From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"vkuznets@redhat.com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
"xin@zytor.com" <xin@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 17:09:22 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZjC1QpnyQA0gHoo4@chao-email> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240207172646.3981-16-xin3.li@intel.com>
On Thu, Feb 08, 2024 at 01:26:35AM +0800, Xin Li wrote:
>Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to have it dump FRED context.
>
>Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
>Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
>---
>
>Change since v1:
>* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
>* Dump guest FRED states only if guest has FRED enabled (Nikolay Borisov).
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index a484b9ac2400..e3409607122d 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -6392,7 +6392,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
> u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
>- u64 tertiary_exec_control;
>+ u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;
> unsigned long cr4;
> int efer_slot;
>
>@@ -6403,6 +6403,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
> vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
>+ secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
>+ vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
> cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
>@@ -6449,6 +6451,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
> vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
> vmx_dump_sel("TR: ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (kvm_is_fred_enabled(vcpu)) {
FRED MSRs are accessible even if CR4.FRED isn't set and #ifdef is ugly, I think
you can simply do:
if (vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
just like below handling for EFER/PAT etc.
>+ pr_err("FRED guest: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP0=0x%016lx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
>+ read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>+ }
>+#endif
> efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
> if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
> pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
>@@ -6496,6 +6511,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
> pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
> vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
ditto
>+ pr_err("FRED host: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP0=0x%016llx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
>+ vmx->msr_host_fred_rsp0,
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>+ }
>+#endif
> pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
> vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
> vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
>@@ -6517,25 +6545,29 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
> pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
> cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
>- pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
>- pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
>+ pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=0x%08x\n",
>+ pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl);
>+ pr_err("ExitControls=0x%08x SecondaryExitControls=0x%016llx\n",
>+ vmexit_ctl, secondary_vmexit_ctl);
> pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
> vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
> vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
> vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
>- pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
>+ pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x event data=%016llx\n",
s/event data/event_data/
> vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
> vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
>- vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
>+ vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN),
>+ kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
again, it is better to check some vmexit/vmentry ctrl bit.
> pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
> pr_err(" reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
>- pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
>+ pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x event data=%016llx\n",
s/event data/event_data/
> vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
>- vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
>+ vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE),
>+ kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
ditto
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-30 9:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-07 17:26 [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:21 ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:22 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 3:27 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:24 ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2024-04-19 11:02 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 3:31 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] KVM: VMX: Set intercept for FRED MSRs Xin Li
2024-04-19 13:35 ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:06 ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-05 17:09 ` Xin Li
2024-09-12 20:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-18 8:35 ` Xin Li
2024-09-25 14:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-25 22:13 ` Xin Li
2024-09-27 17:48 ` Xin Li
2024-09-30 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 21:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:01 ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:02 ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:23 ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 16:37 ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-10 15:51 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 16:15 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 17:17 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 19:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-17 17:31 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 13:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-18 17:44 ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 21:04 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-07-19 15:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-21 18:09 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2024-04-29 6:31 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2024-04-29 8:24 ` Chao Gao
2024-05-11 1:24 ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11 1:53 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2024-04-30 3:14 ` Chao Gao
2024-05-10 9:36 ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11 3:03 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 23:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 5:29 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 22:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 18:02 ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Xin Li
2024-04-30 7:34 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li
2024-04-30 8:21 ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 18:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2024-04-30 9:09 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2024-06-12 23:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li
2024-03-29 20:18 ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-03-29 20:18 ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-24 16:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-27 8:08 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Kang, Shan
2024-06-13 18:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-14 0:52 ` Li, Xin3
2024-04-15 17:58 ` Li, Xin3
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