down the relevant bits to the lowest two, then
+ * mask off all the other high bits.
+ */
+ return masked_pkru;
+}
+
+static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+ u32 old_pkru = __rdpkru();
+ u32 new_pkru;
+
+ /* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
+ assert(!(rights & ~mask));
+
+ /* copy old pkru */
+ new_pkru = old_pkru;
+ /* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
+ new_pkru &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ /* OR in new bits for pkey: */
+ new_pkru |= (rights << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+
+ __wrpkru(new_pkru);
+
+ dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x pkru now: %x old_pkru: %x\n",
+ __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __rdpkru(), old_pkru);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
+{
+ unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int pkey_rights;
+ u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+
+ dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
+ pkey, flags);
+ pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
+
+ pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+ pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights |= flags;
+
+ ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
+ assert(!ret);
+ /*pkru and flags have the same format */
+ shadow_pkru |= flags << (pkey * 2);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkru);
+
+ pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ if (flags)
+ pkey_assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+ dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
+ pkey, flags);
+}
+
+void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
+{
+ unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+ u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+
+ pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+ pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights |= flags;
+
+ ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
+ /* pkru and flags have the same format */
+ shadow_pkru &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
+ pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
+
+ pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
+ pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ if (flags)
+ assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+}
+
+void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+}
+void pkey_write_deny(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+}
+void pkey_access_allow(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
+}
+void pkey_access_deny(int pkey)
+{
+ pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
+}
+
+int sys_mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ dprintf2("%s(0x%p, %zx, prot=%lx, pkey=%lx)\n", __func__,
+ ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+ if (errno) {
+ dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key sret: %d\n", sret);
+ dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key prot: 0x%lx\n", orig_prot);
+ dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key failed, errno: %d\n", errno);
+ if (DEBUG_LEVEL >= 2)
+ perror("SYS_mprotect_pkey");
+ }
+ return sret;
+}
+
+int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_alloc, flags, init_val);
+ dprintf1("%s(flags=%lx, init_val=%lx) syscall ret: %d errno: %d\n",
+ __func__, flags, init_val, ret, errno);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int alloc_pkey(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
+
+ dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n",
+ __LINE__, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
+ /*
+ * pkey_alloc() sets PKRU, so we need to reflect it in
+ * shadow_pkru:
+ */
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ if (ret) {
+ /* clear both the bits: */
+ shadow_pkru &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ /*
+ * move the new state in from init_val
+ * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkru format)
+ */
+ shadow_pkru |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
+ }
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d errno: %d\n", __LINE__, errno);
+ /* for shadow checking: */
+ rdpkru();
+ dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
+ dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * I had a bug where pkey bits could be set by mprotect() but
+ * not cleared. This ensures we get lots of random bit sets
+ * and clears on the vma and pte pkey bits.
+ */
+int alloc_random_pkey(void)
+{
+ int max_nr_pkey_allocs;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+ int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
+ int nr_alloced = 0;
+ int random_index;
+ memset(alloced_pkeys, 0, sizeof(alloced_pkeys));
+
+ /* allocate every possible key and make a note of which ones we got */
+ max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
+ max_nr_pkey_allocs = 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
+ int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+ if (new_pkey < 0)
+ break;
+ alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
+ }
+
+ pkey_assert(nr_alloced > 0);
+ /* select a random one out of the allocated ones */
+ random_index = rand() % nr_alloced;
+ ret = alloced_pkeys[random_index];
+ /* now zero it out so we don't free it next */
+ alloced_pkeys[random_index] = 0;
+
+ /* go through the allocated ones that we did not want and free them */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
+ int free_ret;
+ if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
+ continue;
+ free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
+ pkey_assert(!free_ret);
+ }
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ int nr_iterations = random() % 100;
+ int ret;
+
+ while (0) {
+ int rpkey = alloc_random_pkey();
+ ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+ dprintf1("sys_mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
+ ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
+ if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
+ break;
+
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ }
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+ dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
+ ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct pkey_malloc_record {
+ void *ptr;
+ long size;
+ int prot;
+};
+struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_malloc_records;
+struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_last_malloc_record;
+long nr_pkey_malloc_records;
+void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot)
+{
+ long i;
+ struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
+ rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
+ /* find a free record */
+ if (rec)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!rec) {
+ /* every record is full */
+ size_t old_nr_records = nr_pkey_malloc_records;
+ size_t new_nr_records = (nr_pkey_malloc_records * 2 + 1);
+ size_t new_size = new_nr_records * sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
+ dprintf2("new_nr_records: %zd\n", new_nr_records);
+ dprintf2("new_size: %zd\n", new_size);
+ pkey_malloc_records = realloc(pkey_malloc_records, new_size);
+ pkey_assert(pkey_malloc_records != NULL);
+ rec = &pkey_malloc_records[nr_pkey_malloc_records];
+ /*
+ * realloc() does not initialize memory, so zero it from
+ * the first new record all the way to the end.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < new_nr_records - old_nr_records; i++)
+ memset(rec + i, 0, sizeof(*rec));
+ }
+ dprintf3("filling malloc record[%d/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
+ (int)(rec - pkey_malloc_records), rec, ptr, size);
+ rec->ptr = ptr;
+ rec->size = size;
+ rec->prot = prot;
+ pkey_last_malloc_record = rec;
+ nr_pkey_malloc_records++;
+}
+
+void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
+{
+ long i;
+ int ret;
+ dprintf3("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ptr);
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
+ struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
+ dprintf4("looking for ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
+ ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
+ if ((ptr < rec->ptr) ||
+ (ptr >= rec->ptr + rec->size))
+ continue;
+
+ dprintf3("found ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
+ ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
+ nr_pkey_malloc_records--;
+ ret = munmap(rec->ptr, rec->size);
+ dprintf3("munmap ret: %d\n", ret);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ dprintf3("clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
+ rec->ptr = NULL;
+ dprintf3("done clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
+ return;
+ }
+ pkey_assert(false);
+}
+
+
+void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ rdpkru();
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+ rdpkru();
+
+ dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *malloc_pkey_anon_huge(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ /*
+ * Guarantee we can fit at least one huge page in the resulting
+ * allocation by allocating space for 2:
+ */
+ size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+
+ dprintf1("unaligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
+ ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE);
+ dprintf1(" aligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
+ ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
+ dprintf1("MADV_HUGEPAGE ret: %d\n", ret);
+ ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_WILLNEED);
+ dprintf1("MADV_WILLNEED ret: %d\n", ret);
+ memset(ptr, 0, HPAGE_SIZE);
+
+ dprintf1("mmap()'d thp for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+int hugetlb_setup_ok;
+#define GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES 10
+void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
+{
+ int err;
+ int fd;
+ char buf[] = "123";
+
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES), "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
+
+ /*
+ * Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
+ * are 2M pages. Someone might have made 1G the default.
+ */
+ fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages", O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ perror("opening sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* -1 to guarantee leaving the trailing \0 */
+ err = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
+ close(fd);
+ if (err <= 0) {
+ perror("reading sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (atoi(buf) != GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got: '%s' expected %d\n",
+ buf, GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ hugetlb_setup_ok = 1;
+}
+
+void *malloc_pkey_hugetlb(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_HUGETLB;
+
+ if (!hugetlb_setup_ok)
+ return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(%ld, %x, %x)\n", __func__, size, prot, pkey);
+ size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, flags, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+
+ dprintf1("mmap()'d hugetlbfs for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *malloc_pkey_mmap_dax(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int fd;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ fd = open("/dax/foo", O_RDWR);
+ pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
+
+ ptr = mmap(0, size, prot, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+
+ dprintf1("mmap()'d for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ close(fd);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *(*pkey_malloc[])(long size, int prot, u16 pkey) = {
+
+ malloc_pkey_with_mprotect,
+ malloc_pkey_anon_huge,
+ malloc_pkey_hugetlb
+/* can not do direct with the pkey_mprotect() API:
+ malloc_pkey_mmap_direct,
+ malloc_pkey_mmap_dax,
+*/
+};
+
+void *malloc_pkey(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ret;
+ static int malloc_type;
+ int nr_malloc_types = ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_malloc);
+
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+
+ while (1) {
+ pkey_assert(malloc_type < nr_malloc_types);
+
+ ret = pkey_malloc[malloc_type](size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(ret != (void *)-1);
+
+ malloc_type++;
+ if (malloc_type >= nr_malloc_types)
+ malloc_type = (random()%nr_malloc_types);
+
+ /* try again if the malloc_type we tried is unsupported */
+ if (ret == PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP)
+ continue;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dprintf3("%s(%ld, prot=%x, pkey=%x) returning: %p\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int last_pkru_faults;
+#define UNKNOWN_PKEY -2
+void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
+{
+ dprintf2("%s(): last_pkru_faults: %d pkru_faults: %d\n",
+ __func__, last_pkru_faults, pkru_faults);
+ dprintf2("%s(%d): last_si_pkey: %d\n", __func__, pkey, last_si_pkey);
+ pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults + 1 == pkru_faults);
+
+ /*
+ * For exec-only memory, we do not know the pkey in
+ * advance, so skip this check.
+ */
+ if (pkey != UNKNOWN_PKEY)
+ pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKRU to let the
+ * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
+ */
+ if (__rdpkru() != 0)
+ pkey_assert(0);
+
+ __wrpkru(shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s() set PKRU=%x to restore state after signal nuked it\n",
+ __func__, shadow_pkru);
+ last_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+ last_si_pkey = -1;
+}
+
+#define do_not_expect_pk_fault(msg) do { \
+ if (last_pkru_faults != pkru_faults) \
+ dprintf0("unexpected PK fault: %s\n", msg); \
+ pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults == pkru_faults); \
+} while (0)
+
+int test_fds[10] = { -1 };
+int nr_test_fds;
+void __save_test_fd(int fd)
+{
+ pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
+ pkey_assert(nr_test_fds < ARRAY_SIZE(test_fds));
+ test_fds[nr_test_fds] = fd;
+ nr_test_fds++;
+}
+
+int get_test_read_fd(void)
+{
+ int test_fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ __save_test_fd(test_fd);
+ return test_fd;
+}
+
+void close_test_fds(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_test_fds; i++) {
+ if (test_fds[i] < 0)
+ continue;
+ close(test_fds[i]);
+ test_fds[i] = -1;
+ }
+ nr_test_fds = 0;
+}
+
+#define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory")
+__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr)
+{
+ /*
+ * Keep GCC from optimizing this away somehow
+ */
+ barrier();
+ return *ptr;
+}
+
+void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[1], doing read\n");
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
+ dprintf1("\n");
+}
+void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ rdpkru();
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
+
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
+ "having kernel read() to buffer\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 1);
+ dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
+ pkey_assert(ret);
+}
+void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
+
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 100);
+ dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
+ if (ret < 0 && (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0))
+ perror("verbose read result (OK for this to be bad)");
+ pkey_assert(ret);
+}
+
+void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int pipe_ret, vmsplice_ret;
+ struct iovec iov;
+ int pipe_fds[2];
+
+ pipe_ret = pipe(pipe_fds);
+
+ pkey_assert(pipe_ret == 0);
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
+ "having kernel vmsplice from buffer\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ iov.iov_base = ptr;
+ iov.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
+ vmsplice_ret = vmsplice(pipe_fds[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
+ dprintf1("vmsplice() ret: %d\n", vmsplice_ret);
+ pkey_assert(vmsplice_ret == -1);
+
+ close(pipe_fds[0]);
+ close(pipe_fds[1]);
+}
+
+void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ignored = 0xdada;
+ int futex_ret;
+ int some_int = __LINE__;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling write to PKEY[%02d], "
+ "doing futex gunk in buffer\n", pkey);
+ *ptr = some_int;
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ futex_ret = syscall(SYS_futex, ptr, FUTEX_WAIT, some_int-1, NULL,
+ &ignored, ignored);
+ if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0)
+ perror("futex");
+ dprintf1("futex() ret: %d\n", futex_ret);
+}
+
+/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
+void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int err;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
+ for (i = 1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
+ if (pkey == i)
+ continue;
+
+ dprintf1("trying get/set/free to non-allocated pkey: %2d\n", i);
+ err = sys_pkey_free(i);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+
+ err = sys_pkey_free(i);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, i);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
+void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int err;
+ int bad_pkey = NR_PKEYS+99;
+
+ /* pass a known-invalid pkey in: */
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, bad_pkey);
+ pkey_assert(err);
+}
+
+/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
+void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int err;
+ int allocated_pkeys[NR_PKEYS] = {0};
+ int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
+ int new_pkey;
+ dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
+ new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, err, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
+ if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
+ dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
+ __func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
+ break;
+ }
+ pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
+ allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
+ }
+
+ dprintf3("%s()::%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+
+ /*
+ * ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without
+ * failure:
+ */
+ pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
+
+ /*
+ * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
+ * allocated by the time we get here:
+ * 1. The default key (0)
+ * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
+ * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
+ * 'pkey' to this function.
+ * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
+ */
+ pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
+ err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * pkey 0 is special. It is allocated by default, so you do not
+ * have to call pkey_alloc() to use it first. Make sure that it
+ * is usable.
+ */
+void test_mprotect_with_pkey_0(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ long size;
+ int prot;
+
+ assert(pkey_last_malloc_record);
+ size = pkey_last_malloc_record->size;
+ /*
+ * This is a bit of a hack. But mprotect() requires
+ * huge-page-aligned sizes when operating on hugetlbfs.
+ * So, make sure that we use something that's a multiple
+ * of a huge page when we can.
+ */
+ if (size >= HPAGE_SIZE)
+ size = HPAGE_SIZE;
+ prot = pkey_last_malloc_record->prot;
+
+ /* Use pkey 0 */
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, 0);
+
+ /* Make sure that we can set it back to the original pkey. */
+ mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
+}
+
+void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ __attribute__((__unused__)) int peek_result;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ void *ignored = 0;
+ long ret;
+ int status;
+ /*
+ * This is the "control" for our little expermient. Make sure
+ * we can always access it when ptracing.
+ */
+ int *plain_ptr_unaligned = malloc(HPAGE_SIZE);
+ int *plain_ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(plain_ptr_unaligned, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Fork a child which is an exact copy of this process, of course.
+ * That means we can do all of our tests via ptrace() and then plain
+ * memory access and ensure they work differently.
+ */
+ child_pid = fork_lazy_child();
+ dprintf1("[%d] child pid: %d\n", getpid(), child_pid);
+
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, child_pid, ignored, ignored);
+ if (ret)
+ perror("attach");
+ dprintf1("[%d] attach ret: %ld %d\n", getpid(), ret, __LINE__);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ ret = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
+ if ((ret != child_pid) || !(WIFSTOPPED(status))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "weird waitpid result %ld stat %x\n",
+ ret, status);
+ pkey_assert(0);
+ }
+ dprintf2("waitpid ret: %ld\n", ret);
+ dprintf2("waitpid status: %d\n", status);
+
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+
+ /* Write access, untested for now:
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, child_pid, peek_at, data);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ dprintf1("poke at %p: %ld\n", peek_at, ret);
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Try to access the pkey-protected "ptr" via ptrace:
+ */
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, ptr, ignored);
+ /* expect it to work, without an error: */
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ /* Now access from the current task, and expect an exception: */
+ peek_result = read_ptr(ptr);
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * Try to access the NON-pkey-protected "plain_ptr" via ptrace:
+ */
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, plain_ptr, ignored);
+ /* expect it to work, without an error: */
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+ /* Now access from the current task, and expect NO exception: */
+ peek_result = read_ptr(plain_ptr);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
+
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child_pid, ignored, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+
+ ret = kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
+ pkey_assert(ret != -1);
+
+ wait(&status);
+
+ free(plain_ptr_unaligned);
+}
+
+void *get_pointer_to_instructions(void)
+{
+ void *p1;
+
+ p1 = ALIGN_PTR_UP(&lots_o_noops_around_write, PAGE_SIZE);
+ dprintf3("&lots_o_noops: %p\n", &lots_o_noops_around_write);
+ /* lots_o_noops_around_write should be page-aligned already */
+ assert(p1 == &lots_o_noops_around_write);
+
+ /* Point 'p1' at the *second* page of the function: */
+ p1 += PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to ensure we fault this in on next touch to ensure
+ * we get an instruction fault as opposed to a data one
+ */
+ madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
+
+ return p1;
+}
+
+void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *p1;
+ int scratch;
+ int ptr_contents;
+ int ret;
+
+ p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+
+ ret = mprotect_pkey(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC, (u64)pkey);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+
+ dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
+ */
+ madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+ expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+}
+
+void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *p1;
+ int scratch;
+ int ptr_contents;
+ int ret;
+
+ dprintf1("%s() start\n", __func__);
+
+ p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+
+ /* Use a *normal* mprotect(), not mprotect_pkey(): */
+ ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+
+ dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+
+ /* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
+ madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+ expected_pk_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
+
+ /*
+ * Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
+ * exec-only pkey off the VMA and allow it to be readable
+ * again. Go to PROT_NONE first to check for a kernel bug
+ * that did not clear the pkey when doing PROT_NONE.
+ */
+ ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+
+ ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ do_not_expect_pk_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
+}
+
+void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ int sret;
+
+ if (cpu_has_pku()) {
+ dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, PROT_READ, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(sret < 0);
+}
+
+void (*pkey_tests[])(int *ptr, u16 pkey) = {
+ test_read_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region,
+ test_executing_on_unreadable_memory,
+ test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory,
+ test_mprotect_with_pkey_0,
+ test_ptrace_of_child,
+ test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey,
+ test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args,
+ test_pkey_alloc_exhaust,
+};
+
+void run_tests_once(void)
+{
+ int *ptr;
+ int prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
+
+ for (test_nr = 0; test_nr < ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests); test_nr++) {
+ int pkey;
+ int orig_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+
+ dprintf1("======================\n");
+ dprintf1("test %d preparing...\n", test_nr);
+
+ tracing_on();
+ pkey = alloc_random_pkey();
+ dprintf1("test %d starting with pkey: %d\n", test_nr, pkey);
+ ptr = malloc_pkey(PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
+ dprintf1("test %d starting...\n", test_nr);
+ pkey_tests[test_nr](ptr, pkey);
+ dprintf1("freeing test memory: %p\n", ptr);
+ free_pkey_malloc(ptr);
+ sys_pkey_free(pkey);
+
+ dprintf1("pkru_faults: %d\n", pkru_faults);
+ dprintf1("orig_pkru_faults: %d\n", orig_pkru_faults);
+
+ tracing_off();
+ close_test_fds();
+
+ printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n", test_nr, iteration_nr);
+ dprintf1("======================\n\n");
+ }
+ iteration_nr++;
+}
+
+void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
+{
+ shadow_pkru = __rdpkru();
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ int nr_iterations = 22;
+
+ setup_handlers();
+
+ printf("has pku: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
+
+ if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
+ int size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ int *ptr;
+
+ printf("running PKEY tests for unsupported CPU/OS\n");
+
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(ptr, 1);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ pkey_setup_shadow();
+ printf("startup pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ setup_hugetlbfs();
+
+ while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
+ run_tests_once();
+
+ printf("done (all tests OK)\n");
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore
index 7757f73..eb30ffd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/.gitignore
@@ -11,5 +11,4 @@ ldt_gdt
iopl
mpx-mini-test
ioperm
-protection_keys
test_vdso
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 254e543..0000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef _PKEYS_HELPER_H
-#define _PKEYS_HELPER_H
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <ucontext.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-
-#define NR_PKEYS 16
-#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
-
-#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
-#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
-#endif
-#define DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE 4096
-extern int dprint_in_signal;
-extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
-static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
-
- if (!dprint_in_signal) {
- va_start(ap, format);
- vprintf(format, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- } else {
- int ret;
- /*
- * No printf() functions are signal-safe.
- * They deadlock easily. Write the format
- * string to get some output, even if
- * incomplete.
- */
- ret = write(1, format, strlen(format));
- if (ret < 0)
- exit(1);
- }
-}
-#define dprintf_level(level, args...) do { \
- if (level <= DEBUG_LEVEL) \
- sigsafe_printf(args); \
-} while (0)
-#define dprintf0(args...) dprintf_level(0, args)
-#define dprintf1(args...) dprintf_level(1, args)
-#define dprintf2(args...) dprintf_level(2, args)
-#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
-#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
-
-extern unsigned int shadow_pkru;
-static inline unsigned int __rdpkru(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax, edx;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkru;
-
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
- : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
- : "c" (ecx));
- pkru = eax;
- return pkru;
-}
-
-static inline unsigned int _rdpkru(int line)
-{
- unsigned int pkru = __rdpkru();
-
- dprintf4("rdpkru(line=%d) pkru: %x shadow: %x\n",
- line, pkru, shadow_pkru);
- assert(pkru == shadow_pkru);
-
- return pkru;
-}
-
-#define rdpkru() _rdpkru(__LINE__)
-
-static inline void __wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
-{
- unsigned int eax = pkru;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int edx = 0;
-
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
- : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
- assert(pkru == __rdpkru());
-}
-
-static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
-{
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
- /* will do the shadow check for us: */
- rdpkru();
- __wrpkru(pkru);
- shadow_pkru = pkru;
- dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkru: %08x\n", __func__, pkru, __rdpkru());
-}
-
-/*
- * These are technically racy. since something could
- * change PKRU between the read and the write.
- */
-static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
-{
- unsigned int pkru = rdpkru();
- int bit = pkey * 2;
-
- if (do_allow)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
- else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
-
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
- wrpkru(pkru);
-}
-
-static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
-{
- long pkru = rdpkru();
- int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
-
- if (do_allow_write)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
- else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
-
- wrpkru(pkru);
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
-}
-
-#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
-#define PROT_PKEY1 0x20 /* protection key value (bit 1) */
-#define PROT_PKEY2 0x40 /* protection key value (bit 2) */
-#define PROT_PKEY3 0x80 /* protection key value (bit 3) */
-
-#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
-#define MB (1<<20)
-
-static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
- unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
-{
- /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
- asm volatile(
- "cpuid;"
- : "=a" (*eax),
- "=b" (*ebx),
- "=c" (*ecx),
- "=d" (*edx)
- : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
-}
-
-/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
-
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
-
- eax = 0x7;
- ecx = 0x0;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT (9)
-#define XSTATE_PKRU 0x200
-
-int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
- int xstate_offset;
- int xstate_size;
- unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
- int leaf;
-
- /* assume that XSTATE_PKRU is set in XCR0 */
- leaf = XSTATE_PKRU_BIT;
- {
- eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
- ecx = leaf;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (leaf == XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) {
- xstate_offset = ebx;
- xstate_size = eax;
- }
- }
-
- if (xstate_size == 0) {
- printf("could not find size/offset of PKRU in xsave state\n");
- return 0;
- }
-
- return xstate_offset;
-}
-
-#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 460b4bd..0000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1485 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-/*
- * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt)
- *
- * There are examples in here of:
- * * how to set protection keys on memory
- * * how to set/clear bits in PKRU (the rights register)
- * * how to handle SEGV_PKRU signals and extract pkey-relevant
- * information from the siginfo
- *
- * Things to add:
- * make sure KSM and KSM COW breaking works
- * prefault pages in at malloc, or not
- * protect MPX bounds tables with protection keys?
- * make sure VMA splitting/merging is working correctly
- * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()), so make sure it is immune to pkeys
- * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA but "freed" back to the kernel
- * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make sure the pkey sticks
- *
- * Compile like this:
- * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
- * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
- */
-#define _GNU_SOURCE
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <linux/futex.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <ucontext.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/ptrace.h>
-#include <setjmp.h>
-
-#include "pkey-helpers.h"
-
-int iteration_nr = 1;
-int test_nr;
-
-unsigned int shadow_pkru;
-
-#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
-#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
-#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
-#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
-
-#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
-
-int dprint_in_signal;
-char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
-
-extern void abort_hooks(void);
-#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
- if (!(condition)) { \
- dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
- __FILE__, __LINE__, \
- test_nr, iteration_nr); \
- dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
- abort_hooks(); \
- exit(__LINE__); \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
-void cat_into_file(char *str, char *file)
-{
- int fd = open(file, O_RDWR);
- int ret;
-
- dprintf2("%s(): writing '%s' to '%s'\n", __func__, str, file);
- /*
- * these need to be raw because they are called under
- * pkey_assert()
- */
- if (fd < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "error opening '%s'\n", str);
- perror("error: ");
- exit(__LINE__);
- }
-
- ret = write(fd, str, strlen(str));
- if (ret != strlen(str)) {
- perror("write to file failed");
- fprintf(stderr, "filename: '%s' str: '%s'\n", file, str);
- exit(__LINE__);
- }
- close(fd);
-}
-
-#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
-static int warned_tracing;
-int tracing_root_ok(void)
-{
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- if (!warned_tracing)
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, "
- "can not do tracing control\n");
- warned_tracing = 1;
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-void tracing_on(void)
-{
-#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
-#define TRACEDIR "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing"
- char pidstr[32];
-
- if (!tracing_root_ok())
- return;
-
- sprintf(pidstr, "%d", getpid());
- cat_into_file("0", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
- cat_into_file("\n", TRACEDIR "/trace");
- if (1) {
- cat_into_file("function_graph", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
- cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/options/funcgraph-proc");
- } else {
- cat_into_file("nop", TRACEDIR "/current_tracer");
- }
- cat_into_file(pidstr, TRACEDIR "/set_ftrace_pid");
- cat_into_file("1", TRACEDIR "/tracing_on");
- dprintf1("enabled tracing\n");
-#endif
-}
-
-void tracing_off(void)
-{
-#if CONTROL_TRACING > 0
- if (!tracing_root_ok())
- return;
- cat_into_file("0", "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on");
-#endif
-}
-
-void abort_hooks(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "running %s()...\n", __func__);
- tracing_off();
-#ifdef SLEEP_ON_ABORT
- sleep(SLEEP_ON_ABORT);
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
-{
- /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
- asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
-}
-
-/*
- * This attempts to have roughly a page of instructions followed by a few
- * instructions that do a write, and another page of instructions. That
- * way, we are pretty sure that the write is in the second page of
- * instructions and has at least a page of padding behind it.
- *
- * *That* lets us be sure to madvise() away the write instruction, which
- * will then fault, which makes sure that the fault code handles
- * execute-only memory properly.
- */
-__attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)))
-void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
-{
- dprintf3("running %s()\n", __func__);
- __page_o_noops();
- /* Assume this happens in the second page of instructions: */
- *write_to_me = __LINE__;
- /* pad out by another page: */
- __page_o_noops();
- dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
-}
-
-/* Define some kernel-like types */
-#define u8 uint8_t
-#define u16 uint16_t
-#define u32 uint32_t
-#define u64 uint64_t
-
-#ifdef __i386__
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
-# define SYS_pkey_free 382
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
-
-#else
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
-# define SYS_pkey_free 331
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
-
-#endif
-
-void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
-{
- char *c = (void *)dumpme;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i += sizeof(u64)) {
- u64 *ptr = (u64 *)(c + i);
- dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016jx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
- }
-}
-
-/* Failed address bound checks: */
-#ifndef SEGV_BNDERR
-# define SEGV_BNDERR 3
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SEGV_PKUERR
-# define SEGV_PKUERR 4
-#endif
-
-static char *si_code_str(int si_code)
-{
- if (si_code == SEGV_MAPERR)
- return "SEGV_MAPERR";
- if (si_code == SEGV_ACCERR)
- return "SEGV_ACCERR";
- if (si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)
- return "SEGV_BNDERR";
- if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
- return "SEGV_PKUERR";
- return "UNKNOWN";
-}
-
-int pkru_faults;
-int last_si_pkey = -1;
-void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
-{
- ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
- int trapno;
- unsigned long ip;
- char *fpregs;
- u32 *pkru_ptr;
- u64 siginfo_pkey;
- u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
- int pkru_offset;
- fpregset_t fpregset;
-
- dprint_in_signal = 1;
- dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
- __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
-
- trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
- ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
- fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
- fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
-
- dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n", __func__,
- trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code), si->si_code);
-#ifdef __i386__
- /*
- * 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
- * the XSTATE header is present in addition to the "legacy" FPU
- * state. We just assume that it is here.
- */
- fpregs += 0x70;
-#endif
- pkru_offset = pkru_xstate_offset();
- pkru_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkru_offset]);
-
- dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
- dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
- /*
- * If we got a PKRU fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
- * here.
- */
- dprintf1("pkru_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkru_xstate_offset());
- if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
- dump_mem(pkru_ptr - 128, 256);
- pkey_assert(*pkru_ptr);
-
- if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
- (si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
- (si->si_code == SEGV_BNDERR)) {
- printf("non-PK si_code, exiting...\n");
- exit(4);
- }
-
- si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
- dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
- dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
- siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
- pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
-
- dprintf1("signal pkru from xsave: %08x\n", *pkru_ptr);
- /* need __rdpkru() version so we do not do shadow_pkru checking */
- dprintf1("signal pkru from pkru: %08x\n", __rdpkru());
- dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
- *(u64 *)pkru_ptr = 0x00000000;
- dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
- pkru_faults++;
- dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
- dprint_in_signal = 0;
-}
-
-int wait_all_children(void)
-{
- int status;
- return waitpid(-1, &status, 0);
-}
-
-void sig_chld(int x)
-{
- dprint_in_signal = 1;
- dprintf2("[%d] SIGCHLD: %d\n", getpid(), x);
- dprint_in_signal = 0;
-}
-
-void setup_sigsegv_handler(void)
-{
- int r, rs;
- struct sigaction newact;
- struct sigaction oldact;
-
- /* #PF is mapped to sigsegv */
- int signum = SIGSEGV;
-
- newact.sa_handler = 0;
- newact.sa_sigaction = signal_handler;
-
- /*sigset_t - signals to block while in the handler */
- /* get the old signal mask. */
- rs = sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, 0, &newact.sa_mask);
- pkey_assert(rs == 0);
-
- /* call sa_sigaction, not sa_handler*/
- newact.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
-
- newact.sa_restorer = 0; /* void(*)(), obsolete */
- r = sigaction(signum, &newact, &oldact);
- r = sigaction(SIGALRM, &newact, &oldact);
- pkey_assert(r == 0);
-}
-
-void setup_handlers(void)
-{
- signal(SIGCHLD, &sig_chld);
- setup_sigsegv_handler();
-}
-
-pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
-{
- pid_t forkret;
-
- forkret = fork();
- pkey_assert(forkret >= 0);
- dprintf3("[%d] fork() ret: %d\n", getpid(), forkret);
-
- if (!forkret) {
- /* in the child */
- while (1) {
- dprintf1("child sleeping...\n");
- sleep(30);
- }
- }
- return forkret;
-}
-
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
-#endif
-
-static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
-{
- u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 shifted_pkru;
- u32 masked_pkru;
-
- dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
- __func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
- dprintf2("%s() raw pkru: %x\n", __func__, pkru);
-
- shifted_pkru = (pkru >> (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkru: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkru);
- masked_pkru = shifted_pkru & mask;
- dprintf2("%s() masked pkru: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkru);
- /*
- * shift down the relevant bits to the lowest two, then
- * mask off all the other high bits.
- */
- return masked_pkru;
-}
-
-static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
-{
- u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 old_pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 new_pkru;
-
- /* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
- assert(!(rights & ~mask));
-
- /* copy old pkru */
- new_pkru = old_pkru;
- /* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
- new_pkru &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- /* OR in new bits for pkey: */
- new_pkru |= (rights << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
-
- __wrpkru(new_pkru);
-
- dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x pkru now: %x old_pkru: %x\n",
- __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __rdpkru(), old_pkru);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
-{
- unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
- int ret;
- int pkey_rights;
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
-
- dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
- pkey, flags);
- pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
-
- pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights |= flags;
-
- ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
- assert(!ret);
- /*pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru |= flags << (pkey * 2);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkru);
-
- pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
- if (flags)
- pkey_assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
- dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
- pkey, flags);
-}
-
-void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
-{
- unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
- int ret;
- int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
-
- pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights |= flags;
-
- ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
- /* pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
- pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
-
- pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
- pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
-
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
- if (flags)
- assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
-}
-
-void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
-}
-void pkey_write_deny(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
-}
-void pkey_access_allow(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_clear(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
-}
-void pkey_access_deny(int pkey)
-{
- pkey_disable_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
-}
-
-int sys_mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
- unsigned long pkey)
-{
- int sret;
-
- dprintf2("%s(0x%p, %zx, prot=%lx, pkey=%lx)\n", __func__,
- ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
-
- errno = 0;
- sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
- if (errno) {
- dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key sret: %d\n", sret);
- dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key prot: 0x%lx\n", orig_prot);
- dprintf2("SYS_mprotect_key failed, errno: %d\n", errno);
- if (DEBUG_LEVEL >= 2)
- perror("SYS_mprotect_pkey");
- }
- return sret;
-}
-
-int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
-{
- int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_alloc, flags, init_val);
- dprintf1("%s(flags=%lx, init_val=%lx) syscall ret: %d errno: %d\n",
- __func__, flags, init_val, ret, errno);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int alloc_pkey(void)
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
-
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n",
- __LINE__, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
- /*
- * pkey_alloc() sets PKRU, so we need to reflect it in
- * shadow_pkru:
- */
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- if (ret) {
- /* clear both the bits: */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- /*
- * move the new state in from init_val
- * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkru format)
- */
- shadow_pkru |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
- }
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d errno: %d\n", __LINE__, errno);
- /* for shadow checking: */
- rdpkru();
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
-{
- int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
- dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * I had a bug where pkey bits could be set by mprotect() but
- * not cleared. This ensures we get lots of random bit sets
- * and clears on the vma and pte pkey bits.
- */
-int alloc_random_pkey(void)
-{
- int max_nr_pkey_allocs;
- int ret;
- int i;
- int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
- int nr_alloced = 0;
- int random_index;
- memset(alloced_pkeys, 0, sizeof(alloced_pkeys));
-
- /* allocate every possible key and make a note of which ones we got */
- max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
- max_nr_pkey_allocs = 1;
- for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
- int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- if (new_pkey < 0)
- break;
- alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
- }
-
- pkey_assert(nr_alloced > 0);
- /* select a random one out of the allocated ones */
- random_index = rand() % nr_alloced;
- ret = alloced_pkeys[random_index];
- /* now zero it out so we don't free it next */
- alloced_pkeys[random_index] = 0;
-
- /* go through the allocated ones that we did not want and free them */
- for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
- int free_ret;
- if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
- continue;
- free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
- pkey_assert(!free_ret);
- }
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
- unsigned long pkey)
-{
- int nr_iterations = random() % 100;
- int ret;
-
- while (0) {
- int rpkey = alloc_random_pkey();
- ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
- dprintf1("sys_mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
- ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
- if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
- break;
-
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- }
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
-
- ret = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
- dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
- ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- return ret;
-}
-
-struct pkey_malloc_record {
- void *ptr;
- long size;
- int prot;
-};
-struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_malloc_records;
-struct pkey_malloc_record *pkey_last_malloc_record;
-long nr_pkey_malloc_records;
-void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot)
-{
- long i;
- struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
- rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
- /* find a free record */
- if (rec)
- break;
- }
- if (!rec) {
- /* every record is full */
- size_t old_nr_records = nr_pkey_malloc_records;
- size_t new_nr_records = (nr_pkey_malloc_records * 2 + 1);
- size_t new_size = new_nr_records * sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
- dprintf2("new_nr_records: %zd\n", new_nr_records);
- dprintf2("new_size: %zd\n", new_size);
- pkey_malloc_records = realloc(pkey_malloc_records, new_size);
- pkey_assert(pkey_malloc_records != NULL);
- rec = &pkey_malloc_records[nr_pkey_malloc_records];
- /*
- * realloc() does not initialize memory, so zero it from
- * the first new record all the way to the end.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < new_nr_records - old_nr_records; i++)
- memset(rec + i, 0, sizeof(*rec));
- }
- dprintf3("filling malloc record[%d/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
- (int)(rec - pkey_malloc_records), rec, ptr, size);
- rec->ptr = ptr;
- rec->size = size;
- rec->prot = prot;
- pkey_last_malloc_record = rec;
- nr_pkey_malloc_records++;
-}
-
-void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
-{
- long i;
- int ret;
- dprintf3("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ptr);
- for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
- struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
- dprintf4("looking for ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
- ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
- if ((ptr < rec->ptr) ||
- (ptr >= rec->ptr + rec->size))
- continue;
-
- dprintf3("found ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
- ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
- nr_pkey_malloc_records--;
- ret = munmap(rec->ptr, rec->size);
- dprintf3("munmap ret: %d\n", ret);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf3("clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
- rec->ptr = NULL;
- dprintf3("done clearing rec->ptr, rec: %p\n", rec);
- return;
- }
- pkey_assert(false);
-}
-
-
-void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ptr;
- int ret;
-
- rdpkru();
- dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
- rdpkru();
-
- dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *malloc_pkey_anon_huge(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ret;
- void *ptr;
-
- dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey);
- /*
- * Guarantee we can fit at least one huge page in the resulting
- * allocation by allocating space for 2:
- */
- size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-
- dprintf1("unaligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
- ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE);
- dprintf1(" aligned ptr: %p\n", ptr);
- ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE);
- dprintf1("MADV_HUGEPAGE ret: %d\n", ret);
- ret = madvise(ptr, HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_WILLNEED);
- dprintf1("MADV_WILLNEED ret: %d\n", ret);
- memset(ptr, 0, HPAGE_SIZE);
-
- dprintf1("mmap()'d thp for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-int hugetlb_setup_ok;
-#define GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES 10
-void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
-{
- int err;
- int fd;
- char buf[] = "123";
-
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
- return;
- }
-
- cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES), "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
-
- /*
- * Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
- * are 2M pages. Someone might have made 1G the default.
- */
- fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages", O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- perror("opening sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
- return;
- }
-
- /* -1 to guarantee leaving the trailing \0 */
- err = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
- close(fd);
- if (err <= 0) {
- perror("reading sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
- return;
- }
-
- if (atoi(buf) != GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES) {
- fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got: '%s' expected %d\n",
- buf, GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES);
- return;
- }
-
- hugetlb_setup_ok = 1;
-}
-
-void *malloc_pkey_hugetlb(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ptr;
- int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_HUGETLB;
-
- if (!hugetlb_setup_ok)
- return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
-
- dprintf1("doing %s(%ld, %x, %x)\n", __func__, size, prot, pkey);
- size = ALIGN_UP(size, HPAGE_SIZE * 2);
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, flags, -1, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
-
- dprintf1("mmap()'d hugetlbfs for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *malloc_pkey_mmap_dax(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ptr;
- int fd;
-
- dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- fd = open("/dax/foo", O_RDWR);
- pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
-
- ptr = mmap(0, size, prot, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
- pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
-
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-
- record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
-
- dprintf1("mmap()'d for pkey %d @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- close(fd);
- return ptr;
-}
-
-void *(*pkey_malloc[])(long size, int prot, u16 pkey) = {
-
- malloc_pkey_with_mprotect,
- malloc_pkey_anon_huge,
- malloc_pkey_hugetlb
-/* can not do direct with the pkey_mprotect() API:
- malloc_pkey_mmap_direct,
- malloc_pkey_mmap_dax,
-*/
-};
-
-void *malloc_pkey(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *ret;
- static int malloc_type;
- int nr_malloc_types = ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_malloc);
-
- pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
-
- while (1) {
- pkey_assert(malloc_type < nr_malloc_types);
-
- ret = pkey_malloc[malloc_type](size, prot, pkey);
- pkey_assert(ret != (void *)-1);
-
- malloc_type++;
- if (malloc_type >= nr_malloc_types)
- malloc_type = (random()%nr_malloc_types);
-
- /* try again if the malloc_type we tried is unsupported */
- if (ret == PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP)
- continue;
-
- break;
- }
-
- dprintf3("%s(%ld, prot=%x, pkey=%x) returning: %p\n", __func__,
- size, prot, pkey, ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int last_pkru_faults;
-#define UNKNOWN_PKEY -2
-void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
-{
- dprintf2("%s(): last_pkru_faults: %d pkru_faults: %d\n",
- __func__, last_pkru_faults, pkru_faults);
- dprintf2("%s(%d): last_si_pkey: %d\n", __func__, pkey, last_si_pkey);
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults + 1 == pkru_faults);
-
- /*
- * For exec-only memory, we do not know the pkey in
- * advance, so skip this check.
- */
- if (pkey != UNKNOWN_PKEY)
- pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
-
- /*
- * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKRU to let the
- * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
- */
- if (__rdpkru() != 0)
- pkey_assert(0);
-
- __wrpkru(shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("%s() set PKRU=%x to restore state after signal nuked it\n",
- __func__, shadow_pkru);
- last_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
- last_si_pkey = -1;
-}
-
-#define do_not_expect_pk_fault(msg) do { \
- if (last_pkru_faults != pkru_faults) \
- dprintf0("unexpected PK fault: %s\n", msg); \
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults == pkru_faults); \
-} while (0)
-
-int test_fds[10] = { -1 };
-int nr_test_fds;
-void __save_test_fd(int fd)
-{
- pkey_assert(fd >= 0);
- pkey_assert(nr_test_fds < ARRAY_SIZE(test_fds));
- test_fds[nr_test_fds] = fd;
- nr_test_fds++;
-}
-
-int get_test_read_fd(void)
-{
- int test_fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
- __save_test_fd(test_fd);
- return test_fd;
-}
-
-void close_test_fds(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_test_fds; i++) {
- if (test_fds[i] < 0)
- continue;
- close(test_fds[i]);
- test_fds[i] = -1;
- }
- nr_test_fds = 0;
-}
-
-#define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory")
-__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr)
-{
- /*
- * Keep GCC from optimizing this away somehow
- */
- barrier();
- return *ptr;
-}
-
-void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ptr_contents;
-
- dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[1], doing read\n");
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
- dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
- dprintf1("\n");
-}
-void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ptr_contents;
-
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- rdpkru();
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
- dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- *ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- *ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ret;
- int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
-
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
- "having kernel read() to buffer\n", pkey);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 1);
- dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
- pkey_assert(ret);
-}
-void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ret;
- int test_fd = get_test_read_fd();
-
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 100);
- dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
- if (ret < 0 && (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0))
- perror("verbose read result (OK for this to be bad)");
- pkey_assert(ret);
-}
-
-void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int pipe_ret, vmsplice_ret;
- struct iovec iov;
- int pipe_fds[2];
-
- pipe_ret = pipe(pipe_fds);
-
- pkey_assert(pipe_ret == 0);
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], "
- "having kernel vmsplice from buffer\n", pkey);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- iov.iov_base = ptr;
- iov.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
- vmsplice_ret = vmsplice(pipe_fds[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
- dprintf1("vmsplice() ret: %d\n", vmsplice_ret);
- pkey_assert(vmsplice_ret == -1);
-
- close(pipe_fds[0]);
- close(pipe_fds[1]);
-}
-
-void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int ignored = 0xdada;
- int futex_ret;
- int some_int = __LINE__;
-
- dprintf1("disabling write to PKEY[%02d], "
- "doing futex gunk in buffer\n", pkey);
- *ptr = some_int;
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
- futex_ret = syscall(SYS_futex, ptr, FUTEX_WAIT, some_int-1, NULL,
- &ignored, ignored);
- if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0)
- perror("futex");
- dprintf1("futex() ret: %d\n", futex_ret);
-}
-
-/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
-void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int err;
- int i;
-
- /* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
- for (i = 1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
- if (pkey == i)
- continue;
-
- dprintf1("trying get/set/free to non-allocated pkey: %2d\n", i);
- err = sys_pkey_free(i);
- pkey_assert(err);
-
- err = sys_pkey_free(i);
- pkey_assert(err);
-
- err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, i);
- pkey_assert(err);
- }
-}
-
-/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
-void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int err;
- int bad_pkey = NR_PKEYS+99;
-
- /* pass a known-invalid pkey in: */
- err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, bad_pkey);
- pkey_assert(err);
-}
-
-/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
-void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int err;
- int allocated_pkeys[NR_PKEYS] = {0};
- int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
- int new_pkey;
- dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
- new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, err, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
- dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
- if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
- dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
- __func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
- break;
- }
- pkey_assert(nr_allocated_pkeys < NR_PKEYS);
- allocated_pkeys[nr_allocated_pkeys++] = new_pkey;
- }
-
- dprintf3("%s()::%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
-
- /*
- * ensure it did not reach the end of the loop without
- * failure:
- */
- pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
-
- /*
- * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
- * allocated by the time we get here:
- * 1. The default key (0)
- * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
- * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
- * 'pkey' to this function.
- * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
- */
- pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
- err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
- pkey_assert(!err);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * pkey 0 is special. It is allocated by default, so you do not
- * have to call pkey_alloc() to use it first. Make sure that it
- * is usable.
- */
-void test_mprotect_with_pkey_0(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- long size;
- int prot;
-
- assert(pkey_last_malloc_record);
- size = pkey_last_malloc_record->size;
- /*
- * This is a bit of a hack. But mprotect() requires
- * huge-page-aligned sizes when operating on hugetlbfs.
- * So, make sure that we use something that's a multiple
- * of a huge page when we can.
- */
- if (size >= HPAGE_SIZE)
- size = HPAGE_SIZE;
- prot = pkey_last_malloc_record->prot;
-
- /* Use pkey 0 */
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, 0);
-
- /* Make sure that we can set it back to the original pkey. */
- mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, prot, pkey);
-}
-
-void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- __attribute__((__unused__)) int peek_result;
- pid_t child_pid;
- void *ignored = 0;
- long ret;
- int status;
- /*
- * This is the "control" for our little expermient. Make sure
- * we can always access it when ptracing.
- */
- int *plain_ptr_unaligned = malloc(HPAGE_SIZE);
- int *plain_ptr = ALIGN_PTR_UP(plain_ptr_unaligned, PAGE_SIZE);
-
- /*
- * Fork a child which is an exact copy of this process, of course.
- * That means we can do all of our tests via ptrace() and then plain
- * memory access and ensure they work differently.
- */
- child_pid = fork_lazy_child();
- dprintf1("[%d] child pid: %d\n", getpid(), child_pid);
-
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, child_pid, ignored, ignored);
- if (ret)
- perror("attach");
- dprintf1("[%d] attach ret: %ld %d\n", getpid(), ret, __LINE__);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- ret = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
- if ((ret != child_pid) || !(WIFSTOPPED(status))) {
- fprintf(stderr, "weird waitpid result %ld stat %x\n",
- ret, status);
- pkey_assert(0);
- }
- dprintf2("waitpid ret: %ld\n", ret);
- dprintf2("waitpid status: %d\n", status);
-
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- pkey_write_deny(pkey);
-
- /* Write access, untested for now:
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, child_pid, peek_at, data);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- dprintf1("poke at %p: %ld\n", peek_at, ret);
- */
-
- /*
- * Try to access the pkey-protected "ptr" via ptrace:
- */
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, ptr, ignored);
- /* expect it to work, without an error: */
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- /* Now access from the current task, and expect an exception: */
- peek_result = read_ptr(ptr);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-
- /*
- * Try to access the NON-pkey-protected "plain_ptr" via ptrace:
- */
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid, plain_ptr, ignored);
- /* expect it to work, without an error: */
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
- /* Now access from the current task, and expect NO exception: */
- peek_result = read_ptr(plain_ptr);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
-
- ret = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child_pid, ignored, 0);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
-
- ret = kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
- pkey_assert(ret != -1);
-
- wait(&status);
-
- free(plain_ptr_unaligned);
-}
-
-void *get_pointer_to_instructions(void)
-{
- void *p1;
-
- p1 = ALIGN_PTR_UP(&lots_o_noops_around_write, PAGE_SIZE);
- dprintf3("&lots_o_noops: %p\n", &lots_o_noops_around_write);
- /* lots_o_noops_around_write should be page-aligned already */
- assert(p1 == &lots_o_noops_around_write);
-
- /* Point 'p1' at the *second* page of the function: */
- p1 += PAGE_SIZE;
-
- /*
- * Try to ensure we fault this in on next touch to ensure
- * we get an instruction fault as opposed to a data one
- */
- madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
-
- return p1;
-}
-
-void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *p1;
- int scratch;
- int ptr_contents;
- int ret;
-
- p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
-
- ret = mprotect_pkey(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC, (u64)pkey);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- pkey_access_deny(pkey);
-
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
-
- /*
- * Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
- */
- madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
-}
-
-void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- void *p1;
- int scratch;
- int ptr_contents;
- int ret;
-
- dprintf1("%s() start\n", __func__);
-
- p1 = get_pointer_to_instructions();
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
-
- /* Use a *normal* mprotect(), not mprotect_pkey(): */
- ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
-
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
-
- /* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
- madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
- lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
-
- /*
- * Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
- * exec-only pkey off the VMA and allow it to be readable
- * again. Go to PROT_NONE first to check for a kernel bug
- * that did not clear the pkey when doing PROT_NONE.
- */
- ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
-
- ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
- pkey_assert(!ret);
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
-}
-
-void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
-{
- int size = PAGE_SIZE;
- int sret;
-
- if (cpu_has_pku()) {
- dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
- return;
- }
-
- sret = syscall(SYS_mprotect_key, ptr, size, PROT_READ, pkey);
- pkey_assert(sret < 0);
-}
-
-void (*pkey_tests[])(int *ptr, u16 pkey) = {
- test_read_of_write_disabled_region,
- test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
- test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region,
- test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region,
- test_executing_on_unreadable_memory,
- test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory,
- test_mprotect_with_pkey_0,
- test_ptrace_of_child,
- test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey,
- test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args,
- test_pkey_alloc_exhaust,
-};
-
-void run_tests_once(void)
-{
- int *ptr;
- int prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
-
- for (test_nr = 0; test_nr < ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests); test_nr++) {
- int pkey;
- int orig_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
-
- dprintf1("======================\n");
- dprintf1("test %d preparing...\n", test_nr);
-
- tracing_on();
- pkey = alloc_random_pkey();
- dprintf1("test %d starting with pkey: %d\n", test_nr, pkey);
- ptr = malloc_pkey(PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
- dprintf1("test %d starting...\n", test_nr);
- pkey_tests[test_nr](ptr, pkey);
- dprintf1("freeing test memory: %p\n", ptr);
- free_pkey_malloc(ptr);
- sys_pkey_free(pkey);
-
- dprintf1("pkru_faults: %d\n", pkru_faults);
- dprintf1("orig_pkru_faults: %d\n", orig_pkru_faults);
-
- tracing_off();
- close_test_fds();
-
- printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n", test_nr, iteration_nr);
- dprintf1("======================\n\n");
- }
- iteration_nr++;
-}
-
-void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
-{
- shadow_pkru = __rdpkru();
-}
-
-int main(void)
-{
- int nr_iterations = 22;
-
- setup_handlers();
-
- printf("has pku: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
-
- if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
- int size = PAGE_SIZE;
- int *ptr;
-
- printf("running PKEY tests for unsupported CPU/OS\n");
-
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
- assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
- test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(ptr, 1);
- exit(0);
- }
-
- pkey_setup_shadow();
- printf("startup pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
- setup_hugetlbfs();
-
- while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
- run_tests_once();
-
- printf("done (all tests OK)\n");
- return 0;
-}
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 02/24] selftests/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 01/24] selftests/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 03/24] selftests/vm: move generic definitions to header file linuxram
` (22 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
some pkru references are named to pkey_reg
and some prku references are renamed to pkey
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 85 +++++-----
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 238 ++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 254e543..d5779be 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define NR_PKEYS 16
-#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
@@ -53,85 +53,88 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
-extern unsigned int shadow_pkru;
-static inline unsigned int __rdpkru(void)
+extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
+static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
{
unsigned int eax, edx;
unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkru;
+ unsigned int pkey_reg;
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
: "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
: "c" (ecx));
- pkru = eax;
- return pkru;
+ pkey_reg = eax;
+ return pkey_reg;
}
-static inline unsigned int _rdpkru(int line)
+static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
{
- unsigned int pkru = __rdpkru();
+ unsigned int pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- dprintf4("rdpkru(line=%d) pkru: %x shadow: %x\n",
- line, pkru, shadow_pkru);
- assert(pkru == shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf4("read_pkey_reg(line=%d) pkey_reg: %x shadow: %x\n",
+ line, pkey_reg, shadow_pkey_reg);
+ assert(pkey_reg == shadow_pkey_reg);
- return pkru;
+ return pkey_reg;
}
-#define rdpkru() _rdpkru(__LINE__)
+#define read_pkey_reg() _read_pkey_reg(__LINE__)
-static inline void __wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
{
- unsigned int eax = pkru;
+ unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
unsigned int ecx = 0;
unsigned int edx = 0;
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
: : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
- assert(pkru == __rdpkru());
+ assert(pkey_reg == __read_pkey_reg());
}
-static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
{
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
/* will do the shadow check for us: */
- rdpkru();
- __wrpkru(pkru);
- shadow_pkru = pkru;
- dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkru: %08x\n", __func__, pkru, __rdpkru());
+ read_pkey_reg();
+ __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
+ shadow_pkey_reg = pkey_reg;
+ dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkey_reg: %08x\n", __func__,
+ pkey_reg, __read_pkey_reg());
}
/*
* These are technically racy. since something could
- * change PKRU between the read and the write.
+ * change PKEY register between the read and the write.
*/
static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
{
- unsigned int pkru = rdpkru();
+ unsigned int pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2;
if (do_allow)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg &= (1<<bit);
else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
- wrpkru(pkru);
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
}
static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
{
- long pkru = rdpkru();
+ long pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
if (do_allow_write)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg &= (1<<bit);
else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
- wrpkru(pkru);
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
+ write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
@@ -181,10 +184,10 @@ static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
return 1;
}
-#define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT (9)
-#define XSTATE_PKRU 0x200
+#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
+#define XSTATE_PKEY 0x200
-int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
+int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
{
unsigned int eax;
unsigned int ebx;
@@ -195,21 +198,21 @@ int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
int leaf;
- /* assume that XSTATE_PKRU is set in XCR0 */
- leaf = XSTATE_PKRU_BIT;
+ /* assume that XSTATE_PKEY is set in XCR0 */
+ leaf = XSTATE_PKEY_BIT;
{
eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
ecx = leaf;
__cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- if (leaf == XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) {
+ if (leaf == XSTATE_PKEY_BIT) {
xstate_offset = ebx;
xstate_size = eax;
}
}
if (xstate_size == 0) {
- printf("could not find size/offset of PKRU in xsave state\n");
+ printf("could not find size/offset of PKEY in xsave state\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 460b4bd..9f373cc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
- * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt)
+ * Tests Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt)
*
* There are examples in here of:
* * how to set protection keys on memory
- * * how to set/clear bits in PKRU (the rights register)
- * * how to handle SEGV_PKRU signals and extract pkey-relevant
+ * * how to set/clear bits in pkey registers (the rights register)
+ * * how to handle SEGV_PKUERR signals and extract pkey-relevant
* information from the siginfo
*
* Things to add:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
int iteration_nr = 1;
int test_nr;
-unsigned int shadow_pkru;
+unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
return "UNKNOWN";
}
-int pkru_faults;
+int pkey_faults;
int last_si_pkey = -1;
void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
{
@@ -263,16 +263,16 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
int trapno;
unsigned long ip;
char *fpregs;
- u32 *pkru_ptr;
+ u32 *pkey_reg_ptr;
u64 siginfo_pkey;
u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
- int pkru_offset;
+ int pkey_reg_offset;
fpregset_t fpregset;
dprint_in_signal = 1;
dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
- __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
@@ -289,19 +289,19 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
*/
fpregs += 0x70;
#endif
- pkru_offset = pkru_xstate_offset();
- pkru_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkru_offset]);
+ pkey_reg_offset = pkey_reg_xstate_offset();
+ pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_offset]);
dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
/*
- * If we got a PKRU fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
+ * If we got a PKEY fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
* here.
*/
- dprintf1("pkru_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkru_xstate_offset());
+ dprintf1("pkey_reg_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkey_reg_xstate_offset());
if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
- dump_mem(pkru_ptr - 128, 256);
- pkey_assert(*pkru_ptr);
+ dump_mem(pkey_reg_ptr - 128, 256);
+ pkey_assert(*pkey_reg_ptr);
if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
(si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
@@ -317,13 +317,16 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
- dprintf1("signal pkru from xsave: %08x\n", *pkru_ptr);
- /* need __rdpkru() version so we do not do shadow_pkru checking */
- dprintf1("signal pkru from pkru: %08x\n", __rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: %08x\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
+ /*
+ * need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
+ * checking
+ */
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: %08x\n", __read_pkey_reg());
dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
- *(u64 *)pkru_ptr = 0x00000000;
+ *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
- pkru_faults++;
+ pkey_faults++;
dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
dprint_in_signal = 0;
}
@@ -402,45 +405,47 @@ pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 shifted_pkru;
- u32 masked_pkru;
+ u32 pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ u32 shifted_pkey_reg;
+ u32 masked_pkey_reg;
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
__func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
- dprintf2("%s() raw pkru: %x\n", __func__, pkru);
+ dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
- shifted_pkru = (pkru >> (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkru: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkru);
- masked_pkru = shifted_pkru & mask;
- dprintf2("%s() masked pkru: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkru);
+ shifted_pkey_reg = (pkey_reg >> (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkey_reg);
+ masked_pkey_reg = shifted_pkey_reg & mask;
+ dprintf2("%s() masked pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkey_reg);
/*
* shift down the relevant bits to the lowest two, then
* mask off all the other high bits.
*/
- return masked_pkru;
+ return masked_pkey_reg;
}
static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 old_pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 new_pkru;
+ u32 old_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ u32 new_pkey_reg;
/* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
assert(!(rights & ~mask));
- /* copy old pkru */
- new_pkru = old_pkru;
+ /* copy old pkey_reg */
+ new_pkey_reg = old_pkey_reg;
/* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
- new_pkru &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
/* OR in new bits for pkey: */
- new_pkru |= (rights << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg |= (rights << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- __wrpkru(new_pkru);
+ __write_pkey_reg(new_pkey_reg);
- dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x pkru now: %x old_pkru: %x\n",
- __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __rdpkru(), old_pkru);
+ dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x"
+ " pkey_reg now: %x old_pkey_reg: %x\n",
+ __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ old_pkey_reg);
return 0;
}
@@ -449,7 +454,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights;
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+ u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
@@ -465,9 +470,9 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
assert(!ret);
- /*pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru |= flags << (pkey * 2);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkru);
+ /*pkey_reg and flags have the same format */
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= flags << (pkey * 2);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
@@ -475,9 +480,9 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- pkey_assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+ pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
}
@@ -487,7 +492,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+ u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
@@ -498,17 +503,16 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
pkey_rights |= flags;
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
- /* pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+ assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
}
void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
@@ -561,33 +565,38 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
int ret;
unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n",
- __LINE__, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
/*
- * pkey_alloc() sets PKRU, so we need to reflect it in
- * shadow_pkru:
+ * pkey_alloc() sets PKEY register, so we need to reflect it in
+ * shadow_pkey_reg:
*/
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
if (ret) {
/* clear both the bits: */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
/*
* move the new state in from init_val
- * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkru format)
+ * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkey_reg format)
*/
- shadow_pkru |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
}
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d errno: %d\n", __LINE__, errno);
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d errno: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, errno);
/* for shadow checking: */
- rdpkru();
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ read_pkey_reg();
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -638,8 +647,8 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
pkey_assert(!free_ret);
}
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -657,11 +666,13 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
break;
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
}
pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
@@ -669,8 +680,8 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -752,7 +763,7 @@ void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
void *ptr;
int ret;
- rdpkru();
+ read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
size, prot, pkey);
pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
@@ -761,7 +772,7 @@ void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
pkey_assert(!ret);
record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
- rdpkru();
+ read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
return ptr;
@@ -924,15 +935,15 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
return ret;
}
-int last_pkru_faults;
+int last_pkey_faults;
#define UNKNOWN_PKEY -2
-void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
+void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
{
- dprintf2("%s(): last_pkru_faults: %d pkru_faults: %d\n",
- __func__, last_pkru_faults, pkru_faults);
+ dprintf2("%s(): last_pkey_faults: %d pkey_faults: %d\n",
+ __func__, last_pkey_faults, pkey_faults);
dprintf2("%s(%d): last_si_pkey: %d\n", __func__, pkey, last_si_pkey);
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults + 1 == pkru_faults);
+ pkey_assert(last_pkey_faults + 1 == pkey_faults);
/*
* For exec-only memory, we do not know the pkey in
* advance, so skip this check.
@@ -941,23 +952,23 @@ void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
/*
- * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKRU to let the
+ * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
* test program continue. We now have to restore it.
*/
- if (__rdpkru() != 0)
+ if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
pkey_assert(0);
- __wrpkru(shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("%s() set PKRU=%x to restore state after signal nuked it\n",
- __func__, shadow_pkru);
- last_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+ __write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s() set pkey_reg=%x to restore state after signal "
+ "nuked it\n", __func__, shadow_pkey_reg);
+ last_pkey_faults = pkey_faults;
last_si_pkey = -1;
}
-#define do_not_expect_pk_fault(msg) do { \
- if (last_pkru_faults != pkru_faults) \
- dprintf0("unexpected PK fault: %s\n", msg); \
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults == pkru_faults); \
+#define do_not_expect_pkey_fault(msg) do { \
+ if (last_pkey_faults != pkey_faults) \
+ dprintf0("unexpected PKey fault: %s\n", msg); \
+ pkey_assert(last_pkey_faults == pkey_faults); \
} while (0)
int test_fds[10] = { -1 };
@@ -1015,25 +1026,25 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int ptr_contents;
dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- rdpkru();
+ read_pkey_reg();
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
pkey_write_deny(pkey);
*ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
*ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
@@ -1145,9 +1156,10 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int new_pkey;
dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, err, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, err, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
+ read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
@@ -1180,7 +1192,7 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
pkey_assert(!err);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
}
}
@@ -1266,7 +1278,7 @@ void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(ret != -1);
/* Now access from the current task, and expect an exception: */
peek_result = read_ptr(ptr);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
/*
* Try to access the NON-pkey-protected "plain_ptr" via ptrace:
@@ -1276,7 +1288,7 @@ void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(ret != -1);
/* Now access from the current task, and expect NO exception: */
peek_result = read_ptr(plain_ptr);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
ret = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child_pid, ignored, 0);
pkey_assert(ret != -1);
@@ -1326,17 +1338,17 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(!ret);
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ dprintf2("pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
/*
* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
*/
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1357,15 +1369,15 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
/* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
+ expected_pkey_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
/*
* Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
@@ -1379,7 +1391,7 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
pkey_assert(!ret);
ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
}
void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1421,7 +1433,7 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
for (test_nr = 0; test_nr < ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests); test_nr++) {
int pkey;
- int orig_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+ int orig_pkey_faults = pkey_faults;
dprintf1("======================\n");
dprintf1("test %d preparing...\n", test_nr);
@@ -1436,8 +1448,8 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
free_pkey_malloc(ptr);
sys_pkey_free(pkey);
- dprintf1("pkru_faults: %d\n", pkru_faults);
- dprintf1("orig_pkru_faults: %d\n", orig_pkru_faults);
+ dprintf1("pkey_faults: %d\n", pkey_faults);
+ dprintf1("orig_pkey_faults: %d\n", orig_pkey_faults);
tracing_off();
close_test_fds();
@@ -1450,7 +1462,7 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
{
- shadow_pkru = __rdpkru();
+ shadow_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
}
int main(void)
@@ -1474,7 +1486,7 @@ int main(void)
}
pkey_setup_shadow();
- printf("startup pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ printf("startup pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
setup_hugetlbfs();
while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 02/24] selftests/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 02/24] selftests/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
some pkru references are named to pkey_reg
and some prku references are renamed to pkey
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 85 +++++-----
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 238 ++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 254e543..d5779be 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define NR_PKEYS 16
-#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
@@ -53,85 +53,88 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
-extern unsigned int shadow_pkru;
-static inline unsigned int __rdpkru(void)
+extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
+static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
{
unsigned int eax, edx;
unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkru;
+ unsigned int pkey_reg;
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
: "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
: "c" (ecx));
- pkru = eax;
- return pkru;
+ pkey_reg = eax;
+ return pkey_reg;
}
-static inline unsigned int _rdpkru(int line)
+static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
{
- unsigned int pkru = __rdpkru();
+ unsigned int pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- dprintf4("rdpkru(line=%d) pkru: %x shadow: %x\n",
- line, pkru, shadow_pkru);
- assert(pkru == shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf4("read_pkey_reg(line=%d) pkey_reg: %x shadow: %x\n",
+ line, pkey_reg, shadow_pkey_reg);
+ assert(pkey_reg == shadow_pkey_reg);
- return pkru;
+ return pkey_reg;
}
-#define rdpkru() _rdpkru(__LINE__)
+#define read_pkey_reg() _read_pkey_reg(__LINE__)
-static inline void __wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
{
- unsigned int eax = pkru;
+ unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
unsigned int ecx = 0;
unsigned int edx = 0;
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
: : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
- assert(pkru == __rdpkru());
+ assert(pkey_reg == __read_pkey_reg());
}
-static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
{
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
/* will do the shadow check for us: */
- rdpkru();
- __wrpkru(pkru);
- shadow_pkru = pkru;
- dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkru: %08x\n", __func__, pkru, __rdpkru());
+ read_pkey_reg();
+ __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
+ shadow_pkey_reg = pkey_reg;
+ dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkey_reg: %08x\n", __func__,
+ pkey_reg, __read_pkey_reg());
}
/*
* These are technically racy. since something could
- * change PKRU between the read and the write.
+ * change PKEY register between the read and the write.
*/
static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
{
- unsigned int pkru = rdpkru();
+ unsigned int pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2;
if (do_allow)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg &= (1<<bit);
else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
- wrpkru(pkru);
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
}
static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
{
- long pkru = rdpkru();
+ long pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
if (do_allow_write)
- pkru &= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg &= (1<<bit);
else
- pkru |= (1<<bit);
+ pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
- wrpkru(pkru);
- dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
+ write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
@@ -181,10 +184,10 @@ static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
return 1;
}
-#define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT (9)
-#define XSTATE_PKRU 0x200
+#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
+#define XSTATE_PKEY 0x200
-int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
+int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
{
unsigned int eax;
unsigned int ebx;
@@ -195,21 +198,21 @@ int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
int leaf;
- /* assume that XSTATE_PKRU is set in XCR0 */
- leaf = XSTATE_PKRU_BIT;
+ /* assume that XSTATE_PKEY is set in XCR0 */
+ leaf = XSTATE_PKEY_BIT;
{
eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
ecx = leaf;
__cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- if (leaf == XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) {
+ if (leaf == XSTATE_PKEY_BIT) {
xstate_offset = ebx;
xstate_size = eax;
}
}
if (xstate_size == 0) {
- printf("could not find size/offset of PKRU in xsave state\n");
+ printf("could not find size/offset of PKEY in xsave state\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 460b4bd..9f373cc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
- * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt)
+ * Tests Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt)
*
* There are examples in here of:
* * how to set protection keys on memory
- * * how to set/clear bits in PKRU (the rights register)
- * * how to handle SEGV_PKRU signals and extract pkey-relevant
+ * * how to set/clear bits in pkey registers (the rights register)
+ * * how to handle SEGV_PKUERR signals and extract pkey-relevant
* information from the siginfo
*
* Things to add:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
int iteration_nr = 1;
int test_nr;
-unsigned int shadow_pkru;
+unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
return "UNKNOWN";
}
-int pkru_faults;
+int pkey_faults;
int last_si_pkey = -1;
void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
{
@@ -263,16 +263,16 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
int trapno;
unsigned long ip;
char *fpregs;
- u32 *pkru_ptr;
+ u32 *pkey_reg_ptr;
u64 siginfo_pkey;
u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
- int pkru_offset;
+ int pkey_reg_offset;
fpregset_t fpregset;
dprint_in_signal = 1;
dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
- __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
@@ -289,19 +289,19 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
*/
fpregs += 0x70;
#endif
- pkru_offset = pkru_xstate_offset();
- pkru_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkru_offset]);
+ pkey_reg_offset = pkey_reg_xstate_offset();
+ pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_offset]);
dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
/*
- * If we got a PKRU fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
+ * If we got a PKEY fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
* here.
*/
- dprintf1("pkru_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkru_xstate_offset());
+ dprintf1("pkey_reg_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkey_reg_xstate_offset());
if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
- dump_mem(pkru_ptr - 128, 256);
- pkey_assert(*pkru_ptr);
+ dump_mem(pkey_reg_ptr - 128, 256);
+ pkey_assert(*pkey_reg_ptr);
if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
(si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
@@ -317,13 +317,16 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
- dprintf1("signal pkru from xsave: %08x\n", *pkru_ptr);
- /* need __rdpkru() version so we do not do shadow_pkru checking */
- dprintf1("signal pkru from pkru: %08x\n", __rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: %08x\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
+ /*
+ * need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
+ * checking
+ */
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: %08x\n", __read_pkey_reg());
dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
- *(u64 *)pkru_ptr = 0x00000000;
+ *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
- pkru_faults++;
+ pkey_faults++;
dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
dprint_in_signal = 0;
}
@@ -402,45 +405,47 @@ pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 shifted_pkru;
- u32 masked_pkru;
+ u32 pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ u32 shifted_pkey_reg;
+ u32 masked_pkey_reg;
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
__func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
- dprintf2("%s() raw pkru: %x\n", __func__, pkru);
+ dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
- shifted_pkru = (pkru >> (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkru: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkru);
- masked_pkru = shifted_pkru & mask;
- dprintf2("%s() masked pkru: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkru);
+ shifted_pkey_reg = (pkey_reg >> (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkey_reg);
+ masked_pkey_reg = shifted_pkey_reg & mask;
+ dprintf2("%s() masked pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkey_reg);
/*
* shift down the relevant bits to the lowest two, then
* mask off all the other high bits.
*/
- return masked_pkru;
+ return masked_pkey_reg;
}
static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 old_pkru = __rdpkru();
- u32 new_pkru;
+ u32 old_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ u32 new_pkey_reg;
/* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
assert(!(rights & ~mask));
- /* copy old pkru */
- new_pkru = old_pkru;
+ /* copy old pkey_reg */
+ new_pkey_reg = old_pkey_reg;
/* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
- new_pkru &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
/* OR in new bits for pkey: */
- new_pkru |= (rights << (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg |= (rights << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- __wrpkru(new_pkru);
+ __write_pkey_reg(new_pkey_reg);
- dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x pkru now: %x old_pkru: %x\n",
- __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __rdpkru(), old_pkru);
+ dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x"
+ " pkey_reg now: %x old_pkey_reg: %x\n",
+ __func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ old_pkey_reg);
return 0;
}
@@ -449,7 +454,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights;
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+ u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
@@ -465,9 +470,9 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
assert(!ret);
- /*pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru |= flags << (pkey * 2);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkru);
+ /*pkey_reg and flags have the same format */
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= flags << (pkey * 2);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
@@ -475,9 +480,9 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- pkey_assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+ pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
}
@@ -487,7 +492,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- u32 orig_pkru = rdpkru();
+ u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
@@ -498,17 +503,16 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
pkey_rights |= flags;
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
- /* pkru and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkru: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, rdpkru());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- assert(rdpkru() > orig_pkru);
+ assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
}
void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
@@ -561,33 +565,38 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
int ret;
unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d, pkru: 0x%x shadow: %x\n",
- __LINE__, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
/*
- * pkey_alloc() sets PKRU, so we need to reflect it in
- * shadow_pkru:
+ * pkey_alloc() sets PKEY register, so we need to reflect it in
+ * shadow_pkey_reg:
*/
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
if (ret) {
/* clear both the bits: */
- shadow_pkru &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
/*
* move the new state in from init_val
- * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkru format)
+ * (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkey_reg format)
*/
- shadow_pkru |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
}
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("alloc_pkey()::%d errno: %d\n", __LINE__, errno);
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d errno: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, errno);
/* for shadow checking: */
- rdpkru();
- dprintf4("alloc_pkey()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ read_pkey_reg();
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -638,8 +647,8 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
pkey_assert(!free_ret);
}
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -657,11 +666,13 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
break;
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
}
pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
@@ -669,8 +680,8 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, ret, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -752,7 +763,7 @@ void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
void *ptr;
int ret;
- rdpkru();
+ read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
size, prot, pkey);
pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
@@ -761,7 +772,7 @@ void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
pkey_assert(!ret);
record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
- rdpkru();
+ read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
return ptr;
@@ -924,15 +935,15 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
return ret;
}
-int last_pkru_faults;
+int last_pkey_faults;
#define UNKNOWN_PKEY -2
-void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
+void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
{
- dprintf2("%s(): last_pkru_faults: %d pkru_faults: %d\n",
- __func__, last_pkru_faults, pkru_faults);
+ dprintf2("%s(): last_pkey_faults: %d pkey_faults: %d\n",
+ __func__, last_pkey_faults, pkey_faults);
dprintf2("%s(%d): last_si_pkey: %d\n", __func__, pkey, last_si_pkey);
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults + 1 == pkru_faults);
+ pkey_assert(last_pkey_faults + 1 == pkey_faults);
/*
* For exec-only memory, we do not know the pkey in
* advance, so skip this check.
@@ -941,23 +952,23 @@ void expected_pk_fault(int pkey)
pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
/*
- * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKRU to let the
+ * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
* test program continue. We now have to restore it.
*/
- if (__rdpkru() != 0)
+ if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
pkey_assert(0);
- __wrpkru(shadow_pkru);
- dprintf1("%s() set PKRU=%x to restore state after signal nuked it\n",
- __func__, shadow_pkru);
- last_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+ __write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s() set pkey_reg=%x to restore state after signal "
+ "nuked it\n", __func__, shadow_pkey_reg);
+ last_pkey_faults = pkey_faults;
last_si_pkey = -1;
}
-#define do_not_expect_pk_fault(msg) do { \
- if (last_pkru_faults != pkru_faults) \
- dprintf0("unexpected PK fault: %s\n", msg); \
- pkey_assert(last_pkru_faults == pkru_faults); \
+#define do_not_expect_pkey_fault(msg) do { \
+ if (last_pkey_faults != pkey_faults) \
+ dprintf0("unexpected PKey fault: %s\n", msg); \
+ pkey_assert(last_pkey_faults == pkey_faults); \
} while (0)
int test_fds[10] = { -1 };
@@ -1015,25 +1026,25 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int ptr_contents;
dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
- rdpkru();
+ read_pkey_reg();
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
pkey_write_deny(pkey);
*ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
*ptr = __LINE__;
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
@@ -1145,9 +1156,10 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int new_pkey;
dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkru: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, err, __rdpkru(), shadow_pkru);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, err, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ shadow_pkey_reg);
+ read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
@@ -1180,7 +1192,7 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
pkey_assert(!err);
- rdpkru(); /* for shadow checking */
+ read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
}
}
@@ -1266,7 +1278,7 @@ void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(ret != -1);
/* Now access from the current task, and expect an exception: */
peek_result = read_ptr(ptr);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
/*
* Try to access the NON-pkey-protected "plain_ptr" via ptrace:
@@ -1276,7 +1288,7 @@ void test_ptrace_of_child(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(ret != -1);
/* Now access from the current task, and expect NO exception: */
peek_result = read_ptr(plain_ptr);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("read plain pointer after ptrace");
ret = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child_pid, ignored, 0);
pkey_assert(ret != -1);
@@ -1326,17 +1338,17 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(!ret);
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ dprintf2("pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
/*
* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
*/
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(pkey);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1357,15 +1369,15 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
/* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pk_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
+ expected_pkey_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
/*
* Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
@@ -1379,7 +1391,7 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
pkey_assert(!ret);
ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- do_not_expect_pk_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
+ do_not_expect_pkey_fault("plain read on recently PROT_EXEC area");
}
void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1421,7 +1433,7 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
for (test_nr = 0; test_nr < ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_tests); test_nr++) {
int pkey;
- int orig_pkru_faults = pkru_faults;
+ int orig_pkey_faults = pkey_faults;
dprintf1("======================\n");
dprintf1("test %d preparing...\n", test_nr);
@@ -1436,8 +1448,8 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
free_pkey_malloc(ptr);
sys_pkey_free(pkey);
- dprintf1("pkru_faults: %d\n", pkru_faults);
- dprintf1("orig_pkru_faults: %d\n", orig_pkru_faults);
+ dprintf1("pkey_faults: %d\n", pkey_faults);
+ dprintf1("orig_pkey_faults: %d\n", orig_pkey_faults);
tracing_off();
close_test_fds();
@@ -1450,7 +1462,7 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
{
- shadow_pkru = __rdpkru();
+ shadow_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
}
int main(void)
@@ -1474,7 +1486,7 @@ int main(void)
}
pkey_setup_shadow();
- printf("startup pkru: %x\n", rdpkru());
+ printf("startup pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
setup_hugetlbfs();
while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 03/24] selftests/vm: move generic definitions to header file
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 02/24] selftests/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 04/24] selftests/vm: move arch-specific definitions to arch-specific header linuxram
` (21 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
Moved all the generic definition and helper functions to the header file.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 27 --------------------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index d5779be..6ad1bd5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@
#include <ucontext.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
+/* Define some kernel-like types */
+#define u8 uint8_t
+#define u16 uint16_t
+#define u32 uint32_t
+#define u64 uint64_t
+
+#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
+
#define NR_PKEYS 16
#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
@@ -53,6 +61,18 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
+extern void abort_hooks(void);
+#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
+ if (!(condition)) { \
+ dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, \
+ test_nr, iteration_nr); \
+ dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
+ abort_hooks(); \
+ exit(__LINE__); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
{
@@ -137,11 +157,6 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
-#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
-#define PROT_PKEY1 0x20 /* protection key value (bit 1) */
-#define PROT_PKEY2 0x40 /* protection key value (bit 2) */
-#define PROT_PKEY3 0x80 /* protection key value (bit 3) */
-
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#define MB (1<<20)
@@ -219,4 +234,14 @@ int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
return xstate_offset;
}
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
+#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) \
+ ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) \
+ ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
+#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 9f373cc..cad52dc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -51,31 +51,10 @@
unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
-#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
-#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
-#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
-
-#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
int dprint_in_signal;
char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
-extern void abort_hooks(void);
-#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
- if (!(condition)) { \
- dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
- __FILE__, __LINE__, \
- test_nr, iteration_nr); \
- dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
- abort_hooks(); \
- exit(__LINE__); \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
void cat_into_file(char *str, char *file)
{
int fd = open(file, O_RDWR);
@@ -186,12 +165,6 @@ void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
}
-/* Define some kernel-like types */
-#define u8 uint8_t
-#define u16 uint16_t
-#define u32 uint32_t
-#define u64 uint64_t
-
#ifdef __i386__
#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 03/24] selftests/vm: move generic definitions to header file
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 03/24] selftests/vm: move generic definitions to header file linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
Moved all the generic definition and helper functions to the header file.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 27 --------------------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index d5779be..6ad1bd5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@
#include <ucontext.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
+/* Define some kernel-like types */
+#define u8 uint8_t
+#define u16 uint16_t
+#define u32 uint32_t
+#define u64 uint64_t
+
+#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
+
#define NR_PKEYS 16
#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
@@ -53,6 +61,18 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
#define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
+extern void abort_hooks(void);
+#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
+ if (!(condition)) { \
+ dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, \
+ test_nr, iteration_nr); \
+ dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
+ abort_hooks(); \
+ exit(__LINE__); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
{
@@ -137,11 +157,6 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
-#define PROT_PKEY0 0x10 /* protection key value (bit 0) */
-#define PROT_PKEY1 0x20 /* protection key value (bit 1) */
-#define PROT_PKEY2 0x40 /* protection key value (bit 2) */
-#define PROT_PKEY3 0x80 /* protection key value (bit 3) */
-
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#define MB (1<<20)
@@ -219,4 +234,14 @@ int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
return xstate_offset;
}
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
+#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) \
+ ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) \
+ ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
+#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 9f373cc..cad52dc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -51,31 +51,10 @@
unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
-#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
-#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) ((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
-#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
-#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
-
-#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
int dprint_in_signal;
char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
-extern void abort_hooks(void);
-#define pkey_assert(condition) do { \
- if (!(condition)) { \
- dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
- __FILE__, __LINE__, \
- test_nr, iteration_nr); \
- dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno); \
- abort_hooks(); \
- exit(__LINE__); \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
void cat_into_file(char *str, char *file)
{
int fd = open(file, O_RDWR);
@@ -186,12 +165,6 @@ void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
}
-/* Define some kernel-like types */
-#define u8 uint8_t
-#define u16 uint16_t
-#define u32 uint32_t
-#define u64 uint64_t
-
#ifdef __i386__
#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 04/24] selftests/vm: move arch-specific definitions to arch-specific header
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 03/24] selftests/vm: move generic definitions to header file linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 05/24] selftests/vm: Make gcc check arguments of sigsafe_printf() linuxram
` (20 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
In preparation for multi-arch support, move definitions which have
arch-specific values to x86-specific header.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 111 +-----------------
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 47 --------
3 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 152 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 6ad1bd5..3ed2f02 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@
#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
-#define NR_PKEYS 16
-#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
-
#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
#endif
@@ -73,19 +70,13 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
} \
} while (0)
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+#include "pkey-x86.h"
+#else /* arch */
+#error Architecture not supported
+#endif /* arch */
+
extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
-static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax, edx;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkey_reg;
-
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
- : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
- : "c" (ecx));
- pkey_reg = eax;
- return pkey_reg;
-}
static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
{
@@ -100,19 +91,6 @@ static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
#define read_pkey_reg() _read_pkey_reg(__LINE__)
-static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
-{
- unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int edx = 0;
-
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
- __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
- : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
- assert(pkey_reg == __read_pkey_reg());
-}
-
static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
{
dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
@@ -157,83 +135,6 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
-#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
-#define MB (1<<20)
-
-static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
- unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
-{
- /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
- asm volatile(
- "cpuid;"
- : "=a" (*eax),
- "=b" (*ebx),
- "=c" (*ecx),
- "=d" (*edx)
- : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
-}
-
-/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
-
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
-
- eax = 0x7;
- ecx = 0x0;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
-#define XSTATE_PKEY 0x200
-
-int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
- int xstate_offset;
- int xstate_size;
- unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
- int leaf;
-
- /* assume that XSTATE_PKEY is set in XCR0 */
- leaf = XSTATE_PKEY_BIT;
- {
- eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
- ecx = leaf;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (leaf == XSTATE_PKEY_BIT) {
- xstate_offset = ebx;
- xstate_size = eax;
- }
- }
-
- if (xstate_size == 0) {
- printf("could not find size/offset of PKEY in xsave state\n");
- return 0;
- }
-
- return xstate_offset;
-}
-
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f04ade
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _PKEYS_X86_H
+#define _PKEYS_X86_H
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
+# define SYS_pkey_free 382
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
+
+#else
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
+# define SYS_pkey_free 331
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
+#endif
+
+#define NR_PKEYS 16
+#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define MB (1<<20)
+
+static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
+{
+ /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
+ asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, edx;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int pkey_reg;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
+ : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
+ : "c" (ecx));
+ pkey_reg = eax;
+ return pkey_reg;
+}
+
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
+{
+ unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int edx = 0;
+
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
+ : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
+ assert(pkey_reg == __read_pkey_reg());
+}
+
+static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
+ unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
+{
+ /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
+ asm volatile(
+ "cpuid;"
+ : "=a" (*eax),
+ "=b" (*ebx),
+ "=c" (*ecx),
+ "=d" (*edx)
+ : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
+}
+
+/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
+
+static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+
+ eax = 0x7;
+ ecx = 0x0;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
+#define XSTATE_PKEY 0x200
+
+int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+ int xstate_offset;
+ int xstate_size;
+ unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
+ int leaf;
+
+ /* assume that XSTATE_PKEY is set in XCR0 */
+ leaf = XSTATE_PKEY_BIT;
+ {
+ eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
+ ecx = leaf;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (leaf == XSTATE_PKEY_BIT) {
+ xstate_offset = ebx;
+ xstate_size = eax;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (xstate_size == 0) {
+ printf("could not find size/offset of PKEY in xsave state\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return xstate_offset;
+}
+
+#endif /* _PKEYS_X86_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index cad52dc..99e4e1e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@
int test_nr;
unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
-
-#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
-
int dprint_in_signal;
char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
@@ -137,12 +134,6 @@ void abort_hooks(void)
#endif
}
-static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
-{
- /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
- asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
-}
-
/*
* This attempts to have roughly a page of instructions followed by a few
* instructions that do a write, and another page of instructions. That
@@ -165,36 +156,6 @@ void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
}
-#ifdef __i386__
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
-# define SYS_pkey_free 382
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
-
-#else
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
-# define SYS_pkey_free 331
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
-
-#endif
-
void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
{
char *c = (void *)dumpme;
@@ -367,14 +328,6 @@ pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
return forkret;
}
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
-#endif
-
static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 04/24] selftests/vm: move arch-specific definitions to arch-specific header
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 04/24] selftests/vm: move arch-specific definitions to arch-specific header linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
In preparation for multi-arch support, move definitions which have
arch-specific values to x86-specific header.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 111 +-----------------
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 47 --------
3 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 152 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 6ad1bd5..3ed2f02 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@
#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
-#define NR_PKEYS 16
-#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
-
#ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
#define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
#endif
@@ -73,19 +70,13 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
} \
} while (0)
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+#include "pkey-x86.h"
+#else /* arch */
+#error Architecture not supported
+#endif /* arch */
+
extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
-static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax, edx;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkey_reg;
-
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
- : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
- : "c" (ecx));
- pkey_reg = eax;
- return pkey_reg;
-}
static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
{
@@ -100,19 +91,6 @@ static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
#define read_pkey_reg() _read_pkey_reg(__LINE__)
-static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
-{
- unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int edx = 0;
-
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
- __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
- asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
- : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
- assert(pkey_reg == __read_pkey_reg());
-}
-
static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
{
dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
@@ -157,83 +135,6 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
-#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
-#define MB (1<<20)
-
-static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
- unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
-{
- /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
- asm volatile(
- "cpuid;"
- : "=a" (*eax),
- "=b" (*ebx),
- "=c" (*ecx),
- "=d" (*edx)
- : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
-}
-
-/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
-
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
-
- eax = 0x7;
- ecx = 0x0;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
- dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
-#define XSTATE_PKEY 0x200
-
-int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
-{
- unsigned int eax;
- unsigned int ebx;
- unsigned int ecx;
- unsigned int edx;
- int xstate_offset;
- int xstate_size;
- unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
- int leaf;
-
- /* assume that XSTATE_PKEY is set in XCR0 */
- leaf = XSTATE_PKEY_BIT;
- {
- eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
- ecx = leaf;
- __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-
- if (leaf == XSTATE_PKEY_BIT) {
- xstate_offset = ebx;
- xstate_size = eax;
- }
- }
-
- if (xstate_size == 0) {
- printf("could not find size/offset of PKEY in xsave state\n");
- return 0;
- }
-
- return xstate_offset;
-}
-
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to) (((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f04ade
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _PKEYS_X86_H
+#define _PKEYS_X86_H
+
+#ifdef __i386__
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
+# define SYS_pkey_free 382
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
+
+#else
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
+# define SYS_pkey_free 331
+#endif
+
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
+#endif
+
+#define NR_PKEYS 16
+#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define MB (1<<20)
+
+static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
+{
+ /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
+ asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, edx;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int pkey_reg;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
+ : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
+ : "c" (ecx));
+ pkey_reg = eax;
+ return pkey_reg;
+}
+
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
+{
+ unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int edx = 0;
+
+ dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
+ : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
+ assert(pkey_reg == __read_pkey_reg());
+}
+
+static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
+ unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
+{
+ /* ecx is often an input as well as an output. */
+ asm volatile(
+ "cpuid;"
+ : "=a" (*eax),
+ "=b" (*ebx),
+ "=c" (*ecx),
+ "=d" (*edx)
+ : "0" (*eax), "2" (*ecx));
+}
+
+/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
+
+static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+
+ eax = 0x7;
+ ecx = 0x0;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
+ dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
+#define XSTATE_PKEY 0x200
+
+int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int ebx;
+ unsigned int ecx;
+ unsigned int edx;
+ int xstate_offset;
+ int xstate_size;
+ unsigned long XSTATE_CPUID = 0xd;
+ int leaf;
+
+ /* assume that XSTATE_PKEY is set in XCR0 */
+ leaf = XSTATE_PKEY_BIT;
+ {
+ eax = XSTATE_CPUID;
+ ecx = leaf;
+ __cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (leaf == XSTATE_PKEY_BIT) {
+ xstate_offset = ebx;
+ xstate_size = eax;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (xstate_size == 0) {
+ printf("could not find size/offset of PKEY in xsave state\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return xstate_offset;
+}
+
+#endif /* _PKEYS_X86_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index cad52dc..99e4e1e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@
int test_nr;
unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
-
-#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
-
int dprint_in_signal;
char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
@@ -137,12 +134,6 @@ void abort_hooks(void)
#endif
}
-static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
-{
- /* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
- asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
-}
-
/*
* This attempts to have roughly a page of instructions followed by a few
* instructions that do a write, and another page of instructions. That
@@ -165,36 +156,6 @@ void lots_o_noops_around_write(int *write_to_me)
dprintf3("%s() done\n", __func__);
}
-#ifdef __i386__
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 380
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 381
-# define SYS_pkey_free 382
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
-
-#else
-
-#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
-# define SYS_mprotect_key 329
-#endif
-
-#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
-# define SYS_pkey_alloc 330
-# define SYS_pkey_free 331
-#endif
-
-#define REG_IP_IDX REG_RIP
-#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
-
-#endif
-
void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
{
char *c = (void *)dumpme;
@@ -367,14 +328,6 @@ pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
return forkret;
}
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
-# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
-#endif
-
static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
--
1.7.1
--
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the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 05/24] selftests/vm: Make gcc check arguments of sigsafe_printf()
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 04/24] selftests/vm: move arch-specific definitions to arch-specific header linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 06/24] selftests/vm: typecast the pkey register linuxram
` (19 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
This will help us ensure we print pkey_reg_t values correctly in different
architectures.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 4 ++++
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 3ed2f02..7f18a82 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
#define DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE 4096
extern int dprint_in_signal;
extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
+
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+__attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
+#endif
static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
{
va_list ap;
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 06/24] selftests/vm: typecast the pkey register
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 05/24] selftests/vm: Make gcc check arguments of sigsafe_printf() linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 07/24] selftests/vm: generic function to handle shadow key register linuxram
` (18 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
This is in preparation to accomadate a differing size register
across architectures.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 23 ++++---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 16 +++--
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 87 +++++++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 7f18a82..2a1a024 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -80,13 +80,14 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#error Architecture not supported
#endif /* arch */
-extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
+extern pkey_reg_t shadow_pkey_reg;
-static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
+static inline pkey_reg_t _read_pkey_reg(int line)
{
- unsigned int pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- dprintf4("read_pkey_reg(line=%d) pkey_reg: %x shadow: %x\n",
+ dprintf4("read_pkey_reg(line=%d) pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
line, pkey_reg, shadow_pkey_reg);
assert(pkey_reg == shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -95,15 +96,15 @@ static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
#define read_pkey_reg() _read_pkey_reg(__LINE__)
-static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
+static inline void write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
{
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf4("%s() changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
/* will do the shadow check for us: */
read_pkey_reg();
__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
shadow_pkey_reg = pkey_reg;
- dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkey_reg: %08x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf4("%s("PKEY_REG_FMT") pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
pkey_reg, __read_pkey_reg());
}
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
*/
static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
{
- unsigned int pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2;
if (do_allow)
@@ -121,13 +122,13 @@ static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
else
pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
- dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
}
static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
{
- long pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
if (do_allow_write)
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
- dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 2f04ade..5f40901 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#define MB (1<<20)
+#define pkey_reg_t u32
+#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016x"
static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
{
@@ -53,11 +55,11 @@ static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
}
-static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
+static inline pkey_reg_t __read_pkey_reg(void)
{
unsigned int eax, edx;
unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg;
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
: "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
@@ -66,13 +68,13 @@ static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
return pkey_reg;
}
-static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
{
- unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int edx = 0;
+ pkey_reg_t eax = pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t ecx = 0;
+ pkey_reg_t edx = 0;
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf4("%s() changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
: : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 99e4e1e..90b3a41 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
int iteration_nr = 1;
int test_nr;
-unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
+pkey_reg_t shadow_pkey_reg;
int dprint_in_signal;
char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i += sizeof(u64)) {
u64 *ptr = (u64 *)(c + i);
- dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016jx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
+ dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016lx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
}
}
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
int trapno;
unsigned long ip;
char *fpregs;
- u32 *pkey_reg_ptr;
+ pkey_reg_t *pkey_reg_ptr;
u64 siginfo_pkey;
u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
int pkey_reg_offset;
@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
dprint_in_signal = 1;
dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT" shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__,
__read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
- dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n", __func__,
- trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code), si->si_code);
+ dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%016lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n",
+ __func__, trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code),
+ si->si_code);
#ifdef __i386__
/*
* 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
@@ -251,12 +253,13 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
- dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: %08x\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
/*
* need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
* checking
*/
- dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: %08x\n", __read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __read_pkey_reg());
dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
*(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
@@ -331,16 +334,17 @@ pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- u32 shifted_pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t shifted_pkey_reg;
u32 masked_pkey_reg;
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
__func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
- dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
+ dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
shifted_pkey_reg = (pkey_reg >> (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
+ shifted_pkey_reg);
masked_pkey_reg = shifted_pkey_reg & mask;
dprintf2("%s() masked pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkey_reg);
/*
@@ -353,8 +357,8 @@ static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 old_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- u32 new_pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t old_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t new_pkey_reg;
/* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
assert(!(rights & ~mask));
@@ -369,7 +373,7 @@ static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
__write_pkey_reg(new_pkey_reg);
dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x"
- " pkey_reg now: %x old_pkey_reg: %x\n",
+ " pkey_reg now: "PKEY_REG_FMT" old_pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __read_pkey_reg(),
old_pkey_reg);
return 0;
@@ -380,7 +384,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights;
- u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
@@ -390,6 +394,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+
pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
pkey_rights |= flags;
@@ -398,7 +403,8 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
assert(!ret);
/*pkey_reg and flags have the same format */
shadow_pkey_reg |= flags << (pkey * 2);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
@@ -406,7 +412,8 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
@@ -418,7 +425,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
@@ -436,7 +443,8 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
+ pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
}
@@ -491,20 +499,22 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
int ret;
unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT" shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
/*
* pkey_alloc() sets PKEY register, so we need to reflect it in
* shadow_pkey_reg:
*/
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
if (ret) {
/* clear both the bits: */
shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__,
__LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -514,13 +524,15 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
*/
shadow_pkey_reg |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
}
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("%s()::%d errno: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, errno);
/* for shadow checking: */
read_pkey_reg();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
@@ -573,7 +585,8 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
pkey_assert(!free_ret);
}
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -592,11 +605,13 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
break;
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
}
@@ -606,7 +621,8 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -885,7 +901,7 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
pkey_assert(0);
__write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
- dprintf1("%s() set pkey_reg=%x to restore state after signal "
+ dprintf1("%s() set pkey_reg="PKEY_REG_FMT" to restore state after signal "
"nuked it\n", __func__, shadow_pkey_reg);
last_pkey_faults = pkey_faults;
last_si_pkey = -1;
@@ -1082,7 +1098,8 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int new_pkey;
dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, err, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
@@ -1264,7 +1281,7 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(!ret);
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- dprintf2("pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf2("pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
/*
* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
@@ -1295,7 +1312,7 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf2("pkru: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
/* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
@@ -1412,7 +1429,7 @@ int main(void)
}
pkey_setup_shadow();
- printf("startup pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ printf("startup pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
setup_hugetlbfs();
while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 06/24] selftests/vm: typecast the pkey register
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 06/24] selftests/vm: typecast the pkey register linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
This is in preparation to accomadate a differing size register
across architectures.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 23 ++++---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 16 +++--
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 87 +++++++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 7f18a82..2a1a024 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -80,13 +80,14 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#error Architecture not supported
#endif /* arch */
-extern unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
+extern pkey_reg_t shadow_pkey_reg;
-static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
+static inline pkey_reg_t _read_pkey_reg(int line)
{
- unsigned int pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- dprintf4("read_pkey_reg(line=%d) pkey_reg: %x shadow: %x\n",
+ dprintf4("read_pkey_reg(line=%d) pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
line, pkey_reg, shadow_pkey_reg);
assert(pkey_reg == shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -95,15 +96,15 @@ static inline unsigned int _read_pkey_reg(int line)
#define read_pkey_reg() _read_pkey_reg(__LINE__)
-static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
+static inline void write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
{
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf4("%s() changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
/* will do the shadow check for us: */
read_pkey_reg();
__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
shadow_pkey_reg = pkey_reg;
- dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkey_reg: %08x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf4("%s("PKEY_REG_FMT") pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
pkey_reg, __read_pkey_reg());
}
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ static inline void write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
*/
static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
{
- unsigned int pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2;
if (do_allow)
@@ -121,13 +122,13 @@ static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
else
pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
- dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
}
static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
{
- long pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
if (do_allow_write)
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
- dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %08x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf4("pkey_reg now: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
}
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 2f04ade..5f40901 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#define MB (1<<20)
+#define pkey_reg_t u32
+#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016x"
static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
{
@@ -53,11 +55,11 @@ static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr");
}
-static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
+static inline pkey_reg_t __read_pkey_reg(void)
{
unsigned int eax, edx;
unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg;
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
: "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
@@ -66,13 +68,13 @@ static inline unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
return pkey_reg;
}
-static inline void __write_pkey_reg(unsigned int pkey_reg)
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
{
- unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
- unsigned int ecx = 0;
- unsigned int edx = 0;
+ pkey_reg_t eax = pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t ecx = 0;
+ pkey_reg_t edx = 0;
- dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf4("%s() changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
: : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 99e4e1e..90b3a41 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
int iteration_nr = 1;
int test_nr;
-unsigned int shadow_pkey_reg;
+pkey_reg_t shadow_pkey_reg;
int dprint_in_signal;
char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i += sizeof(u64)) {
u64 *ptr = (u64 *)(c + i);
- dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016jx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
+ dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016lx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
}
}
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
int trapno;
unsigned long ip;
char *fpregs;
- u32 *pkey_reg_ptr;
+ pkey_reg_t *pkey_reg_ptr;
u64 siginfo_pkey;
u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
int pkey_reg_offset;
@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
dprint_in_signal = 1;
dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT" shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__,
__read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
- dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n", __func__,
- trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code), si->si_code);
+ dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%016lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n",
+ __func__, trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code),
+ si->si_code);
#ifdef __i386__
/*
* 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
@@ -251,12 +253,13 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
- dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: %08x\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
/*
* need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
* checking
*/
- dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: %08x\n", __read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __read_pkey_reg());
dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
*(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
@@ -331,16 +334,17 @@ pid_t fork_lazy_child(void)
static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- u32 shifted_pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t shifted_pkey_reg;
u32 masked_pkey_reg;
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%d, flags=%lx) = %x / %d\n",
__func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
- dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
+ dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
shifted_pkey_reg = (pkey_reg >> (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
- dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, shifted_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
+ shifted_pkey_reg);
masked_pkey_reg = shifted_pkey_reg & mask;
dprintf2("%s() masked pkey_reg: %x\n", __func__, masked_pkey_reg);
/*
@@ -353,8 +357,8 @@ static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 mask = (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS|PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
- u32 old_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
- u32 new_pkey_reg;
+ pkey_reg_t old_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t new_pkey_reg;
/* make sure that 'rights' only contains the bits we expect: */
assert(!(rights & ~mask));
@@ -369,7 +373,7 @@ static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
__write_pkey_reg(new_pkey_reg);
dprintf3("%s(pkey=%d, rights=%lx, flags=%lx) = %x"
- " pkey_reg now: %x old_pkey_reg: %x\n",
+ " pkey_reg now: "PKEY_REG_FMT" old_pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, pkey, rights, flags, 0, __read_pkey_reg(),
old_pkey_reg);
return 0;
@@ -380,7 +384,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights;
- u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
@@ -390,6 +394,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
+
pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
pkey_rights |= flags;
@@ -398,7 +403,8 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
assert(!ret);
/*pkey_reg and flags have the same format */
shadow_pkey_reg |= flags << (pkey * 2);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
@@ -406,7 +412,8 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
@@ -418,7 +425,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
int pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
- u32 orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_reg_t orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
pkey_assert(flags & (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
@@ -436,7 +443,8 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) hw_pkey_get(%d): %x\n", __func__,
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
- dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x%x\n", __func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
+ pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
}
@@ -491,20 +499,22 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
int ret;
unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: %x\n", __func__,
- __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT" shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, init_val);
/*
* pkey_alloc() sets PKEY register, so we need to reflect it in
* shadow_pkey_reg:
*/
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
if (ret) {
/* clear both the bits: */
shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__,
__LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -514,13 +524,15 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
*/
shadow_pkey_reg |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
}
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("%s()::%d errno: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, errno);
/* for shadow checking: */
read_pkey_reg();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
@@ -573,7 +585,8 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
pkey_assert(!free_ret);
}
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -592,11 +605,13 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
if (nr_iterations-- < 0)
break;
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
sys_pkey_free(rpkey);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
}
@@ -606,7 +621,8 @@ int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
dprintf1("mprotect_pkey(%p, %zx, prot=0x%lx, pkey=%ld) ret: %d\n",
ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey, ret);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n", __func__,
+ dprintf1("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
__LINE__, ret, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
return ret;
}
@@ -885,7 +901,7 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
pkey_assert(0);
__write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
- dprintf1("%s() set pkey_reg=%x to restore state after signal "
+ dprintf1("%s() set pkey_reg="PKEY_REG_FMT" to restore state after signal "
"nuked it\n", __func__, shadow_pkey_reg);
last_pkey_faults = pkey_faults;
last_si_pkey = -1;
@@ -1082,7 +1098,8 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int new_pkey;
dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
- dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x%x shadow: 0x%x\n",
+ dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
+ " shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, err, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
@@ -1264,7 +1281,7 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(!ret);
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
- dprintf2("pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf2("pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
/*
* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault
@@ -1295,7 +1312,7 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = mprotect(p1, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
pkey_assert(!ret);
- dprintf2("pkru: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ dprintf2("pkru: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
/* Make sure this is an *instruction* fault */
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
@@ -1412,7 +1429,7 @@ int main(void)
}
pkey_setup_shadow();
- printf("startup pkey_reg: %x\n", read_pkey_reg());
+ printf("startup pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", read_pkey_reg());
setup_hugetlbfs();
while (nr_iterations-- > 0)
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 07/24] selftests/vm: generic function to handle shadow key register
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 06/24] selftests/vm: typecast the pkey register linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set() linuxram
` (17 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
helper functions to handler shadow pkey register
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 5 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 2a1a024..ada0146 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -80,6 +80,35 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#error Architecture not supported
#endif /* arch */
+static inline pkey_reg_t clear_pkey_flags(int pkey, pkey_reg_t flags)
+{
+ u32 shift = pkey_bit_position(pkey);
+
+ return ~(flags << shift);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes pkey flags and puts them at the right bit position for the given key so
+ * that the result can be ORed into the register.
+ */
+static inline pkey_reg_t left_shift_bits(int pkey, pkey_reg_t bits)
+{
+ u32 shift = pkey_bit_position(pkey);
+
+ return (bits << shift);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes pkey register values and puts the flags for the given pkey at the least
+ * significant bits of the returned value.
+ */
+static inline pkey_reg_t right_shift_bits(int pkey, pkey_reg_t bits)
+{
+ u32 shift = pkey_bit_position(pkey);
+
+ return (bits >> shift);
+}
+
extern pkey_reg_t shadow_pkey_reg;
static inline pkey_reg_t _read_pkey_reg(int line)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 5f40901..2b3780d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@
#define pkey_reg_t u32
#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016x"
+static inline u32 pkey_bit_position(int pkey)
+{
+ return pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+}
+
static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
{
/* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 90b3a41..57340b3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
__func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
- shifted_pkey_reg = (pkey_reg >> (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ shifted_pkey_reg = right_shift_bits(pkey, pkey_reg);
dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
shifted_pkey_reg);
masked_pkey_reg = shifted_pkey_reg & mask;
@@ -366,9 +366,9 @@ static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
/* copy old pkey_reg */
new_pkey_reg = old_pkey_reg;
/* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
- new_pkey_reg &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, mask);
/* OR in new bits for pkey: */
- new_pkey_reg |= (rights << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg |= left_shift_bits(pkey, rights);
__write_pkey_reg(new_pkey_reg);
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
assert(!ret);
/*pkey_reg and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkey_reg |= flags << (pkey * 2);
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= left_shift_bits(pkey, flags);
dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
pkey_rights |= flags;
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
- shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, flags);
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
@@ -494,6 +494,21 @@ int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
return ret;
}
+void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
+{
+ shadow_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+}
+
+void pkey_reset_shadow(u32 key)
+{
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(key, 0x3);
+}
+
+void pkey_set_shadow(u32 key, u64 init_val)
+{
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= left_shift_bits(key, init_val);
+}
+
int alloc_pkey(void)
{
int ret;
@@ -512,7 +527,7 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
shadow_pkey_reg);
if (ret) {
/* clear both the bits: */
- shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
+ pkey_reset_shadow(ret);
dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
" shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__,
@@ -522,7 +537,7 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
* move the new state in from init_val
* (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkey_reg format)
*/
- shadow_pkey_reg |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
+ pkey_set_shadow(ret, init_val);
}
dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
" shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
@@ -1403,11 +1418,6 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
iteration_nr++;
}
-void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
-{
- shadow_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
-}
-
int main(void)
{
int nr_iterations = 22;
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 07/24] selftests/vm: generic function to handle shadow key register
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 07/24] selftests/vm: generic function to handle shadow key register linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
helper functions to handler shadow pkey register
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 5 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 2a1a024..ada0146 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -80,6 +80,35 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
#error Architecture not supported
#endif /* arch */
+static inline pkey_reg_t clear_pkey_flags(int pkey, pkey_reg_t flags)
+{
+ u32 shift = pkey_bit_position(pkey);
+
+ return ~(flags << shift);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes pkey flags and puts them at the right bit position for the given key so
+ * that the result can be ORed into the register.
+ */
+static inline pkey_reg_t left_shift_bits(int pkey, pkey_reg_t bits)
+{
+ u32 shift = pkey_bit_position(pkey);
+
+ return (bits << shift);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes pkey register values and puts the flags for the given pkey at the least
+ * significant bits of the returned value.
+ */
+static inline pkey_reg_t right_shift_bits(int pkey, pkey_reg_t bits)
+{
+ u32 shift = pkey_bit_position(pkey);
+
+ return (bits >> shift);
+}
+
extern pkey_reg_t shadow_pkey_reg;
static inline pkey_reg_t _read_pkey_reg(int line)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 5f40901..2b3780d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@
#define pkey_reg_t u32
#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016x"
+static inline u32 pkey_bit_position(int pkey)
+{
+ return pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+}
+
static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
{
/* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 90b3a41..57340b3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static u32 hw_pkey_get(int pkey, unsigned long flags)
__func__, pkey, flags, 0, 0);
dprintf2("%s() raw pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__, pkey_reg);
- shifted_pkey_reg = (pkey_reg >> (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ shifted_pkey_reg = right_shift_bits(pkey, pkey_reg);
dprintf2("%s() shifted_pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
shifted_pkey_reg);
masked_pkey_reg = shifted_pkey_reg & mask;
@@ -366,9 +366,9 @@ static int hw_pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long rights, unsigned long flags)
/* copy old pkey_reg */
new_pkey_reg = old_pkey_reg;
/* mask out bits from pkey in old value: */
- new_pkey_reg &= ~(mask << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, mask);
/* OR in new bits for pkey: */
- new_pkey_reg |= (rights << (pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY));
+ new_pkey_reg |= left_shift_bits(pkey, rights);
__write_pkey_reg(new_pkey_reg);
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, syscall_flags);
assert(!ret);
/*pkey_reg and flags have the same format */
- shadow_pkey_reg |= flags << (pkey * 2);
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= left_shift_bits(pkey, flags);
dprintf1("%s(%d) shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, pkey, shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
pkey_rights |= flags;
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
- shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(flags << (pkey * 2));
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, flags);
pkey_assert(ret >= 0);
pkey_rights = hw_pkey_get(pkey, syscall_flags);
@@ -494,6 +494,21 @@ int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
return ret;
}
+void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
+{
+ shadow_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
+}
+
+void pkey_reset_shadow(u32 key)
+{
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(key, 0x3);
+}
+
+void pkey_set_shadow(u32 key, u64 init_val)
+{
+ shadow_pkey_reg |= left_shift_bits(key, init_val);
+}
+
int alloc_pkey(void)
{
int ret;
@@ -512,7 +527,7 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
shadow_pkey_reg);
if (ret) {
/* clear both the bits: */
- shadow_pkey_reg &= ~(0x3 << (ret * 2));
+ pkey_reset_shadow(ret);
dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
" shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__,
@@ -522,7 +537,7 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
* move the new state in from init_val
* (remember, we cheated and init_val == pkey_reg format)
*/
- shadow_pkey_reg |= (init_val << (ret * 2));
+ pkey_set_shadow(ret, init_val);
}
dprintf4("%s()::%d, ret: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
" shadow: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
@@ -1403,11 +1418,6 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
iteration_nr++;
}
-void pkey_setup_shadow(void)
-{
- shadow_pkey_reg = __read_pkey_reg();
-}
-
int main(void)
{
int nr_iterations = 22;
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 07/24] selftests/vm: generic function to handle shadow key register linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:47 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 09/24] selftests/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear() linuxram
` (16 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
was earlier.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 57340b3..5fcccdb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
+ pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
}
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set() linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:47 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
was earlier.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 57340b3..5fcccdb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
+ pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
pkey, flags);
}
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set() linuxram
2018-06-14 0:44 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 14:47 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 14:47 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 15:58 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:44 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
> the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
> was earlier
...
> if (flags)
> - pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
> + pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
> dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
> pkey, flags);
> }
This is the kind of thing where I'd love to hear the motivation and
background. This "disable a key that was already disabled" operation
obviously doesn't happen today. What motivated you to change it now?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-06-20 14:47 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 14:47 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 15:58 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:44 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
> the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
> was earlier
...
> if (flags)
> - pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
> + pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
> dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
> pkey, flags);
> }
This is the kind of thing where I'd love to hear the motivation and
background. This "disable a key that was already disabled" operation
obviously doesn't happen today. What motivated you to change it now?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-06-20 14:47 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 14:47 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 15:58 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 15:58 ` Ram Pai
2018-07-17 17:53 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 15:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 07:47:02AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:44 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
> > the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
> > was earlier
> ...
> > if (flags)
> > - pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
> > + pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
> > dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
> > pkey, flags);
> > }
>
> This is the kind of thing where I'd love to hear the motivation and
> background. This "disable a key that was already disabled" operation
> obviously doesn't happen today. What motivated you to change it now?
On powerpc, hardware supports READ_DISABLE and WRITE_DISABLE.
ACCESS_DISABLE is basically READ_DISABLE|WRITE_DISABLE on powerpc.
If access disable is called on a key followed by a write disable, the
second operation becomes a nop. In such cases,
read_pkey_reg() == orig_pkey_reg
Hence the code above is modified to
pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-07-17 15:58 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 15:58 ` Ram Pai
2018-07-17 17:53 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 15:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@07:47:02AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:44 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
> > the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
> > was earlier
> ...
> > if (flags)
> > - pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
> > + pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
> > dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
> > pkey, flags);
> > }
>
> This is the kind of thing where I'd love to hear the motivation and
> background. This "disable a key that was already disabled" operation
> obviously doesn't happen today. What motivated you to change it now?
On powerpc, hardware supports READ_DISABLE and WRITE_DISABLE.
ACCESS_DISABLE is basically READ_DISABLE|WRITE_DISABLE on powerpc.
If access disable is called on a key followed by a write disable, the
second operation becomes a nop. In such cases,
read_pkey_reg() == orig_pkey_reg
Hence the code above is modified to
pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-07-17 15:58 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 15:58 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-07-17 17:53 ` dave.hansen
2018-07-17 17:53 ` Dave Hansen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-07-17 17:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 07/17/2018 08:58 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 07:47:02AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 06/13/2018 05:44 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
>>> If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
>>> the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
>>> was earlier
>> ...
>>> if (flags)
>>> - pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
>>> + pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
>>> dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
>>> pkey, flags);
>>> }
>> This is the kind of thing where I'd love to hear the motivation and
>> background. This "disable a key that was already disabled" operation
>> obviously doesn't happen today. What motivated you to change it now?
> On powerpc, hardware supports READ_DISABLE and WRITE_DISABLE.
> ACCESS_DISABLE is basically READ_DISABLE|WRITE_DISABLE on powerpc.
>
> If access disable is called on a key followed by a write disable, the
> second operation becomes a nop. In such cases,
> read_pkey_reg() == orig_pkey_reg
>
> Hence the code above is modified to
> pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
Makes sense. Do we have a comment for that now?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
2018-07-17 17:53 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-07-17 17:53 ` Dave Hansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-07-17 17:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 07/17/2018 08:58 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@07:47:02AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 06/13/2018 05:44 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
>>> If the flag is 0, no bits will be set. Hence we cant expect
>>> the resulting bitmap to have a higher value than what it
>>> was earlier
>> ...
>>> if (flags)
>>> - pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
>>> + pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
>>> dprintf1("END<---%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
>>> pkey, flags);
>>> }
>> This is the kind of thing where I'd love to hear the motivation and
>> background. This "disable a key that was already disabled" operation
>> obviously doesn't happen today. What motivated you to change it now?
> On powerpc, hardware supports READ_DISABLE and WRITE_DISABLE.
> ACCESS_DISABLE is basically READ_DISABLE|WRITE_DISABLE on powerpc.
>
> If access disable is called on a key followed by a write disable, the
> second operation becomes a nop. In such cases,
> read_pkey_reg() == orig_pkey_reg
>
> Hence the code above is modified to
> pkey_assert(read_pkey_reg() >= orig_pkey_reg);
Makes sense. Do we have a comment for that now?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 09/24] selftests/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear()
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:44 ` [PATCH v13 08/24] selftests/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set() linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
` (15 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
instead of clearing the bits, pkey_disable_clear() was setting
the bits. Fixed it.
Also fixed a wrong assertion in that function. When bits are
cleared, the resulting bit value will be less than the original.
This hasn't been a problem so far because this code isn't currently
used.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 5fcccdb..da4f5d5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
- pkey_rights |= flags;
+ pkey_rights &= ~flags;
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, flags);
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
+ assert(read_pkey_reg() < orig_pkey_reg);
}
void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 09/24] selftests/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear()
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 09/24] selftests/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear() linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
instead of clearing the bits, pkey_disable_clear() was setting
the bits. Fixed it.
Also fixed a wrong assertion in that function. When bits are
cleared, the resulting bit value will be less than the original.
This hasn't been a problem so far because this code isn't currently
used.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 5fcccdb..da4f5d5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
pkey, pkey, pkey_rights);
pkey_assert(pkey_rights >= 0);
- pkey_rights |= flags;
+ pkey_rights &= ~flags;
ret = hw_pkey_set(pkey, pkey_rights, 0);
shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, flags);
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ void pkey_disable_clear(int pkey, int flags)
dprintf1("%s(%d) pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__,
pkey, read_pkey_reg());
if (flags)
- assert(read_pkey_reg() > orig_pkey_reg);
+ assert(read_pkey_reg() < orig_pkey_reg);
}
void pkey_write_allow(int pkey)
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 09/24] selftests/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear() linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:49 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 11/24] selftests/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random linuxram
` (14 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
which can trigger false-positive asserts.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index da4f5d5..42a91c7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -556,6 +556,9 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
{
int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
return ret;
}
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:49 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
which can trigger false-positive asserts.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index da4f5d5..42a91c7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -556,6 +556,9 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
{
int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
return ret;
}
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 14:49 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 14:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:00 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
> Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
> register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
> which can trigger false-positive asserts.
...--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -556,6 +556,9 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
> int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> {
> int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
> +
> + if (!ret)
> + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> return ret;
> }
This would be great code for an actual application. But, I'm not
immediately convinced we want sane, kind behavior in our selftest. x86
doesn't clear the hardware register at pkey_free, so wouldn't this cause
the shadow and the hardware register to diverge?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-20 14:49 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 14:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:00 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
> Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
> register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
> which can trigger false-positive asserts.
...--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -556,6 +556,9 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
> int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> {
> int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
> +
> + if (!ret)
> + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> return ret;
> }
This would be great code for an actual application. But, I'm not
immediately convinced we want sane, kind behavior in our selftest. x86
doesn't clear the hardware register at pkey_free, so wouldn't this cause
the shadow and the hardware register to diverge?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-20 14:49 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 14:49 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 16:00 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:00 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 16:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 07:49:31AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
> > Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
> > register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
> > which can trigger false-positive asserts.
> ...--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > @@ -556,6 +556,9 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
> > int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> > {
> > int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
> > +
> > + if (!ret)
> > + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> > dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> > return ret;
> > }
>
> This would be great code for an actual application. But, I'm not
> immediately convinced we want sane, kind behavior in our selftest. x86
> doesn't clear the hardware register at pkey_free, so wouldn't this cause
> the shadow and the hardware register to diverge?
Have deleted the code in the newer version.
RP
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-07-17 16:00 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 16:00 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 16:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@07:49:31AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
> > Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
> > register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
> > which can trigger false-positive asserts.
> ...--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > @@ -556,6 +556,9 @@ int alloc_pkey(void)
> > int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> > {
> > int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
> > +
> > + if (!ret)
> > + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> > dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> > return ret;
> > }
>
> This would be great code for an actual application. But, I'm not
> immediately convinced we want sane, kind behavior in our selftest. x86
> doesn't clear the hardware register at pkey_free, so wouldn't this cause
> the shadow and the hardware register to diverge?
Have deleted the code in the newer version.
RP
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 11/24] selftests/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 10/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 12/24] selftests/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction linuxram
` (13 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
alloc_random_pkey() was allocating the same pkey every time.
Not all pkeys were geting tested. fixed it.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 6 +++++-
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 42a91c7..c5f9776 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -576,13 +577,15 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
int nr_alloced = 0;
int random_index;
+
memset(alloced_pkeys, 0, sizeof(alloced_pkeys));
+ srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
/* allocate every possible key and make a note of which ones we got */
max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
- max_nr_pkey_allocs = 1;
for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+
if (new_pkey < 0)
break;
alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
@@ -598,6 +601,7 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
/* go through the allocated ones that we did not want and free them */
for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
int free_ret;
+
if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
continue;
free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 11/24] selftests/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 11/24] selftests/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
alloc_random_pkey() was allocating the same pkey every time.
Not all pkeys were geting tested. fixed it.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 6 +++++-
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 42a91c7..c5f9776 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -576,13 +577,15 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
int nr_alloced = 0;
int random_index;
+
memset(alloced_pkeys, 0, sizeof(alloced_pkeys));
+ srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
/* allocate every possible key and make a note of which ones we got */
max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
- max_nr_pkey_allocs = 1;
for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+
if (new_pkey < 0)
break;
alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
@@ -598,6 +601,7 @@ int alloc_random_pkey(void)
/* go through the allocated ones that we did not want and free them */
for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
int free_ret;
+
if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
continue;
free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 12/24] selftests/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 11/24] selftests/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey linuxram
` (12 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
open_hugepage_file() <- opens the huge page file
get_start_key() <-- provides the first non-reserved key.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 10 ++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index ada0146..52a1152 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -179,4 +179,14 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
+static inline int open_hugepage_file(int flag)
+{
+ return open(HUGEPAGE_FILE, flag);
+}
+
+static inline int get_start_key(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 2b3780d..d5fa299 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
#define MB (1<<20)
#define pkey_reg_t u32
#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016x"
+#define HUGEPAGE_FILE "/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages"
static inline u32 pkey_bit_position(int pkey)
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index c5f9776..9afe894 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
* Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
* are 2M pages. Someone might have made 1G the default.
*/
- fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages", O_RDONLY);
+ fd = open_hugepage_file(O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("opening sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
return;
@@ -1078,10 +1078,10 @@ void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int err;
- int i;
+ int i = get_start_key();
/* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
- for (i = 1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
+ for (; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
if (pkey == i)
continue;
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 12/24] selftests/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 12/24] selftests/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
open_hugepage_file() <- opens the huge page file
get_start_key() <-- provides the first non-reserved key.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 10 ++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index ada0146..52a1152 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -179,4 +179,14 @@ static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
#define __stringify_1(x...) #x
#define __stringify(x...) __stringify_1(x)
+static inline int open_hugepage_file(int flag)
+{
+ return open(HUGEPAGE_FILE, flag);
+}
+
+static inline int get_start_key(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 2b3780d..d5fa299 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
#define MB (1<<20)
#define pkey_reg_t u32
#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016x"
+#define HUGEPAGE_FILE "/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages"
static inline u32 pkey_bit_position(int pkey)
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index c5f9776..9afe894 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
* Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
* are 2M pages. Someone might have made 1G the default.
*/
- fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages", O_RDONLY);
+ fd = open_hugepage_file(O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("opening sysfs 2M hugetlb config");
return;
@@ -1078,10 +1078,10 @@ void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int err;
- int i;
+ int i = get_start_key();
/* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
- for (i = 1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
+ for (; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
if (pkey == i)
continue;
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 12/24] selftests/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:53 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup linuxram
` (11 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
expected_pkey_fault() is comparing the contents of pkey
register with 0. This may not be true all the time. There
could be bits set by default by the architecture
which can never be changed. Hence compare the value against
shadow pkey register, which is supposed to track the bits
accurately all throughout
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 9afe894..adcae4a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -916,10 +916,10 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
/*
- * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
+ * The signal handler should have cleared out pkey-register to let the
* test program continue. We now have to restore it.
*/
- if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
+ if (__read_pkey_reg() != shadow_pkey_reg)
pkey_assert(0);
__write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:53 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
expected_pkey_fault() is comparing the contents of pkey
register with 0. This may not be true all the time. There
could be bits set by default by the architecture
which can never be changed. Hence compare the value against
shadow pkey register, which is supposed to track the bits
accurately all throughout
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 9afe894..adcae4a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -916,10 +916,10 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
/*
- * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
+ * The signal handler should have cleared out pkey-register to let the
* test program continue. We now have to restore it.
*/
- if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
+ if (__read_pkey_reg() != shadow_pkey_reg)
pkey_assert(0);
__write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 14:53 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 14:53 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:02 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -916,10 +916,10 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
> pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
>
> /*
> - * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
> + * The signal handler should have cleared out pkey-register to let the
> * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
> */
> - if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
> + if (__read_pkey_reg() != shadow_pkey_reg)
> pkey_assert(0);
>
> __write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
I think this is wrong on x86.
When we leave the signal handler, we zero out PKRU so that the faulting
instruction can continue, that's why we have the check against zero.
I'm actually kinda surprised this works.
Logically, this patch does:
if (hardware != shadow)
error();
hardware = shadow;
That does not look right to me. What we want is:
if (hardware != signal_return_pkey_reg)
error();
hardware = shadow;
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
2018-06-20 14:53 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 14:53 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:02 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -916,10 +916,10 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
> pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
>
> /*
> - * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
> + * The signal handler should have cleared out pkey-register to let the
> * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
> */
> - if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
> + if (__read_pkey_reg() != shadow_pkey_reg)
> pkey_assert(0);
>
> __write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
I think this is wrong on x86.
When we leave the signal handler, we zero out PKRU so that the faulting
instruction can continue, that's why we have the check against zero.
I'm actually kinda surprised this works.
Logically, this patch does:
if (hardware != shadow)
error();
hardware = shadow;
That does not look right to me. What we want is:
if (hardware != signal_return_pkey_reg)
error();
hardware = shadow;
--
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the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
2018-06-20 14:53 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 14:53 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 16:02 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:02 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 16:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 07:53:57AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > @@ -916,10 +916,10 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
> > pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
> >
> > /*
> > - * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
> > + * The signal handler should have cleared out pkey-register to let the
> > * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
> > */
> > - if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
> > + if (__read_pkey_reg() != shadow_pkey_reg)
> > pkey_assert(0);
> >
> > __write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
>
> I think this is wrong on x86.
>
> When we leave the signal handler, we zero out PKRU so that the faulting
> instruction can continue, that's why we have the check against zero.
> I'm actually kinda surprised this works.
The code is modified to zero out only the violated key in the signal
handler. Hence it works. Have verified it to work on x86 aswell.
RP
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
2018-07-17 16:02 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 16:02 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 16:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@07:53:57AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > @@ -916,10 +916,10 @@ void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey)
> > pkey_assert(last_si_pkey == pkey);
> >
> > /*
> > - * The signal handler shold have cleared out PKEY register to let the
> > + * The signal handler should have cleared out pkey-register to let the
> > * test program continue. We now have to restore it.
> > */
> > - if (__read_pkey_reg() != 0)
> > + if (__read_pkey_reg() != shadow_pkey_reg)
> > pkey_assert(0);
> >
> > __write_pkey_reg(shadow_pkey_reg);
>
> I think this is wrong on x86.
>
> When we leave the signal handler, we zero out PKRU so that the faulting
> instruction can continue, that's why we have the check against zero.
> I'm actually kinda surprised this works.
The code is modified to zero out only the violated key in the signal
handler. Hence it works. Have verified it to work on x86 aswell.
RP
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 13/24] selftests/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:57 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction linuxram
` (10 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
cleanup the code to satisfy coding styles.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index adcae4a..f43a319 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
*
* There are examples in here of:
* * how to set protection keys on memory
- * * how to set/clear bits in pkey registers (the rights register)
+ * * how to set/clear bits in Protection Key registers (the rights register)
* * how to handle SEGV_PKUERR signals and extract pkey-relevant
* information from the siginfo
*
@@ -13,13 +13,18 @@
* prefault pages in at malloc, or not
* protect MPX bounds tables with protection keys?
* make sure VMA splitting/merging is working correctly
- * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()), so make sure it is immune to pkeys
- * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA but "freed" back to the kernel
- * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make sure the pkey sticks
+ * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()),
+ * so make sure it is immune to pkeys
+ * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA
+ * but "freed" back to the kernel
+ * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make
+ * sure the pkey sticks
*
* Compile like this:
- * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
- * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99
+ * -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99
+ * -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
@@ -263,10 +268,12 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
__read_pkey_reg());
dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
*(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
- dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
+ dprintf1("WARNING: set PKEY_REG=0 to allow faulting instruction "
+ "to continue\n");
pkey_faults++;
dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
dprint_in_signal = 0;
+ return;
}
int wait_all_children(void)
@@ -384,7 +391,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
{
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
- int pkey_rights;
+ u32 pkey_rights;
pkey_reg_t orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
@@ -487,9 +494,10 @@ int sys_mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
return sret;
}
-int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
+int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, u64 init_val)
{
int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_alloc, flags, init_val);
+
dprintf1("%s(flags=%lx, init_val=%lx) syscall ret: %d errno: %d\n",
__func__, flags, init_val, ret, errno);
return ret;
@@ -513,7 +521,7 @@ void pkey_set_shadow(u32 key, u64 init_val)
int alloc_pkey(void)
{
int ret;
- unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
+ u64 init_val = 0x0;
dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT" shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -672,7 +680,9 @@ void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot)
/* every record is full */
size_t old_nr_records = nr_pkey_malloc_records;
size_t new_nr_records = (nr_pkey_malloc_records * 2 + 1);
- size_t new_size = new_nr_records * sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
+ size_t new_size = new_nr_records *
+ sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
+
dprintf2("new_nr_records: %zd\n", new_nr_records);
dprintf2("new_size: %zd\n", new_size);
pkey_malloc_records = realloc(pkey_malloc_records, new_size);
@@ -698,9 +708,11 @@ void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
{
long i;
int ret;
+
dprintf3("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ptr);
for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
+
dprintf4("looking for ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
if ((ptr < rec->ptr) ||
@@ -781,11 +793,13 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
char buf[] = "123";
if (geteuid() != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
return;
}
- cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES), "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
+ cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES),
+ "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
/*
* Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
@@ -806,7 +820,8 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
}
if (atoi(buf) != GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES) {
- fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got: '%s' expected %d\n",
+ fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got:"
+ " '%s' expected %d\n",
buf, GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES);
return;
}
@@ -948,6 +963,7 @@ void __save_test_fd(int fd)
int get_test_read_fd(void)
{
int test_fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
__save_test_fd(test_fd);
return test_fd;
}
@@ -989,7 +1005,8 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int ptr_contents;
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
+ pkey, ptr);
read_pkey_reg();
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
@@ -1111,13 +1128,14 @@ void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
int allocated_pkeys[NR_PKEYS] = {0};
int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
int new_pkey;
+
dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
@@ -1125,9 +1143,11 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
__func__, __LINE__, err, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
- dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
+ dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n",
+ __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
- dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
+ dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey "
+ "after %d tries\n",
__func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
break;
}
@@ -1419,7 +1439,8 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
tracing_off();
close_test_fds();
- printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n", test_nr, iteration_nr);
+ printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n",
+ test_nr, iteration_nr);
dprintf1("======================\n\n");
}
iteration_nr++;
@@ -1431,7 +1452,7 @@ int main(void)
setup_handlers();
- printf("has pku: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
+ printf("has pkey: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
int size = PAGE_SIZE;
@@ -1439,7 +1460,8 @@ int main(void)
printf("running PKEY tests for unsupported CPU/OS\n");
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(ptr, 1);
exit(0);
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 14:57 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
cleanup the code to satisfy coding styles.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index adcae4a..f43a319 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
*
* There are examples in here of:
* * how to set protection keys on memory
- * * how to set/clear bits in pkey registers (the rights register)
+ * * how to set/clear bits in Protection Key registers (the rights register)
* * how to handle SEGV_PKUERR signals and extract pkey-relevant
* information from the siginfo
*
@@ -13,13 +13,18 @@
* prefault pages in at malloc, or not
* protect MPX bounds tables with protection keys?
* make sure VMA splitting/merging is working correctly
- * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()), so make sure it is immune to pkeys
- * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA but "freed" back to the kernel
- * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make sure the pkey sticks
+ * OOMs can destroy mm->mmap (see exit_mmap()),
+ * so make sure it is immune to pkeys
+ * look for pkey "leaks" where it is still set on a VMA
+ * but "freed" back to the kernel
+ * do a plain mprotect() to a mprotect_pkey() area and make
+ * sure the pkey sticks
*
* Compile like this:
- * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
- * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99 -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ * gcc -o protection_keys -O2 -g -std=gnu99
+ * -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
+ * gcc -m32 -o protection_keys_32 -O2 -g -std=gnu99
+ * -pthread -Wall protection_keys.c -lrt -ldl -lm
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
@@ -263,10 +268,12 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
__read_pkey_reg());
dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
*(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
- dprintf1("WARNING: set PRKU=0 to allow faulting instruction to continue\n");
+ dprintf1("WARNING: set PKEY_REG=0 to allow faulting instruction "
+ "to continue\n");
pkey_faults++;
dprintf1("<<<<==================================================\n");
dprint_in_signal = 0;
+ return;
}
int wait_all_children(void)
@@ -384,7 +391,7 @@ void pkey_disable_set(int pkey, int flags)
{
unsigned long syscall_flags = 0;
int ret;
- int pkey_rights;
+ u32 pkey_rights;
pkey_reg_t orig_pkey_reg = read_pkey_reg();
dprintf1("START->%s(%d, 0x%x)\n", __func__,
@@ -487,9 +494,10 @@ int sys_mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
return sret;
}
-int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
+int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, u64 init_val)
{
int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_alloc, flags, init_val);
+
dprintf1("%s(flags=%lx, init_val=%lx) syscall ret: %d errno: %d\n",
__func__, flags, init_val, ret, errno);
return ret;
@@ -513,7 +521,7 @@ void pkey_set_shadow(u32 key, u64 init_val)
int alloc_pkey(void)
{
int ret;
- unsigned long init_val = 0x0;
+ u64 init_val = 0x0;
dprintf1("%s()::%d, pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT" shadow: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__func__, __LINE__, __read_pkey_reg(), shadow_pkey_reg);
@@ -672,7 +680,9 @@ void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot)
/* every record is full */
size_t old_nr_records = nr_pkey_malloc_records;
size_t new_nr_records = (nr_pkey_malloc_records * 2 + 1);
- size_t new_size = new_nr_records * sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
+ size_t new_size = new_nr_records *
+ sizeof(struct pkey_malloc_record);
+
dprintf2("new_nr_records: %zd\n", new_nr_records);
dprintf2("new_size: %zd\n", new_size);
pkey_malloc_records = realloc(pkey_malloc_records, new_size);
@@ -698,9 +708,11 @@ void free_pkey_malloc(void *ptr)
{
long i;
int ret;
+
dprintf3("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ptr);
for (i = 0; i < nr_pkey_malloc_records; i++) {
struct pkey_malloc_record *rec = &pkey_malloc_records[i];
+
dprintf4("looking for ptr %p at record[%ld/%p]: {%p, %ld}\n",
ptr, i, rec, rec->ptr, rec->size);
if ((ptr < rec->ptr) ||
@@ -781,11 +793,13 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
char buf[] = "123";
if (geteuid() != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "WARNING: not run as root, can not do hugetlb test\n");
return;
}
- cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES), "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
+ cat_into_file(__stringify(GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES),
+ "/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages");
/*
* Now go make sure that we got the pages and that they
@@ -806,7 +820,8 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
}
if (atoi(buf) != GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES) {
- fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got: '%s' expected %d\n",
+ fprintf(stderr, "could not confirm 2M pages, got:"
+ " '%s' expected %d\n",
buf, GET_NR_HUGE_PAGES);
return;
}
@@ -948,6 +963,7 @@ void __save_test_fd(int fd)
int get_test_read_fd(void)
{
int test_fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
__save_test_fd(test_fd);
return test_fd;
}
@@ -989,7 +1005,8 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int ptr_contents;
- dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n", pkey, ptr);
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
+ pkey, ptr);
read_pkey_reg();
pkey_access_deny(pkey);
ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
@@ -1111,13 +1128,14 @@ void test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
int allocated_pkeys[NR_PKEYS] = {0};
int nr_allocated_pkeys = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NR_PKEYS*2; i++) {
int new_pkey;
+
dprintf1("%s() alloc loop: %d\n", __func__, i);
new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
dprintf4("%s()::%d, err: %d pkey_reg: 0x"PKEY_REG_FMT
@@ -1125,9 +1143,11 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
__func__, __LINE__, err, __read_pkey_reg(),
shadow_pkey_reg);
read_pkey_reg(); /* for shadow checking */
- dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n", __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
+ dprintf2("%s() errno: %d ENOSPC: %d\n",
+ __func__, errno, ENOSPC);
if ((new_pkey == -1) && (errno == ENOSPC)) {
- dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey after %d tries\n",
+ dprintf2("%s() failed to allocate pkey "
+ "after %d tries\n",
__func__, nr_allocated_pkeys);
break;
}
@@ -1419,7 +1439,8 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
tracing_off();
close_test_fds();
- printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n", test_nr, iteration_nr);
+ printf("test %2d PASSED (iteration %d)\n",
+ test_nr, iteration_nr);
dprintf1("======================\n\n");
}
iteration_nr++;
@@ -1431,7 +1452,7 @@ int main(void)
setup_handlers();
- printf("has pku: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
+ printf("has pkey: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
int size = PAGE_SIZE;
@@ -1439,7 +1460,8 @@ int main(void)
printf("running PKEY tests for unsupported CPU/OS\n");
- ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(ptr, 1);
exit(0);
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 14:57 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 14:57 ` Dave Hansen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> cleanup the code to satisfy coding styles.
A lot of this makes the code look worse and more unreadable than before.
I think someone just ran it through lindent or something.
I also took a few CodingStyle liberties in here because it's _not_ main
kernel code. I think the occasional 85-column line is probably OK in here.
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup
2018-06-20 14:57 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 14:57 ` Dave Hansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 14:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> cleanup the code to satisfy coding styles.
A lot of this makes the code look worse and more unreadable than before.
I think someone just ran it through lindent or something.
I also took a few CodingStyle liberties in here because it's _not_ main
kernel code. I think the occasional 85-column line is probably OK in here.
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 14/24] selftests/vm: generic cleanup linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:06 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
` (9 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
Introduce powerpc implementation for the various
abstractions.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 16 ++++-
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 15 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 62 ++++++++++--------
4 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 52a1152..321bbbd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -74,8 +74,13 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
} \
} while (0)
+__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr);
+void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey);
+
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
#include "pkey-x86.h"
+#elif defined(__powerpc64__) /* arch */
+#include "pkey-powerpc.h"
#else /* arch */
#error Architecture not supported
#endif /* arch */
@@ -186,7 +191,16 @@ static inline int open_hugepage_file(int flag)
static inline int get_start_key(void)
{
- return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u32 *siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(siginfo_t *si)
+{
+#ifdef si_pkey
+ return &si->si_pkey;
+#else
+ return (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
+#endif
}
#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec6f5d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _PKEYS_POWERPC_H
+#define _PKEYS_POWERPC_H
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 386
+#endif
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 384
+# define SYS_pkey_free 385
+#endif
+#define REG_IP_IDX PT_NIP
+#define REG_TRAPNO PT_TRAP
+#define gregs gp_regs
+#define fpregs fp_regs
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x3 /* disable read and write */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
+#endif
+
+#define NR_PKEYS 32
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_4K 26
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_64K 3
+#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL << 24)
+#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << 16)
+#define pkey_reg_t u64
+#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016lx"
+#define HUGEPAGE_FILE "/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-16384kB/nr_hugepages"
+
+static inline u32 pkey_bit_position(int pkey)
+{
+ return (NR_PKEYS - pkey - 1) * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+}
+
+static inline pkey_reg_t __read_pkey_reg(void)
+{
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg;
+
+ asm volatile("mfspr %0, 0xd" : "=r" (pkey_reg));
+
+ return pkey_reg;
+}
+
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
+{
+ pkey_reg_t eax = pkey_reg;
+
+ dprintf4("%s() changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
+
+ asm volatile("mtspr 0xd, %0" : : "r" ((unsigned long)(eax)) : "memory");
+
+ dprintf4("%s() pkey register after changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "
+ PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ pkey_reg);
+}
+
+static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static inline int arch_reserved_keys(void)
+{
+ if (sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE) == 4096)
+ return NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_4K;
+ else
+ return NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_64K;
+}
+
+void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
+{
+ /* powerpc does not allow userspace to change permissions of exec-only
+ * keys since those keys are not allocated by userspace. The signal
+ * handler wont be able to reset the permissions, which means the code
+ * will infinitely continue to segfault here.
+ */
+ return;
+}
+
+/* 8-bytes of instruction * 16384bytes = 1 page */
+#define __page_o_noops() asm(".rept 16384 ; nop; .endr")
+
+#endif /* _PKEYS_POWERPC_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index d5fa299..95ee952 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#endif
#define NR_PKEYS 16
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS 1
#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
@@ -161,4 +162,18 @@ int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
return xstate_offset;
}
+static inline int arch_reserved_keys(void)
+{
+ return NR_RESERVED_PKEYS;
+}
+
+void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_X86_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index f43a319..88dfa40 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -197,17 +197,18 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
int pkey_faults;
int last_si_pkey = -1;
+void pkey_access_allow(int pkey);
void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
{
ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
int trapno;
unsigned long ip;
char *fpregs;
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
pkey_reg_t *pkey_reg_ptr;
- u64 siginfo_pkey;
+#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
+ u32 siginfo_pkey;
u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
- int pkey_reg_offset;
- fpregset_t fpregset;
dprint_in_signal = 1;
dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
@@ -217,12 +218,14 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
- fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
- fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
+ fpregs = (char *) uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%016lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n",
__func__, trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code),
si->si_code);
+
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+
#ifdef __i386__
/*
* 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
@@ -230,20 +233,28 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
* state. We just assume that it is here.
*/
fpregs += 0x70;
-#endif
- pkey_reg_offset = pkey_reg_xstate_offset();
- pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_offset]);
+#endif /* __i386__ */
- dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
- dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
+ pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_xstate_offset()]);
/*
- * If we got a PKEY fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
+ * If we got a key fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
* here.
*/
dprintf1("pkey_reg_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkey_reg_xstate_offset());
if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
dump_mem(pkey_reg_ptr - 128, 256);
pkey_assert(*pkey_reg_ptr);
+#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
+
+ dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
+ dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
+
+ si_pkey_ptr = siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(si);
+ dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
+ dump_mem(si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
+ siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
+ pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
(si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
@@ -252,22 +263,21 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
exit(4);
}
- si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
- dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
- dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
- siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
- pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
-
- dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
/*
* need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
* checking
*/
dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__read_pkey_reg());
- dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
- *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
+ *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
+ PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+#elif __powerpc64__
+ pkey_access_allow(siginfo_pkey);
+#endif
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
+ PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
dprintf1("WARNING: set PKEY_REG=0 to allow faulting instruction "
"to continue\n");
pkey_faults++;
@@ -1331,9 +1341,8 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+
+ expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(p1, pkey);
}
void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1360,9 +1369,8 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pkey_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
+
+ expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(p1, UNKNOWN_PKEY);
/*
* Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:06 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
Introduce powerpc implementation for the various
abstractions.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 16 ++++-
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 15 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 62 ++++++++++--------
4 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 52a1152..321bbbd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -74,8 +74,13 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
} \
} while (0)
+__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr);
+void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey);
+
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
#include "pkey-x86.h"
+#elif defined(__powerpc64__) /* arch */
+#include "pkey-powerpc.h"
#else /* arch */
#error Architecture not supported
#endif /* arch */
@@ -186,7 +191,16 @@ static inline int open_hugepage_file(int flag)
static inline int get_start_key(void)
{
- return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u32 *siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(siginfo_t *si)
+{
+#ifdef si_pkey
+ return &si->si_pkey;
+#else
+ return (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
+#endif
}
#endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec6f5d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _PKEYS_POWERPC_H
+#define _PKEYS_POWERPC_H
+
+#ifndef SYS_mprotect_key
+# define SYS_mprotect_key 386
+#endif
+#ifndef SYS_pkey_alloc
+# define SYS_pkey_alloc 384
+# define SYS_pkey_free 385
+#endif
+#define REG_IP_IDX PT_NIP
+#define REG_TRAPNO PT_TRAP
+#define gregs gp_regs
+#define fpregs fp_regs
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x20
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x3 /* disable read and write */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
+#endif
+
+#define NR_PKEYS 32
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_4K 26
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_64K 3
+#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL << 24)
+#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << 16)
+#define pkey_reg_t u64
+#define PKEY_REG_FMT "%016lx"
+#define HUGEPAGE_FILE "/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-16384kB/nr_hugepages"
+
+static inline u32 pkey_bit_position(int pkey)
+{
+ return (NR_PKEYS - pkey - 1) * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+}
+
+static inline pkey_reg_t __read_pkey_reg(void)
+{
+ pkey_reg_t pkey_reg;
+
+ asm volatile("mfspr %0, 0xd" : "=r" (pkey_reg));
+
+ return pkey_reg;
+}
+
+static inline void __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
+{
+ pkey_reg_t eax = pkey_reg;
+
+ dprintf4("%s() changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
+ __func__, __read_pkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
+
+ asm volatile("mtspr 0xd, %0" : : "r" ((unsigned long)(eax)) : "memory");
+
+ dprintf4("%s() pkey register after changing "PKEY_REG_FMT" to "
+ PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", __func__, __read_pkey_reg(),
+ pkey_reg);
+}
+
+static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static inline int arch_reserved_keys(void)
+{
+ if (sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE) == 4096)
+ return NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_4K;
+ else
+ return NR_RESERVED_PKEYS_64K;
+}
+
+void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
+{
+ /* powerpc does not allow userspace to change permissions of exec-only
+ * keys since those keys are not allocated by userspace. The signal
+ * handler wont be able to reset the permissions, which means the code
+ * will infinitely continue to segfault here.
+ */
+ return;
+}
+
+/* 8-bytes of instruction * 16384bytes = 1 page */
+#define __page_o_noops() asm(".rept 16384 ; nop; .endr")
+
+#endif /* _PKEYS_POWERPC_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index d5fa299..95ee952 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#endif
#define NR_PKEYS 16
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS 1
#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
#define HPAGE_SIZE (1UL<<21)
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
@@ -161,4 +162,18 @@ int pkey_reg_xstate_offset(void)
return xstate_offset;
}
+static inline int arch_reserved_keys(void)
+{
+ return NR_RESERVED_PKEYS;
+}
+
+void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
+ dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_X86_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index f43a319..88dfa40 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -197,17 +197,18 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
int pkey_faults;
int last_si_pkey = -1;
+void pkey_access_allow(int pkey);
void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
{
ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
int trapno;
unsigned long ip;
char *fpregs;
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
pkey_reg_t *pkey_reg_ptr;
- u64 siginfo_pkey;
+#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
+ u32 siginfo_pkey;
u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
- int pkey_reg_offset;
- fpregset_t fpregset;
dprint_in_signal = 1;
dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
@@ -217,12 +218,14 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
- fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
- fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
+ fpregs = (char *) uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%016lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n",
__func__, trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code),
si->si_code);
+
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+
#ifdef __i386__
/*
* 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
@@ -230,20 +233,28 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
* state. We just assume that it is here.
*/
fpregs += 0x70;
-#endif
- pkey_reg_offset = pkey_reg_xstate_offset();
- pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_offset]);
+#endif /* __i386__ */
- dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
- dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
+ pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_xstate_offset()]);
/*
- * If we got a PKEY fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
+ * If we got a key fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
* here.
*/
dprintf1("pkey_reg_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkey_reg_xstate_offset());
if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
dump_mem(pkey_reg_ptr - 128, 256);
pkey_assert(*pkey_reg_ptr);
+#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
+
+ dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
+ dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
+
+ si_pkey_ptr = siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(si);
+ dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
+ dump_mem(si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
+ siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
+ pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
(si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
@@ -252,22 +263,21 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
exit(4);
}
- si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
- dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
- dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
- siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
- pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
- last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
-
- dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
/*
* need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
* checking
*/
dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
__read_pkey_reg());
- dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
- *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+ dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
+ *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
+ PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+#elif __powerpc64__
+ pkey_access_allow(siginfo_pkey);
+#endif
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
+ PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
dprintf1("WARNING: set PKEY_REG=0 to allow faulting instruction "
"to continue\n");
pkey_faults++;
@@ -1331,9 +1341,8 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+
+ expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(p1, pkey);
}
void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1360,9 +1369,8 @@ void test_implicit_mprotect_exec_only_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
- ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
- dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
- expected_pkey_fault(UNKNOWN_PKEY);
+
+ expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(p1, UNKNOWN_PKEY);
/*
* Put the memory back to non-PROT_EXEC. Should clear the
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 15:06 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:06 ` Dave Hansen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
> +static inline u32 *siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(siginfo_t *si)
> +{
> +#ifdef si_pkey
> + return &si->si_pkey;
> +#else
> + return (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
> +#endif
> }
FWIW, this isn't ppc-specific.
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> index f43a319..88dfa40 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -197,17 +197,18 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
>
> int pkey_faults;
> int last_si_pkey = -1;
> +void pkey_access_allow(int pkey);
> void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
> {
> ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
> int trapno;
> unsigned long ip;
> char *fpregs;
> +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
> pkey_reg_t *pkey_reg_ptr;
> - u64 siginfo_pkey;
> +#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
> + u32 siginfo_pkey;
> u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
> - int pkey_reg_offset;
> - fpregset_t fpregset;
>
> dprint_in_signal = 1;
> dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
> @@ -217,12 +218,14 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
>
> trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
> ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
> - fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
> - fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
> + fpregs = (char *) uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
>
> dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%016lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n",
> __func__, trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code),
> si->si_code);
> +
> +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
> +
> #ifdef __i386__
> /*
> * 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
> @@ -230,20 +233,28 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
> * state. We just assume that it is here.
> */
> fpregs += 0x70;
> -#endif
> - pkey_reg_offset = pkey_reg_xstate_offset();
> - pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_offset]);
> +#endif /* __i386__ */
>
> - dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
> - dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
> + pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_xstate_offset()]);
> /*
> - * If we got a PKEY fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
> + * If we got a key fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
> * here.
> */
> dprintf1("pkey_reg_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkey_reg_xstate_offset());
> if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
> dump_mem(pkey_reg_ptr - 128, 256);
> pkey_assert(*pkey_reg_ptr);
> +#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
The series up to this point has been looking pretty nice and broken out
and easy to read. It goes off the rails a bit here. Adding #ifdefs and..
> + dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
> + dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
> +
> + si_pkey_ptr = siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(si);
> + dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
> + dump_mem(si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
> + siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
> + pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
> + last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
>
> if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
> (si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
> @@ -252,22 +263,21 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
> exit(4);
> }
>
> - si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
> - dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
> - dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
> - siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
> - pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
> - last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
Moving random code around with no explanation.
> - dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
> /*
> * need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
> * checking
> */
> dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
> __read_pkey_reg());
> - dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
> - *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
> +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
> + dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
> + *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
> + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> +#elif __powerpc64__
> + pkey_access_allow(siginfo_pkey);
> +#endif
> + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
> + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> dprintf1("WARNING: set PKEY_REG=0 to allow faulting instruction "
> "to continue\n");
> pkey_faults++;
> @@ -1331,9 +1341,8 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
> madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
> lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
> do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
> - ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
> - dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
> - expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
> +
> + expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(p1, pkey);
> }
While none of this is a deal-breaker (as I said, I feel like the
selftests/ rules are a bit more lax) this does kinda break the illusion
of a nice, broken out series.
Could you address this a bit in the changelog at least, please?
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction
2018-06-20 15:06 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 15:06 ` Dave Hansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
> +static inline u32 *siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(siginfo_t *si)
> +{
> +#ifdef si_pkey
> + return &si->si_pkey;
> +#else
> + return (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
> +#endif
> }
FWIW, this isn't ppc-specific.
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> index f43a319..88dfa40 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -197,17 +197,18 @@ void dump_mem(void *dumpme, int len_bytes)
>
> int pkey_faults;
> int last_si_pkey = -1;
> +void pkey_access_allow(int pkey);
> void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
> {
> ucontext_t *uctxt = vucontext;
> int trapno;
> unsigned long ip;
> char *fpregs;
> +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
> pkey_reg_t *pkey_reg_ptr;
> - u64 siginfo_pkey;
> +#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
> + u32 siginfo_pkey;
> u32 *si_pkey_ptr;
> - int pkey_reg_offset;
> - fpregset_t fpregset;
>
> dprint_in_signal = 1;
> dprintf1(">>>>===============SIGSEGV============================\n");
> @@ -217,12 +218,14 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
>
> trapno = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
> ip = uctxt->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_IP_IDX];
> - fpregset = uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
> - fpregs = (void *)fpregset;
> + fpregs = (char *) uctxt->uc_mcontext.fpregs;
>
> dprintf2("%s() trapno: %d ip: 0x%016lx info->si_code: %s/%d\n",
> __func__, trapno, ip, si_code_str(si->si_code),
> si->si_code);
> +
> +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
> +
> #ifdef __i386__
> /*
> * 32-bit has some extra padding so that userspace can tell whether
> @@ -230,20 +233,28 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
> * state. We just assume that it is here.
> */
> fpregs += 0x70;
> -#endif
> - pkey_reg_offset = pkey_reg_xstate_offset();
> - pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_offset]);
> +#endif /* __i386__ */
>
> - dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
> - dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
> + pkey_reg_ptr = (void *)(&fpregs[pkey_reg_xstate_offset()]);
> /*
> - * If we got a PKEY fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
> + * If we got a key fault, we *HAVE* to have at least one bit set in
> * here.
> */
> dprintf1("pkey_reg_xstate_offset: %d\n", pkey_reg_xstate_offset());
> if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 4)
> dump_mem(pkey_reg_ptr - 128, 256);
> pkey_assert(*pkey_reg_ptr);
> +#endif /* defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) */
The series up to this point has been looking pretty nice and broken out
and easy to read. It goes off the rails a bit here. Adding #ifdefs and..
> + dprintf1("siginfo: %p\n", si);
> + dprintf1(" fpregs: %p\n", fpregs);
> +
> + si_pkey_ptr = siginfo_get_pkey_ptr(si);
> + dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
> + dump_mem(si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
> + siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
> + pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
> + last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
>
> if ((si->si_code == SEGV_MAPERR) ||
> (si->si_code == SEGV_ACCERR) ||
> @@ -252,22 +263,21 @@ void signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *vucontext)
> exit(4);
> }
>
> - si_pkey_ptr = (u32 *)(((u8 *)si) + si_pkey_offset);
> - dprintf1("si_pkey_ptr: %p\n", si_pkey_ptr);
> - dump_mem((u8 *)si_pkey_ptr - 8, 24);
> - siginfo_pkey = *si_pkey_ptr;
> - pkey_assert(siginfo_pkey < NR_PKEYS);
> - last_si_pkey = siginfo_pkey;
Moving random code around with no explanation.
> - dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
> /*
> * need __read_pkey_reg() version so we do not do shadow_pkey_reg
> * checking
> */
> dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from pkey_reg: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n",
> __read_pkey_reg());
> - dprintf1("pkey from siginfo: %jx\n", siginfo_pkey);
> - *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr = 0x00000000;
> +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
> + dprintf1("signal pkey_reg from xsave: "PKEY_REG_FMT"\n", *pkey_reg_ptr);
> + *(u64 *)pkey_reg_ptr &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
> + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> +#elif __powerpc64__
> + pkey_access_allow(siginfo_pkey);
> +#endif
> + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(siginfo_pkey,
> + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> dprintf1("WARNING: set PKEY_REG=0 to allow faulting instruction "
> "to continue\n");
> pkey_faults++;
> @@ -1331,9 +1341,8 @@ void test_executing_on_unreadable_memory(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
> madvise(p1, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED);
> lots_o_noops_around_write(&scratch);
> do_not_expect_pkey_fault("executing on PROT_EXEC memory");
> - ptr_contents = read_ptr(p1);
> - dprintf2("ptr (%p) contents@%d: %x\n", p1, __LINE__, ptr_contents);
> - expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
> +
> + expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(p1, pkey);
> }
While none of this is a deal-breaker (as I said, I feel like the
selftests/ rules are a bit more lax) this does kinda break the illusion
of a nice, broken out series.
Could you address this a bit in the changelog at least, please?
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 15/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:07 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey linuxram
` (8 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
which can trigger false-positive asserts.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 3 ++-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 88dfa40..ba184ca 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -577,7 +577,8 @@ int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
if (!ret)
- shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey,
+ PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
return ret;
}
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:07 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
When a key is freed, the key is no more effective.
Clear the bits corresponding to the pkey in the shadow
register. Otherwise it will carry some spurious bits
which can trigger false-positive asserts.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 3 ++-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 88dfa40..ba184ca 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -577,7 +577,8 @@ int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
if (!ret)
- shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
+ shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey,
+ PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
return ret;
}
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 15:07 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:03 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -577,7 +577,8 @@ int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
>
> if (!ret)
> - shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey,
> + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> return ret;
> }
Why did you introduce this code earlier and then modify it now?
BTW, my original aversion to this code still stands.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-20 15:07 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 15:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:03 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> @@ -577,7 +577,8 @@ int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
>
> if (!ret)
> - shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey,
> + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> return ret;
> }
Why did you introduce this code earlier and then modify it now?
BTW, my original aversion to this code still stands.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-06-20 15:07 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:07 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 16:03 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:03 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 08:07:31AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > @@ -577,7 +577,8 @@ int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> > int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
> >
> > if (!ret)
> > - shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> > + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey,
> > + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> > dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> > return ret;
> > }
>
> Why did you introduce this code earlier and then modify it now?
>
> BTW, my original aversion to this code still stands.
Have entirely got rid of this code in the new version.
--
Ram Pai
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed.
2018-07-17 16:03 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 16:03 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@08:07:31AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
> > @@ -577,7 +577,8 @@ int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey)
> > int ret = syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey);
> >
> > if (!ret)
> > - shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
> > + shadow_pkey_reg &= clear_pkey_flags(pkey,
> > + PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
> > dprintf1("%s(pkey=%ld) syscall ret: %d\n", __func__, pkey, ret);
> > return ret;
> > }
>
> Why did you introduce this code earlier and then modify it now?
>
> BTW, my original aversion to this code still stands.
Have entirely got rid of this code in the new version.
--
Ram Pai
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 16/24] selftests/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:09 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust() linuxram
` (7 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
pkey subsystem is supported if the hardware and kernel has support.
We determine that by checking if allocation of a key succeeds or not.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 2 ++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 8 ++++----
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 9 +++++----
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 321bbbd..288ccff 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr);
void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey);
+int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, u64 init_val);
+int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey);
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
#include "pkey-x86.h"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
index ec6f5d7..957f6f6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
@@ -62,9 +62,19 @@ static inline void __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
pkey_reg);
}
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+static inline bool is_pkey_supported(void)
{
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * No simple way to determine this.
+ * Lets try allocating a key and see if it succeeds.
+ */
+ int ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0);
+
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ sys_pkey_free(ret);
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
}
static inline int arch_reserved_keys(void)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 95ee952..6820c10 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+static inline bool is_pkey_supported(void)
{
unsigned int eax;
unsigned int ebx;
@@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
- return 1;
+ return true;
}
#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index ba184ca..cb81a47 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1393,8 +1393,8 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int size = PAGE_SIZE;
int sret;
- if (cpu_has_pku()) {
- dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
+ if (is_pkey_supported()) {
+ dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU/kernel support\n", __func__);
return;
}
@@ -1458,12 +1458,13 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
int main(void)
{
int nr_iterations = 22;
+ int pkey_supported = is_pkey_supported();
setup_handlers();
- printf("has pkey: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
+ printf("has pkey: %s\n", pkey_supported ? "Yes" : "No");
- if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
+ if (!pkey_supported) {
int size = PAGE_SIZE;
int *ptr;
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:09 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
pkey subsystem is supported if the hardware and kernel has support.
We determine that by checking if allocation of a key succeeds or not.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 2 ++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 8 ++++----
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 9 +++++----
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 321bbbd..288ccff 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
__attribute__((noinline)) int read_ptr(int *ptr);
void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey);
+int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, u64 init_val);
+int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey);
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
#include "pkey-x86.h"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
index ec6f5d7..957f6f6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
@@ -62,9 +62,19 @@ static inline void __write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_t pkey_reg)
pkey_reg);
}
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+static inline bool is_pkey_supported(void)
{
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * No simple way to determine this.
+ * Lets try allocating a key and see if it succeeds.
+ */
+ int ret = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0);
+
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ sys_pkey_free(ret);
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
}
static inline int arch_reserved_keys(void)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 95ee952..6820c10 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+static inline bool is_pkey_supported(void)
{
unsigned int eax;
unsigned int ebx;
@@ -118,13 +118,13 @@ static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_PKU)) {
dprintf2("cpu does not have PKU\n");
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
if (!(ecx & X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
dprintf2("cpu does not have OSPKE\n");
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
- return 1;
+ return true;
}
#define XSTATE_PKEY_BIT (9)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index ba184ca..cb81a47 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1393,8 +1393,8 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
int size = PAGE_SIZE;
int sret;
- if (cpu_has_pku()) {
- dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
+ if (is_pkey_supported()) {
+ dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU/kernel support\n", __func__);
return;
}
@@ -1458,12 +1458,13 @@ void run_tests_once(void)
int main(void)
{
int nr_iterations = 22;
+ int pkey_supported = is_pkey_supported();
setup_handlers();
- printf("has pkey: %d\n", cpu_has_pku());
+ printf("has pkey: %s\n", pkey_supported ? "Yes" : "No");
- if (!cpu_has_pku()) {
+ if (!pkey_supported) {
int size = PAGE_SIZE;
int *ptr;
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 15:09 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:05 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
> - if (cpu_has_pku()) {
> - dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
> + if (is_pkey_supported()) {
> + dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU/kernel support\n", __func__);
> return;
> }
I actually kinda wanted a specific message for when the *CPU* doesn't
support the feature.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey
2018-06-20 15:09 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 15:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:05 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
> - if (cpu_has_pku()) {
> - dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
> + if (is_pkey_supported()) {
> + dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU/kernel support\n", __func__);
> return;
> }
I actually kinda wanted a specific message for when the *CPU* doesn't
support the feature.
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey
2018-06-20 15:09 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:09 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 16:05 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:05 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 08:09:12AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > - if (cpu_has_pku()) {
> > - dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
> > + if (is_pkey_supported()) {
> > + dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU/kernel support\n", __func__);
> > return;
> > }
>
> I actually kinda wanted a specific message for when the *CPU* doesn't
> support the feature.
is_pkey_supported() x86 implementation has specific messages. it will
print if the CPU doesn't support the feature.
RP
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey
2018-07-17 16:05 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 16:05 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@08:09:12AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > - if (cpu_has_pku()) {
> > - dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU support\n", __func__);
> > + if (is_pkey_supported()) {
> > + dprintf1("SKIP: %s: no CPU/kernel support\n", __func__);
> > return;
> > }
>
> I actually kinda wanted a specific message for when the *CPU* doesn't
> support the feature.
is_pkey_supported() x86 implementation has specific messages. it will
print if the CPU doesn't support the feature.
RP
--
Ram Pai
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 17/24] selftests/vm: powerpc implementation to check support for pkey linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:11 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation linuxram
` (6 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
The maximum number of keys that can be allocated has to
take into consideration, that some keys are reserved by
the architecture for specific purpose. Hence cannot
be allocated.
Fix the assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 13 +++++--------
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index cb81a47..e8ad970 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1175,15 +1175,12 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
/*
- * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
- * allocated by the time we get here:
- * 1. The default key (0)
- * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
- * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
- * 'pkey' to this function.
- * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
+ * There are NR_PKEYS pkeys supported in hardware. arch_reserved_keys()
+ * are reserved. One of which is the default key(0). One can be taken
+ * up by an execute-only mapping.
+ * Ensure that we can allocate at least the remaining.
*/
- pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
+ pkey_assert(i >= (NR_PKEYS-arch_reserved_keys()-1));
for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust() linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:11 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
The maximum number of keys that can be allocated has to
take into consideration, that some keys are reserved by
the architecture for specific purpose. Hence cannot
be allocated.
Fix the assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 13 +++++--------
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index cb81a47..e8ad970 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1175,15 +1175,12 @@ void test_pkey_alloc_exhaust(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
pkey_assert(i < NR_PKEYS*2);
/*
- * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
- * allocated by the time we get here:
- * 1. The default key (0)
- * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
- * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
- * 'pkey' to this function.
- * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
+ * There are NR_PKEYS pkeys supported in hardware. arch_reserved_keys()
+ * are reserved. One of which is the default key(0). One can be taken
+ * up by an execute-only mapping.
+ * Ensure that we can allocate at least the remaining.
*/
- pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
+ pkey_assert(i >= (NR_PKEYS-arch_reserved_keys()-1));
for (i = 0; i < nr_allocated_pkeys; i++) {
err = sys_pkey_free(allocated_pkeys[i]);
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust() linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 15:11 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:08 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> /*
> - * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
> - * allocated by the time we get here:
> - * 1. The default key (0)
> - * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
> - * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
> - * 'pkey' to this function.
> - * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
> + * There are NR_PKEYS pkeys supported in hardware. arch_reserved_keys()
> + * are reserved. One of which is the default key(0). One can be taken
> + * up by an execute-only mapping.
> + * Ensure that we can allocate at least the remaining.
> */
> - pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
> + pkey_assert(i >= (NR_PKEYS-arch_reserved_keys()-1));
We recently had a bug here. I fixed it and left myself a really nice
comment so I and others wouldn't screw it up in the future.
Does this kill my nice, new comment?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
2018-06-20 15:11 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 15:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:08 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> /*
> - * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
> - * allocated by the time we get here:
> - * 1. The default key (0)
> - * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
> - * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
> - * 'pkey' to this function.
> - * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
> + * There are NR_PKEYS pkeys supported in hardware. arch_reserved_keys()
> + * are reserved. One of which is the default key(0). One can be taken
> + * up by an execute-only mapping.
> + * Ensure that we can allocate at least the remaining.
> */
> - pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
> + pkey_assert(i >= (NR_PKEYS-arch_reserved_keys()-1));
We recently had a bug here. I fixed it and left myself a really nice
comment so I and others wouldn't screw it up in the future.
Does this kill my nice, new comment?
--
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the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
2018-06-20 15:11 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:11 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 16:08 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:08 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 16:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 08:11:07AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > /*
> > - * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
> > - * allocated by the time we get here:
> > - * 1. The default key (0)
> > - * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
> > - * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
> > - * 'pkey' to this function.
> > - * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
> > + * There are NR_PKEYS pkeys supported in hardware. arch_reserved_keys()
> > + * are reserved. One of which is the default key(0). One can be taken
> > + * up by an execute-only mapping.
> > + * Ensure that we can allocate at least the remaining.
> > */
> > - pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
> > + pkey_assert(i >= (NR_PKEYS-arch_reserved_keys()-1));
>
> We recently had a bug here. I fixed it and left myself a really nice
> comment so I and others wouldn't screw it up in the future.
>
> Does this kill my nice, new comment?
part of your nice comment has been moved into the header file. The arch
specific header file explains where and how the reserved keys are used.
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
2018-07-17 16:08 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 16:08 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 16:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@08:11:07AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > /*
> > - * There are 16 pkeys supported in hardware. Three are
> > - * allocated by the time we get here:
> > - * 1. The default key (0)
> > - * 2. One possibly consumed by an execute-only mapping.
> > - * 3. One allocated by the test code and passed in via
> > - * 'pkey' to this function.
> > - * Ensure that we can allocate at least another 13 (16-3).
> > + * There are NR_PKEYS pkeys supported in hardware. arch_reserved_keys()
> > + * are reserved. One of which is the default key(0). One can be taken
> > + * up by an execute-only mapping.
> > + * Ensure that we can allocate at least the remaining.
> > */
> > - pkey_assert(i >= NR_PKEYS-3);
> > + pkey_assert(i >= (NR_PKEYS-arch_reserved_keys()-1));
>
> We recently had a bug here. I fixed it and left myself a really nice
> comment so I and others wouldn't screw it up in the future.
>
> Does this kill my nice, new comment?
part of your nice comment has been moved into the header file. The arch
specific header file explains where and how the reserved keys are used.
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 18/24] selftests/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust() linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:16 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 20/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation linuxram
` (5 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
detect access-violation on a page to which access-disabled
key is associated much after the page is mapped.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index e8ad970..04d0249 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1024,6 +1024,24 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+
+void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
+ u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
+ pkey, ptr);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("reading ptr before disabling the read : %d\n",
+ ptr_contents);
+ read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
@@ -1402,6 +1420,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
void (*pkey_tests[])(int *ptr, u16 pkey) = {
test_read_of_write_disabled_region,
test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:16 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
detect access-violation on a page to which access-disabled
key is associated much after the page is mapped.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index e8ad970..04d0249 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1024,6 +1024,24 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+
+void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
+ u16 pkey)
+{
+ int ptr_contents;
+
+ dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
+ pkey, ptr);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("reading ptr before disabling the read : %d\n",
+ ptr_contents);
+ read_pkey_reg();
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
+ dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
@@ -1402,6 +1420,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
void (*pkey_tests[])(int *ptr, u16 pkey) = {
test_read_of_write_disabled_region,
test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 15:16 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:13 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> +void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
> + u16 pkey)
> +{
> + int ptr_contents;
> +
> + dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
> + pkey, ptr);
> + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> + dprintf1("reading ptr before disabling the read : %d\n",
> + ptr_contents);
> + read_pkey_reg();
> + pkey_access_deny(pkey);
> + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> + dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
> + expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
> +}
Looks fine to me. I'm a bit surprised we didn't do this already, which
is a good thing for this patch.
FWIW, if you took patches like this and put them first, you could
probably get it merged now. Yes, I know it would mean redoing some of
the later code move and rename ones.
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-06-20 15:16 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 15:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:13 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> +void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
> + u16 pkey)
> +{
> + int ptr_contents;
> +
> + dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
> + pkey, ptr);
> + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> + dprintf1("reading ptr before disabling the read : %d\n",
> + ptr_contents);
> + read_pkey_reg();
> + pkey_access_deny(pkey);
> + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> + dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
> + expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
> +}
Looks fine to me. I'm a bit surprised we didn't do this already, which
is a good thing for this patch.
FWIW, if you took patches like this and put them first, you could
probably get it merged now. Yes, I know it would mean redoing some of
the later code move and rename ones.
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-06-20 15:16 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:16 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 16:13 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:13 ` Ram Pai
2018-07-17 17:56 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 16:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 08:16:44AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > +void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
> > + u16 pkey)
> > +{
> > + int ptr_contents;
> > +
> > + dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
> > + pkey, ptr);
> > + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> > + dprintf1("reading ptr before disabling the read : %d\n",
> > + ptr_contents);
> > + read_pkey_reg();
> > + pkey_access_deny(pkey);
> > + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> > + dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
> > + expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
> > +}
>
> Looks fine to me. I'm a bit surprised we didn't do this already, which
> is a good thing for this patch.
>
> FWIW, if you took patches like this and put them first, you could
> probably get it merged now. Yes, I know it would mean redoing some of
> the later code move and rename ones.
I have incorporated almost all of your comments. But there are some
comments that take some effort to implement. Shall we get the patches
merged in the current form? This code has been sitting out for a while.
In the current form its tested and works on powerpc and on x86, and
incorporates about 95% of your suggestions. The rest I will take care
as we go.
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-07-17 16:13 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 16:13 ` Ram Pai
2018-07-17 17:56 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 16:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@08:16:44AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > +void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
> > + u16 pkey)
> > +{
> > + int ptr_contents;
> > +
> > + dprintf1("disabling access to PKEY[%02d], doing read @ %p\n",
> > + pkey, ptr);
> > + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> > + dprintf1("reading ptr before disabling the read : %d\n",
> > + ptr_contents);
> > + read_pkey_reg();
> > + pkey_access_deny(pkey);
> > + ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
> > + dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
> > + expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
> > +}
>
> Looks fine to me. I'm a bit surprised we didn't do this already, which
> is a good thing for this patch.
>
> FWIW, if you took patches like this and put them first, you could
> probably get it merged now. Yes, I know it would mean redoing some of
> the later code move and rename ones.
I have incorporated almost all of your comments. But there are some
comments that take some effort to implement. Shall we get the patches
merged in the current form? This code has been sitting out for a while.
In the current form its tested and works on powerpc and on x86, and
incorporates about 95% of your suggestions. The rest I will take care
as we go.
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-07-17 16:13 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:13 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-07-17 17:56 ` dave.hansen
2018-07-17 17:56 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 19:10 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-07-17 17:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 07/17/2018 09:13 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> I have incorporated almost all of your comments. But there are some
> comments that take some effort to implement. Shall we get the patches
> merged in the current form? This code has been sitting out for a while.
>
> In the current form its tested and works on powerpc and on x86, and
> incorporates about 95% of your suggestions. The rest I will take care
> as we go.
What constitutes the remaining 5%?
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-07-17 17:56 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-07-17 17:56 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 19:10 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-07-17 17:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 07/17/2018 09:13 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> I have incorporated almost all of your comments. But there are some
> comments that take some effort to implement. Shall we get the patches
> merged in the current form? This code has been sitting out for a while.
>
> In the current form its tested and works on powerpc and on x86, and
> incorporates about 95% of your suggestions. The rest I will take care
> as we go.
What constitutes the remaining 5%?
--
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the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-07-17 17:56 ` dave.hansen
2018-07-17 17:56 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 19:10 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 19:10 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Tue, Jul 17, 2018 at 10:56:08AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 07/17/2018 09:13 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > I have incorporated almost all of your comments. But there are some
> > comments that take some effort to implement. Shall we get the patches
> > merged in the current form? This code has been sitting out for a while.
> >
> > In the current form its tested and works on powerpc and on x86, and
> > incorporates about 95% of your suggestions. The rest I will take care
> > as we go.
>
> What constitutes the remaining 5%?
Mostly your comments on code-organization in the signal handler. There
are still some #if defined(__i386__) ..... Can be cleaned up and
abstracted further.
Also your questions on some of the code changes, the rationale for which
is not obvious. Will help to spinkle in some descriptive comments there.
Have fixed up a lot of codying style issues. But there could till be a
few that may spew warning by checkpatch.pl.
There are no functional issues AFAICT.
RP
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
2018-07-17 19:10 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 19:10 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Tue, Jul 17, 2018@10:56:08AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 07/17/2018 09:13 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > I have incorporated almost all of your comments. But there are some
> > comments that take some effort to implement. Shall we get the patches
> > merged in the current form? This code has been sitting out for a while.
> >
> > In the current form its tested and works on powerpc and on x86, and
> > incorporates about 95% of your suggestions. The rest I will take care
> > as we go.
>
> What constitutes the remaining 5%?
Mostly your comments on code-organization in the signal handler. There
are still some #if defined(__i386__) ..... Can be cleaned up and
abstracted further.
Also your questions on some of the code changes, the rationale for which
is not obvious. Will help to spinkle in some descriptive comments there.
Have fixed up a lot of codying style issues. But there could till be a
few that may spew warning by checkpatch.pl.
There are no functional issues AFAICT.
RP
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 20/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 19/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 21/24] selftests/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page linuxram
` (4 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
detect write-violation on a page to which write-disabled
key is associated much after the page is mapped.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 04d0249..f4acd72 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1042,6 +1042,17 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+void test_write_of_write_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
+ u16 pkey)
+{
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ dprintf1("disabling write access; after accessing the page, "
+ "to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
@@ -1422,6 +1433,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_write_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 20/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 20/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
detect write-violation on a page to which write-disabled
key is associated much after the page is mapped.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index 04d0249..f4acd72 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1042,6 +1042,17 @@ void test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+void test_write_of_write_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
+ u16 pkey)
+{
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ dprintf1("disabling write access; after accessing the page, "
+ "to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_write_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
void test_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
dprintf1("disabling write access to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
@@ -1422,6 +1433,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
test_read_of_access_disabled_region,
test_read_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_write_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 21/24] selftests/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 20/24] selftests/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions linuxram
` (3 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
detect write-violation on a page to which access-disabled
key is associated much after the page is mapped.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index f4acd72..caf634e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1067,6 +1067,18 @@ void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
*ptr = __LINE__;
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+
+void test_write_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
+ u16 pkey)
+{
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ dprintf1("disabling access; after accessing the page, "
+ " to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int ret;
@@ -1435,6 +1447,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
test_write_of_write_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region,
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 21/24] selftests/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 21/24] selftests/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
detect write-violation on a page to which access-disabled
key is associated much after the page is mapped.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index f4acd72..caf634e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1067,6 +1067,18 @@ void test_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
*ptr = __LINE__;
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+
+void test_write_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped(int *ptr,
+ u16 pkey)
+{
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ dprintf1("disabling access; after accessing the page, "
+ " to PKEY[%02d], doing write\n", pkey);
+ pkey_access_deny(pkey);
+ *ptr = __LINE__;
+ expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
+}
+
void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int ret;
@@ -1435,6 +1447,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
test_write_of_write_disabled_region,
test_write_of_write_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_write_of_access_disabled_region,
+ test_write_of_access_disabled_region_with_page_already_mapped,
test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region,
test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region,
test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region,
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 21/24] selftests/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:20 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 23/24] selftests/vm: sub-page allocator linuxram
` (2 subsequent siblings)
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
Generally the signal handler restores the state of the pkey register
before returning. However there are times when the read/write operation
can legitamely fail without invoking the signal handler. Eg: A
sys_read() operaton to a write-protected page should be disallowed. In
such a case the state of the pkey register is not restored to its
original state. The test case is responsible for restoring the key
register state to its original value.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 5 +++++
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index caf634e..b5a9e6c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1011,6 +1011,7 @@ void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
dprintf1("\n");
+ pkey_write_allow(pkey);
}
void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
@@ -1090,6 +1091,7 @@ void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 1);
dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
pkey_assert(ret);
+ pkey_access_allow(pkey);
}
void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
@@ -1102,6 +1104,7 @@ void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
if (ret < 0 && (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0))
perror("verbose read result (OK for this to be bad)");
pkey_assert(ret);
+ pkey_write_allow(pkey);
}
void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1121,6 +1124,7 @@ void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
vmsplice_ret = vmsplice(pipe_fds[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
dprintf1("vmsplice() ret: %d\n", vmsplice_ret);
pkey_assert(vmsplice_ret == -1);
+ pkey_access_allow(pkey);
close(pipe_fds[0]);
close(pipe_fds[1]);
@@ -1141,6 +1145,7 @@ void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0)
perror("futex");
dprintf1("futex() ret: %d\n", futex_ret);
+ pkey_write_allow(pkey);
}
/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:20 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
Generally the signal handler restores the state of the pkey register
before returning. However there are times when the read/write operation
can legitamely fail without invoking the signal handler. Eg: A
sys_read() operaton to a write-protected page should be disallowed. In
such a case the state of the pkey register is not restored to its
original state. The test case is responsible for restoring the key
register state to its original value.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 5 +++++
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index caf634e..b5a9e6c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1011,6 +1011,7 @@ void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ptr_contents = read_ptr(ptr);
dprintf1("*ptr: %d\n", ptr_contents);
dprintf1("\n");
+ pkey_write_allow(pkey);
}
void test_read_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
@@ -1090,6 +1091,7 @@ void test_kernel_write_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
ret = read(test_fd, ptr, 1);
dprintf1("read ret: %d\n", ret);
pkey_assert(ret);
+ pkey_access_allow(pkey);
}
void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
@@ -1102,6 +1104,7 @@ void test_kernel_write_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
if (ret < 0 && (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0))
perror("verbose read result (OK for this to be bad)");
pkey_assert(ret);
+ pkey_write_allow(pkey);
}
void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
@@ -1121,6 +1124,7 @@ void test_kernel_gup_of_access_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
vmsplice_ret = vmsplice(pipe_fds[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
dprintf1("vmsplice() ret: %d\n", vmsplice_ret);
pkey_assert(vmsplice_ret == -1);
+ pkey_access_allow(pkey);
close(pipe_fds[0]);
close(pipe_fds[1]);
@@ -1141,6 +1145,7 @@ void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
if (DEBUG_LEVEL > 0)
perror("futex");
dprintf1("futex() ret: %d\n", futex_ret);
+ pkey_write_allow(pkey);
}
/* Assumes that all pkeys other than 'pkey' are unallocated */
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 15:20 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:09 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> Generally the signal handler restores the state of the pkey register
> before returning. However there are times when the read/write operation
> can legitamely fail without invoking the signal handler. Eg: A
> sys_read() operaton to a write-protected page should be disallowed. In
> such a case the state of the pkey register is not restored to its
> original state. The test case is responsible for restoring the key
> register state to its original value.
Seems fragile. Can't we just do this in common code? We could just
loop through and restore the default permissions. That seems much more
resistant to a bad test case.
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions
2018-06-20 15:20 ` dave.hansen
@ 2018-06-20 15:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 16:09 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Dave Hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> Generally the signal handler restores the state of the pkey register
> before returning. However there are times when the read/write operation
> can legitamely fail without invoking the signal handler. Eg: A
> sys_read() operaton to a write-protected page should be disallowed. In
> such a case the state of the pkey register is not restored to its
> original state. The test case is responsible for restoring the key
> register state to its original value.
Seems fragile. Can't we just do this in common code? We could just
loop through and restore the default permissions. That seems much more
resistant to a bad test case.
--
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the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions
2018-06-20 15:20 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:20 ` Dave Hansen
@ 2018-07-17 16:09 ` linuxram
2018-07-17 16:09 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-07-17 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 08:20:22AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > Generally the signal handler restores the state of the pkey register
> > before returning. However there are times when the read/write operation
> > can legitamely fail without invoking the signal handler. Eg: A
> > sys_read() operaton to a write-protected page should be disallowed. In
> > such a case the state of the pkey register is not restored to its
> > original state. The test case is responsible for restoring the key
> > register state to its original value.
>
> Seems fragile. Can't we just do this in common code? We could just
> loop through and restore the default permissions. That seems much more
> resistant to a bad test case.
Yes. done. fixed it the way you suggested in the new version.
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions
2018-07-17 16:09 ` linuxram
@ 2018-07-17 16:09 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-07-17 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018@08:20:22AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > Generally the signal handler restores the state of the pkey register
> > before returning. However there are times when the read/write operation
> > can legitamely fail without invoking the signal handler. Eg: A
> > sys_read() operaton to a write-protected page should be disallowed. In
> > such a case the state of the pkey register is not restored to its
> > original state. The test case is responsible for restoring the key
> > register state to its original value.
>
> Seems fragile. Can't we just do this in common code? We could just
> loop through and restore the default permissions. That seems much more
> resistant to a bad test case.
Yes. done. fixed it the way you suggested in the new version.
--
Ram Pai
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 23/24] selftests/vm: sub-page allocator
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 22/24] selftests/vm: testcases must restore pkey-permissions linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 24/24] selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0 linuxram
2018-06-14 20:19 ` [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys fweimer
25 siblings, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
introduce a new allocator that allocates 4k hardware-pages to back
64k linux-page. This allocator is only applicable on powerpc.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 6 ++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 5 +++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 288ccff..a00eee6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
extern int dprint_in_signal;
extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
+extern int test_nr;
+extern int iteration_nr;
+
#ifdef __GNUC__
__attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
#endif
@@ -78,6 +81,9 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey);
int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, u64 init_val);
int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey);
+int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
+ unsigned long pkey);
+void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot);
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
#include "pkey-x86.h"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
index 957f6f6..af44eed 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
@@ -98,4 +98,29 @@ void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
/* 8-bytes of instruction * 16384bytes = 1 page */
#define __page_o_noops() asm(".rept 16384 ; nop; .endr")
+void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect_subpage(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ ret = syscall(__NR_subpage_prot, ptr, size, NULL);
+ if (ret) {
+ perror("subpage_perm");
+ return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+
+ dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_POWERPC_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 6820c10..322da49 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -176,4 +176,9 @@ void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect_subpage(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_X86_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index b5a9e6c..cbd87f8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
void *(*pkey_malloc[])(long size, int prot, u16 pkey) = {
malloc_pkey_with_mprotect,
+ malloc_pkey_with_mprotect_subpage,
malloc_pkey_anon_huge,
malloc_pkey_hugetlb
/* can not do direct with the pkey_mprotect() API:
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 23/24] selftests/vm: sub-page allocator
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 23/24] selftests/vm: sub-page allocator linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
introduce a new allocator that allocates 4k hardware-pages to back
64k linux-page. This allocator is only applicable on powerpc.
cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h | 6 ++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h | 5 +++++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
index 288ccff..a00eee6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
extern int dprint_in_signal;
extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
+extern int test_nr;
+extern int iteration_nr;
+
#ifdef __GNUC__
__attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
#endif
@@ -78,6 +81,9 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
void expected_pkey_fault(int pkey);
int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, u64 init_val);
int sys_pkey_free(unsigned long pkey);
+int mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
+ unsigned long pkey);
+void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot);
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
#include "pkey-x86.h"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
index 957f6f6..af44eed 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-powerpc.h
@@ -98,4 +98,29 @@ void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
/* 8-bytes of instruction * 16384bytes = 1 page */
#define __page_o_noops() asm(".rept 16384 ; nop; .endr")
+void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect_subpage(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ dprintf1("doing %s(size=%ld, prot=0x%x, pkey=%d)\n", __func__,
+ size, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(pkey < NR_PKEYS);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ pkey_assert(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ ret = syscall(__NR_subpage_prot, ptr, size, NULL);
+ if (ret) {
+ perror("subpage_perm");
+ return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ ret = mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, PAGE_SIZE, prot, pkey);
+ pkey_assert(!ret);
+ record_pkey_malloc(ptr, size, prot);
+
+ dprintf1("%s() for pkey %d @ %p\n", __func__, pkey, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_POWERPC_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
index 6820c10..322da49 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-x86.h
@@ -176,4 +176,9 @@ void expect_fault_on_read_execonly_key(void *p1, u16 pkey)
expected_pkey_fault(pkey);
}
+void *malloc_pkey_with_mprotect_subpage(long size, int prot, u16 pkey)
+{
+ return PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP;
+}
+
#endif /* _PKEYS_X86_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index b5a9e6c..cbd87f8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ void setup_hugetlbfs(void)
void *(*pkey_malloc[])(long size, int prot, u16 pkey) = {
malloc_pkey_with_mprotect,
+ malloc_pkey_with_mprotect_subpage,
malloc_pkey_anon_huge,
malloc_pkey_hugetlb
/* can not do direct with the pkey_mprotect() API:
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 24/24] selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 23/24] selftests/vm: sub-page allocator linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:22 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-14 20:19 ` [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys fweimer
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
Ensure pkey-0 is allocated on start. Ensure pkey-0 can be attached
dynamically in various modes, without failures. Ensure pkey-0 can be
freed and allocated.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index cbd87f8..f37b031 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1003,6 +1003,67 @@ void close_test_fds(void)
return *ptr;
}
+void test_pkey_alloc_free_attach_pkey0(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int i, err;
+ int max_nr_pkey_allocs;
+ int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
+ int nr_alloced = 0;
+ int newpkey;
+ long size;
+
+ assert(pkey_last_malloc_record);
+ size = pkey_last_malloc_record->size;
+ /*
+ * This is a bit of a hack. But mprotect() requires
+ * huge-page-aligned sizes when operating on hugetlbfs.
+ * So, make sure that we use something that's a multiple
+ * of a huge page when we can.
+ */
+ if (size >= HPAGE_SIZE)
+ size = HPAGE_SIZE;
+
+
+ /* allocate every possible key and make sure key-0 never got allocated */
+ max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
+ for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
+ int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+ assert(new_pkey != 0);
+
+ if (new_pkey < 0)
+ break;
+ alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
+ }
+ /* free all the allocated keys */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
+ int free_ret;
+
+ if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
+ continue;
+ free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
+ pkey_assert(!free_ret);
+ }
+
+ /* attach key-0 in various modes */
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_READ, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_WRITE, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_EXEC, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+
+ /* free key-0 */
+ err = sys_pkey_free(0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+
+ newpkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0x0);
+ assert(newpkey == 0);
+}
+
void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int ptr_contents;
@@ -1153,10 +1214,10 @@ void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int err;
- int i = get_start_key();
+ int i;
/* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
- for (; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
+ for (i=1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
if (pkey == i)
continue;
@@ -1465,6 +1526,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey,
test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args,
test_pkey_alloc_exhaust,
+ test_pkey_alloc_free_attach_pkey0,
};
void run_tests_once(void)
--
1.7.1
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 24/24] selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 24/24] selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0 linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
2018-06-20 15:22 ` dave.hansen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-14 0:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
Ensure pkey-0 is allocated on start. Ensure pkey-0 can be attached
dynamically in various modes, without failures. Ensure pkey-0 can be
freed and allocated.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
index cbd87f8..f37b031 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
@@ -1003,6 +1003,67 @@ void close_test_fds(void)
return *ptr;
}
+void test_pkey_alloc_free_attach_pkey0(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
+{
+ int i, err;
+ int max_nr_pkey_allocs;
+ int alloced_pkeys[NR_PKEYS];
+ int nr_alloced = 0;
+ int newpkey;
+ long size;
+
+ assert(pkey_last_malloc_record);
+ size = pkey_last_malloc_record->size;
+ /*
+ * This is a bit of a hack. But mprotect() requires
+ * huge-page-aligned sizes when operating on hugetlbfs.
+ * So, make sure that we use something that's a multiple
+ * of a huge page when we can.
+ */
+ if (size >= HPAGE_SIZE)
+ size = HPAGE_SIZE;
+
+
+ /* allocate every possible key and make sure key-0 never got allocated */
+ max_nr_pkey_allocs = NR_PKEYS;
+ for (i = 0; i < max_nr_pkey_allocs; i++) {
+ int new_pkey = alloc_pkey();
+ assert(new_pkey != 0);
+
+ if (new_pkey < 0)
+ break;
+ alloced_pkeys[nr_alloced++] = new_pkey;
+ }
+ /* free all the allocated keys */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_alloced; i++) {
+ int free_ret;
+
+ if (!alloced_pkeys[i])
+ continue;
+ free_ret = sys_pkey_free(alloced_pkeys[i]);
+ pkey_assert(!free_ret);
+ }
+
+ /* attach key-0 in various modes */
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_READ, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_WRITE, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_EXEC, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+ err = sys_mprotect_pkey(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, 0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+
+ /* free key-0 */
+ err = sys_pkey_free(0);
+ pkey_assert(!err);
+
+ newpkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0x0);
+ assert(newpkey == 0);
+}
+
void test_read_of_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int ptr_contents;
@@ -1153,10 +1214,10 @@ void test_kernel_gup_write_to_write_disabled_region(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
void test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
{
int err;
- int i = get_start_key();
+ int i;
/* Note: 0 is the default pkey, so don't mess with it */
- for (; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
+ for (i=1; i < NR_PKEYS; i++) {
if (pkey == i)
continue;
@@ -1465,6 +1526,7 @@ void test_mprotect_pkey_on_unsupported_cpu(int *ptr, u16 pkey)
test_pkey_syscalls_on_non_allocated_pkey,
test_pkey_syscalls_bad_args,
test_pkey_alloc_exhaust,
+ test_pkey_alloc_free_attach_pkey0,
};
void run_tests_once(void)
--
1.7.1
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 24/24] selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 24/24] selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0 linuxram
2018-06-14 0:45 ` Ram Pai
@ 2018-06-20 15:22 ` dave.hansen
2018-06-20 15:22 ` Dave Hansen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: dave.hansen @ 2018-06-20 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/13/2018 05:45 PM, Ram Pai wrote:
> Ensure pkey-0 is allocated on start. Ensure pkey-0 can be attached
> dynamically in various modes, without failures. Ensure pkey-0 can be
> freed and allocated.
I like this. Looks very useful.
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at intel.com>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys
2018-06-14 0:44 [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys linuxram
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2018-06-14 0:45 ` [PATCH v13 24/24] selftests/vm: test correct behavior of pkey-0 linuxram
@ 2018-06-14 20:19 ` fweimer
2018-06-14 20:19 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-15 0:58 ` linuxram
25 siblings, 2 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: fweimer @ 2018-06-14 20:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1501 bytes --]
On 06/14/2018 02:44 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> Test
> ----
> Verified for correctness on powerpc. Need help verifying on x86.
> Compiles on x86.
It breaks make in tools/testing/selftests/x86:
make: *** No rule to make target `protection_keys.c', needed by
`/home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys_64'. Stop.
The generic implementation no longer builds 32-bit binaries. Is this
the intent?
It's possible to build 32-bit binaries with “make CC='gcc -m32'”, so
perhaps this is good enough?
But with that, I get a warning:
protection_keys.c: In function ‘dump_mem’:
protection_keys.c:172:3: warning: format ‘%lx’ expects argument of type
‘long unsigned int’, but argument 4 has type ‘uint64_t’ [-Wformat=]
dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016lx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
^
I suppose you could use %016llx and add a cast to unsigned long long to
fix this.
Anyway, both the 32-bit and 64-bit tests fail here:
assert() at protection_keys.c::943 test_nr: 12 iteration: 1
running abort_hooks()...
I've yet checked what causes this. It's with the kernel headers from
4.17, but with other userspace headers based on glibc 2.17. I hope to
look into this some more before the weekend, but I eventually have to
return the test machine to the pool.
Thanks,
Florian
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys
2018-06-14 20:19 ` [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys fweimer
@ 2018-06-14 20:19 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-15 0:58 ` linuxram
1 sibling, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Florian Weimer @ 2018-06-14 20:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
On 06/14/2018 02:44 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> Test
> ----
> Verified for correctness on powerpc. Need help verifying on x86.
> Compiles on x86.
It breaks make in tools/testing/selftests/x86:
make: *** No rule to make target `protection_keys.c', needed by
`/home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys_64'. Stop.
The generic implementation no longer builds 32-bit binaries. Is this
the intent?
It's possible to build 32-bit binaries with “make CC='gcc -m32'”, so
perhaps this is good enough?
But with that, I get a warning:
protection_keys.c: In function ‘dump_mem’:
protection_keys.c:172:3: warning: format ‘%lx’ expects argument of type
‘long unsigned int’, but argument 4 has type ‘uint64_t’ [-Wformat=]
dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016lx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
^
I suppose you could use %016llx and add a cast to unsigned long long to
fix this.
Anyway, both the 32-bit and 64-bit tests fail here:
assert() at protection_keys.c::943 test_nr: 12 iteration: 1
running abort_hooks()...
I've yet checked what causes this. It's with the kernel headers from
4.17, but with other userspace headers based on glibc 2.17. I hope to
look into this some more before the weekend, but I eventually have to
return the test machine to the pool.
Thanks,
Florian
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys
2018-06-14 20:19 ` [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys fweimer
2018-06-14 20:19 ` Florian Weimer
@ 2018-06-15 0:58 ` linuxram
2018-06-15 0:58 ` Ram Pai
1 sibling, 1 reply; 98+ messages in thread
From: linuxram @ 2018-06-15 0:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2300 bytes --]
On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 10:19:11PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 06/14/2018 02:44 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> >Test
> >----
> >Verified for correctness on powerpc. Need help verifying on x86.
> >Compiles on x86.
>
> It breaks make in tools/testing/selftests/x86:
>
> make: *** No rule to make target `protection_keys.c', needed by
> `/home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys_64'. Stop.
Ah.. it has to be taken out from the Makefile of
/home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/x86/
The sources have been moved to /home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/mm/
>
> The generic implementation no longer builds 32-bit binaries. Is
> this the intent?
No. But building it 32-bit after moving it to a the new directory
needs some special code in the Makefile.
>
> It's possible to build 32-bit binaries with “make CC='gcc -m32'”, so
> perhaps this is good enough?
Dave Hansen did mention it, but he did not complain too much. So I kept
quite.
>
> But with that, I get a warning:
>
> protection_keys.c: In function ‘dump_mem’:
> protection_keys.c:172:3: warning: format ‘%lx’ expects argument of
> type ‘long unsigned int’, but argument 4 has type ‘uint64_t’
> [-Wformat=]
> dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016lx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
> ^
>
> I suppose you could use %016llx and add a cast to unsigned long long
> to fix this.
yes.
>
> Anyway, both the 32-bit and 64-bit tests fail here:
>
> assert() at protection_keys.c::943 test_nr: 12 iteration: 1
> running abort_hooks()...
>
> I've yet checked what causes this. It's with the kernel headers
> from 4.17, but with other userspace headers based on glibc 2.17. I
> hope to look into this some more before the weekend, but I
> eventually have to return the test machine to the pool.
I wish I could get a x86 machine which could do memory keys. Had a AWS
instance, but struggled to boot my kernel. Can't get to the console...
gave up. If someone can give me a ready-made machine with support for
memkeys, I can quickly fix all the outstanding x86 issues. But if
someone can just fix it for me, .... ;)
RP
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread* [PATCH v13 00/24] selftests, powerpc, x86 : Memory Protection Keys
2018-06-15 0:58 ` linuxram
@ 2018-06-15 0:58 ` Ram Pai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 98+ messages in thread
From: Ram Pai @ 2018-06-15 0:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
On Thu, Jun 14, 2018@10:19:11PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 06/14/2018 02:44 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> >Test
> >----
> >Verified for correctness on powerpc. Need help verifying on x86.
> >Compiles on x86.
>
> It breaks make in tools/testing/selftests/x86:
>
> make: *** No rule to make target `protection_keys.c', needed by
> `/home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys_64'. Stop.
Ah.. it has to be taken out from the Makefile of
/home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/x86/
The sources have been moved to /home/linux/tools/testing/selftests/mm/
>
> The generic implementation no longer builds 32-bit binaries. Is
> this the intent?
No. But building it 32-bit after moving it to a the new directory
needs some special code in the Makefile.
>
> It's possible to build 32-bit binaries with “make CC='gcc -m32'”, so
> perhaps this is good enough?
Dave Hansen did mention it, but he did not complain too much. So I kept
quite.
>
> But with that, I get a warning:
>
> protection_keys.c: In function ‘dump_mem’:
> protection_keys.c:172:3: warning: format ‘%lx’ expects argument of
> type ‘long unsigned int’, but argument 4 has type ‘uint64_t’
> [-Wformat=]
> dprintf1("dump[%03d][@%p]: %016lx\n", i, ptr, *ptr);
> ^
>
> I suppose you could use %016llx and add a cast to unsigned long long
> to fix this.
yes.
>
> Anyway, both the 32-bit and 64-bit tests fail here:
>
> assert() at protection_keys.c::943 test_nr: 12 iteration: 1
> running abort_hooks()...
>
> I've yet checked what causes this. It's with the kernel headers
> from 4.17, but with other userspace headers based on glibc 2.17. I
> hope to look into this some more before the weekend, but I
> eventually have to return the test machine to the pool.
I wish I could get a x86 machine which could do memory keys. Had a AWS
instance, but struggled to boot my kernel. Can't get to the console...
gave up. If someone can give me a ready-made machine with support for
memkeys, I can quickly fix all the outstanding x86 issues. But if
someone can just fix it for me, .... ;)
RP
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 98+ messages in thread