From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Alejandro Colomar <alx+linux-man@kernel.org>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:55:26 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avpUW_zBBph5d40d@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261103202211.13820-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
On Tue, 03 Nov 2026 21:22:06 +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> Reword the description of SCM_SECURITY to not be specific to SELinux.
>
> The security context is populated in scm_passec() in linux.git
> net/core/scm.c, through the security_secid_to_secctx() LSM hook, which
> is currently implemented by SELinux, Smack and AppArmor.
>
> As clarified in [1], the returned security context is in the general
> case a byte buffer, not a null-terminated string. The only LSM that
> returns a buffer with trailing null byte is SELinux, but even that is
> not guaranteed in case that the message is truncated.
>
> Link: [1] <https://lore.kernel.org/all/auZcwYWv0NeiIR8d@google.com/>
> Fixes: ffad6a017f91 (2018-07-28; "unix.7: Document SCM_SECURITY ancillary data")
> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
> Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> Notes:
> This feature is also available in other LSMs. Unfortunately, they
> implemented it inconsistently and that complicates the description of
> how string boundaries are handled. Linux does indeed neither
> guarantee that this terminates with a NUL byte, nor that NAME_MAX is
> large enough to hold it.
>
> After confirmation from Kuniyuki Iwashima, this documents it as
> returning a byte buffer.
>
> I prefer this variant over the previous longer one, also because it
> refers to the individual LSMs for the exact format. A reader of the
> security context will require LSM-specific documentation anyway to
> interpret the security context.
>
> This patch is still LLM-assisted, but at this point, since everything
> is rewritten now, the only LLM-assisted part is the discovery that
> this part of the documentation could be improved.
>
> man/man7/unix.7 | 19 +++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/man/man7/unix.7 b/man/man7/unix.7
> index 61f06a74359b..c0e2bdbacdd8 100644
> --- a/man/man7/unix.7
> +++ b/man/man7/unix.7
> @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ .SS Socket options
> is an integer boolean flag.
> .TP
> .B SO_PASSSEC
> -Enables receiving of the SELinux security label of the peer socket
> +Enables receiving of the security label of the peer socket
> in an ancillary message of type
> .B SCM_SECURITY
> (see below).
> @@ -538,13 +538,16 @@ .SS Ancillary messages
> option must be enabled on the socket.
> .TP
> .B SCM_SECURITY
> -Receive the SELinux security context (the security label)
> -of the peer socket.
> -The received ancillary data is a null-terminated string containing
> -the security context.
> -The receiver should allocate at least
> -.B NAME_MAX
> -bytes in the data portion of the ancillary message for this data.
> +Receive the security context (the security label)
> +of the peer socket,
> +as provided by the active Linux Security Module (LSM).
> +The received ancillary data is a byte buffer.
> +.IP
> +The exact format of the security context buffer
> +is defined by the active major LSM.
> +For example,
> +SELinux returns a SELinux label as a string
> +(including a terminating null byte).
nit: s/null/NUL/
otherwise looks good
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 0:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-03 20:22 [PATCH v2 0/8] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] man/man7/unix.7: ERRORS: ETOOMANYREFS: Fix the conditions Günther Noack
2026-11-06 13:00 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] man/man7/unix.7: Multiple same-typed SCM_* messages may be sent in one message Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:52 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] man/man7/unix.7: Autobind: Clarify when it happens, and mention SO_PASSPIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:53 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:55 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] man/man7/unix.7: SO_PASSSEC: wfix Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSPIDFD, SO_PEERPIDFD, and SCM_PIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16 1:03 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSRIGHTS Günther Noack
2026-11-16 1:02 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] man/man7/unix.7: Remove mentions of "namespace" in the general sense Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:59 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
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