Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] media: uvcvideo: Introduce allow_privacy_override module parameter

[Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>]

On Mon, 16 Mar 2026 13:34:46 +0000, Ricardo Ribalda wrote:
> Some camera modules have XU controls that can configure the behaviour of
> the privacy LED.
> 
> Block mapping of those controls, unless the module is configured with
> a new parameter: allow_privacy_override.
> 
> This is just an interim solution. Based on the users feedback, we will
> either put the privacy controls behind a CONFIG option, or completely
> block them.

What feedback do you expect to get?

Users will one day see their setup broken.
They will curse you and jump through the hoops you set up.
Next year they will see their setup broken completely.
They will curse again and wish you all pain, but *after* the fact.

> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
> ---
>  drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c   | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c   |  7 +++++++
>  drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h   |  2 ++
>  include/linux/usb/uvc.h            |  4 ++++
>  5 files changed, 71 insertions(+)

This doesn't seem to cover libusb, VM guests and such.

What's even the attack vector? It has to be full remote code execution.
And it's just an LED, when you see it turn on somebody already has your
mugshot, if you notice at all. And the mugshot isn't your worst worry.

> 
> diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c
> index b6e020b41671..3ca108b83f1d 100644
> --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c
> +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c
> @@ -3001,6 +3001,35 @@ static int uvc_ctrl_init_xu_ctrl(struct uvc_device *dev,
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +bool uvc_ctrl_is_privacy_control(u8 entity[16], u8 selector)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * This list is not exhaustive, it is a best effort to block access to
> +	 * non documented controls that can affect user's privacy.
> +	 */

So it's not removal of some controversial feature, but 3KB of extra
code in everybody's kernel (I just applied this patch) and a forever
game of whack-a-mole with HW vendors? They will win...

You will blacklist features found by legitimate users and shared on
public forums, while hackers will keep their findings to themselves.
Assuming that there are any who even care.

> +	struct privacy_control {
> +		u8 entity[16];
> +		u8 selector;
> +	} privacy_control[] = {
> +		{
> +			.entity = UVC_GUID_LOGITECH_USER_HW_CONTROL_V1,
> +			.selector = 1,
> +		},
> +		{
> +			.entity = UVC_GUID_LOGITECH_PERIPHERAL,
> +			.selector = 9,
> +		},
> +	};
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(privacy_control); i++)
> +		if (!memcmp(entity, privacy_control[i].entity, 16) &&
> +		    selector == privacy_control[i].selector)
> +			return true;
> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  int uvc_xu_ctrl_query(struct uvc_video_chain *chain,
>  	struct uvc_xu_control_query *xqry)
>  {
> @@ -3045,6 +3074,15 @@ int uvc_xu_ctrl_query(struct uvc_video_chain *chain,
>  		return -ENOENT;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (uvc_ctrl_is_privacy_control(entity->guid, xqry->selector) &&
> +	    !uvc_allow_privacy_override_param) {
> +		dev_warn_once(&chain->dev->intf->dev,
> +			      "Privacy related controls can only be accessed if module parameter allow_privacy_override is true\n");
> +		uvc_dbg(chain->dev, CONTROL, "Blocking access to privacy related Control %pUl/%u\n",
> +			entity->guid, xqry->selector);
> +		return -EACCES;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&chain->ctrl_mutex))
>  		return -ERESTARTSYS;
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
> index b0ca81d924b6..74c9dea29d36 100644
> --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
> +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ unsigned int uvc_no_drop_param = 1;
>  static unsigned int uvc_quirks_param = -1;
>  unsigned int uvc_dbg_param;
>  unsigned int uvc_timeout_param = UVC_CTRL_STREAMING_TIMEOUT;
> +bool uvc_allow_privacy_override_param;
>  
>  static struct usb_driver uvc_driver;
>  
> @@ -2505,6 +2506,25 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(trace, "Trace level bitmask");
>  module_param_named(timeout, uvc_timeout_param, uint, 0644);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(timeout, "Streaming control requests timeout");
>  
> +static int param_set_privacy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
> +{
> +	pr_warn_once("uvcvideo: " DEPRECATED
> +		     "allow_privacy_override parameter will be eventually removed.\n");
> +	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_privacy = {
> +	.set = param_set_privacy,
> +	.get = param_get_bool,
> +};
> +
> +param_check_bool(allow_privacy_override, &uvc_allow_privacy_override_param);
> +module_param_cb(allow_privacy_override, &param_ops_privacy,
> +		&uvc_allow_privacy_override_param, 0644);
> +__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(allow_privacy_override, "bool");
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(allow_privacy_override,
> +		 "Allow access to privacy related controls");
> +
>  /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>   * Driver initialization and cleanup
>   */
> diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
> index f9049e9c0d3a..6d4f027c8402 100644
> --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
> +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
> @@ -133,6 +133,13 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_xu_ctrl_map(struct uvc_video_chain *chain,
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (uvc_ctrl_is_privacy_control(xmap->entity, xmap->selector) &&
> +	    !uvc_allow_privacy_override_param) {
> +		dev_warn_once(&chain->dev->intf->dev,
> +			      "Privacy related controls can only be mapped if module parameter allow_privacy_override is true\n");
> +		return -EACCES;
> +	}
> +
>  	map = kzalloc_obj(*map);
>  	if (map == NULL)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h
> index 8480d65ecb85..362110d58ca3 100644
> --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h
> +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h
> @@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ extern unsigned int uvc_no_drop_param;
>  extern unsigned int uvc_dbg_param;
>  extern unsigned int uvc_timeout_param;
>  extern unsigned int uvc_hw_timestamps_param;
> +extern bool uvc_allow_privacy_override_param;
>  
>  #define uvc_dbg(_dev, flag, fmt, ...)					\
>  do {									\
> @@ -794,6 +795,7 @@ int uvc_xu_ctrl_query(struct uvc_video_chain *chain,
>  		      struct uvc_xu_control_query *xqry);
>  
>  void uvc_ctrl_cleanup_fh(struct uvc_fh *handle);
> +bool uvc_ctrl_is_privacy_control(u8 entity[16], u8 selector);
>  
>  /* Utility functions */
>  struct usb_host_endpoint *uvc_find_endpoint(struct usb_host_interface *alts,
> diff --git a/include/linux/usb/uvc.h b/include/linux/usb/uvc.h
> index dea23aabbad4..70c2a7d25236 100644
> --- a/include/linux/usb/uvc.h
> +++ b/include/linux/usb/uvc.h
> @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
>  #define UVC_GUID_LOGITECH_PERIPHERAL \
>  	{0x21, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0xff, 0x30, 0x80, 0x2c, 0x4e, \
>  	 0x82, 0xd9, 0xf5, 0x87, 0xd0, 0x05, 0x40, 0xbd }
> +#define UVC_GUID_LOGITECH_USER_HW_CONTROL_V1 \
> +	{0x82, 0x06, 0x61, 0x63, 0x70, 0x50, 0xab, 0x49, \
> +	 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x85, 0x5e, 0x8d, 0x22, 0x1f }
> +
>  
>  /* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/stream/uvc-extensions-1-5#222-extension-unit-controls */
>  #define UVC_MSXU_CONTROL_FOCUS			0x01
> 
> -- 
> 2.53.0.851.ga537e3e6e9-goog
>