From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4AE0D1CF7AC; Wed, 4 Sep 2024 11:32:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=217.140.110.172 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1725449553; cv=none; b=tW6CZZ9dCoEbxNs+uEVnR7TrYsVdhUE3+MdyPWoDRXOjMwXq1bITIviStfRliXqk7vh8QfjhO7QwKcVa0NuEnSeisZ9A+05w27+ETRNtA7jbOrSo+0mTDMd1RgyJziicY8o5Wj2Anq0c9Y7Gq+l9yYWMWoGMKfGAif0h6iBA2Cg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1725449553; c=relaxed/simple; bh=9Y3Nj71EHi/apUGvsPRSVi2+7S7GYrD1WP5eoRv0v5o=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=JpMNXFnLPzvT59pmkIUd4remP6AnBjAI7RmuK7GYbsfIdUEuzr7qVHLDyxh5z1ZikA7QzRZzzDTCMAB5DIcTeTvE4jIZOcmyF1wEIYF+VqioFwnwN3z3aZv6KCMwgHTFEV9x8uv1MMlwnWg5FbtNEWzYKWvdcD4NoBthJaR7IOo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=arm.com; arc=none smtp.client-ip=217.140.110.172 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=arm.com Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDB9DFEC; Wed, 4 Sep 2024 04:32:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from e124191.cambridge.arm.com (e124191.cambridge.arm.com [10.1.197.45]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 356413F73F; Wed, 4 Sep 2024 04:32:27 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2024 12:32:21 +0100 From: Joey Gouly To: Will Deacon Cc: Catalin Marinas , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, nd@arm.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org, aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com, anshuman.khandual@arm.com, bp@alien8.de, broonie@kernel.org, christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, maz@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com, npiggin@gmail.com, oliver.upton@linux.dev, shuah@kernel.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org, szabolcs.nagy@arm.com, tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 06/30] arm64: context switch POR_EL0 register Message-ID: <20240904113221.GA3891700@e124191.cambridge.arm.com> References: <20240822151113.1479789-1-joey.gouly@arm.com> <20240822151113.1479789-7-joey.gouly@arm.com> <20240823144531.GH32156@willie-the-truck> <20240823170835.GA1181@willie-the-truck> <20240827113803.GB4318@willie-the-truck> <20240903145413.GB3669886@e124191.cambridge.arm.com> <20240904102254.GA13280@willie-the-truck> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20240904102254.GA13280@willie-the-truck> On Wed, Sep 04, 2024 at 11:22:54AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > On Tue, Sep 03, 2024 at 03:54:13PM +0100, Joey Gouly wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 02, 2024 at 08:08:08PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > > On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 12:38:04PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 07:40:52PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 06:08:36PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 05:41:06PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 03:45:32PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > > > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2024 at 04:10:49PM +0100, Joey Gouly wrote: > > > > > > > > > +static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next) > > > > > > > > > +{ > > > > > > > > > + if (!system_supports_poe()) > > > > > > > > > + return; > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > + current->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0); > > > > > > > > > + if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) { > > > > > > > > > + write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0); > > > > > > > > > + /* ISB required for kernel uaccess routines when chaning POR_EL0 */ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > nit: typo "chaning". > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But more substantially, is this just to prevent spurious faults in the > > > > > > > > context of a new thread using a stale value for POR_EL0? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Not just prevent faults but enforce the permissions from the new > > > > > > > thread's POR_EL0. The kernel may continue with a uaccess routine from > > > > > > > here, we can't tell. > > > [...] > > > > > > So what do we actually gain by having the uaccess routines honour this? > > > > > > > > > > I guess where it matters is more like not accidentally faulting because > > > > > the previous thread had more restrictive permissions. > > > > > > > > That's what I wondered initially, but won't the fault handler retry in > > > > that case? > > > > > > Yes, it will retry and this should be fine (I assume you are only > > > talking about the dropping ISB in the context switch). > > > > > > For the case of running with a more permissive stale POR_EL0, arguably it's > > > slightly more predictable for the user but, OTOH, some syscalls like > > > readv() could be routed through GUP with no checks. As with MTE, we > > > don't guarantee uaccesses honour the user permissions. > > > > > > That said, at some point we should sanitise this path anyway and have a > > > single ISB at the end. In the meantime, I'm fine with dropping the ISB > > > here. > > > > > > > commit 3141fb86bee8d48ae47cab1594dad54f974a8899 > > Author: Joey Gouly > > Date: Tue Sep 3 15:47:26 2024 +0100 > > > > fixup! arm64: context switch POR_EL0 register > > > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c > > index a3a61ecdb165..c224b0955f1a 100644 > > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c > > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c > > @@ -515,11 +515,8 @@ static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next) > > return; > > > > current->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0); > > - if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) { > > + if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) > > write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0); > > - /* ISB required for kernel uaccess routines when chaning POR_EL0 */ > > - isb(); > > - } > > } > > What about the one in flush_poe()? I'm inclined to drop that as well. Yes I guess that one can be removed too. Catalin any comments? > > > Will, do you want me to re-send the series with this and the permissions > > diff from the other thread [1], > > or you ok with applying them when you pull it in? > > I'll have a crack now, but if it fails miserably then I'll let you know. Thanks! Just to make sure, you should pick the patch up from https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20240903152937.GA3768522@e124191.cambridge.arm.com/ Not the one I linked to in [1] in my previous e-mail. Thanks, Joey