From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks
Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2011 23:53:06 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110703195306.GA9714@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1309721875.18925.30.camel@Joe-Laptop>
On Sun, Jul 03, 2011 at 12:37 -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Sun, 2011-07-03 at 23:24 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > Btw, if the perfomance will be acceptable, what do you think about
> > logging/reacting on the spotted overflows?
>
> If you do, it might be useful to track the found location(s)
Sure.
> and only emit the overflow log entry once as found.
Hmm, if consider it as a purely debugging feature, then yes. But if
consider it as a try to block some exploitation attempt, then no.
I'd appresiate the latter.
> Maybe use __builtin_return_address(depth) for tracking.
PaX/Grsecurity uses dump_stack() and do_group_exit(SIGKILL); If setup,
it kills all user's processes and locks the user for some time. I don't
really propose the latter, but some reaction (to at least slowdown a
blind bruteforce) might be useful.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-07-03 19:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-07-03 11:10 [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 18:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 18:57 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 19:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:37 ` Joe Perches
2011-07-03 19:53 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-06 3:39 ` Jonathan Hawthorne
2011-07-18 18:39 ` [RFC v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 18:52 ` Andrew Morton
2011-07-18 19:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-19 7:40 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 19:08 ` Matt Mackall
2011-07-18 19:24 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 21:18 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-07-19 6:53 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
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