From: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Subject: [PATCH 10/12] proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission()
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2011 15:49:22 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1300045764-24168-11-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1300045764-24168-1-git-send-email-wilsons@start.ca>
Avoid a potential race when task exec's and we get a new ->mm but check against
the old credentials in ptrace_may_access().
Holding of the mutex is implemented by factoring out the body of the code into a
helper function __check_mem_permission(). Performing this factorization now
simplifies upcoming changes and minimizes churn in the diff's.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e52702d..f6b644f 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -191,10 +191,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
return result;
}
-/*
- * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
- */
-static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+static int __check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
{
/*
* A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
@@ -222,6 +219,27 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
return -EPERM;
}
+/*
+ * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ */
+static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate
+ * against old credentials.
+ */
+ err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = __check_mem_permission(task);
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
--
1.7.3.5
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-03-13 19:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-03-13 19:49 [PATCH v2 0/12] enable writing to /proc/pid/mem Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 01/12] x86: add context tag to mark mm when running a task in 32-bit compatibility mode Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 02/12] x86: mark associated mm when running a task in 32 bit " Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 03/12] mm: arch: make get_gate_vma take an mm_struct instead of a task_struct Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 04/12] mm: arch: make in_gate_area " Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 05/12] mm: arch: rename in_gate_area_no_task to in_gate_area_no_mm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 06/12] mm: use mm_struct to resolve gate vma's in __get_user_pages Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 07/12] mm: factor out main logic of access_process_vm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 08/12] mm: implement access_remote_vm Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 09/12] proc: disable mem_write after exec Stephen Wilson
2011-03-13 19:49 ` Stephen Wilson [this message]
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 11/12] proc: make check_mem_permission() return an mm_struct on success Stephen Wilson
2011-03-14 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2011-03-14 0:59 ` Stephen Wilson
2011-03-14 15:13 ` Kees Cook
2011-03-13 19:49 ` [PATCH 12/12] proc: enable writing to /proc/pid/mem Stephen Wilson
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