From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pl0-f72.google.com (mail-pl0-f72.google.com [209.85.160.72]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 623826B0003 for ; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:04:25 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-pl0-f72.google.com with SMTP id g15-v6so1351806plo.11 for ; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 16:04:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mga18.intel.com (mga18.intel.com. [134.134.136.126]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id n88-v6si1945256pfi.360.2018.07.17.16.04.23 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 17 Jul 2018 16:04:23 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <1531868435.3541.18.camel@intel.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack From: Yu-cheng Yu Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 16:00:35 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20180711092951.GW2476@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> References: <20180710222639.8241-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20180710222639.8241-17-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20180711092951.GW2476@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue On Wed, 2018-07-11 at 11:29 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 03:26:28PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > > > > There are three possible shadow stack PTE settings: > > > > A Normal SHSTK PTE: (R/O + DIRTY_HW) > > A SHSTK PTE COW'ed: (R/O + DIRTY_HW) > > A SHSTK PTE shared as R/O data: (R/O + DIRTY_SW) > I count _2_ distinct states there. > > > > > Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for the shadow stack. > So the below disallows can_follow_write when shstk && _PAGE_DIRTY_SW, > but this here Changelog doesn't explain why. Doesn't even get close. Can we add the following to the log: When a SHSTK PTE is shared, it is (R/O + DIRTY_SW); otherwise it is (R/O + DIRTY_HW). When we (FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_FORCE) on a SHSTK PTE, the following must be true: A - It has been COW'ed at least once (FOLL_COW is set); A - It still is not shared, i.e. PTE is (R/O + DIRTY_HW); > > Also, the code is a right mess :/ Can't we try harder to not let this > shadow stack stuff escape arch code. We either check here if the VMA is SHSTK mapping or move the logic to pte_dirty(). A The latter would be less obvious. A Or can we create a can_follow_write_shstk_pte()? Yu-cheng