From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2011 23:24:54 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110718192454.GA4489@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1311016102.23043.235.camel@calx>
On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 14:08 -0500, Matt Mackall wrote:
> On Mon, 2011-07-18 at 22:39 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > This patch implements 2 additional checks for the data copied from
> > kernelspace to userspace and vice versa (original PAX_USERCOPY from PaX
> > patch). Currently there are some very simple and cheap comparisons of
> > supplied size and the size of a copied object known at the compile time
> > in copy_* functions. This patch enhances these checks to check against
> > stack frame boundaries and against SL*B object sizes.
> >
> > More precisely, it checks:
> >
> > 1) if the data touches the stack, checks whether it fully fits in the stack
> > and whether it fully fits in a single stack frame. The latter is arch
> > dependent, currently it is implemented for x86 with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y
> > only. It limits infoleaks/overwrites to a single frame and local variables
> > only, and prevents saved return instruction pointer overwriting.
> >
> > 2) if the data is from the SL*B cache, checks whether it fully fits in a
> > slab page and whether it overflows a slab object. E.g. if the memory
> > was allocated as kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL) and one tries to copy 150
> > bytes, the copy would fail.
>
> FYI, this should almost certainly be split into (at least) two patches:
>
> - the stack check
> - the SL*B check (probably one patch per allocator, preceded by one for
> any shared infrastructure)
Sure, also per architecture probably. But I want to get the comments
about the feature itself before the division.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Fight unfair telecom internet charges in Canada: sign http://stopthemeter.ca/
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-07-18 19:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-07-03 11:10 [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 18:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 18:57 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 19:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:37 ` Joe Perches
2011-07-03 19:53 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 3:39 ` Jonathan Hawthorne
2011-07-18 18:39 ` [RFC v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 18:52 ` Andrew Morton
2011-07-18 19:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-19 7:40 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 19:08 ` Matt Mackall
2011-07-18 19:24 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-18 21:18 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-07-19 6:53 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20110718192454.GA4489@albatros \
--to=segoon@openwall.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=cl@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=mpm@selenic.com \
--cc=penberg@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).