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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __seccomp_filter()
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 16:03:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250128150321.GA15343@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250128150228.GA15298@redhat.com>

After the previous change 'sd' is always NULL.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/seccomp.c | 21 ++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 281e853bae8c..4bd2eb50f77b 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1218,13 +1218,12 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
 	return -1;
 }
 
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
-			    const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 {
 	u32 filter_ret, action;
+	struct seccomp_data sd;
 	struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
 	int data;
-	struct seccomp_data sd_local;
 
 	/*
 	 * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
@@ -1232,12 +1231,9 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
 	 */
 	smp_rmb();
 
-	if (!sd) {
-		populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
-		sd = &sd_local;
-	}
+	populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
 
-	filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
+	filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(&sd, &match);
 	data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
 	action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL;
 
@@ -1295,13 +1291,13 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
 		 * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
 		 * a skip would have already been reported.
 		 */
-		if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
+		if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
 			return -1;
 
 		return 0;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
-		if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, sd))
+		if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, &sd))
 			goto skip;
 
 		return 0;
@@ -1343,8 +1339,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
 	return -1;
 }
 #else
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
-			    const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 {
 	BUG();
 
@@ -1368,7 +1363,7 @@ int __secure_computing(void)
 		__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);  /* may call do_exit */
 		return 0;
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
-		return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, false);
+		return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, false);
 	/* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD:
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
-- 
2.25.1.362.g51ebf55


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-28 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-28 15:02 [PATCH v2 0/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] seccomp/mips: change syscall_trace_enter() to use secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] seccomp: fix the __secure_computing() stub for !HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-29 14:26   ` Linus Walleij
2025-01-28 15:03 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-28 15:03 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2025-02-10 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] " Kees Cook

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