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From: xiujianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: <paul@paul-moore.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>,
	<shuah@kernel.org>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next 2/5] landlock: add chmod and chown support
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2022 16:36:18 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c447b4d3-8bc7-5277-5d49-7f4ffd0b5a5b@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8cb3b7df-fb2f-3e3f-7805-4b14cf1bdf90@digikod.net>

Hi,

在 2022/8/24 19:44, Mickaël Salaün 写道:
> 
> On 23/08/2022 14:50, xiujianfeng wrote:
>>
>>
>> 在 2022/8/23 5:07, Mickaël Salaün 写道:
>>>
>>> On 22/08/2022 20:25, Günther Noack wrote:
>>>> Hi!
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for sending this patch set! :)
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 22, 2022 at 07:46:58PM +0800, Xiu Jianfeng wrote:
>>>>> Add two flags LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHOWN to
>>>>> support restriction to chmod(2) and chown(2) with landlock.
>>>>>
>>>>> Also change the landlock ABI version from 3 to 4.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                |  8 ++++++--
>>>>>    security/landlock/fs.c                       | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>>>>>    security/landlock/limits.h                   |  2 +-
>>>>>    security/landlock/syscalls.c                 |  2 +-
>>>>>    tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c |  2 +-
>>>>>    tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c   |  6 ++++--
>>>>>    6 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>>>>> b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>>>>> index 735b1fe8326e..5ce633c92722 100644
>>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>>>>> @@ -141,13 +141,15 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>>>>>     *   directory) parent.  Otherwise, such actions are denied with
>>>>> errno set to
>>>>>     *   EACCES.  The EACCES errno prevails over EXDEV to let user 
>>>>> space
>>>>>     *   efficiently deal with an unrecoverable error.
>>>>> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD: Change the file mode bits of a file.
>>>>> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHOWN: Change the owner and/or group of a
>>>>> file.
>>>
>>> This section talk about "access rights that only apply to the content of
>>> a directory, not the directory itself", which is not correct (see
>>> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR). I'd like these access rights to remain
>>> here but this kernel patch and the related tests need some changes.
>>>
>>> What about a LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHGRP? I'm not sure if we need to
>>> differentiate these actions or not, but we need arguments to choose.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>     *
>>>>>     * .. warning::
>>>>>     *
>>>>>     *   It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related
>>>>> actions
>>>>>     *   accessible through these syscall families: 
>>>>> :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
>>>>> - *   :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`,
>>>>> - *   :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, 
>>>>> :manpage:`utime(2)`,
>>>>> + *   :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`,
>>>>> + *   :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`,
>>>>
>>>> *formatting nit*
>>>> We could fill up the full line width here
>>>>
>>>>>     *   :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, 
>>>>> :manpage:`access(2)`.
>>>>>     *   Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
>>>>>     */
>>>>> @@ -167,6 +169,8 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>>>>>    #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM            (1ULL << 12)
>>>>>    #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER            (1ULL << 13)
>>>>>    #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE            (1ULL << 14)
>>>>> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD            (1ULL << 15)
>>>>> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHOWN            (1ULL << 16)
>>>>>    /* clang-format on */
>>>>>
>>>>>    #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
>>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
>>>>> index c57f581a9cd5..c25d5f89c8be 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
>>>>> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
>>>>> @@ -147,7 +147,9 @@ static struct landlock_object
>>>>> *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
>>>>>        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
>>>>>        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
>>>>>        LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
>>>>> -    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
>>>>> +    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
>>>>> +    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD | \
>>>>> +    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHOWN)
>>>>>    /* clang-format on */
>>>>>
>>>>>    /*
>>>>> @@ -1146,6 +1148,16 @@ static int hook_path_truncate(const struct
>>>>> path *const path)
>>>>>        return current_check_access_path(path,
>>>>> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
>>>>>    }
>>>>>
>>>>> +static int hook_path_chmod(const struct path *const dir, umode_t 
>>>>> mode)
>>>
>>> This is not a "dir" but a "path".
>>>
>>>
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD);
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static int hook_path_chown(const struct path *const dir, kuid_t uid,
>>>>> kgid_t gid)
>>>
>>> Same here.
>>>
>>>
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHOWN);
>>>>> +}
>>>>
>>>> One implication of this approach is that the chown+chmod right on a
>>>> directory's contents are always going together with the same rights on
>>>> the directory itself.
>>>>
>>>> For example, if you grant chmod+chown access rights for "datadir/",
>>>> the command "chmod 0600 datadir/file1" will work, but so will the
>>>> command "chmod 0600 datadir". But the approach of checking just the
>>>> parent directory's rights is also inflexible if you think through the
>>>> kinds of rights you can grant with it. (It would also not be possible
>>>> to grant chmod+chown on individual files.)
>>>
>>> Good point. For an initial chmod/chown/chgrp access right, I'd prefer to
>>> be able to set these access rights on a directory but only for its
>>> content, not the directory itself. I think it is much safer and should
>>> be enough for the majority of use cases, but let me know if I'm missing
>>> something. I'm not sure being able to change the root directory access
>>> rights may be a good idea anyway (even for containers). ;)
>>>
>>> A path_beneath rule enables to identify a file hierarchy (i.e. the
>>> content of a directory), not to make modifications visible outside of
>>> the directory identifying the hierarchy (hence the "parent_fd" field),
>>> which would be the case with the current chmod/chown access rights.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Do you have any thoughts on how to resolve this if this flexibility
>>>> might be needed?
>>>>
>>>> I wonder whether the right way to resolve this would be to give users
>>>> a way to make that distinction at the level of landlock_add_rule(),
>>>> with an API like this (note the additional flag):
>>>>
>>>>     err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
>>>>                             &path_beneath, LANDLOCK_STRICTLY_BENEATH);
>>>>                                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>>>
>>>> Multiple calls of landlock_add_rule() on the same file are already
>>>> today joining the requested access rights, so it would be possible to
>>>> mix-and-match "strict beneath" with "beneath" rights on the same
>>>> directory, and it would work in the same way for other access rights
>>>> as well.
>>>
>>> This kind of option is interesting. For now, some access rights are kind
>>> of "doubled" to enable to differentiate between a file and a directory
>>> (i.e. READ_DIR/READ_FILE, REMOVE_DIR/REMOVE_FILE, WRITE_FILE/MAKE_*)
>>> when it may be useful, but this is different.
>>>
>>> I think this "strictly beneath" behavior should be the default, which is
>>> currently the case.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> To be clear: I'm proposing this approach not because I think it should
>>>> be part of this patch set, but because it would be good to have a way
>>>> forward if that kind of flexibility is needed in the future.
>>>>
>>>> Does that seem reasonable?
>>>
>>> This is the kind of questions that made such access rights not
>>> appropriate for the initial version of Landlock. But we should talk
>>> about that now.
>>
>> Hi Günther and Mickaël,
>>
>> Thanks for your comments, so I think the conclusion here is that we have
>> to make sure that in this patchset chown/chmod access rights can be set
>> on a directory only for its content, not the directory itself, right?
>> any good idea about how to implement this? :)
> 
> In such hook code, you need to get the parent directory of the path 
> argument. This require to use and refactor the 
> check_access_path_dual/jump_up part in a dedicated helper (and take care 
> of all the corner cases).
> .

Sorry, I don't quite understand what you mean, but I have another idea, 
how about this?

static int hook_path_chown(const struct path *const path, kuid_t uid, 
kgid_t gid)
{
         int ret;
         struct dentry *parent_dentry;
         struct path eff_path;

         eff_path = *path;
         path_get(&eff_path);
         if (d_is_dir(eff_path.dentry)) {
                 parent_dentry = dget_parent(eff_path.dentry);
                 dput(eff_path.dentry);
                 eff_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
         }
         ret = current_check_access_path(&eff_path, 
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHGRP);
         path_put(&eff_path);

         return ret;
}



  reply	other threads:[~2022-08-26  8:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-22 11:46 [PATCH -next 0/5] landlock: add chmod and chown support Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-22 11:46 ` [PATCH -next 1/5] landlock: expand access_mask_t to u32 type Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-22 11:46 ` [PATCH -next 2/5] landlock: add chmod and chown support Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-22 18:25   ` Günther Noack
2022-08-22 21:07     ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-23 12:50       ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-24 11:44         ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-26  8:36           ` xiujianfeng [this message]
2022-08-26  9:36             ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-26 11:14               ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-26 11:32                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-22 11:46 ` [PATCH -next 3/5] landlock/selftests: add selftests for chmod and chown Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-22 18:53   ` Günther Noack
2022-08-22 21:28     ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-24  8:27     ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-22 19:26   ` Günther Noack
2022-08-27 11:14     ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-27 16:57       ` Günther Noack
2022-08-22 11:47 ` [PATCH -next 4/5] landlock/samples: add chmod and chown support Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-22 11:47 ` [PATCH -next 5/5] landlock: update chmod and chown support in document Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-22 21:25   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-22 19:17 ` [PATCH -next 0/5] landlock: add chmod and chown support Günther Noack
2022-08-22 19:35   ` Casey Schaufler
2022-08-22 21:18     ` Günther Noack
2022-08-22 21:21       ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-22 21:53         ` Casey Schaufler
2022-08-23 17:10           ` Mickaël Salaün

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