From: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
To: tsbogend@alpha.franken.de
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, ralf@mips.com, atomlin@atomlin.com,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3] mips: sched: Fix CPUMASK_OFFSTACK memory corruption
Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 10:16:51 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260526141651.773306-1-atomlin@atomlin.com> (raw)
This patch addresses a critical memory management flaw. When
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled, cpumask_var_t is a pointer.
Consequently, sizeof(new_mask) evaluates to the pointer size, causing
copy_from_user() to clobber the mask pointer. Furthermore, the old
logic performed copy_from_user() before allocating the mask.
Fix this by allocating new_mask first. To handle variable-sized user
masks correctly, use cpumask_size() to truncate overly large user masks
or pad undersized masks with zeros before copying the data directly into
the allocated buffer.
Fixes: 295cbf6d63165 ("[MIPS] Move FPU affinity code into separate file.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
---
Changes since v2 [1]:
- Dropped patch 1. This is to be addressed by the cgroup cpuset
maintainer (Waiman Long)
- Dropped patch 3. Will be submitted as a separate patch (Paul Moore)
Changes since v1 [2]:
- Reordered the allocation and user-copy of new_mask in the MIPS
architecture's mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity() to occur before the
LSM hook is invoked. This ensures the security modules evaluate a fully
populated mask rather than uninitialised memory, while cleanly handling
error unwinding
- Updated cpuset_can_fork() to pass the destination cpuset's effective CPU
mask instead of NULL
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260509213803.968464-1-atomlin@atomlin.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260509164847.939294-1-atomlin@atomlin.com/
---
arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
index 10172fc4f627..4fead87d2f43 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
@@ -71,11 +71,16 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
struct task_struct *p;
int retval;
- if (len < sizeof(new_mask))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (copy_from_user(&new_mask, user_mask_ptr, sizeof(new_mask)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&new_mask, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (len < cpumask_size())
+ cpumask_clear(new_mask);
+ else if (len > cpumask_size())
+ len = cpumask_size();
+ if (copy_from_user(new_mask, user_mask_ptr, len)) {
+ retval = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_free_new_mask;
+ }
cpus_read_lock();
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -84,7 +89,8 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
if (!p) {
rcu_read_unlock();
cpus_read_unlock();
- return -ESRCH;
+ retval = -ESRCH;
+ goto out_free_new_mask;
}
/* Prevent p going away */
@@ -95,13 +101,9 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out_put_task;
}
- if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&new_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
- }
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&effective_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_new_mask;
+ goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
}
if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
retval = -EPERM;
@@ -142,13 +144,13 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
}
out_unlock:
free_cpumask_var(effective_mask);
-out_free_new_mask:
- free_cpumask_var(new_mask);
out_free_cpus_allowed:
free_cpumask_var(cpus_allowed);
out_put_task:
put_task_struct(p);
cpus_read_unlock();
+out_free_new_mask:
+ free_cpumask_var(new_mask);
return retval;
}
base-commit: 5200f5f493f79f14bbdc349e402a40dfb32f23c8
--
2.51.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-05-26 14:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-26 14:16 Aaron Tomlin [this message]
2026-06-15 10:29 ` [PATCH v3] mips: sched: Fix CPUMASK_OFFSTACK memory corruption Thomas Bogendoerfer
2026-06-15 12:45 ` Aaron Tomlin
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