From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pf0-f200.google.com (mail-pf0-f200.google.com [209.85.192.200]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45C166B03A1 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 17:35:26 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-pf0-f200.google.com with SMTP id r62so2457800pfj.5 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:35:26 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pg0-x230.google.com (mail-pg0-x230.google.com. [2607:f8b0:400e:c05::230]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id g8si986466pgr.332.2017.08.28.14.35.25 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:35:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pg0-x230.google.com with SMTP id 83so4928636pgb.4 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:35:25 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook Subject: [PATCH v2 12/30] orangefs: Define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache slab cache Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:34:53 -0700 Message-Id: <1503956111-36652-13-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> In-Reply-To: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , David Windsor , Mike Marshall , linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com From: David Windsor orangefs symlink pathnames, stored in struct orangefs_inode_s.link_target and therefore contained in the orangefs_inode_cache, need to be copied to/from userspace. cache object allocation: fs/orangefs/super.c: orangefs_alloc_inode(...): ... orangefs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(orangefs_inode_cache, ...); ... return &orangefs_inode->vfs_inode; fs/orangefs/orangefs-utils.c: exofs_symlink(...): ... inode->i_link = orangefs_inode->link_target; example usage trace: readlink_copy+0x43/0x70 vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110 SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130 fs/namei.c: readlink_copy(..., link): ... copy_to_user(..., link, len); (inlined in vfs_readlink) generic_readlink(dentry, ...): struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *link = inode->i_link; ... readlink_copy(..., link); In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the orangefs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Mike Marshall Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- fs/orangefs/super.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/orangefs/super.c b/fs/orangefs/super.c index 5a1bed6c8c6a..c67b91239730 100644 --- a/fs/orangefs/super.c +++ b/fs/orangefs/super.c @@ -626,11 +626,16 @@ void orangefs_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb) int orangefs_inode_cache_initialize(void) { - orangefs_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("orangefs_inode_cache", - sizeof(struct orangefs_inode_s), - 0, - ORANGEFS_CACHE_CREATE_FLAGS, - orangefs_inode_cache_ctor); + orangefs_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy( + "orangefs_inode_cache", + sizeof(struct orangefs_inode_s), + 0, + ORANGEFS_CACHE_CREATE_FLAGS, + offsetof(struct orangefs_inode_s, + link_target), + sizeof_field(struct orangefs_inode_s, + link_target), + orangefs_inode_cache_ctor); if (!orangefs_inode_cache) { gossip_err("Cannot create orangefs_inode_cache\n"); -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org