From: Jerome Glisse <j.glisse@gmail.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/25] x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2015 18:25:16 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151022222515.GA3511@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <562953BC.9070003@sr71.net>
On Thu, Oct 22, 2015 at 02:23:08PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 10/22/2015 01:57 PM, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > I have not read all the patches, but here i assume that for GUP you do
> > not first call arch_vma_access_permitted(). So issue i see is that GUP
> > for a process might happen inside another process and that process might
> > have different pkru protection keys, effectively randomly allowing or
> > forbidding a device driver to perform a GUP from say some workqueue that
> > just happen to be schedule against a different processor/thread than the
> > one against which it is doing the GUP for.
>
> There are some places where there is no real context from which we can
> determine access rights. ptrace is a good example. We don't enforce
> PKEYs when walking _another_ process's page tables.
>
> Can you give an example of where a process might be doing a gup and it
> is completely separate from the CPU context that it's being executed under?
In drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c thought this is on AMD platform. I also
believe that in infiniband one can have GUP call from workqueue that can
run at any time. In GPU driver we also use GUP thought at this point we
do not allow another process from accessing a buffer that is populated
by GUP from another process.
I am also here mainly talking about what future GPU will do where you will
have the CPU service page fault from GPU inside a workqueue that can run
at any point in time.
>
> > Second and more fundamental thing i have issue with is that this whole
> > pkru keys are centric to CPU POV ie this is a CPU feature. So i do not
> > believe that device driver should be forbidden to do GUP base on pkru
> > keys.
>
> I don't think of it as something necessarily central to the CPU, but
> something central to things that walk page tables. We mark page tables
> with PKEYs and things that walk them will have certain rights.
My point is that we are seing devices that want to walk the page table and
they do it from a work queue inside the kernel which can run against another
process than the one they are doing the walk from.
I am sure there is already upstream device driver that does so, i have not
check all of them to confirm thought.
> > Tying this to the pkru reg value of whatever processor happens to be
> > running some device driver kernel function that try to do a GUP seems
> > broken to me.
>
> That's one way to look at it. Another way is that PKRU is specifying
> some real _intent_ about whether we want access to be allowed to some
> memory.
I think i misexpress myself here, yes PKRU is about specifying intent but
specifying it for CPU thread not for device thread. GPU for instance have
threads that run on behalf of a given process and i would rather see some
kind of coherent way to specify that for each devices like you allow it
to specify it on per CPU thread basis.
> > So as first i would just allow GUP to always work and then come up with
> > syscall to allow to set pkey on device file. This obviously is a lot more
> > work as you need to go over all device driver using GUP.
>
> I wouldn't be opposed to adding some context to the thread (like
> pagefault_disable()) that indicates whether we should enforce protection
> keys. If we are in some asynchronous context, disassociated from the
> running CPU's protection keys, we could set a flag.
I was simply thinking of having a global set of pkeys against the process
mm struct which would be the default global setting for all device GUP
access. This global set could be override by userspace on a per device
basis allowing some device to have more access than others.
> I'd really appreciate if you could point to some concrete examples here
> which could actually cause a problem, like workqueues doing gups.
Well i could grep for all current user of GUP, but i can tell you that this
is gonna be the model for GPU thread ie a kernel workqueue gonna handle
page fault on behalf of GPU and will perform equivalent of GUP. Also apply
for infiniband ODP thing which is upstream.
Cheers,
Jerome
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-22 22:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-28 19:18 [PATCH 00/25] x86: Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 02/25] x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 03/25] x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 01/25] x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 04/25] x86, pku: define new CR4 bit Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 06/25] x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 05/25] x86, pkey: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s) Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-10-01 17:17 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 08/25] x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 07/25] x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-10-01 17:19 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 10/25] x86, pkeys: pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 09/25] x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 13/25] mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 12/25] x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 11/25] x86, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 16/25] x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error() Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 15/25] x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys Dave Hansen
2015-10-22 20:57 ` Jerome Glisse
2015-10-22 21:23 ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-22 22:25 ` Jerome Glisse [this message]
2015-10-23 0:49 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 14/25] mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 18/25] x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 19/25] x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 17/25] x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 20/25] mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 21/25] mm: implement new mprotect_key() system call Dave Hansen
2015-09-29 6:39 ` Michael Ellerman
2015-09-29 14:16 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 23/25] x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 22/25] x86: wire up mprotect_key() system call Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 24/25] x86, pkeys: add self-tests Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 25/25] x86, pkeys: Documentation Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 20:34 ` Andi Kleen
2015-09-28 20:41 ` Dave Hansen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20151022222515.GA3511@gmail.com \
--to=j.glisse@gmail.com \
--cc=borntraeger@de.ibm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dave@sr71.net \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).