From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de,
dyoung@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de,
keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:28:28 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190850830.9523.15876380749386321765.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
The command initate the process to launch this guest into
SEV-enabled mode.
For more information on command structure see [1], section 6.1
[1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Spec.pdf
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 212 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 209 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index dcee635..0b6da4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -265,6 +265,9 @@ static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
static int sev_asid_new(void);
static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
+static void sev_deactivate_handle(unsigned int handle);
+static void sev_decommission_handle(unsigned int handle);
+static int sev_activate_asid(unsigned int handle, int asid, int *psp_ret);
static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -1645,9 +1648,18 @@ static void sev_uninit_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm_sev_unref();
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
- sd->sev_vmcb[asid] = NULL;
+ /* when reference count reaches to zero then free SEV asid and
+ * deactivate psp handle
+ */
+ if (!svm_sev_ref_count()) {
+ sev_deactivate_handle(svm_sev_handle());
+ sev_decommission_handle(svm_sev_handle());
+ sev_asid_free(svm_sev_asid());
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+ sd->sev_vmcb[asid] = NULL;
+ }
}
}
@@ -5196,6 +5208,198 @@ static void sev_asid_free(int asid)
clear_bit(asid, sev_asid_bitmap);
}
+static void sev_decommission_handle(unsigned int handle)
+{
+ int ret, psp_ret;
+ struct psp_data_decommission *decommission;
+
+ decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!decommission)
+ return;
+
+ decommission->hdr.buffer_len = sizeof(*decommission);
+ decommission->handle = handle;
+ ret = psp_guest_decommission(decommission, &psp_ret);
+ if (ret)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: DECOMISSION ret=%d (%#010x)\n",
+ ret, psp_ret);
+
+ kfree(decommission);
+}
+
+static void sev_deactivate_handle(unsigned int handle)
+{
+ int ret, psp_ret;
+ struct psp_data_deactivate *deactivate;
+
+ deactivate = kzalloc(sizeof(*deactivate), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!deactivate)
+ return;
+
+ deactivate->hdr.buffer_len = sizeof(*deactivate);
+ deactivate->handle = handle;
+ ret = psp_guest_deactivate(deactivate, &psp_ret);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: DEACTIVATE ret=%d (%#010x)\n",
+ ret, psp_ret);
+ goto buffer_free;
+ }
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ ret = psp_guest_df_flush(&psp_ret);
+ if (ret)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: DF_FLUSH ret=%d (%#010x)\n",
+ ret, psp_ret);
+
+buffer_free:
+ kfree(deactivate);
+}
+
+static int sev_activate_asid(unsigned int handle, int asid, int *psp_ret)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct psp_data_activate *activate;
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ ret = psp_guest_df_flush(psp_ret);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: DF_FLUSH ret=%d (%#010x)\n",
+ ret, *psp_ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ activate = kzalloc(sizeof(*activate), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!activate)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ activate->hdr.buffer_len = sizeof(*activate);
+ activate->handle = handle;
+ activate->asid = asid;
+ ret = psp_guest_activate(activate, psp_ret);
+ if (ret)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: ACTIVATE ret=%d (%#010x)\n",
+ ret, *psp_ret);
+ kfree(activate);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_pre_start(struct kvm *kvm, int *asid)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* If guest has active psp handle then deactivate before calling
+ * launch start.
+ */
+ if (kvm_sev_guest()) {
+ sev_deactivate_handle(kvm_sev_handle());
+ sev_decommission_handle(kvm_sev_handle());
+ *asid = kvm->arch.sev_info.asid; /* reuse the asid */
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Allocate new asid for this launch */
+ ret = sev_asid_new();
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: failed to allocate asid\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ *asid = ret;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_post_start(struct kvm *kvm, int asid, int handle, int *psp_ret)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* activate asid */
+ ret = sev_activate_asid(handle, asid, psp_ret);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ kvm->arch.sev_info.handle = handle;
+ kvm->arch.sev_info.asid = asid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start __user *arg,
+ int *psp_ret)
+{
+ int ret, asid;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
+ struct psp_data_launch_start *start;
+
+ /* Get parameter from the user */
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(*arg)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!start)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = sev_pre_start(kvm, &asid);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_1;
+
+ start->hdr.buffer_len = sizeof(*start);
+ start->flags = params.flags;
+ start->policy = params.policy;
+ start->handle = params.handle;
+ memcpy(start->nonce, ¶ms.nonce, sizeof(start->nonce));
+ memcpy(start->dh_pub_qx, ¶ms.dh_pub_qx, sizeof(start->dh_pub_qx));
+ memcpy(start->dh_pub_qy, ¶ms.dh_pub_qy, sizeof(start->dh_pub_qy));
+
+ /* launch start */
+ ret = psp_guest_launch_start(start, psp_ret);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: LAUNCH_START ret=%d (%#010x)\n",
+ ret, *psp_ret);
+ goto err_2;
+ }
+
+ ret = sev_post_start(kvm, asid, start->handle, psp_ret);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_2;
+
+ kfree(start);
+ return 0;
+
+err_2:
+ sev_asid_free(asid);
+err_1:
+ kfree(start);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int amd_sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd __user *user_data)
+{
+ int r = -ENOTTY;
+ struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd arg;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&arg, user_data, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ switch (arg.cmd) {
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START: {
+ r = sev_launch_start(kvm, (void *)arg.opaque,
+ &arg.ret_code);
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(user_data, &arg, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd)))
+ r = -EFAULT;
+ return r;
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.cpu_has_kvm_support = has_svm,
.disabled_by_bios = is_disabled,
@@ -5313,6 +5517,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.pmu_ops = &amd_pmu_ops,
.deliver_posted_interrupt = svm_deliver_avic_intr,
+
+ .sev_issue_cmd = amd_sev_issue_cmd,
};
static int __init svm_init(void)
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-22 23:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23 9:33 ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23 9:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23 7:14 ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2016-10-13 11:12 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
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