From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap. Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 18:16:35 -0400 Message-ID: <20180327221635.GA3790@thunk.org> References: <1521736598-12812-1-git-send-email-blackzert@gmail.com> <20180323124806.GA5624@bombadil.infradead.org> <651E0DB6-4507-4DA1-AD46-9C26ED9792A8@gmail.com> <20180326084650.GC5652@dhcp22.suse.cz> <01A133F4-27DF-4AE2-80D6-B0368BF758CD@gmail.com> <20180327072432.GY5652@dhcp22.suse.cz> <0549F29C-12FC-4401-9E85-A430BC11DA78@gmail.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=thunk.org; s=ef5046eb; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type: MIME-Version:References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender: Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Id:List-Help:List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=Qj2I7BshdUHsbFfEKXQ0bFfkdiDTRJGc48sJd/7D8gQ=; b=btEd/5pMdHT1reg7t3RBaUE+uy /Bdw3z7jY7XeWJoswHfXhWDplC89IpsQG/vDQ6v1dDJtSejjuTff8lZCXoolBOru0ZDECFa4i2Sel +sLj1kXCx8bmRRzTvzjDMJZe+nV+SxziLAYDIYo7YWW9gxNtak2ZhetNJJWJVDEUw5as=; Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <0549F29C-12FC-4401-9E85-A430BC11DA78@gmail.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" To: Ilya Smith Cc: Michal Hocko , Matthew Wilcox , rth@twiddle.net, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, mattst88@gmail.com, vgupta@synopsys.com, linux@armlinux.org.uk, tony.luck@intel.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com, ralf@linux-mips.org, jejb@parisc-linux.org, Helge Deller , benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com, ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, nyc@holomorphy.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, deepa.kernel@gmail.com, Hugh Dickins , kstewart@linuxfoundation.org, pombredanne@nexb.com, Andrew Morton On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote: > > /dev/[u]random is not sufficient? > > Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a performance > issue. You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel. > > Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges > > tracking… > > I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR in > user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ‘nether’ or ‘some-day’. And problem > of ASLR will stay forever. Why can't you send patches to the libc developers? Regards, - Ted