From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 01E3CC4332B for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:21:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFA3564E10 for ; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:21:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232002AbhBHKVh (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:21:37 -0500 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:36056 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232022AbhBHKT1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Feb 2021 05:19:27 -0500 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.com; s=susede1; t=1612779520; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=FUp0sifzo5QTEnzB7ndOii0XZdyCiwTOujlpEkca5cM=; b=Qbcw7jgSXKtAlANhPWc3Z7/0P5cS0SLsNfxe79dJAeSLS9zxSZIOgKQ4yx4VXh5YB1FVB+ 55fvFklw7TEoDwyW+2lRw/2LHy5r5yY1UMZg1l8F3aOG1GEwyEbsXAG9lTduRQH97GtReJ rWtcW7iHCW8MI13TZHpHq96oAWB7ik8= Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C932AD62; Mon, 8 Feb 2021 10:18:40 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 11:18:37 +0100 From: Michal Hocko To: Mike Rapoport Cc: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Palmer Dabbelt Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Message-ID: References: <20210208084920.2884-1-rppt@kernel.org> <20210208084920.2884-9-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210208084920.2884-9-rppt@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org On Mon 08-02-21 10:49:18, Mike Rapoport wrote: > From: Mike Rapoport > > It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation > snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially > will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. > > Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Does this feature need any special handling? As it is effectivelly unevictable memory then it should behave the same as other mlock, ramfs which should already disable hibernation as those cannot be swapped out, no? -- Michal Hocko SUSE Labs