From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] pkeys: add details of system call use to Documentation/
Date: Tue, 31 May 2016 08:28:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160531152824.2B18E890@viggo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160531152814.36E0B9EE@viggo.jf.intel.com>
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
This spells out all of the pkey-related system calls that we have
and provides some example code fragments to demonstrate how we
expect them to be used.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
---
b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+)
diff -puN Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt~pkeys-120-syscall-docs Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
--- a/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt~pkeys-120-syscall-docs 2016-05-31 08:27:50.554178908 -0700
+++ b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt 2016-05-31 08:27:50.558179089 -0700
@@ -18,6 +18,69 @@ even though there is theoretically space
permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
instruction fetches.
+=========================== Syscalls ===========================
+
+There are 5 system calls which directly interact with pkeys:
+
+ int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights)
+ int pkey_free(int pkey);
+ int sys_pkey_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len,
+ unsigned long prot, int pkey);
+ unsigned long pkey_get(int pkey);
+ int pkey_set(int pkey, unsigned long access_rights);
+
+Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with
+pkey_alloc(). An application may either call pkey_set() or the
+WRPKRU instruction directly in order to change access permissions
+to memory covered with a key.
+
+ int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
+ pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_WRITE);
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey);
+ ... application runs here
+
+Now, if the application needs to update the data at 'ptr', it can
+gain access, do the update, then remove its write access:
+
+ pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DENY_WRITE
+ *ptr = foo; // assign something
+ pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); // set PKEY_DENY_WRITE again
+
+Now when it frees the memory, it will also free the pkey since it
+is no longer in use:
+
+ munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ pkey_free(pkey);
+
+=========================== Behavior ===========================
+
+The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the
+behavior of a plain mprotect(). For instance if you do this:
+
+ mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
+ something(ptr);
+
+you can expect the same effects with protection keys when doing this:
+
+ sys_pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | PKEY_DISABLE_READ);
+ sys_pkey_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
+ something(ptr);
+
+That should be true whether something() is a direct access to 'ptr'
+like:
+
+ *ptr = foo;
+
+or when the kernel does the access on the application's behalf like
+with a read():
+
+ read(fd, ptr, 1);
+
+The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
+to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
+the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
=========================== Config Option ===========================
This config option adds approximately 1.5kb of text. and 50 bytes of
_
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-31 15:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-31 15:28 [PATCH 0/8] System Calls for Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86, pkeys: add fault handling for PF_PK page fault bit Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` [PATCH 2/8] mm: implement new pkey_mprotect() system call Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86, pkeys: make mprotect_key() mask off additional vm_flags Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` [PATCH 4/8] x86: wire up mprotect_key() system call Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` [PATCH 5/8] x86, pkeys: allocation/free syscalls Dave Hansen
2016-06-01 18:37 ` Jonathan Corbet
2016-06-01 19:32 ` Dave Hansen
2016-06-02 0:11 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-02 0:17 ` Dave Hansen
2016-06-03 0:26 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-03 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2016-06-03 19:27 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2016-06-01 20:48 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-06-02 21:10 ` Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86, pkeys: add pkey set/get syscalls Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2016-06-01 16:43 ` [PATCH 7/8] pkeys: add details of system call use to Documentation/ Jonathan Corbet
2016-06-01 16:46 ` Dave Hansen
2016-06-01 16:49 ` Jonathan Corbet
2016-06-01 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2016-05-31 15:28 ` [PATCH 8/8] x86, pkeys: add self-tests Dave Hansen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-04-11 15:54 [PATCH 0/8] System Calls for Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2016-04-11 15:54 ` [PATCH 7/8] pkeys: add details of system call use to Documentation/ Dave Hansen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20160531152824.2B18E890@viggo.jf.intel.com \
--to=dave@sr71.net \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).