linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
	khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com, aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	bsingharora@gmail.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, hbabu@us.ibm.com,
	linuxram@us.ibm.com, arnd@arndb.de, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	corbet@lwn.net, mingo@redhat.com
Subject: [RFC v4 16/17] Documentation: PowerPC specific updates to memory protection keys
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2017 03:11:58 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1498558319-32466-17-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1498558319-32466-1-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com>

Add documentation updates that capture PowerPC specific changes.

Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt b/Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt
index b643045..889f32e 100644
--- a/Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt
@@ -1,21 +1,46 @@
-Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature
-which will be found on future Intel CPUs.
+Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature found in
+new generation of intel CPUs and on PowerPC 7 and higher CPUs.
 
 Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
-protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
-when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
-dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
-"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
-
-There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
-bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
-register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
-thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
-
-There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
-to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
-even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
-permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables when an
+application changes protection domains.
+
+
+On Intel:
+
+	It works by dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table
+	entry to a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+
+	There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
+	bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
+	register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
+	thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+	There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
+	to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
+	even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
+	permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+	instruction fetches.
+
+
+On PowerPC:
+
+	It works by dedicating 5 hash-page table entry bits to a "protection key",
+	giving 32 possible keys.
+
+	There  is  a  user-accessible  register (AMR)  with  two separate bits;
+	Access Disable and  Write  Disable, for  each key.  Being  a  CPU
+	register,  AMR  is inherently  thread-local,  potentially  giving  each
+	thread a different set of protections from every other thread.  NOTE:
+	Disabling read permission does not disable write and vice-versa.
+
+	The feature is available on 64-bit HPTE mode only.
+	'mtspr 0xd, mem' reads the AMR register
+	'mfspr mem, 0xd' writes into the AMR register.
+
+
+
+Permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
 instruction fetches.
 
 =========================== Syscalls ===========================
@@ -28,9 +53,9 @@ There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys:
 			  unsigned long prot, int pkey);
 
 Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with
-pkey_alloc().  An application calls the WRPKRU instruction
+pkey_alloc().  An application calls the WRPKRU/AMR instruction
 directly in order to change access permissions to memory covered
-with a key.  In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function
+with a key.  In this example WRPKRU/AMR is wrapped by a C function
 called pkey_set().
 
 	int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
@@ -52,11 +77,11 @@ is no longer in use:
 	munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
 	pkey_free(pkey);
 
-(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions.
+(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU,WRPKRU or AMR instructions.
  An example implementation can be found in
  tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c)
 
-=========================== Behavior ===========================
+=========================== Behavior =================================
 
 The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the
 behavior of a plain mprotect().  For instance if you do this:
@@ -83,3 +108,27 @@ with a read():
 The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
 to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
 the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
+
+====================================================================
+		Semantic differences
+
+The following semantic differences exist between x86 and power.
+
+a) powerpc allows creation of a key with execute-disabled.  The following
+	is allowed on powerpc.
+	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | PKEY_DISABLE_READ |
+			PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE);
+   x86 disallows PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE during key creation.
+
+b) x86, PKEY_DISABLE_READ disables read and write on the key.
+   Powerpc, PKEY_DISABLE_READ just disables read.
+   PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE has to be specified explicitly to disable write.
+
+c) changing the permission bits of a key from a signal handler does not
+   persist on x86. The PKRU specific fpregs entry needs to be modified
+   for it to persist.  On powerpc the permission bits of the key can be
+   modified by programming the AMR register from the signal handler.
+   The changes persists across signal boundaries.
+
+=====================================================================
-- 
1.8.3.1

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-27 10:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-27 10:11 [RFC v4 00/17] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 01/17] mm: introduce an additional vma bit for powerpc pkey Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:54   ` Balbir Singh
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 02/17] mm: ability to disable execute permission on a key at creation Ram Pai
2017-06-27 11:32   ` Balbir Singh
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 03/17] x86: key creation with PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE disallowed Ram Pai
2017-06-27 11:32   ` Balbir Singh
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 04/17] powerpc: Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 05/17] powerpc: store and restore the pkey state across context switches Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 06/17] powerpc: Implementation for sys_mprotect_pkey() system call Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 07/17] powerpc: make the hash functions protection-key aware Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 08/17] powerpc: Program HPTE key protection bits Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 09/17] powerpc: call the hash functions with the correct pkey value Ram Pai
2017-06-27 15:24   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-06-28  7:12     ` Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 10/17] powerpc: Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 11/17] powerpc: Handle exceptions caused by pkey violation Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 12/17] powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on " Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 13/17] selftest: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 14/17] selftest: PowerPC specific test updates to memory protection keys Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 15/17] Documentation: Move protecton key documentation to arch neutral directory Ram Pai
2017-06-27 10:11 ` Ram Pai [this message]
2017-06-27 10:11 ` [RFC v4 17/17] procfs: display the protection-key number associated with a vma Ram Pai
2017-06-28  1:50   ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-27 10:46 ` [RFC v4 00/17] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys Balbir Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1498558319-32466-17-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com \
    --to=linuxram@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
    --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=hbabu@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --cc=paulus@samba.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).