From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail.8bytes.org (mail.8bytes.org [85.214.250.239]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9CB9E3D332B; Mon, 8 Jun 2026 14:43:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=85.214.250.239 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1780929795; cv=none; b=CzQP0D+S/nt1trpFBx3W26MBLAVnYKaA/hf4uGg+fkMJZBJcrGnYQSZmEdrNBObY0K5rKUiUvH0IkzSaGS4BEZXlKejGwrVAn07ts0Pd39OSio9R3X9GNjQVwjZo32Hh8wTxylF91CxfUXJD8iwMQ5k7R9ax3NhbjYgYRcWVC9E= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1780929795; c=relaxed/simple; bh=kYA/Pk7RRRe8grwD0M7sRshV1jC5znJbMaKb4ZEPDbY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=n23RKvQc1sK0loypD8uav0vKrNVFL3QRi0Tfd6XqIcL+qE1Ndir1juvkkR6xVgSnqDw8q9fVdX/E4GG+etJiRIOsvAkL3fvUDpp+VGfG4QPW4RSXhFv7CqMK03N5ubT2slUyBp9Mnt0ZG5SmS4Th7vN6RC+J+Xb8H4KqxX7UUYs= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=8bytes.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=8bytes.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=85.214.250.239 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=8bytes.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=8bytes.org Received: from io.home.8bytes.org (p4ffe1d30.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.254.29.48]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail.8bytes.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A453A2028A6; Mon, 8 Jun 2026 16:43:05 +0200 (CEST) From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=B6rg=20R=C3=B6del?= To: Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson Cc: Tom Lendacky , ashish.kalra@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com, nsaenz@amazon.com, anelkz@amazon.de, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, Melody Wang , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, coconut-svsm@lists.linux.dev, joerg.roedel@amd.com Subject: [PATCH 03/60] KVM: SVM: Inject #HV when Restricted Injection is active Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 16:41:55 +0200 Message-ID: <20260608144252.351443-4-joro@8bytes.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260608144252.351443-1-joro@8bytes.org> References: <20260608144252.351443-1-joro@8bytes.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Melody Wang When Restricted Injection is active, only #HV exceptions can be injected into the SEV-SNP guest. Detect that, and then follow the #HV doorbell communication from the GHCB specification to inject the interrupt or exception. Co-developed-by: Thomas Lendacky Signed-off-by: Thomas Lendacky Signed-off-by: Melody Wang Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 14 +++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 21 ++++++ 3 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index b9ad1169cb2c..f2f40f81ba86 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -5380,3 +5380,167 @@ void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) free_page((unsigned long)vmsa); } + +static void prepare_hv_injection(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct hvdb *hvdb) +{ + if (hvdb->events.no_further_signal) + return; + + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = HV_VECTOR | + SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT | + SVM_EVTINJ_VALID; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err = 0; + + hvdb->events.no_further_signal = 1; +} + +static void unmap_hvdb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_host_map *map) +{ + kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, map); +} + +static struct hvdb *map_hvdb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_host_map *map) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + + if (!VALID_PAGE(svm->sev_es.hvdb_gpa)) + return NULL; + + if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->sev_es.hvdb_gpa), map)) { + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "snp: error mapping #HV doorbell page [%#llx] from guest\n", + svm->sev_es.hvdb_gpa); + + return NULL; + } + + return map->hva; +} + +static void __sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct kvm_host_map hvdb_map; + struct hvdb *hvdb; + + hvdb = map_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + if (!hvdb) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "Restricted Injection enabled, hvdb page mapping failed\n"); + return; + } + + hvdb->events.vector = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr; + + prepare_hv_injection(svm, hvdb); + + unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); +} + +bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + + if (!sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return false; + + /* + * Restricted Injection is enabled, only #HV is supported. + * If the vector is not HV_VECTOR, do not inject the exception, + * then return true to skip the original injection path. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.vector != HV_VECTOR, + "Restricted Injection enabled, exception vector %u injection not supported\n", + vcpu->arch.exception.vector)) + return true; + + /* + * An intercept likely occurred during #HV delivery, so re-inject it + * using the current HVDB pending event values. + */ + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = HV_VECTOR | + SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT | + SVM_EVTINJ_VALID; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err = 0; + + return true; +} + +bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + if (!sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return false; + + __sev_snp_inject(type, vcpu); + + return true; +} + +void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct kvm_host_map hvdb_map; + struct hvdb *hvdb; + + if (!sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return; + + if (!svm->vmcb->control.event_inj) + return; + + if (WARN_ONCE((svm->vmcb->control.event_inj & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK) != HV_VECTOR, + "Restricted Injection enabled, %u vector not supported\n", + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK)) + return; + + /* + * Copy the information in the doorbell page into the event injection + * fields to complete the cancellation flow. + */ + hvdb = map_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + if (!hvdb) + return; + + if (!hvdb->events.pending_events) { + /* No pending events, then event_inj field should be 0 */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->vmcb->control.event_inj); + goto out; + } + + /* Copy info back into event_inj field (replaces #HV) */ + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID; + + if (hvdb->events.vector) + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj |= hvdb->events.vector | + SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR; + + hvdb->events.pending_events = 0; + +out: + unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); +} + +/* + * sev_snp_blocked() is for each vector - interrupt, NMI and MCE. It is + * checking if there is an interrupt handled by the guest when + * another interrupt is pending. So hvdb->events.vector will be used for + * checking while no_further_signal is signaling to the guest that a #HV + * is presented by the hypervisor. So no_further_signal is checked when + * a #HV needs to be presented to the guest. + */ +bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_host_map hvdb_map; + struct hvdb *hvdb; + bool blocked; + + /* Indicate interrupts are blocked if doorbell page can't be mapped */ + hvdb = map_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + if (!hvdb) + return true; + + /* Indicate interrupts blocked based on guest acknowledgment */ + blocked = !!hvdb->events.vector; + + unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + + return blocked; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 7981e7583384..7253936c460c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -392,6 +392,9 @@ static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu, ex->vector)) return; + if (sev_snp_queue_exception(vcpu)) + return; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | (ex->has_error_code ? SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR : 0) @@ -3818,9 +3821,11 @@ static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected) } trace_kvm_inj_virq(intr->nr, intr->soft, reinjected); - ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections; - svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = intr->nr | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; + if (!sev_snp_inject(INJECT_IRQ, vcpu)) + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = intr->nr | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; + + ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections; } static void svm_fixup_nested_rips(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -3995,6 +4000,9 @@ bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (!gif_set(svm)) return true; + if (sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return sev_snp_blocked(INJECT_IRQ, vcpu); + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { /* As long as interrupts are being delivered... */ if ((svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK) @@ -4345,6 +4353,8 @@ static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control; + sev_snp_cancel_injection(vcpu); + control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj; control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err; control->event_inj = 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index fb956c37c941..a22ad5de03ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ extern int tsc_aux_uret_slot __ro_after_init; extern struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata; +enum inject_type { + INJECT_IRQ, +}; + /* * Clean bits in VMCB. * VMCB_ALL_CLEAN_MASK might also need to @@ -971,6 +975,17 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end); int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private); struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa); +bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +static inline bool sev_snp_is_rinj_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; + + return is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu) && + (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION); +}; #else static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp) { @@ -1008,6 +1023,12 @@ static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return NULL; } static inline void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) {} + +static inline bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } +static inline bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } +static inline void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} +static inline bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } +static inline bool sev_snp_is_rinj_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } #endif /* vmenter.S */ -- 2.53.0