From: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] proc: make check_mem_permission() return an mm_struct on success
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2011 19:42:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1299631343-4499-6-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1299631343-4499-1-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca>
This change allows us to take advantage of access_remote_vm(), which in turn
enables a secure mem_write() implementation.
The previous implementation of mem_write() was insecure since the target task
could exec a setuid-root binary between the permission check and the actual
write. Holding a reference to the target mm_struct eliminates this
vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e52702d..5ffc927 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -192,16 +192,23 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
}
/*
- * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ * If current may access user memory in @task return a reference to the
+ * corresponding mm, otherwise NULL.
*/
-static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+static struct mm_struct *check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ return NULL;
+
/*
* A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
* to use system calls instead of load instructions.
*/
if (task == current)
- return 0;
+ return mm;
/*
* If current is actively ptrace'ing, and would also be
@@ -213,13 +220,14 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
- return 0;
+ return mm;
}
/*
* Noone else is allowed.
*/
- return -EPERM;
+ mmput(mm);
+ return NULL;
}
struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -775,24 +783,20 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (check_mem_permission(task))
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ mm = check_mem_permission(task);
+ if (!mm)
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
if (!page)
- goto out;
-
- ret = 0;
-
- mm = get_task_mm(task);
- if (!mm)
- goto out_free;
+ goto out_put;
ret = -EIO;
if (file->private_data != (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id))
- goto out_put;
+ goto out_free;
ret = 0;
@@ -800,8 +804,8 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
int this_len, retval;
this_len = (count > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : count;
- retval = access_process_vm(task, src, page, this_len, 0);
- if (!retval || check_mem_permission(task)) {
+ retval = access_remote_vm(mm, src, page, this_len, 0);
+ if (!retval) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EIO;
break;
@@ -819,10 +823,10 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
}
*ppos = src;
-out_put:
- mmput(mm);
out_free:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
+out_put:
+ mmput(mm);
out:
put_task_struct(task);
out_no_task:
@@ -838,6 +842,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf,
{
int copied;
char *page;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
unsigned long dst = *ppos;
@@ -845,17 +850,19 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf,
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (check_mem_permission(task))
+ copied = -EPERM;
+ mm = check_mem_permission(task);
+ if (!mm)
goto out;
copied = -EIO;
if (file->private_data != (void *)((long)current->self_exec_id))
- goto out;
+ goto out_put;
copied = -ENOMEM;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
if (!page)
- goto out;
+ goto out_put;
copied = 0;
while (count > 0) {
@@ -866,7 +873,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf,
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
- retval = access_process_vm(task, dst, page, this_len, 1);
+ retval = access_remote_vm(mm, dst, page, this_len, 1);
if (!retval) {
if (!copied)
copied = -EIO;
@@ -879,6 +886,9 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf,
}
*ppos = dst;
free_page((unsigned long) page);
+
+out_put:
+ mmput(mm);
out:
put_task_struct(task);
out_no_task:
--
1.7.3.5
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-03-09 0:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-03-09 0:42 [PATCH 0/6] enable writing to /proc/pid/mem Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 0:42 ` [PATCH 1/6] mm: use mm_struct to resolve gate vma's in __get_user_pages Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 5:19 ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2011-03-09 6:06 ` Al Viro
2011-03-09 12:38 ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 0:42 ` [PATCH 2/6] mm: factor out main logic of access_process_vm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 0:42 ` [PATCH 3/6] mm: implement access_remote_vm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 0:42 ` [PATCH 4/6] proc: disable mem_write after exec Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 5:22 ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2011-03-09 0:42 ` Stephen Wilson [this message]
2011-03-09 6:20 ` [PATCH 5/6] proc: make check_mem_permission() return an mm_struct on success KOSAKI Motohiro
2011-03-09 0:42 ` [PATCH 6/6] proc: enable writing to /proc/pid/mem Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 1:30 ` [PATCH 0/6] " Al Viro
2011-03-09 2:15 ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-09 2:33 ` Al Viro
2011-03-09 2:47 ` Stephen Wilson
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