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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	aswin@hp.com, linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>,
	Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>,
	Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>,
	Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/3] x86/vdso: Optimize setup_additional_pages()
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 08:05:01 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131018060501.GA3411@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1382057438-3306-4-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com>


* Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> wrote:

> --- a/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
> @@ -154,12 +154,17 @@ static int setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
>  				  unsigned size)
>  {
>  	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> +	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
>  	unsigned long addr;
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	if (!vdso_enabled)
>  		return 0;
>  
> +	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (unlikely(!vma))
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
>  	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
>  	addr = vdso_addr(mm->start_stack, size);
>  	addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, size, 0, 0);
> @@ -173,14 +178,17 @@ static int setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
>  	ret = install_special_mapping(mm, addr, size,
>  				      VM_READ|VM_EXEC|
>  				      VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYWRITE|VM_MAYEXEC,
> -				      pages);
> +				      pages, &vma);
>  	if (ret) {
>  		current->mm->context.vdso = NULL;
>  		goto up_fail;
>  	}
>  
> +	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +	return ret;
>  up_fail:
>  	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +	kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  

1)

Beyond the simplification that Linus suggested, why not introduce a new 
function, named 'install_special_mapping_vma()' or so, and convert 
architectures one by one, without pressure to get it all done (and all 
correct) in a single patch?

2)

I don't see the justification: this code gets executed in exec() where a 
new mm has just been allocated. There's only a single user of the mm and 
thus the critical section width of mmap_sem is more or less irrelevant.

mmap_sem critical section size only matters for codepaths that threaded 
programs can hit.

3)

But, if we do all that, a couple of other (micro-)optimizations are 
possible in setup_additional_pages() as well:

 - vdso_addr(), which is actually much _more_ expensive than kmalloc() 
   because on most distros it will call into the RNG, can also be done 
   outside the mmap_sem.

 - the error paths can all be merged and the common case can be made 
   fall-through.

 - use 'mm' consistently instead of repeating 'current->mm'

 - set 'mm->context.vdso' only once we know it's all a success, and do it 
   outside the lock

 - add a few comments about which operations are locked, which unlocked, 
   and why. Please double check the assumptions I documented there.

See the diff attached below. (Totally untested and all that.)

Also note that I think, in theory, if exec() guaranteed the privacy and 
single threadedness of the new mm, we could probably do _all_ of this 
unlocked. Right now I don't think this is guaranteed: ptrace() users might 
look up the new PID and might interfere on the MM via 
PTRACE_PEEK*/PTRACE_POKE*.

( Furthermore, /proc/ might also give early access to aspects of the mm - 
  although no manipulation of the mm is possible there. )

If such privacy of the new mm was guaranteed then that would also remove 
the need to move the allocation out of install_special_mapping().

But, I don't think it all matters, due to #2 - and your changes actively 
complicate setup_pages(), which makes this security sensitive code a bit 
more fragile. We can still do it out of sheer principle, I just don't see 
where it's supposed to help scale better.

Thanks,

	Ingo

 arch/x86/vdso/vma.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
index 431e875..c590387 100644
--- a/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
@@ -157,30 +157,44 @@ static int setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	unsigned long addr;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!vdso_enabled)
+	if (unlikely(!vdso_enabled))
 		return 0;
 
-	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	/*
+	 * Do this outside the MM lock - we are in exec() with a new MM,
+	 * nobody else can use these fields of the mm:
+	 */
 	addr = vdso_addr(mm->start_stack, size);
-	addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, size, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
-		ret = addr;
-		goto up_fail;
-	}
 
-	current->mm->context.vdso = (void *)addr;
+	/*
+	 * This must be done under the MM lock - there might be parallel
+	 * accesses to this mm, such as ptrace().
+	 *
+	 * [ This could be further optimized if exec() reliably inhibited
+	 *   all early access to the mm. ]
+	 */
+	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, size, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		goto up_fail_addr;
 
 	ret = install_special_mapping(mm, addr, size,
 				      VM_READ|VM_EXEC|
 				      VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYWRITE|VM_MAYEXEC,
 				      pages);
-	if (ret) {
-		current->mm->context.vdso = NULL;
-		goto up_fail;
-	}
+	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	if (ret)
+		goto fail;
 
-up_fail:
+	mm->context.vdso = (void *)addr;
+	return ret;
+
+up_fail_addr:
+	ret = addr;
 	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+fail:
+	mm->context.vdso = NULL;
+
 	return ret;
 }
 

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-10-18  6:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-10-18  0:50 [PATCH 0/3] mm,vdso: preallocate new vmas Davidlohr Bueso
2013-10-18  0:50 ` [PATCH 1/3] mm: add mlock_future_check helper Davidlohr Bueso
2013-10-23  9:30   ` walken
2013-10-18  0:50 ` [PATCH 2/3] mm/mlock: prepare params outside critical region Davidlohr Bueso
2013-10-23  9:33   ` walken
2013-10-23  9:46   ` Vlastimil Babka
2013-10-18  0:50 ` [PATCH 3/3] vdso: preallocate new vmas Davidlohr Bueso
2013-10-18  1:17   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-10-18  5:59   ` Richard Weinberger
2013-10-18  6:05   ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2013-10-21  3:52     ` [PATCH 4/3] x86/vdso: Optimize setup_additional_pages() Davidlohr Bueso
2013-10-21  5:27       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-21  3:26   ` [PATCH 3/3] vdso: preallocate new vmas Davidlohr Bueso
2013-10-23  9:53     ` walken
2013-10-25  0:55       ` Davidlohr Bueso
2013-10-22 15:48 ` [PATCH 0/3] mm,vdso: " walken
2013-10-22 16:20   ` Linus Torvalds
2013-10-22 17:04     ` Michel Lespinasse
2013-10-22 17:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-23 10:13     ` Michel Lespinasse
2013-10-23 21:42       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-23  2:46   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2013-11-05  0:39 ` Davidlohr Bueso

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