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From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: Add support for sanitization
Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 19:40:37 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1450755641-7856-4-git-send-email-laura@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1450755641-7856-1-git-send-email-laura@labbott.name>


Clearing of objects on free only happens on debug paths. This is a
security risk since sensative data may exist long past it's life
span. Add unconditional clearing of objects on free.

All credit for the original work should be given to Brad Spengler and
the PaX Team.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
---
 mm/slab.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index 4765c97..0ca92d8 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -319,6 +319,8 @@ static void kmem_cache_node_init(struct kmem_cache_node *parent)
 #define STATS_INC_ALLOCMISS(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->allocmiss)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEHIT(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->freehit)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEMISS(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->freemiss)
+#define STATS_INC_SANITIZED(x)	atomic_inc(&(x)->sanitized)
+#define STATS_INC_NOT_SANITIZED(x) atomic_inc(&(x)->not_sanitized)
 #else
 #define	STATS_INC_ACTIVE(x)	do { } while (0)
 #define	STATS_DEC_ACTIVE(x)	do { } while (0)
@@ -335,6 +337,8 @@ static void kmem_cache_node_init(struct kmem_cache_node *parent)
 #define STATS_INC_ALLOCMISS(x)	do { } while (0)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEHIT(x)	do { } while (0)
 #define STATS_INC_FREEMISS(x)	do { } while (0)
+#define STATS_INC_SANITIZED(x)  do { } while (0)
+#define STATS_INC_NOT_SANITIZED(x) do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #if DEBUG
@@ -3359,6 +3363,27 @@ free_done:
 	memmove(ac->entry, &(ac->entry[batchcount]), sizeof(void *)*ac->avail);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
+static void slab_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
+{
+	if (cachep->flags & (SLAB_POISON | SLAB_NO_SANITIZE)) {
+		STATS_INC_NOT_SANITIZED(cachep);
+	} else {
+		memset(objp, SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE_VALUE, cachep->object_size);
+
+		if (cachep->ctor)
+			cachep->ctor(objp);
+
+		STATS_INC_SANITIZED(cachep);
+	}
+}
+#else
+static void slab_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Release an obj back to its cache. If the obj has a constructed state, it must
  * be in this state _before_ it is released.  Called with disabled ints.
@@ -3369,6 +3394,8 @@ static inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
 	struct array_cache *ac = cpu_cache_get(cachep);
 
 	check_irq_off();
+
+	slab_sanitize(cachep, objp);
 	kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
 	objp = cache_free_debugcheck(cachep, objp, caller);
 
@@ -4014,6 +4041,14 @@ void slabinfo_show_stats(struct seq_file *m, struct kmem_cache *cachep)
 		seq_printf(m, " : cpustat %6lu %6lu %6lu %6lu",
 			   allochit, allocmiss, freehit, freemiss);
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE
+	{
+		unsigned long sanitized = atomic_read(&cachep->sanitized);
+		unsigned long not_sanitized = atomic_read(&cachep->not_sanitized);
+
+		seq_printf(m, " : sanitized %6lu %6lu", sanitized, not_sanitized);
+	}
+#endif
 #endif
 }
 
-- 
2.5.0

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-12-22  3:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-22  3:40 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48   ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06  0:17     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:06       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:19   ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:21   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:11     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  9:33   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37       ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18         ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06           ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25     ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22       ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28           ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08             ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19               ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13                 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32                   ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06  0:29                   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:46                     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:15   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:49     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38   ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:09     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  3:17       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26         ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08  1:23           ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07             ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14  3:49               ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39                   ` Christoph Lameter

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