From: lazytyped <lazytyped@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Ilya Smith <blackzert@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 22:31:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <089e9c52-f623-085a-4d8b-d91cfc6a3608@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKF7ysJqj57ZktrcVL4G2NWOFHCud8dtXFHLs=tvVLXnQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 2/27/18 9:52 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'd like more details on the threat model here; if it's just a matter
> of .so loading order, I wonder if load order randomization would get a
> comparable level of uncertainty without the memory fragmentation,
This also seems to assume that leaking the address of one single library
isn't enough to mount a ROP attack to either gain enough privileges or
generate a primitive that can leak further information. Is this really
the case? Do you have some further data around this?
A A A A A A -A twiz
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-27 21:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-27 13:13 [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap Ilya Smith
2018-02-27 20:52 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-27 21:31 ` lazytyped [this message]
2018-02-28 17:13 ` Ilya Smith
2018-02-28 18:33 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-28 21:02 ` Daniel Micay
2018-03-03 13:58 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-03 21:00 ` Daniel Micay
2018-03-04 3:47 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-04 20:56 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-05 13:09 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-05 14:23 ` Daniel Micay
2018-03-05 16:05 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-05 16:23 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-05 19:27 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-05 19:47 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-05 20:20 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-02 20:30 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-02 20:48 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-03 15:13 ` Ilya Smith
2018-02-28 19:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-01 13:52 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-02 7:17 ` 097eb0af45: kernel_BUG_at_mm/hugetlb.c kernel test robot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=089e9c52-f623-085a-4d8b-d91cfc6a3608@gmail.com \
--to=lazytyped@gmail.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=blackzert@gmail.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=deller@gmx.de \
--cc=hughd@google.com \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jglisse@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mhocko@suse.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).