From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pf0-f199.google.com (mail-pf0-f199.google.com [209.85.192.199]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1416E6B04A8 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 17:43:58 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-pf0-f199.google.com with SMTP id p69so2447013pfk.10 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:43:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pf0-x22b.google.com (mail-pf0-x22b.google.com. [2607:f8b0:400e:c00::22b]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id o66si956132pfg.500.2017.08.28.14.43.56 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:43:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf0-x22b.google.com with SMTP id h75so4746271pfh.1 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:43:56 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook Subject: [PATCH v2 25/30] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:35:06 -0700 Message-Id: <1503956111-36652-26-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> In-Reply-To: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , David Windsor , Ingo Molnar , Andrew Morton , Thomas Gleixner , Andy Lutomirski , linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com From: David Windsor In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed. Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and !CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. cache object allocation: kernel/fork.c: alloc_thread_stack_node(...): return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...) dup_task_struct(...): ... stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...) ... tsk->stack = stack; copy_process(...): ... dup_task_struct(...) _do_fork(...): ... copy_process(...) This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor [kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace] Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- kernel/fork.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index d8ebf755a47b..0f33fb1aabbf 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -276,8 +276,9 @@ static void free_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk) void thread_stack_cache_init(void) { - thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create("thread_stack", THREAD_SIZE, - THREAD_SIZE, 0, NULL); + thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("thread_stack", + THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_SIZE, 0, 0, + THREAD_SIZE, NULL); BUG_ON(thread_stack_cache == NULL); } # endif -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org