From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC bpf-next 4/9] bpf: Add kfuncs to allocate and seal user pages
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 21:57:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261021195759.119421-5-jolsa@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261021195759.119421-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Adding sleepable BPF kfuncs for allocating anonymous pages
in the current process and changing an allocated page to
read/execute permissions. The mapping remains in userspace
until it is unmapped or the process exits.
It's allowed only for sleepable kprobe type, which technicaly
means only sleepable uprobe.
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 127 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 4d9e9423826a..246f4969a144 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
#include <linux/task_work.h>
#include <linux/irq_work.h>
#include <linux/buildid.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
#include "../../lib/kstrtox.h"
@@ -3739,6 +3743,127 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_mm(void *dst, u32 dst__sz,
return ret;
}
+/* vm_private_data token for the unmergeable anonymous mapping below. */
+static char bpf_user_page_marker;
+
+/**
+ * bpf_user_page_alloc() - Allocate lazy anonymous pages in the current mm
+ * @nr_pages: Number of pages to allocate
+ *
+ * Creates a read/write anonymous mapping in the current task's address space.
+ * The mapping is kept non-executable even for tasks with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC,
+ * to avoid creating a writable executable mapping. The physical page is
+ * allocated on its first access. The mapping remains until userspace unmaps
+ * it or the process exits.
+ *
+ * Return: The userspace address on success, or a negative error code.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc long bpf_user_page_alloc(unsigned long nr_pages)
+{
+ const unsigned long prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+ const unsigned long flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ unsigned long addr, populate, len;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int err;
+
+ if (unlikely(in_interrupt() || current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_EXITING)))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(!nmi_uaccess_okay()))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(!mm))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (unlikely(!nr_pages || nr_pages > (ULONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ len = nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ err = security_mmap_file(NULL, prot, flags);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, len, prot, flags,
+ mk_vma_flags(VMA_DONTEXPAND_BIT, VMA_DONTCOPY_BIT, VMA_DONTDUMP_BIT),
+ 0, &populate, NULL);
+ if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
+ /* VM_DONTEXPAND prevents merging this mapping into another VMA. */
+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+ vma_start_write(vma);
+ if (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) {
+ vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_EXEC);
+ vma_set_page_prot(vma);
+ }
+ vma->vm_private_data = &bpf_user_page_marker;
+ }
+
+ mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+ if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(addr) && populate)
+ mm_populate(addr, populate);
+ return addr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_user_page_exec() - Make a BPF-allocated user page read/execute
+ * @addr: Address of the page to change
+ *
+ * Changes a writable page created by bpf_user_page_alloc() to read/execute.
+ * The page cannot be made writable again after this call.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_user_page_exec(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ struct page *page;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(in_interrupt() ||
+ current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_EXITING)))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(!nmi_uaccess_okay()))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(!mm))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if ((addr & ~PAGE_MASK) || addr > ULONG_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+ if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr)
+ goto out;
+ /* Allow to change only vma allocated by bpf_user_page_alloc. */
+ if (vma->vm_private_data != &bpf_user_page_marker)
+ goto out;
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC))
+ goto out;
+
+ vma_start_write(vma);
+
+ err = get_user_pages(addr, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &page);
+ if (err != 1) {
+ if (!err)
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ flush_icache_user_page(vma, page, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ err = do_mprotect_pkey_locked(addr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, -1);
+ if (!err) {
+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+ vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE);
+ }
+ put_page(page);
+out:
+ mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+ return err;
+}
+
/**
* bpf_probe_write_user_faultable() - Copy data to userspace with page faults
* enabled
@@ -5171,6 +5296,8 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set generic_kfunc_set = {
};
BTF_KFUNCS_START(user_mem_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_user_page_alloc, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_user_page_exec, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_probe_write_user_faultable, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
BTF_KFUNCS_END(user_mem_btf_ids)
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-21 19:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-21 19:57 [RFC bpf-next 0/9] bpf: Add support to allocate user page Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 1/9] bpf: Add __srcptr kfunc argument suffix Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 2/9] bpf: Add uprobe faultable user copy kfunc Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 3/9] mm: Expose locked mprotect operation Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-22 10:25 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-22 19:39 ` Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 19:57 ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2026-10-21 20:41 ` [RFC bpf-next 4/9] bpf: Add kfuncs to allocate and seal user pages bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 5/9] selftests/bpf: Add __srcptr kfunc arguments test Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 6/9] selftests/bpf: Add user page allocation test Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 7/9] selftests/bpf: Add uprobe user page exec test Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 8/9] selftests/bpf: Add faultable user page writes test Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 19:57 ` [RFC bpf-next 9/9] selftests/bpf: Add user page failures test Jiri Olsa
2026-10-21 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-21 21:53 ` [RFC bpf-next 0/9] bpf: Add support to allocate user page Alexei Starovoitov
2026-10-22 10:01 ` Jiri Olsa
2026-10-22 10:27 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
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