From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from out-189.mta1.migadu.com (out-189.mta1.migadu.com [95.215.58.189]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4FFBA37EFE2 for ; Mon, 20 Apr 2026 02:55:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=95.215.58.189 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776653734; cv=none; b=MdtrrbkwI7aCcHezsrIcKDurolWJD0EyR1/1YnJDr2Y6xPGQuZEEp+unDOh2Br3/I//OTPjVuGmXfPdwMVVqszHalJdXzRtAwopoxGiVG44pDCHJLa3r6sRKHriNOunE1hhm0YpObFDJ89ccls7JJGme7hsZ+2+ZscMFBhjI4ao= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1776653734; c=relaxed/simple; bh=W+YhvuHhs0tpeD/R6Thui+aVfpVb/wJM8LJx2eu4Ffw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=XrClScFwxX9ryn03cXZn9KMtQ6Bj6TVdiSwLgbxaLPB9kFw6qGjs0Am8fKcw8aTyisnadCuUk3Fmn/5pkfRoDF+yZrvbPNlE8TWdAjGqmFuJ16JM7FtWm+qwpZm772mGbPv29YiezFvIVhzIPH1Fb6MPEJEtOiUdTpNb2NcPvfI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b=wmMB/PyV; arc=none smtp.client-ip=95.215.58.189 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b="wmMB/PyV" X-Report-Abuse: Please report any abuse attempt to abuse@migadu.com and include these headers. DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.dev; s=key1; t=1776653717; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=wp8FZznvlQ3LIkoMDFeNKqv6fbtzOk5vOjQ3wvKUWag=; b=wmMB/PyVmIOoQtSfg4u3z1sUPnRt1IG9m3PmxFhbZmpeAYSQk2Eaz/IjQzU1niRXtx/T+q 01ucqJMe7QeqwNF83mXLa4hFipj0ped2Ybwae5spy597bc2139w6uNsdKJz7k267AZc45u 0h5Dy8ApLfF0o8acel5xKbUg0i3vUT0= From: Jiayuan Chen To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jiayuan Chen , Eric Dumazet , Neal Cardwell , Kuniyuki Iwashima , "David S. Miller" , David Ahern , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , Shuah Khan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH net 2/2] selftests/net: packetdrill: cover challenge ACK on SEG.ACK > SND.NXT Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 10:54:09 +0800 Message-ID: <20260420025428.101192-3-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> In-Reply-To: <20260420025428.101192-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> References: <20260420025428.101192-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Migadu-Flow: FLOW_OUT Exercise the RFC 5961 Section 5.2 / RFC 793 Section 3.9 requirement on the upper edge of the acceptable ACK range, mirroring the existing coverage of the SEG.ACK < SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND case. After the peer ACKs data the receiver has never sent, the receiver must respond with and drop the offending segment. The script validates this exact response. Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen --- .../tcp_rfc5961_ack-beyond-snd-nxt.pkt | 31 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/packetdrill/tcp_rfc5961_ack-beyond-snd-nxt.pkt diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/packetdrill/tcp_rfc5961_ack-beyond-snd-nxt.pkt b/tools/testing/selftests/net/packetdrill/tcp_rfc5961_ack-beyond-snd-nxt.pkt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..29d61a98d5ef --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/packetdrill/tcp_rfc5961_ack-beyond-snd-nxt.pkt @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// +// RFC 5961 Section 5.2 / RFC 793 Section 3.9: when a received +// segment's SEG.ACK acknowledges data we have never sent +// (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT), the receiver MUST discard the segment and +// send a challenge ACK back. +// +// Complement the existing mitigation for the symmetric +// (SEG.ACK < SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) case. + +`./defaults.sh` + + // Open listener socket + 0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 + +0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 + +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 + +0 listen(3, 1) = 0 + + // Three-way handshake + +0 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 + +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <...> + +.1 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 + +0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 + + // Server has sent no data yet: SND.UNA = SND.NXT = 1, RCV.NXT = 1. + // Peer sends a pure ACK with SEG.ACK = 2, which is > SND.NXT. + +0 < . 1:1(0) ack 2 win 257 + + // Expect an immediate challenge ACK: + // + +0 > . 1:1(0) ack 1 -- 2.43.0