From: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
To: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, <kees@kernel.org>,
<akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <david@kernel.org>, <ljs@kernel.org>,
<liam@infradead.org>, <vbabka@kernel.org>, <rppt@kernel.org>,
<surenb@google.com>, <mhocko@suse.com>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
<vincent.guittot@linaro.org>, <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
<rostedt@goodmis.org>, <bsegall@google.com>, <mgorman@suse.de>,
<vschneid@redhat.com>, <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
<paul@paul-moore.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>, <shuah@kernel.org>,
<brauner@kernel.org>, <alexjlzheng@tencent.com>,
<jannh@google.com>, <jaime.saguillo@gmail.com>,
<elver@google.com>, <blbllhy@gmail.com>, <bvanassche@acm.org>,
<pjw@kernel.org>, <broonie@kernel.org>, <debug@rivosinc.com>,
<tglx@kernel.org>, <aleksey.oladko@virtuozzo.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] security: Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK for process-wide bounding-set drops
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 11:15:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1772fffa-b938-4fa7-bd47-ff7c03552efa@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACmP8UK=b4Hkivzf77BJ-S_CR94+AgpNs_EfQ4i=CHL3+=0Y6Q@mail.gmail.com>
在 2026/11/18 4:32, Andrew G. Morgan 写道:
> LGTM but reflecting on the likely lack of further expansion for that
> new argument, I would have likely gone with different
> prctl(PR_CAPBSET_*,...) values for the two scopes of operation.
Hi Andrew and Serge,
Do I need to resubmit RFC v3 based on your suggestion and address the
sashiko review issues besides sighand?
Or wait for the results of new discussions?
>
> Cheers
>
> Andrew
>
> On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 10:39 PM Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 在 2026/11/9 22:59, Serge E. Hallyn 写道:
>>> Hi Jinjie,
>>>
>>> how do you feel about adding something like a thread | process flag?
>>
>> Hi Serge, Andrew,
>>
>> Sorry for replying so late.
>>
>> I think this sounds good for me, similar to seccomp's
>> SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC: by default only the calling thread's bounding
>> set is trimmed (so a later fork() inherits it while the rest of the
>> process is untouched), and PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS applies it to the
>> whole thread group.
>>
>> Is it similar to the following code?
>>
>>
>> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK <n>
>> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_THREAD 0
>> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS 1
>>
>> User space use as below:
>>
>> prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, lo, hi, PR_CAPBSET_DROP_THREAD, 0);
>> prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, lo, hi, PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS, 0);
>>
>> # cap_task_prctl()
>> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK:
>> switch (arg4) {
>> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_THREAD:
>> return cap_prctl_drop_mask(arg2, arg3, false);
>>
>> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_PROCESS:
>> return cap_prctl_drop_mask(arg2, arg3, true);
>>
>> default:
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>>
>> static int cap_bset_drop_thread(kernel_cap_t mask)
>> {
>> struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
>>
>> if (!new)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> new->cap_bset = cap_drop(new->cap_bset, mask);
>> return commit_creds(new);
>> }
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Jinjie
>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 at 07:42:43AM -0700, Andrew G. Morgan wrote:
>>>> There are a number of situations where existing code wants to
>>>> (temporarily) affect the capabilities of a single thread, so a
>>>> subsequent fork() starts with those without affecting the parent
>>>> process as a whole. I've been wondering if this code could be
>>>> structured to allow an argument of the prctl() to indicate if the call
>>>> is "whole process" or "just this thread" scoped?
>>>>
>>>> Cheers
>>>>
>>>> Andrew
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 at 7:36 AM Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Sep 29, 2026 at 09:01:59PM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>>>>>> PR_CAPBSET_DROP only affects the calling thread. Process-wide capability
>>>>>> dropping requires user space to loop over every thread and every
>>>>>> capability, which is highly expensive. For instance, long-lived
>>>>>> multi-threaded processes (like gVisor's sentry) spend milliseconds
>>>>>> trimming the bounding set because the runtime has to coordinate
>>>>>> and signal every thread.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, an opt-in prctl that removes a set of
>>>>>> capabilities from the entire thread group's bounding set in a single call.
>>>>>> The capabilities are specified via a 64-bit mask across arg2 (low 32 bits)
>>>>>> and arg3 (high 32 bits).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The drop is recorded in a per-thread-group mask,
>>>>>> signal_struct::cap_bset_pending, under sighand->siglock. This pending drop
>>>>>> is dynamically folded into the bounding set in critical paths:
>>>>>> cap_capset(), PR_CAPBSET_READ(), and cap_bprm_creds_from_file().
>>>>>> Running, concurrently created, or future threads within the group will
>>>>>> all immediately observe the drop. A forked child inherits this mask
>>>>>> in cap_bset_drop_fork() under siglock to close the race window
>>>>>> against clone().
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The operation is drop-only, so concurrent callers commute and a single
>>>>>> atomic OR is the linearization point. It performs no per-thread allocation
>>>>>> and only the caller's replacement cred can fail, reported synchronously as
>>>>>> -ENOMEM before anything changes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In an arm64 KVM guest, trimming 41 capabilities of a multi-threaded Go
>>>>>> process takes ~8.5-23.6ms with the per-thread PR_CAPBSET_DROP loop and
>>>>>> ~11-14us with PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK, independent of the thread count.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> Interesting idea, storing it in the sighand.
>>>>>
>>>>> Oleg, do you see any issues with that part of this?
>>>>>
>>>>> Overall, this seems ok to me. That is, I think it addresses all the
>>>>> concerns I had with the previous version.
>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> fs/proc/array.c | 3 +-
>>>>>> include/linux/capability.h | 5 ++
>>>>>> include/linux/sched/signal.h | 8 ++++
>>>>>> include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 +
>>>>>> kernel/fork.c | 1 +
>>>>>> security/commoncap.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>> 6 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
>>>>>> index f6f75d206762..f1cde26d079c 100644
>>>>>> --- a/fs/proc/array.c
>>>>>> +++ b/fs/proc/array.c
>>>>>> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
>>>>>> #include <linux/tty.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/string.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/mman.h>
>>>>>> +#include <linux/capability.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
>>>>>> @@ -318,7 +319,7 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
>>>>>> cap_inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
>>>>>> cap_permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
>>>>>> cap_effective = cred->cap_effective;
>>>>>> - cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;
>>>>>> + cap_bset = cap_bset_effective(p, cred);
>>>>>> cap_ambient = cred->cap_ambient;
>>>>>> rcu_read_unlock();
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
>>>>>> index 7921a0b3b04a..6413c7fedb69 100644
>>>>>> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
>>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
>>>>>> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct file;
>>>>>> struct inode;
>>>>>> struct dentry;
>>>>>> struct task_struct;
>>>>>> +struct cred;
>>>>>> struct user_namespace;
>>>>>> struct mnt_idmap;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @@ -197,6 +198,10 @@ bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>>>>>> const struct inode *inode, int cap);
>>>>>> extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>>>>>> extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
>>>>>> +extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset_effective(const struct task_struct *task,
>>>>>> + const struct cred *cred);
>>>>>> +extern void cap_bset_drop_fork(struct task_struct *p);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>>>>>> index d45a5476b97d..bda6f18b65b9 100644
>>>>>> --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>>>>>> @@ -98,6 +98,14 @@ struct signal_struct {
>>>>>> int quick_threads;
>>>>>> struct list_head thread_head;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * Capabilities being removed from the bounding set of every thread in
>>>>>> + * this group by PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK. Read on capability-transition
>>>>>> + * paths without sighand->siglock, hence atomic64 (a 64-bit value would
>>>>>> + * otherwise tear on 32-bit).
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + atomic64_t cap_bset_pending;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> wait_queue_head_t wait_chldexit; /* for wait4() */
>>>>>>
>>>>>> /* current thread group signal load-balancing target: */
>>>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
>>>>>> index b6ec6f693719..85ac71897070 100644
>>>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
>>>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
>>>>>> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
>>>>>> /* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
>>>>>> #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
>>>>>> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
>>>>>> +#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK 82
>>>>>>
>>>>>> /* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */
>>>>>> #define PR_GET_TSC 25
>>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
>>>>>> index 5ef413368912..bf671a85d39d 100644
>>>>>> --- a/kernel/fork.c
>>>>>> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
>>>>>> @@ -2504,6 +2504,7 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>>>>>> * before holding sighand lock.
>>>>>> */
>>>>>> copy_seccomp(p);
>>>>>> + cap_bset_drop_fork(p);
>>>>>>
>>>>>> if (clone_flags & CLONE_NNP)
>>>>>> task_set_no_new_privs(p);
>>>>>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>>>>>> index 3399535808fe..3bec15d43731 100644
>>>>>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>>>>>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>>>>>> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
>>>>>> */
>>>>>>
>>>>>> #include <linux/capability.h>
>>>>>> +#include <linux/cred.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/audit.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/init.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/kernel.h>
>>>>>> @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@
>>>>>> #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/mount.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/sched.h>
>>>>>> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/prctl.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/securebits.h>
>>>>>> #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>>>>>> @@ -30,6 +32,25 @@
>>>>>> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
>>>>>> #include <trace/events/capability.h>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +/**
>>>>>> + * Effective bounding set of @cred in @task's thread group
>>>>>> + * @task: task whose thread group's pending drop applies
>>>>>> + * @cred: credentials to read the bounding set from
>>>>>> + *
>>>>>> + * A drop recorded by PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK is authoritative on the thread group
>>>>>> + * and may not have been materialized into every thread's cred yet, so the
>>>>>> + * effective bounding set is the cred's own set minus the group's pending drop.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> +kernel_cap_t cap_bset_effective(const struct task_struct *task,
>>>>>> + const struct cred *cred)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + kernel_cap_t pending = {
>>>>>> + .val = atomic64_read(&task->signal->cap_bset_pending),
>>>>>> + };
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + return cap_drop(cred->cap_bset, pending);
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> /*
>>>>>> * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
>>>>>> * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
>>>>>> @@ -284,8 +305,8 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
>>>>>> cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
>>>>>> - old->cap_bset)))
>>>>>> /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
>>>>>> + cap_bset_effective(current, old))))
>>>>>> return -EPERM;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
>>>>>> @@ -849,7 +870,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
>>>>>> */
>>>>>> if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
>>>>>> /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
>>>>>> - new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
>>>>>> + new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_bset,
>>>>>> old->cap_inheritable);
>>>>>> }
>>>>>> /*
>>>>>> @@ -925,6 +946,8 @@ int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
>>>>>> int ret;
>>>>>> kuid_t root_uid;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + new->cap_bset = cap_bset_effective(current, new);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
>>>>>> return -EPERM;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @@ -1283,6 +1306,63 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
>>>>>> return commit_creds(new);
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +static int cap_bset_drop_process(kernel_cap_t mask)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + kernel_cap_t pending;
>>>>>> + struct cred *new;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + new = prepare_creds();
>>>>>> + if (!new)
>>>>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * Record the drop before committing the caller's cred, so that a
>>>>>> + * thread created from now on is guaranteed to observe it. Apply the
>>>>>> + * current union, not just this call's mask, to the caller's cred.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
>>>>>> + atomic64_or(mask.val, ¤t->signal->cap_bset_pending);
>>>>>> + pending.val = atomic64_read(¤t->signal->cap_bset_pending);
>>>>>> + spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + new->cap_bset = cap_drop(new->cap_bset, pending);
>>>>>> + commit_creds(new);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +/*
>>>>>> + * Propagate a pending process-wide bounding-set drop to @p, a task being
>>>>>> + * created by the current thread. Threads sharing the group read
>>>>>> + * current->signal->cap_bset_pending directly; a forked child gets its own
>>>>>> + * signal_struct and must carry the mask itself. Called under
>>>>>> + * current->sighand->siglock, which serializes it with cap_bset_drop_process().
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> +void cap_bset_drop_fork(struct task_struct *p)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + kernel_cap_t mask = {
>>>>>> + .val = atomic64_read(¤t->signal->cap_bset_pending),
>>>>>> + };
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (cap_isclear(mask) || p->signal == current->signal)
>>>>>> + return;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + atomic64_or(mask.val, &p->signal->cap_bset_pending);
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +static int cap_prctl_drop_mask(unsigned long low, unsigned long high)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + kernel_cap_t mask = mk_kernel_cap((u32)low, (u32)high);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (cap_isclear(mask))
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
>>>>>> + return -EPERM;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + return cap_bset_drop_process(mask);
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> /**
>>>>>> * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
>>>>>> * @option: The process control function requested
>>>>>> @@ -1308,11 +1388,16 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>>>>>> case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
>>>>>> if (!cap_valid(arg2))
>>>>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>>>> - return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2);
>>>>>> + return !!cap_raised(cap_bset_effective(current, old), arg2);
>>>>>>
>>>>>> case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
>>>>>> return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + case PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK:
>>>>>> + if (arg4 || arg5)
>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>> + return cap_prctl_drop_mask(arg2, arg3);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> /*
>>>>>> * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
>>>>>> * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> 2.34.1
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 3:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-29 13:01 [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security: Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK Jinjie Ruan
2026-09-29 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] capability: Move mk_kernel_cap() to header Jinjie Ruan
2026-09-29 13:01 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] security: Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK for process-wide bounding-set drops Jinjie Ruan
2026-10-21 14:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-10-21 14:42 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2026-11-09 14:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-17 6:39 ` Jinjie Ruan
2026-11-17 20:32 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2026-11-18 3:15 ` Jinjie Ruan [this message]
2026-11-09 14:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-09 18:00 ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-11-09 18:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-17 7:08 ` Jinjie Ruan
2026-09-29 13:02 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] selftests: prctl: add process-wide bounding-set drop tests Jinjie Ruan
2026-10-13 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security: Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK Serge E. Hallyn
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