From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
quae@daurnimator.com, dev@opencontainers.org,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, libc-alpha@sourceware.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] openat2: minor uapi cleanups
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 18:09:41 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200118180941.GT8904@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200118152833.GS8904@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On Sat, Jan 18, 2020 at 03:28:33PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> #work.openat2 updated, #for-next rebuilt and force-pushed. There's
> a massive update of #work.namei as well, also pushed out; not in
> #for-next yet, will post the patch series for review later today.
BTW, looking through that code again, how could this
static bool legitimize_root(struct nameidata *nd)
{
/*
* For scoped-lookups (where nd->root has been zeroed), we need to
* restart the whole lookup from scratch -- because set_root() is wrong
* for these lookups (nd->dfd is the root, not the filesystem root).
*/
if (!nd->root.mnt && (nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
return false;
possibly trigger? The only things that ever clean ->root.mnt are
1) failing legitimize_path(nd, &nd->root, nd->root_seq) in
legitimize_root() itself. If *ANY* legitimize_path() has failed,
we are through - RCU pathwalk is given up. In particular, if you
look at the call chains leading to legitimize_root(), you'll see
that it's called by unlazy_walk() or unlazy_child() and failure
has either of those buggger off immediately. The same goes for
their callers; fail any of those and we are done; the very next
thing that will be done with that nameidata is going to be
terminate_walk(). We don't look at its fields, etc. - just return
to the top level ASAP and call terminate_walk() on it. Which is where
we run into
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED) {
path_put(&nd->root);
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED;
}
paired with setting LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED just before the attempt
to legitimize in legitimize_root(). The next thing *after*
terminate_walk() is either path_init() or the end of life for
that struct nameidata instance.
This is really, really fundamental for understanding the whole
thing - a failure of unlazy_walk/unlazy_child means that we are through
with that attempt.
2) complete_walk() doing
if (!(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_ROOT | LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED)))
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
Can't happen with LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED in flags, obviously.
3) path_init(). Where it's followed either by leaving through
if (*s == '/' && !(flags & LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)) {
....
}
(and LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED includes LOOKUP_IN_ROOT) or with a failure exit
(no calls of *anything* but terminate_walk() after that or with
if (flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED) {
nd->root = nd->path;
... and that makes damn sure nd->root.mnt is not NULL.
And neither of the LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED bits ever gets changed in nd->flags -
they remain as path_init() has set them.
The same, BTW, goes for the check you've added in the beginning of
set_root() - set_root() is called only with NULL nd->root.mnt (trivial to
prove) and that is incompatible with LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED. I'm kinda-sorta
OK with having WARN_ON() there for a while, but IMO the check in the
beginning of legitimize_root() should go away - this kind of defensive
programming only makes harder to reason about the behaviour of the
entire thing. And fs/namei.c is too convoluted as it is...
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-18 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20200115144831.GJ8904@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
2020-01-18 12:07 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] openat2: minor uapi cleanups Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-18 12:07 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] open: introduce openat2(2) syscall Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-18 12:08 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests: add openat2(2) selftests Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-18 15:28 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] openat2: minor uapi cleanups Al Viro
2020-01-18 18:09 ` Al Viro [this message]
2020-01-18 23:03 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-01-19 1:12 ` Al Viro
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