Re: [PATCH v4 29/30] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv

Bagas Sanjaya
2024-09-16T03:20:52Z

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On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 04:16:48PM -0700, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> Adding documentation on shadow stack for user mode on riscv and kernel
> interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
> ---
> Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 169 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst

Add the toctree entry:

---- >8 ----
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst
index be7237b6968213..e240eb0ceb70c4 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ RISC-V architecture
vector
cmodx
zicfilp
+ zicfiss

features

> +Following structure has been added to sigcontext for RISC-V. `rsvd` field has been kept
> +in case we need some extra information in future for landing pads / indirect branch
> +tracking. It has been kept today in order to allow backward compatibility in future.
> +
> +struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state {
> + unsigned long ss_ptr;
> + unsigned long rsvd;
> +};

Sphinx reports indentation warning again:

Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst:163: WARNING: Definition list ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.

I have to wrap __sc_riscv_cfi_state struct definition as a literal code block:

---- >8 ----
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
index f133b6af9c1525..96d85ed352b146 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
@@ -155,12 +155,12 @@ make sure that there is a `shadow stack token` in addition to invoking `sigretur
-----------------------
Following structure has been added to sigcontext for RISC-V. `rsvd` field has been kept
in case we need some extra information in future for landing pads / indirect branch
-tracking. It has been kept today in order to allow backward compatibility in future.
+tracking. It has been kept today in order to allow backward compatibility in future::

-struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state {
+ struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state {
unsigned long ss_ptr;
unsigned long rsvd;
-};
+ };

As part of signal delivery, shadow stack token is saved on current shadow stack itself and
updated pointer is saved away in `ss_ptr` field in `__sc_riscv_cfi_state` under `sigcontext`

> +
> +As part of signal delivery, shadow stack token is saved on current shadow stack itself and
> +updated pointer is saved away in `ss_ptr` field in `__sc_riscv_cfi_state` under `sigcontext`
> +Existing shadow stack allocation is used for signal delivery. During `sigreturn`, kernel will
> +obtain `ss_ptr` from `sigcontext` and verify the saved token on shadow stack itself and switch
> +shadow stack.

Also inline the code identifiers (keywords):

---- >8 ----
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
index 96d85ed352b146..9f721fbcaa6f6a 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
@@ -23,30 +23,30 @@ of the program.

Return addresses live on stack and thus in read-write memory and thus are
susceptible to corruption and allows an adversary to reach any program counter
-(PC) in address space. On RISC-V `zicfiss` extension provides an alternate stack
-`shadow stack` on which return addresses can be safely placed in prolog of the
-function and retrieved in epilog. `zicfiss` extension makes following changes
+(PC) in address space. On RISC-V ``zicfiss`` extension provides an alternate stack
+(`shadow stack`) on which return addresses can be safely placed in prolog of the
+function and retrieved in epilog. ``zicfiss`` extension makes following changes:

- PTE encodings for shadow stack virtual memory
An earlier reserved encoding in first stage translation i.e.
PTE.R=0, PTE.W=1, PTE.X=0 becomes PTE encoding for shadow stack pages.

- - `sspush x1/x5` instruction pushes (stores) `x1/x5` to shadow stack.
+ - ``sspush x1/x5`` instruction pushes (stores) `x1/x5`` to shadow stack.

- - `sspopchk x1/x5` instruction pops (loads) from shadow stack and compares
- with `x1/x5` and if un-equal, CPU raises `software check exception` with
- `*tval = 3`
+ - ``sspopchk x1/x5`` instruction pops (loads) from shadow stack and compares
+ with ``x1/x5`` and if not equal, CPU raises software check exception
+ with ``*tval = 3``

-Compiler toolchain makes sure that function prologs have `sspush x1/x5` to save return
-address on shadow stack in addition to regular stack. Similarly function epilogs have
-`ld x5, offset(x2)`; `sspopchk x5` to ensure that popped value from regular stack
-matches with popped value from shadow stack.
+Compiler toolchain makes sure that function prologs have ``sspush x1/x5`` to
+save return address on shadow stack in addition to regular stack. Similarly
+function epilogs have ``ld x5, offset(x2); sspopchk x5`` to ensure that popped
+value from regular stack matches with popped value from shadow stack.

2. Shadow stack protections and linux memory manager
-----------------------------------------------------

As mentioned earlier, shadow stack get new page table encodings and thus have some
-special properties assigned to them and instructions that operate on them as below
+special properties assigned to them and instructions that operate on them as below:

- Regular stores to shadow stack memory raises access store faults.
This way shadow stack memory is protected from stray inadvertant
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ special properties assigned to them and instructions that operate on them as bel
shadow stack store.

- Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-only memory raises
- AMO/store page fault. Thus both `sspush x1/x5` and `sspopchk x1/x5`
+ AMO/store page fault. Thus both ``sspush x1/x5`` and ``sspopchk x1/x5``
will raise AMO/store page fault. This simplies COW handling in kernel
During fork, kernel can convert shadow stack pages into read-only
memory (as it does for regular read-write memory) and as soon as
- subsequent `sspush` or `sspopchk` in userspace is encountered, then
+ subsequent ``sspush`` or ``sspopchk`` in userspace is encountered, then
kernel can perform COW.

- Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-write, read-write-
@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ special properties assigned to them and instructions that operate on them as bel
3. ELF and psABI
-----------------

-Toolchain sets up `GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_BCFI` for property
-`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object file.
+Toolchain sets up ``GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_BCFI`` for property
+``GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND`` in notes section of the object file.

4. Linux enabling
------------------
@@ -89,25 +89,25 @@ shadow stack for the program.
5. prctl() enabling
--------------------

-`PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` / `PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` /
-`PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage shadow stack
+``PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`` / ``PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`` /
+``PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`` are three prctls added to manage shadow stack
enabling for tasks. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other arches.

-`PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`: If arg1 `PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` and if CPU supports
-`zicfiss` then kernel will enable shadow stack for the task. Dynamic loader can
-issue this `prctl` once it has determined that all the objects loaded in address
-space have support for shadow stack. Additionally if there is a `dlopen` to an
-object which wasn't compiled with `zicfiss`, dynamic loader can issue this prctl
-with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. `PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` being clear)
+``PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS``: If arg1 ``PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE`` and if CPU supports
+``zicfiss`` then kernel will enable shadow stack for the task. Dynamic loader can
+issue this ``prctl`` once it has determined that all the objects loaded in address
+space have support for shadow stack. Additionally if there is a ``dlopen`` to an
+object which wasn't compiled with ``zicfiss``, dynamic loader can issue this prctl
+with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. ``PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE`` being clear)

-`PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`: Returns current status of indirect branch tracking.
-If enabled it'll return `PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE`
+``PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS``: Returns current status of indirect branch tracking.
+If enabled it'll return ``PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE``

-`PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`: Locks current status of shadow stack enabling on the
-task. User space may want to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want
-loading of objects without `zicfiss` support in it and thus would want to disallow
-disabling of shadow stack on current task. In that case user space can use this prctl
-to lock current settings.
+``PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS``: Locks current status of shadow stack enabling
+on the task. User space may want to run with strict security posture and
+wouldn't want loading of objects without ``zicfiss`` support in it and thus
+would want to disallow disabling of shadow stack on current task. In that case
+user space can use this prctl to lock current settings.

5. violations related to returns with shadow stack enabled
-----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -115,22 +115,22 @@ to lock current settings.
Pertaining to shadow stack, CPU raises software check exception in following
condition

- - On execution of `sspopchk x1/x5`, x1/x5 didn't match top of shadow stack.
- If mismatch happens then cpu does `*tval = 3` and raise software check
- exception
+ - On execution of ``sspopchk x1/x5``, x1/x5 didn't match top of shadow
+ stack. If mismatch happens then cpu does ``*tval = 3`` and raise
+ software check exception.

-Linux kernel will treat this as `SIGSEV`` with code = `SEGV_CPERR` and follow
+Linux kernel will treat this as ``SIGSEV`` with ``SEGV_CPERR`` code and follow
normal course of signal delivery.

6. Shadow stack tokens
-----------------------
-Regular stores on shadow stacks are not allowed and thus can't be tampered with via
-arbitrary stray writes due to bugs. Method of pivoting / switching to shadow stack
-is simply writing to csr `CSR_SSP` changes active shadow stack. This can be problematic
-because usually value to be written to `CSR_SSP` will be loaded somewhere in writeable
-memory and thus allows an adversary to corruption bug in software to pivot to an any
-address in shadow stack range. Shadow stack tokens can help mitigate this problem by
-making sure that:
+Regular stores on shadow stacks are not allowed and thus can't be tampered with
+via arbitrary stray writes due to bugs. Method of pivoting / switching to
+shadow stack is simply writing to csr ``CSR_SSP`` changes active shadow stack.
+This can be problematic because usually value to be written to ``CSR_SSP`` will
+be loaded somewhere in writeable memory and thus allows an adversary to
+corruption bug in software to pivot to an any address in shadow stack range.
+Shadow stack tokens can help mitigate this problem by making sure that:

- When software is switching away from a shadow stack, shadow stack pointer should be
saved on shadow stack itself and call it `shadow stack token`
@@ -139,31 +139,34 @@ making sure that:
from shadow stack pointer and verify that `shadow stack token` itself is pointer to
shadow stack itself.

- - Once the token verification is done, software can perform the write to `CSR_SSP` to
- switch shadow stack.
+ - Once the token verification is done, software can perform the write to
+ ``CSR_SSP`` to switch shadow stack.

-Here software can be user mode task runtime itself which is managing various contexts
-as part of single thread. Software can be kernel as well when kernel has to deliver a
-signal to user task and must save shadow stack pointer. Kernel can perform similar
-procedure by saving a token on user shadow stack itself. This way whenever sigreturn
-happens, kernel can read the token and verify the token and then switch to shadow stack.
-Using this mechanism, kernel helps user task so that any corruption issue in user task
-is not exploited by adversary by arbitrarily using `sigreturn`. Adversary will have to
-make sure that there is a `shadow stack token` in addition to invoking `sigreturn`
+Here software can be user mode task runtime itself which is managing various
+contexts as part of single thread. Software can be kernel as well when kernel
+has to deliver a signal to user task and must save shadow stack pointer. Kernel
+can perform similar procedure by saving a token on user shadow stack itself.
+This way whenever sigreturn happens, kernel can read the token and verify the
+token and then switch to shadow stack. Using this mechanism, kernel helps user
+task so that any corruption issue in user task is not exploited by adversary by
+arbitrarily using ``sigreturn``. Adversary will have to make sure that there is
+a `shadow stack token` in addition to invoking ``sigreturn``

7. Signal shadow stack
-----------------------
-Following structure has been added to sigcontext for RISC-V. `rsvd` field has been kept
-in case we need some extra information in future for landing pads / indirect branch
-tracking. It has been kept today in order to allow backward compatibility in future::
+Following structure has been added to sigcontext for RISC-V. ``rsvd`` field has
+been kept in case we need some extra information in future for landing pads /
+indirect branch tracking. It has been kept today in order to allow backward
+compatibility in future::

struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state {
unsigned long ss_ptr;
unsigned long rsvd;
};

-As part of signal delivery, shadow stack token is saved on current shadow stack itself and
-updated pointer is saved away in `ss_ptr` field in `__sc_riscv_cfi_state` under `sigcontext`
-Existing shadow stack allocation is used for signal delivery. During `sigreturn`, kernel will
-obtain `ss_ptr` from `sigcontext` and verify the saved token on shadow stack itself and switch
-shadow stack.
+As part of signal delivery, shadow stack token is saved on current shadow stack
+itself and updated pointer is saved away in ``ss_ptr`` field in
+``__sc_riscv_cfi_state`` under ``sigcontext`` Existing shadow stack allocation
+is used for signal delivery. During ``sigreturn``, kernel will obtain
+``ss_ptr`` from ``sigcontext`` and verify the saved token on shadow stack
+itself and switch shadow stack.

Thanks.

--
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara

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