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[157.56.112.103]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id tt9si7428667obb.74.2016.05.06.05.45.09 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Fri, 06 May 2016 05:45:10 -0700 (PDT) From: Andrey Ryabinin Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86/kasan: Instrument user memory access API Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 15:45:22 +0300 Message-ID: <1462538722-1574-4-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> In-Reply-To: <1462538722-1574-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> References: <1462538722-1574-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Andrew Morton Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Dmitry Vyukov , x86@kernel.org Exchange between user and kernel memory is coded in assembly language. Which means that such accesses won't be spotted by KASAN as a compiler instruments only C code. Add explicit KASAN checks to user memory access API to ensure that userspace writes to (or reads from) a valid kernel memory. Note: Unlike others strncpy_from_user() is written mostly in C and KASAN sees memory accesses in it. However, it makes sense to add explicit check for all @count bytes that *potentially* could be written to the kernel. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: x86@kernel.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 7 +++++++ lib/strncpy_from_user.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 0b17fad..5dd6d18 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ */ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -732,6 +733,8 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) might_fault(); + kasan_check_write(to, n); + /* * While we would like to have the compiler do the checking for us * even in the non-constant size case, any false positives there are @@ -765,6 +768,8 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { int sz = __compiletime_object_size(from); + kasan_check_read(from, n); + might_fault(); /* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h index 3076986..2eac2aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static __always_inline __must_check int __copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) { might_fault(); + kasan_check_write(dst, size); return __copy_from_user_nocheck(dst, src, size); } @@ -175,6 +177,7 @@ static __always_inline __must_check int __copy_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size) { might_fault(); + kasan_check_read(src, size); return __copy_to_user_nocheck(dst, src, size); } @@ -242,12 +245,14 @@ int __copy_in_user(void __user *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) static __must_check __always_inline int __copy_from_user_inatomic(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) { + kasan_check_write(dst, size); return __copy_from_user_nocheck(dst, src, size); } static __must_check __always_inline int __copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned size) { + kasan_check_read(src, size); return __copy_to_user_nocheck(dst, src, size); } @@ -258,6 +263,7 @@ static inline int __copy_from_user_nocache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) { might_fault(); + kasan_check_write(dst, size); return __copy_user_nocache(dst, src, size, 1); } @@ -265,6 +271,7 @@ static inline int __copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size) { + kasan_check_write(dst, size); return __copy_user_nocache(dst, src, size, 0); } diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c index 3384032..e3472b0 100644 --- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c +++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -103,6 +104,7 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count) if (unlikely(count <= 0)) return 0; + kasan_check_write(dst, count); max_addr = user_addr_max(); src_addr = (unsigned long)src; if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) { -- 2.7.3 -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. 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